“Useless agreement”: why did they sign the Khasavyurt agreements? Khasavyurt agreements Khasavyurt agreements 1996
More than 16 years have passed since the signing of the so-called Khasavyurt Agreement. Aslan Maskhadov and Alexander Lebed put their signatures on the document on behalf of the presidents of the Republic of Ichkeria and the Russian Federation. It is officially believed that it was Khasavyurt '96 that put an end to the bloody war in Chechnya and confirmed the complete and final victory of the Chechen army, supported by international separatists of various stripes, over federal troops; the victory of the then Chechen leadership over Yeltsin and his political entourage. Naturally, this version has long served as a life-giving balm for supporters of the separation of the North Caucasus from Russia with the subsequent creation of the so-called Caucasian Caliphate, capable of stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea.
However, both the agreements themselves between Moscow and Grozny, and their background, even years later, continue to remain extremely contradictory and give reason to doubt that Chechnya’s victory over the federal center occurred solely as a result of the military superiority of the former over the latter. And there is a whole range of evidence for this, many of which have proven documentary form.
So, once again dryly and officially: the Khasavyurt agreements of the type on August 31, 1996 were signed by the Chief of Staff of the Republic of Ichkeria Maskhadov and the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation General Lebed. Here are the points defining the relationship between Grozny and Moscow according to the Khasavyurt Paper:
1. An agreement on the fundamentals of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, determined in accordance with generally accepted principles and norms of international law, must be reached before December 31, 2001.
2. No later than October 1, 1996, a Joint Commission is formed from representatives of government bodies of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, the tasks of which are:
monitoring the implementation of Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of June 25, 1996 985 and preparing proposals for completing the withdrawal of troops;
preparation of coordinated measures to combat crime, terrorism and manifestations of national and religious hatred and monitoring their implementation;
preparation of proposals for the restoration of monetary, financial and budgetary relations;
preparation and submission to the government of the Russian Federation of programs for the restoration of the socio-economic complex of the Chechen Republic;
control over the coordinated interaction of government authorities and other interested organizations in providing the population with food and medicine.
3. The legislation of the Chechen Republic is based on respect for human and civil rights, the right of peoples to self-determination, the principles of equal rights of peoples, ensuring civil peace, interethnic harmony and the safety of citizens living on the territory of the Chechen Republic, regardless of nationality, religion and other differences.
4. The Joint Commission completes its work by mutual agreement.
Moscow undertakes to withdraw military units from Chechnya, direct funds to restore the destroyed republic, and provide Ichkeria with food, money and medicine. A kind of indemnity that Moscow must pay...
However, this is not the main thing. After all, Moscow even today financially helps Chechnya... The main thing here should be considered the phrase contained in the first paragraph of the principles for defining the relationship between Grozny and Moscow. We are talking about such a concept as “in accordance with... the norms of international law.” In other words, the Chechen Republic was de jure to be recognized as a subject of international law, separating from Russia over the next five years. Journalist Andrei Karaulov talks about three years of “waiting” for complete independence for Ichkeria. Three years or five years – in the grand scheme of things it doesn’t matter. What matters is that on behalf of the President of Russia a document was signed in which Russia not only admits its defeat in the North Caucasus, but also creates a precedent for the North Caucasian republics to secede from the federation. After all, today hardly anyone has any doubts that the separation of Chechnya from Russia would not have led to the so-called domino effect, when the entire country, already consumed by economic and political problems, would begin to crumble.
Let's not forget that in August 1996, not even five years had passed since the signing of the infamous Belovezhskaya Accords, which put an end to the big country. It turns out that in 1996, Yeltsin, who had recently celebrated an extremely dubious victory in the elections, essentially received the status of the leader of the state, who managed, within less than five years, to take part in events to collapse two states (first the USSR, and then the Russian Federation).
But was the hand of only Boris Yeltsin visible in the Khasavyurt agreements, or was he not the most important figure in someone’s big game?
In answering this question, it is worth considering the background of the Khasavyurt agreements themselves, according to which Ichkeria could turn into an independent state within a few years and become the “first sign” of the total destruction of the Russian Federation. The background is that the Khasavyurt agreements were signed on August 31 after units of Chechen militants occupied Grozny, driving out federal troops from there, but according to the Secretary of the Security Council of the Chechen Republic Ruslan Tsakaev, the agreements themselves were prepared by General Lebed at least a month before the attack by the Chechen separatists. According to him, the attack on the Chechen administrative center itself was an event that should have justified the signing of the paper in Khasavyurt, Dagestan.
It turns out that the Russian authorities at that time needed a reason to end the war on the territory of Chechnya, but the withdrawal of troops without an obvious reason would have looked completely ridiculous. The fact that many people knew about the militant attack on Grozny on August 6, 1996 is today confirmed by both politicians and journalists who were working in Chechnya at that time. In particular, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic Yuri Plugin says that an unexpected order was received to remove Ministry of Internal Affairs officers from several checkpoints at the entrance to Grozny and, for unknown reasons, send them to the villages of the region to carry out passport control and monitor the situation on rural roads. Moreover, immediately before the militants’ attack on Grozny, the commander of the combined group of Russian troops in Chechnya, General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, went on vacation, and General Vladimir Shamanov (at that time the commander of the group of forces of the Ministry of Defense in the Chechen Republic) was unexpectedly summoned to study at the Academy of the Russian General Staff in Moscow . In essence, the army group was decapitated, and it was clear that someone was very stubbornly and methodically clearing the way for international terrorists so that they could calmly take possession of the Chechen capital. In total, 887 people entered Grozny, according to information once published by the head of the separatist information bureau, Mairbek Vachagaev, almost unhindered. After several days of confrontation with representatives of the Chechen police loyal to Moscow, as well as units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops remaining in the city, they took control of Grozny.
