First Ukrainian Front. See what the “1st Ukrainian Front” is in other dictionaries The combat path of the 1st Ukrainian Front
Operation plan of the 1st Ukrainian Front
The overall goal of the operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Stepanovich Konev was to break through the German defenses on the Neisse River, defeat enemy groups in the Cottbus area and south of Berlin, followed by an offensive to the west and the entry of Soviet troops to the Belitz, Wittenberg and R. Elbe.
By the beginning of the operation, the 1st Ukrainian Front deployed south of the 1st Belorussian Front in a sector 390 km wide from Gross-Gastrose to Krnov. The main strike group of the front was located on the 48-kilometer section of Gross-Gastrose, Birkfere. The Birkvere, Rothenburg sector, 30 km away, was defended by two Polish divisions. The southern auxiliary strike group was located on the 13-kilometer section of Rothenburg and Pentsikh. The Pencekh, Krnov sector (about 300 km) was defended by divisions of the left flank of the 52nd Army, troops of the 21st and 59th armies. The 6th Army continued the siege of Breslau. Already during the Berlin operation, the 31st Army was transferred to the left flank of the front.
Konev decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of three combined arms and two tank armies from the Triebel area in the direction of Spremberg, Belzig with the aim of defeating German troops in the Cottbus area and south of Berlin and reaching the front line of the river. Elbe. The right wing of the front was supposed to take part in the assault on Berlin. The main strike group included the 3rd Guards Army of Vasily Gordov, the 13th Army of Nikolai Pukhov, the 5th Guards Army of Alexei Zhadov, the 3rd Guards Tank Army of Pavel Rybalko and the 4th Guards Tank Army of Dmitry Lelyushenko. The 3rd Guards Army was reinforced by the 25th Tank Corps, and the 5th Guards Army by the 4th Guards Tank Corps. In addition, in the second echelon of the front there was the 28th Army of Alexander Luchinsky, which was supposed to build on the success in the main direction. On the second day of the operation, the front's main attack group was supposed to break through the enemy's defenses in the Forst-Muskau sector and reach the Spree River.
Commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal I.S. Konev and commander of the 4th Tank Army D.D. Lelyushenko at an observation post during the breakthrough of the German defense on the Neisse River
From the line of the Spree River they planned to introduce tank armies into the breakthrough (in reality, they entered the battle already on the first day of the operation). Rybalko's army received the task of attacking from the line south of Cottbus, and Lelyushenko's army - from the area north of Spremberg. The mobile formations of the front had to decisively break away from the front and develop a rapid offensive to the northwest, in the general direction of Troenbritzen. Rybalko's Guards Army received the task on the 5th day of the offensive to reach the area of Trebbin, Troenbritzen, Luckenwalde, and on the 6th day to capture Brandenburg. Part of the forces of the 3rd Guards Tank Army received the task of attacking Berlin from the south. Lelyushenko's Guards Army received the task on the 5th day of the operation to reach the Nimegk, Wittenberg area, and on the 6th day to occupy Rathenow and Dessau with forward detachments.
To ensure the success of the main strike force from the south, an auxiliary attack was planned by the forces of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army Karol Swierczewski, the Polish tank corps and the right wing of the 52nd Army of Konstantin Koroteev with the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps of Ivan Korchagin from the area west of Kolfurt in the general direction to Dresden. In addition, it was planned to introduce the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps of Viktor Baranov into the offensive zone of the 52nd Army. The cavalry was supposed to go to the rear of the enemy's Görlitz-Dresden group. From the air, the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front was supported by the 2nd Air Army of Stepan Krasovsky.
Breakthrough of the Neissen line
April 16. On the night of April 16, 1945, in the Forst and Muskau strip, our troops conducted reconnaissance in force. From each division of the first echelon a reinforced company was allocated. At night, reconnaissance companies, reinforced with artillerymen and mortarmen, secretly crossed the Neisse. However, their attempts to break into the enemy’s defenses encountered strong, well-organized resistance. As a result, intelligence established that German troops were firmly in defensive positions.
In order to disguise the direction of the main attack, at dawn on April 16, a smoke screen was installed along the entire 390-kilometer front occupied by Konev’s armies. At 6 o'clock. 15 minutes. a 40-minute artillery preparation began. From 7 o'clock 05 min. Bomber aircraft began attacking at 8 o'clock. 30 min. and the stormtroopers were active all day long. Meanwhile, sappers built assault bridges and prepared watercraft.