It was after this that Moscow, or, more precisely, those who stood behind it then, had a motive to withdraw troops from Ichkeria, essentially announcing the defeat of the federal troops. The motive, as mentioned above, was written in the script version before the so-called storming of Grozny by militants.
After signing the paper in Khasavyurt under the controlling gaze of diplomats from the OSCE, General Lebed in Russia was accused of almost state treason. But if, let’s say, we rewind time, it becomes clear that he was not the person who played a serious role in this big game. The fact is that Alexander Lebed, as you know, in 1996 ran for president from the Congress of Russian Communities. At the same time, in the first round of the presidential campaign, Lebed managed to take third place, gaining more than 14% of the votes. Obviously, Boris Yeltsin needed the votes cast for the general, and he made Lebed an offer that he could not refuse. Yeltsin appointed General Lebed, who was popular among the troops, to the post of Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation for National Security and Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.
Apparently, immediately after the appointment, Lebed was told about how it was necessary to complete the Chechen campaign. At first glance, it is surprising why the general, who managed to distinguish himself in Afghanistan and Transnistria, made the shameful proposal to conclude agreements with the separatists, in fact condoning the fact that Russian military personnel were left in Grozny to obvious death. Betrayal?.. Ignorance of the situation?.. Vanity?..
The answer to this question can be the words spoken by Lebed in an interview with the German publication Der Spiegel. In particular, in 1996, General Lebed stated that he was ready to take the post of president and did not see any potential in the sick and aging Boris Yeltsin.
In other words, Lebed could have signed the Khasavyurt agreements, among other things, in order to show the world who really stopped the war in Chechnya. Probably, the thought was spinning in his head that this would give him some political trump cards, and especially trump cards would appear when the West supported him in the event that Yeltsin retired due to his health. It turns out that it was precisely vanity that could push the military general to such a very dubious move as shaking hands with Maskhadov and other representatives of the separatists. Obviously, Lebed knew well who really stood behind the militants in Chechnya, and therefore wished that they would certainly like him as a kind of peacekeeper general.
But the aspirations of General Lebed were not destined to come true: the West, led by the United States, supported Boris Yeltsin, who already in mid-October 1996 (from the moment of the Khasavyurt agreements) dismissed Alexander Lebed. The situation is reminiscent of one in which General Lebed, who had hoped for someone’s help in pushing through his candidacy for the highest government post, was skillfully taken advantage of, and then simply lost... Yeltsin took advantage of the moment, received votes from Lebed, let him carry out an extremely unpopular task in Russia, and then gently pulled the drain rope...
Thus, for many, Lebed is still associated with a person who was ready to have a hand in the collapse of Russia, but in fact he only took part in a rather short-lived stage of a large geopolitical party. At the same time, President Yeltsin himself played the role of an extra, who obviously did not intend to become a two-time destroyer of the country, because this could completely bury his chances of continuing his political career, which by that time was already in considerable doubt. Yeltsin, who, according to his associates, received active funding from abroad for his election campaign, had to pursue a policy that was of interest to the West. At the same time, the Khasavyurt agreements are one of the stages of such a policy.
To put it in simple language, President Yeltsin himself found himself hostage to the forces that he once asked to support him in the elections. These forces supported him, but on conditions that could put an end to such a state as Russia. For obvious reasons, Yeltsin was burdened by this dependence, and he wanted to show his character by once and for all cutting the western Gordian knot that tied his hands. At the same time, Yeltsin dealt his main blow to those who decided to finally tear Russia into pieces in 1999, when, without agreement with Western “partners,” he decided to make first the second and then the first person in the state of Vladimir Putin. It is clear that Putin did not fit into the Western concept of the Russian leader, if only because it was thanks to Putin that those same Khasavyurt agreements, apparently dictated in 1996 by a certain group of foreign “specialists” and which became Yeltsin’s ticket to a second presidential term, were buried , and the Caucasian people are consolidated against the separatist movement in the Caucasus. The events of 1999 in Dagestan, when Chechen militants decided to strengthen their positions, and the people of Dagestan gave them a serious rebuff, clearly illustrate this.
The big political game, in which Russia was assigned the role of a patchwork quilt, each part of which was supposed to snap at neighboring parts, turned out to be completed in a completely different way than those interested in the collapse of the country expected.
This can be judged by Western and Russian overly liberal newspapers of that time, which, from calmly telling about the victory of law and democracy in Chechnya, about the joyful day of the possible independence of this North Caucasian republic from Russia, first suddenly turned into somewhat taken aback, and then began throwing mud at the new Russian leadership, accusing them of “oppression” of the Caucasian peoples and new “imperial ambitions.” And this mournful record has been spinning for the 13th year in a row, confirming the thesis that in 1999 Yeltsin, by signing the document on the appointment of Putin, seriously confused the cards for someone...
Materials used:
Program “Moment of Truth” Channel 5 from 10/01/2012
Documentary film “On the other side of the war – Khasavyurt”, NTV
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/12737/print
http://www.peoples.ru/military/general/lebed/index.html
http://mn.ru/blog_caucasus/20110901/304590216.html
http://www.litmir.net/br/?b=91245&p=39
The end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st century is inclined to believe that the decision on this truce was wrong for the Russian side - the Khasavyurt agreements gave the Chechen separatists the opportunity to take a break and accumulate forces and means for further military operations.
An ongoing source of conflict
In the first Chechen campaign, federal troops were placed in obviously unfavorable conditions for themselves - the militants were supported by a significant part of the population of the rebellious republic, they were well oriented in the mountainous terrain familiar to them and waged a largely successful guerrilla war. The liquidation of the first president of self-proclaimed Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudayev, did not change the situation - the fighting continued, and the federal authorities realized that this bloody conflict could be protracted. The Kremlin made attempts to negotiate with the leadership of the militants, but these truces each time turned out to be short-lived. The situation was complicated by the fact that “illegal armed gangs” regularly received assistance from abroad - weapons, money, mercenaries. At the end of the summer of 1996, the separatists recaptured Grozny from the federals, and such strategically important settlements of Chechnya as Argun and Gudermes also came under the control of the militants.
Chechnya was in fact recognized as independent
It was these strategic losses of federal troops, according to some experts, that served as the reason for the conclusion of the Khasavyurt peace agreement, signed at the end of August of the same year. The agreement was signed by the then Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Alexander Lebed and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov, the future unrecognized president of the rebellious Chechnya. The agreement contained clauses on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of the republic, on the resumption of economic relations with Russia (essentially, financing of Chechnya from the center). The main thing in this agreement was what was written between the lines: Russia’s actual recognition of the independence of Chechnya. Although consideration of this issue from a legal point of view was formally postponed until the complete restoration of Chechnya after the war.
Useless contract
In essence, the legal aspects of this agreement were never respected by the Chechen side during the life of the agreement - it was drawn up in such a way that the main responsibilities were imposed on Russia. The main one is the complete provision of the destroyed republic. In addition, a dangerous precedent was created, on the basis of which the rest of the North Caucasus republics could also present their rights to autonomy. Some State Duma deputies tried to check the agreement for compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, but the Constitutional Court of Russia did not consider this appeal. With the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements, the situation in Chechnya only worsened: Islamic extremists rapidly expanded the territory of their influence, human trafficking flourished in the republic and cases of hostage-taking and cases of brutal oppression of the Russian-speaking population became more frequent. No one was going to restore the infrastructure of Chechnya, and because of ethnic cleansing, everyone who did not belong to the Chechen nation was in a hurry to leave the republic. This “sluggish schizophrenia” continued until the attack of gangs on Dagestan in 1999. The second Chechen campaign began; this time the North Caucasus region remained in the counter-terrorist operation mode for 8 years, until 2009. The Russian authorities realized that the only way to fight the militants was by force, without agreeing to their terms.
More aboutDid the first Chechen war end on time?
Kommersant asked Alexander Rutsky, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Franz Klintsevich and its other readers / Russia after the 90s
August 31 marks the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Khasavyurt Truce and the end of the First Chechen War. On topic: |
Kommersant asked its readers whether the fighting in Chechnya was stopped in time in August 1996.
2. Photo: Alexander Miridonov
It's difficult to answer. By the standards of that time, the signing of the military bloc agreement on August 31, 1996, was, albeit a small victory... But almost immediately it became clear from the intercepted negotiations of the militant leaders what was on their minds. They accumulated strength and did not give up hope of striking. It had to be admitted that every time our good will shown towards the militants backfired on us.
3. Photo: Gennady Gulyaev
It was better not to start it. And there was such a possibility, but Pavel Grachev (in 1994, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation - Kommersant) convinced Boris Yeltsin that it should be started... But the agreements signed in Khasavyurt, although they stopped the war, were a betrayal towards those who laid down there are their heads. And if these agreements had included clauses on the complete surrender of weapons by the Chechens and the complete withdrawal of troops from the territory, then there would not have been a second war.
4. Photo: Dmitry Dukhanin
The pause, which was sustained as a result of protracted negotiations with Maskhadov, gave our security forces the opportunity to come to their senses and prepare for further actions. In the Chechen Republic the situation among the population has also changed. People are tired of war. The population of the republic began to understand that the war needed to be stopped, because they were not gaining anything from it.
5. Photo: Vyacheslav Reutov
During. I am against any bloodshed. The army that was on the territory of Chechnya consisted of conscript soldiers. They were not at all ready for full-fledged combat operations. Therefore, saving their lives by the Khasavyurt agreement seems to me to be the right decision. Moreover, from a political point of view, it also looked quite successful.
6. Photo: Stanislav Tikhomirov
The war did not end then. The first Chechen war was betrayed. Two weeks before the assault on Grozny, the militants warned about this and asked to leave there in order to avoid casualties. Exactly on the appointed day they actually took the city. And our valiant commanders have already withdrawn the special services and riot police from there and practically surrendered the city. The resentment of the military personnel who participated in this campaign was great because they were simply betrayed. Nobody wanted to figure out how it happened later.
7. Photo: Dmitry Lebedev
It was impossible to end the war, and the Khasavyurt agreement was an ordinary betrayal. The bandits in Chechnya took a break, regrouped, and active hostilities then continued for another seven years. This led to the loss of the country's image and the death of a large number of our soldiers. The war could have been ended even then.
8. Photo: Dmitry Lekai
It was necessary to stop the war and bloodshed, but signing the Khasavyurt agreement was impossible. I was almost the only one who criticized it, saying that it was shameful and would not lead to peace. Even my allies criticized me then, but subsequent events and the second war became the logical consequence of this particular agreement.
9. Photo: Gleb Shchelkunov
I don’t have a clear answer to this question. It’s good that it was completed, because its completion allowed us to avoid more losses. But there are no internal wars that, after their end, would have a clear, clear ending. This war ended when the opportunity to end it arose.