At 6 o'clock. 55 min. reinforced battalions of the first echelon divisions began to cross the Neisse. Escorting guns were transported with the advanced units. Since the bridges had not yet been built, the guns were dragged to the other bank using ropes along the river bottom. After the advanced units captured the bridgeheads, the engineering troops built bridges along which the first echelons of the main forces of the strike force began to move. Within 50 minutes, sappers built bridges on boats, after 2 hours - bridges for 30-ton loads, and after 4-5 hours - bridges on rigid supports for loads up to 60 tons. From 8 o'clock 40 minutes, when the artillery fire was transferred deep into the German defense, the first echelon divisions went on the attack.
In general, combat operations in the offensive zone of the front's main strike group developed according to the planned plan. Troops of the 3rd Guards Army, with the support of the 6th Guards Tank Corps of General V. A. Mitrofanov and the 2nd Guards Assault Aviation Corps of General S. V. Slyusarev crossed the Neisse, broke through the main enemy defense line, and took the strongholds of Koine and Grosse Zschachsdorf. Particularly fierce battles took place for the main and most powerful stronghold of the Nijsen defensive line - Forst. Before the assault, our aviation dealt a powerful blow to the fortress, from which the Forst garrison suffered serious losses. Then units of the 76th Rifle Corps captured the eastern and southern parts of the city and began a battle for the center.
By the end of the day, the strike group of Gordov's Guards Army - the 120th and 21st Rifle Corps, the 25th Tank Corps - broke through the main enemy defense line, advancing 4-6 km. The right-flank 76th Corps eliminated the German bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Neisse in the Forst area and advanced 1-1.5 km.
The 13th Army, advancing in the center of the main strike group, with the support of the 7th and 10th Guards Tank Corps, achieved the greatest successes. The army was supported from the air by the 1st Guards Assault Aviation Corps of General V. G. Ryazanov. Pukhov's army crossed the Neisse along the entire offensive front, and fought heavy battles all day in a continuous forest. The forest was burning, which worsened the conditions of the offensive. The 102nd Rifle Corps of General I.M. Puzikov, the 27th Rifle Corps of F.M. Cherokmanov, the 7th Guards Tank Corps of V.V. Novikov and the 10th Guards Tank Corps of E.E. Belov advanced 12- 13 km, broke through the main line of enemy defense and captured a number of strong points. The advanced units wedged into the second line of enemy defense (Matilda line).
The 5th Guards Army, attacking on the left flank, also advanced successfully. The greatest success was achieved by the 32nd Guards Corps of General A.I. Rodimtsev, which, with the support of Poluboyarov’s 4th Guards Tank Corps, broke through the main line of enemy defense, advanced 8 kilometers and reached the second line of German defense. The 34th Guards Rifle Corps, with the support of attack aircraft, destroyed the German bridgehead on the right bank of the Neisse in the Muskau area and took this strong stronghold. By the end of the day, the 34th Guards Corps broke through the main defense line and advanced 6 km. It should be noted that Zhadov’s army encountered great difficulties in crossing the Neisse. There were not enough crossing facilities; the left bank of the Neisse passed through wooded and swampy terrain. The Germans mined areas convenient for movement.
On the same day, the southern auxiliary group of the front went on the offensive. Polish troops crossed the Neisse River and broke through the enemy's main defense line, advancing 1-6 km in different directions. The right-flank 73rd Rifle Corps of the 52nd Army, commanded by General S.S. Martirosyan, crossed the water barrier, broke through the main defense line and advanced 10 km.
Thus, on the very first day of the offensive, the main attack group of the front broke through the main line of German defense in the 26-kilometer section of Forst, Muskau, advanced up to 13 km in depth, and in places wedged itself into the second line of defense. True, the task set on the first day of the offensive, to break through the first and second lines of defense, was not fully completed. The German command, in the fight for the second line of defense, brought the 21st Panzer Division into the battle, as well as a number of individual units and subunits, and our troops had to repel fierce enemy counterattacks.
Mobile formations played a major role in breaking through the main line of defense. Already on the first day of the offensive, the advanced brigades of the Guards Tank Armies, as well as the 25th and 4th Guards Tank Corps, were brought into battle. Aviation provided great assistance, making 3,376 sorties during the day. German aviation was not active that day, making 220 sorties.
April 17. Our armies continued their offensive with part of their forces at night. The 3rd Guards Army continued to storm Forst with part of its forces, while part of its forces advanced on Cottbus - the most important enemy defense center and communications center. The Germans put up stubborn resistance and repeatedly launched counterattacks. The strongholds of Zimmersdorf and Zergen were taken. Gordov's army advanced up to 8 km.