10. Photo: Maxim Kimerling
That war could have been avoided and the conflict stopped in the bud. Yeltsin lacked more respect for Dzhokhar Dudayev (leader of the separatists - Kommersant). Yeltsin responded haughtily to Dudayev’s proposals... Yes, Yeltsin started that war, it was a mistake on the verge of a crime. But he repented of it.
Don't look down on your finest hour
Gleb Cherkasov - about Alexander Lebed and Aslan Maskhadov
By the time the Khasavyurt agreements were signed, Alexander Lebed, then Secretary of the Security Council, already had experience in stopping hostilities. Moreover, his political career really began in 1992 in Transnistria. His appointment as commander of the 14th Army led, as was commonly believed then, to the cessation of hostilities. And the incredible bass and penchant for chopped aphorisms only added to the beauty of the image.
11. Gleb Cherkasov / Photo: Sergey Mikheev
The Khasavyurt agreements were supposed to be the same step on General Lebed’s road to the very top, like a scandalous dismissal from the army or third place in the 1996 presidential elections. That summer, it would be difficult to find anyone who doubted that Alexander Lebed would become one of the main characters in the next presidential elections. And when they pass, Boris Yeltsin’s appearance suggested that everything could happen a little earlier than expected.
Aslan Maskhadov, who signed the Khasavyurt agreements on behalf of the self-proclaimed Ichkeria, also negotiated a truce not for the first time. But in August 1996, everything indicated that it was he who would become the leader of post-war Ichkeria and it was with him that the Russian leaders, who, according to the Kremlin staffing table, stood above the secretary of the Security Council (SC), would have to negotiate. And so it happened: in January 1997, Aslan Maskhadov was elected president of the republic, and in the fall of 1996 and spring of 1997 he signed agreements with Viktor Chernomyrdin and Boris Yeltsin - simple human memory has not preserved their names, contents, or circumstances.
Only Alexander Lebed, Aslan Maskhadov and Khasavyurt remain in my memory. The agreements that were signed there were then a symbol of peace, the end of one of the most difficult conflicts in the post-Soviet space, then they began to be called a symbol of weakness and surrender. The assessment of the cessation of hostilities often varies: after the shooting stops and some time later.
In any case, the Khasavyurt agreements were not implemented. By 2001, when the parties were going to return to the issue of the status of Chechnya, the second Chechen war was going on, and there was no one and nothing to discuss.
Aslan Maskhadov remained the president of Ichkeria and could only remember how it was not possible to ensure long-term peace. The second campaign of Russian troops turned out to be more successful than the first, and by 2001 the star of the Kadyrov clan was already rising, having defected to Moscow. Ahead were wanderings around the not-so-native republic and death, it is believed, in battle.
Alexander Lebed experienced a scandalous resignation from the post of Secretary of the Security Council, a retreat to the post of governor of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, which was initially perceived as an attack on the Kremlin from the flank, and by 2001 he was an ordinary leader of the region with the absence of any career prospects. Ahead was an unsuccessful helicopter ride - this type of transport has killed more than one governor.
The Khasavyurt agreements became the finest hour for Lebed and Maskhadov, but at that moment they probably did not understand this. Maybe because for two former Soviet officers with experience in the conflicts of the late 80s, any ceasefire agreement was perceived as nothing more than a respite. Or maybe because of the hope that the future career will only be more beautiful.
There is no politician who does not dream of his “finest hour,” and not everyone is able to realize when it actually happens. And not everyone has time to live to write truly detailed memoirs.
"The generals did not want to admit that they could not win"
Vladimir Lukin, a participant in the Khasavyurt negotiations, told Kommersant how the first Chechen war ended
On August 30, 1996, at about seven o’clock in the evening, a combat Mi-24 landed on the outskirts of the village of Zondak, Nozhai-Yurtovsky district of Chechnya. A short, middle-aged man dressed in camouflage uniform climbed on board. This was the chief of the main headquarters of the armed forces of Ichkeria, former colonel of the Soviet army Aslan Maskhadov. The helicopter flew towards Dagestan. Half an hour later, negotiations began between the Russian and Chechen delegations in the Khasavyurt city administration building. In the dead of night, Aslan Maskhadov and Alexander Lebed, then secretary of the Russian Security Council, signed peace agreements.
12. Former chief of the main staff of the armed forces of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov and General Alexander Lebed / Photo: Alexi Fyodorov
Khasavyurt was preceded by fierce battles in Grozny. In the early morning of August 6, several thousand militants, many of whom made their way into the city in advance, attacked military and administrative facilities. For several days they paralyzed the actions of the federal forces, but the superiority in numbers and weapons ultimately allowed the army and internal troops to block the separatist forces.
Thus, a small detachment of Shamil Basayev took up a fighting position in the basement of an old multi-story building in the center of Grozny, a few blocks from a complex of government buildings. The Basayevites fired at the federals, and they hit back with direct fire. In addition to the militants, civilians were also hiding in the house. Women asked the militants: “What will happen to us?” The militants answered: “Get ready to die in Gazavat, we won’t leave here alive.”
Then, when the republic finally fell into the hands of the separatists, the field commanders themselves admitted: after the ultimatum of the commander of the Russian military group, General Konstantin Pulikovsky, who threatened to bomb Grozny, there were only a few hundred militants left in the city who decided to fight to the end. “It was not we who won, but Allah came to our aid and removed the Russians from here,” said Aslan Maskhadov.
Member of the Russian delegation at negotiations with the separatists in 1996 Vladimir Lukin explained to a Kommersant correspondent Musa Muradov, which forced Moscow to negotiate and conclude a peace, which both then and now many call “treasonous.”
13. Photo: Dmitry Korotaev
“Lebed hoped to replace the sick Yeltsin”
- Who came up with the idea of negotiations?
Many began to say that this war was terrible and tragically prolonged. However, if we talk about personalities, then, of course, the decisive role in the fact that truly intensive peace negotiations began belongs to Alexander Ivanovich Lebed. It was he who initiated this process. As you know, then the presidential elections took place in Russia. The swan took third place and became such a regulating factor. And Alexander Ivanovich very clearly imagined that he could play a historical role. And, of course, he hoped that he would become the main figure, that he would replace the seriously ill Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin as president in one way or another. Alexander Lebed believed that his fame as a peacemaker would make his path to the presidency easier. And then, without being distracted by the war, he will successfully solve the country’s political and economic problems. That is why he set out to remove this thorn from the body of our country, to stop hostilities, in fact, a civil war.
- Do you think that Alexander Lebed forced Boris Yeltsin to negotiate with the Chechens?
I don't think he forced it. Boris Nikolaevich himself was, of course, in a difficult position and by this time he had already begun to understand that this war, in which he found himself drawn, was politically counterproductive for him. Because of her, he lost a significant part of his political capital. But he was in a deadlock: those around him could not agree on how to end this war, and in the army everything was not easy. The generals did not want to admit that they could not win, although they really could not win at that time. And as a result of all this, a situation arose that someone had to decisively correct. This man turned out to be Alexander Lebed
- Were there any signals from the Chechen side?
I think there were signals from the Chechen side as well. There probably were.
- How did you get into the delegation?
I was then the chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, a representative of the Yabloko party, which took an anti-war position. Many people in the government of that time trusted me and treated with understanding what I said. I raised the question that we must immediately end the war, we must conclude peace. I spoke about this with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. I spoke about this with General Anatoly Kulikov, who was then the Minister of Internal Affairs.
- What did you mean by the words “we must end the war”?
This means, first of all, stopping hostilities. There is a children's game called “Freeze.” When everyone freezes and so on. There should have been no haggling about who stood where, what the boundaries were. It was necessary to simply stop hostilities and continue to negotiate about a further political system, and so on and so forth.
Then in August I was on vacation with my family in the Pskov region. And there, on vacation, I received a call from General Kulikov, who, on behalf of Chernomyrdin, said that this kind of negotiations was beginning, that Alexander Ivanovich Lebed was going to the Caucasus. And they ask me to join him as an experienced negotiator, as a person who knows what diplomacy is. Well, I immediately interrupted my vacation and came to Moscow. Came to Swan. We practically didn’t know him before. He told me that he also readily agreed with my candidacy. So we began to actively work on who would go and how they would go. And all this was compressed into a very short time. On August 30 we flew to Makhachkala. At midnight we boarded a helicopter and flew from Makhachkala to Khasavyurt. This flight became the most difficult test for me. The fact is that soon after takeoff, Alexander Ivanovich, removing the pilot, began to fly the helicopter himself.
“The Chechens felt that the wind was blowing into their sails”
- How did you meet the Chechens?
When we arrived, I asked: “Where is Maskhadov?” Nobody knows anything, no one has contacted anyone. In general, it's a mess. Then I told my assistant, he now works as an ambassador to one of the Asian countries: “Listen, you need to call the Swiss Embassy in Moscow.” The fact is that Tim Guldimann, a Swiss citizen and OSCE representative in the conflict zone, knew about our mission. I decided to let them find Guldimann at the embassy and connect him with us. And the ambassador: “We don’t know anything, we’re not participating.” I had to call several times and insist. Then the second or third time the ambassador says: “Okay, I’ll try.” After some time, that same Guldimann appears. We ask him: “Where is the Chechen company? Where are our negotiators? He says he doesn't know exactly what he'll try to find out. We told him: let them know about us, let them know that Alexander Lebed is here, our delegation is here and we came with the intention of seriously concluding peace agreements. After some time, Mr. Guldimann reports that he managed to contact the Chechens, that soon Aslan Maskhadov and his people will arrive. And so they began to arrive. One by one: first the ordinary members of the delegation, and the last - Aslan Maskhadov.
- Why did they choose Khasavyurt in Dagestan and not Grozny as the meeting place?
I do not know this. Apparently because Khasavyurt is such a border town. Near Chechnya. It seems that the Chechens insisted on this. It was convenient for them to get there from the places where they were hiding. Again, many Chechens lived here, among whom, by the way, there were many supporters of independence. In general, the location was agreed upon during preliminary negotiations. That's how we sat down at the table. Alexander Ivanovich in general, especially at first, sat on the sidelines and watched. For him, diplomacy was new and something incomprehensible. And we were negotiating - me and some of my colleagues. But mainly I was engaged in this matter.
- How did the Chechens behave?
At first the Chechens behaved very emotionally. They felt like people who felt that they had an advantage, that the wind was blowing in their sails. Because before that, they had actually captured Grozny, so to speak. At least Moscow didn't win. So they felt like people who had the right to insist. Insist and demand. And at the same time, they, as people not very experienced in such matters, tried very emotionally to challenge secondary matters.
- Why were the Chechens represented by Aslan Maskhadov? He was just a field commander...
It was quite obvious that Lebed and Maskhadov were the leaders of these negotiations. And this was not in doubt.
- What did the Chechen side argue with you about?
The Chechens, for example, very strongly insisted that Mr. Guldimann participate in the negotiations. I ask: “What status will he participate in? As a representative of the OSCE? They consulted and began to say that the OSCE should not be included - these are, they say, bilateral negotiations. Because the OSCE recognizes Russia within borders that include Chechnya. Chechens: “No, Chechnya does not need to be included anywhere.” I say: “If Chechnya does not need to be included, then let Guldimann leave.” No, let him not leave, the Chechens ask. They argued like this for an hour. Finally they agreed: if Guldimann does not leave, then let him remain as an observer, let him sit at a separate table and remain silent. As an observer, he can be present, but no more. The Chechens did not really grasp such subtle things of a professional nature, of course, but this is not surprising.
“In order to negotiate from a position of strength, it was necessary to pause”
- Which version of the agreement was ultimately adopted - Russian or Chechen?
Oddly enough, even before the discussion began, the Chechens were familiar with our version of the agreement and therefore immediately began to reject some points. For example, references to the Russian Constitution, other points presupposing the preservation of the integrity of the country, indicating that Chechnya, although with a special status, is a subject of the federation.
- How were the Chechens able to receive your version of the agreement in advance?
Even before we left, someone from Moscow sent them a document. Who did it and how, and most importantly, why they did it - I don’t know. Most likely, they had their own people among the officials in Moscow. Given the chaos that reigned at the time, this is not surprising.
- So you had to make concessions to the Chechens?
I didn’t like some things in the final document; I wish it had been different. The Chechens, for example, insisted that the document should not contain references to the Russian Constitution, so that the agreement would look like an interstate one. I objected, but Alexander Lebed was in a hurry. He understood: either we sign the agreement now, or later the slowdown will begin and everything else. And he insisted. Well, then Yeltsin also agreed with this agreement and accepted it. But the decisive thing in this agreement was, undoubtedly, that hostilities would cease, that the republic would receive material and other assistance, that illegal armed groups would be gradually eliminated.
But these fundamental things were not implemented and remained on paper. But the Russian side needed a break. A respite was needed both politically and militarily.
- In other words, Moscow could not cope with the situation in Chechnya?
It was obvious that our army was stuck there. Very serious measures were needed to strengthen the army. Strengthen it. To create a situation in which it would be possible to solve the problem, including with the help of military force. So, I think, for this purpose the federal authorities started negotiations with the Chechens. This became clear judging by the events that occurred in Chechnya later.
- What impression did Aslan Maskhadov make on you?
He impressed me as a man with the psychology of a professional Soviet officer. A man so straightforward like a soldier, but not a stupid man.
Shamil Basayev’s brother always stood behind Maskhadov. And so, silently, I watched our conversation. I had the impression that there were big internal conflicts, big disagreements. And military actions and a common enemy somehow smoothed out these differences. To some extent. But then they showed up with all their might. Therefore, it is difficult to say what each of them had intentions.
How was Aslan Maskhadov going to guarantee the implementation of agreements if he was so dependent on Basayev and other field commanders?
I think Maskhadov hoped that he would strengthen his power among this rebel conglomerate on the basis of victory, on the basis of the peak of his authority. It will strengthen and somehow push back extremist groups. But it turned out differently. He turned out to be incapable of this work, this scenario of events. Or he himself did not want this scenario.
- Why did the Russian military regard the Khasavyurt agreements as a betrayal?
I think that those military men who were directly involved in unsuccessful battles tried to save their face. After all, the military always lacks five minutes to achieve complete victory. Do you understand? That's why I think it was some kind of fist-waving after the fight. When they were pointed out their miscalculations and the fact that they had plenty of time to suppress the resistance of the militants, they fell silent.
On the other hand, there were great difficulties in terms of state discipline, in terms of state mobilization. Therefore, now it is easy to talk about how badly someone fought there, how badly someone acted. There was general laxity. Undocking. Well, then the situation was like this. That's why a break was needed to get things in order. This respite was obtained.
How it was used is another matter. In general, they used it normally, because the second war ended differently than the first. No matter what anyone says, I still believe that stopping the war then was the right decision, because otherwise the bloodshed would have continued and there would have been incomparably more casualties.
“I believe that it was possible to reach an agreement with Dudayev”
- Do you think the first Chechen war could have been avoided?
I think the federal center acted too harshly. I would say so, I negotiated inflexibly with Dzhokhar Dudayev (the first president of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, killed during a special operation in April 1996 - Kommersant). And I think that it was still possible to reach an agreement with Dudayev. Especially in the early stages. I would say this: if Kremlin officials had shown more tact and personal respect in dealing with Chechen leaders, I think there would have been no bloodshed.
- In your opinion, is there any historical explanation for what happened in the early 1990s in Chechnya?
Your question reminds me of the phrase of one very smart person: “The problem of the gods is too complex, and human life is too short.” Why are such revolutionary eras born? It's part of being human. In each of us there is a person who can intelligently solve issues and analyze. But suddenly something happens - as they say, I got up on the wrong foot - and an escape from reality begins in the direction of some heroic and unambiguous solution to the issue. This is how all revolutions begin. But we must also take into account the fact that Chechens have a reputation for being very courageous and very hot-tempered people, who often punch first and then think about what is happening. Then there are relatively many Chechens in the Caucasus in comparison with other peoples who were deported by the Stalinist regime. And the memory of the deportation, in my opinion, played an important role.
The Khasavyurt agreements, which came into force at the end of the summer of 1996, marked the end of a conflict that had lasted since December 1994.
Main episodes and end of the military conflict
Federal Russian troops were introduced into the republic in December 1994. The reason for this government step was the strengthening here openly
bandit and anti-government elements that contributed to destabilization in the region with the aim of further separating Ichkeria from Russia: widespread ethnic clashes, the collapse of the republic’s infrastructure, the radicalization of Islamic youth, record unemployment, a multiple increase in crime here, and so on. With the introduction of federal troops in December 1994, it was planned to stabilize the situation and put an end to the rampant anti-government elements before the new year, but a significant underestimation of enemy forces led to a protracted war. Moscow believed that Dzhokhar Dudayev had only a couple of hundred armed militants. Practice has demonstrated that there were more than ten thousand of them, moreover, well trained and financed by the states of the Muslim East. The assault on the city of Grozny lasted several months, until March 1995, and
Control over the area was finally established only in the summer of this year, after which protracted negotiations on peace terms began. However, the emerging rapprochement was again broken by the militants who staged Kizlyar in January 1996, and an attempt to recapture Grozny. In fact, the end of the war in Chechnya came after the murder of Dzhokhar Dudayev in April of this year. After this, the war again entered the stage of stagnation and sluggish negotiations. the latter with the remaining separatists continued until August. Their results are known today as the Khasavyurt Agreements.
The text of the Khasavyurt Agreement assumed that Russia had to withdraw its troops from the territories. The decision on the status issue was postponed for five years, until December 2001. Until this period, the management of the entire designated territory is carried out by a joint commission created from representatives of federal and local government bodies.
Real consequences of the act
Today, it is customary to criticize the Khasavyurt agreements based on the consequences they brought to the country. In fact, they once again showed complete
inability of the parties to agree. Despite the points of the agreements regarding measures to combat the restoration of the infrastructure of the economic complex of the republic and so on, the Khasavyurt agreements again returned Ichkeria to the uncontrolled growth of Wahhabi sentiments and total crime. Essentially, this situation led to the need for a new deployment of federal troops in September and the beginning of the Second Chechen War. At the same time, it should be noted that there was definitely logic in signing such an act at the time of August 1996. Here we should take into account the situation in which President Yeltsin and the central government found themselves after the bloody conflict, as well as strong pressure from the public, who wanted a speedy cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of conscripts from the Caucasus.
Caused a lot of controversy in society. Some people said that these were concessions to terrorism, others called them a temporary compromise for which there could be no alternative. Let's figure out what the Khasavyurt agreements were, what they provided for, and what significance they had for the future of Russia.
Beginning of the conflict
The roots of the Chechen conflict stretch back to the beginning of the settlement of the North Caucasus by Russians. For most of the 19th century, the region was engulfed in constant war. The resistance of the Chechen Imam Shamil turned out to be especially stubborn. In Soviet times, the conflict between Chechens and the authorities periodically flared up, but never escalated into a full-fledged war.
Under the conditions of perestroika and the collapse of the USSR, the situation changed. In the late 80s - early 90s of the last century, separatist sentiments revived in some regions of the Russian Federation. In particular, in Chechnya, forces that want independence for the region have raised their heads. They sent an invitation to lead the republic to the only general at that time who was an ethnic Chechen, Dzhokhar Dudayev.
In September 1991, a coup was carried out in Chechnya, as a result of which nationalist militants seized power. On October 27, Dudayev was elected president, and three days later he announced the complete independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.
Russian President Boris Yeltsin tried to give a forceful response to the coup in the Caucasus, but his actions did not find support in the Duma. The operations carried out by Russian security forces against Ichkeria were unsystematic and poorly organized, and to a greater extent they were aimed at supporting the opposition within Chechnya itself.
First Chechen War
By and large, the Chechen war began only in December 1994. During a full-scale offensive, Russian troops managed to capture Grozny and a number of other strategic points in Chechnya. But a series of terrorist attacks involving hostage-taking by Chechen terrorists contributed to the curtailment of the offensive of the Russian Federation army.
During the respite, the militants were able to regain their strength and launch a counteroffensive, using the guerrilla method of warfare. The Russian army suffered significant losses. Even the physical removal of Dzhokhar Dudayev in April 1996, who was replaced by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev as acting president of Ichkeria, did not help.
Before Khasavyurt
Meanwhile, opposition to war began to grow increasingly in Russian society. Unsuccessful military operations, deaths of soldiers and civilians, threats of terrorist attacks directly on the territory of the Russian Federation led to the fact that there were more and more supporters of negotiations with the leadership of Ichkeria.
The Chechen war was unpopular among the people. The mood in society, as well as military failures, forced the Russian authorities to think about a compromise with the separatists, although before that Boris Yeltsin spoke about non-recognition of the government of Ichkeria and refused to make direct contact with it. At the end of May 1996, a landmark meeting between the President of Russia and Zelimkhan Yandarbiev took place in Moscow. Agreements were reached on a ceasefire from June 1. During subsequent contacts, the authorized representatives of the parties adopted an agreement on the partial withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya, the disarmament of the militants and the holding of elections in Ichkeria.
But these agreements were repeatedly violated by both sides, and on July 9, full-scale hostilities resumed with renewed vigor. To top it off, in August 1996, the militants launched an offensive operation called Jihad. They captured the cities of Grozny, Argun and Gudermes.
These military defeats finally pushed the Russian authorities to negotiate with the leadership of Ichkeria. In mid-August, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Alexander Lebed agreed to continue the dialogue, the end result of which was the Khasavyurt Agreements.
Signing agreements
A landmark meeting took place on August 31, 1996 in the Dagestan city of Khasavyurt, which has the status of a regional center. Russia was represented by Secretary of the Security Council Alexander Lebed and his deputy Sergei Kharlamov. From Ichkeria, the delegates were Aslan Maskhadov, who was then the chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI, and the vice-president of the self-proclaimed state, Said-Khasan Abumuslimov. Members of the delegations were given the broadest powers. In addition, the head of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya, Tim Guldiman, attended the meeting as an observer.
During the discussion of peace conditions, a joint statement was developed and announced on the principles of future relations between Russia and Ichkeria. These agreements are the Khasavyurt Agreements. They were separated into a separate document and signed by all authorized persons.
The signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements marked the end of the First Chechen War.
The essence of the agreements
And now about what the essence of the document was. The Khasavyurt agreements provided for the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya and the cessation of hostilities. Russia also had to take measures to restore the republic’s infrastructure. The Chechen side, in turn, pledged to legally respect the rights and freedoms of all citizens, regardless of nationality or religious affiliation, that is, to comply with the Khasavyurt Agreement. The text of the agreements stated that the final settlement of the status of the territories included in the Chechen Republic should occur before the beginning of 2002. That is, by this time the fate of the region should have been determined.
But the general essence of the Khasavyurt agreement was that the Russian delegation, represented by the signatories, recognized the independence of Ichkeria. Legal registration of this fact was postponed until a later period, during which, with the help of Russia, the region should be restored after the hostilities.
Attitude to agreements in the Russian Federation
In Russian society, the attitude towards the agreements reached in Khasavyurt was quite ambiguous. Some considered it a good thing for the country that its sons would stop dying in the war, and the state would let go of the rebellious and hostile region. Others saw the agreements as a necessary respite in the fight against terrorism.
The third part of society was sure that the state actually recognized the surrender by signing the Khasavyurt Agreement. The collapse of Russia, in their opinion, should have been a natural consequence of this act, which acted as a kind of guillotine for the unity of the country. After all, other North Caucasian republics, and perhaps not only them, could be inspired by the example of Ichkeria.
Legal force of agreements
Although the agreements signed in Khasavyurt were approved by the Russian government, on October 10 the Federation Council decided to consider them just a kind of road map for resolving the conflict and evidence of the good will of the parties, and not a document with legal force.
Also in 1996, a group of deputies appealed to the Constitutional Court with a request to see whether these agreements violated the Constitution of Russia. But the answer was almost identical, namely: the court ruled that the document signed in Khasavyurt is only a statement of intentions of a political nature and cannot be considered as an agreement between the government of the Russian Federation and the authorities of its constituent entity.
Thus, even initially, the status of the Khasavyurt agreements was questioned by the Russian legislative and judicial authorities. Despite this, the federal government tried to adhere to the agreements.
Consequences
After signing the agreements, Russia tried to adhere to the Khasavyurt agreements as much as possible. In particular, the complete withdrawal of federal troops from the territory of Chechnya was completed. It seemed that the agreements would be respected in Ichkeria as well. Thus, in 1997, presidential elections were held there, which were recognized by many experts as democratic or close to such. During the voting, the CRI chief of staff Aslan Maskhadov, who had the least radical views in comparison with his main competitors, in particular Yandarbiev, won.
As envisaged by the Khasavyurt agreements, Ichkeria was declaratively declared a secular state in which the norms of fundamental human rights apply. As it turned out, many positive changes were only on paper.
Violations
In fact, the Khasavyurt agreements began to be violated by militants almost from the very beginning. So, none of the field commanders even thought about disarming their formations. They were the real masters of Ichkeria, and not the relatively legitimate government in the person of Maskhadov. They were in charge of drug and weapons trafficking and continued to try to undermine the situation inside Russia. Banditry based on clan concepts flourished in the republic.
In Ichkeria, widespread Islamization of society began, despite the agreements reached. In particular, Sharia law began to be applied in judicial practice, using the death penalty as a punishment for minor violations. Wahhabism became almost the state religion. Maskhadov’s decree to ban it did not lead to anything, since the president of Ichkeria had practically no real power.
The apogee of the Chechen field commanders' disregard for the Khasavyurt agreements was the raid of militants led by Shamil Basayev and Khattab on the territory of Dagestan in August 1999 with the aim of creating an Islamic state throughout the North Caucasus.
Cancellation of the Khasavyurt Agreements
The authorities of the Russian Federation rightly considered this treacherous attack to be the last and most significant straw, violating previously accepted agreements that were awaiting cancellation. The Khasavyurt agreement was never truly respected by the militants, so adhering to it unilaterally would be detrimental for Russia.
Despite the fact that Maskhadov formally condemned the actions of Khattab and Basayev, he did not take any specific measures to suppress their activities, continuing to remain a “democratic” screen for the terrorist regime.
The Russian authorities decided to introduce a counter-terrorist operation regime in the territories of the North Caucasus controlled by militants. After several weeks of heavy fighting, the extremists were driven out of Dagestan. The operation was transferred to the territory of Chechnya.
This time the fighting was carried out much more successfully than during the First Chechen War. Until the beginning of 2001, the Russian Federation controlled almost the entire territory of Chechnya, although due to the presence of individual pockets of resistance, the counter-terrorist operation regime was canceled only in 2009.
The militant gangs were defeated, their leaders were liquidated, and a referendum was held in the republic, which confirmed the desire of the Chechen people to remain part of the Russian Federation. Akhmad Kadyrov, who had previously defected to the federal forces, became the new president of the republic in 2003.
Document meaning
The Khasavyurt agreements are undoubtedly one of the most controversial steps taken by Russia in its recent history. However, as further developments showed, this was a forced concession, which made it possible to avoid many casualties and win the war as a whole.