Pukhov's 13th Army broke enemy resistance on the second line of defense. Attempts by German troops to delay the Soviet offensive with counterattacks were unsuccessful. In the offensive zone of the 5th Guards Army, the German command on the second defensive line brought into battle part of the forces of the Fuhrer's Guard tank division. However, our troops repelled German counterattacks and broke through the second line of defense in the Ttzschernitz, Kromlau sector. Tank armies and corps, and aviation continued to provide serious assistance to the infantry. True, the activity of our aviation decreased - 1,779 sorties, while the German one increased - 400 sorties. Our pilots shot down 48 German planes.
Thus, on the second day of the offensive, the 1st Ukrainian Front achieved significant success; on a 20-kilometer front, the second line of enemy defense was broken through; in other directions, our troops wedged themselves into the second line of defense. The greatest success was achieved by the troops of the left wing of the 13th and right wing of the 5th Guards Armies, which advanced in the general direction of Spremberg. During the two days of the offensive, Soviet troops advanced here 18 km to the west. However, it was not possible to force the river. Spree and break through the third line of defense, as ordered by the front command.
Konev, having received the consent of Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, decided on the night of April 18 to cross the Spree, and then turn the tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front towards Berlin. If the enemy could put up serious resistance on the Spree, they planned to pull up artillery to the river and carry out a powerful artillery barrage in the morning. The tank armies had to develop a rapid offensive towards Berlin and Potsdam, bypassing cities and large populated areas that had been turned into strong strongholds and without getting involved in protracted battles.
Our troops also successfully advanced in the Dresden direction. The 2nd Army of the Polish Army, in difficult conditions of a wooded area, advanced 4-7 km and wedged into the second line of enemy defense. The divisions of the 52nd Army, which also advanced in difficult conditions of wooded and swampy terrain, advanced 4-5 km and wedged 2-3 km into the second line of enemy defense. Our troops had to repel strong counterattacks by units of the 1st Parachute Tank Division "Hermann Goering", which the German command brought into the battle north of Görlitz. Konev ordered the commander of the 31st Army, General P.G. Shafranov, on the night of April 19 to begin replacing the divisions of the 52nd Army in the Pentsikha area. The liberated three divisions of the 52nd Army were planned to be transferred to the Dresden direction.
The German command, after attempts to contain the advance of our troops with the help of the forces of the 21st Panzer Division and the Fuhrer's Guard Panzer Division failed, tried to organize a stable defense on the third (rear) defense line, which ran along the Spree River. Already in the second half of the day, the withdrawal of troops to the Spree River began. The German command, with the help of reserves, tried to organize a counterattack to close the gap between Cottbus and Spremberg. Among the reserves was the 10th Panzer Division "Frundsberg". In addition, on April 18, the 2nd parachute motorized division "Hermann Goering" and the 344th infantry division began to be transferred to this direction. At the same time, the Germans tried to organize a counterattack against the left flank of the front’s strike force. For this purpose, already on April 17, a strike group began to be created in the Görlitz area. In addition to the 1st parachute tank division "Hermann Goering", on April 18 it included three infantry divisions and the corps group "Moser". By April 23, another infantry division and the 20th Panzer Division were transferred to the Görlitz area.
A column of Soviet T-34-85 tanks from the 9th Mechanized Corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army with armored infantry waiting to march.
In the foreground on the right is a SU-85M self-propelled artillery mount.
A specially built barricade on the approaches to Berlin. In the event of a breakthrough by Soviet tanks, the structures of their logs and earth in the upper part of the barricade were detonated by special charges and were knocked down and blocked the passage
April 18th. On this day the fighting was especially fierce. The Germans brought new reserves into the battle and tried with all their might to delay our troops at the rear line of defense. The troops of the 3rd Guards Army completely took Forst and crossed the Fliess Canal. As a result, the army broke through the second line of enemy defense on the Fliess Canal and reached the Spree River.
The 13th Army, supported by the 3rd Guards Tank Army, continued its offensive at night, pushing the enemy rearguards back to the Spree. During the day, Pukhov's army repulsed several fierce enemy counterattacks. The Soviet command, having established that the Germans had concentrated most of their forces and reserves in the areas of Cottbus and Spremberg, decided to cross the Spree and break through the third line of defense between these two strong points. Between Cottbus and Spremberg the Germans had the weakest defense. Therefore, the main forces of the tank armies of Rybalko and Lelyushenko were sent to the 13th Army zone. At the same time, Soviet aviation launched powerful attacks on the positions of the third defense line and the advancing German reserves.
At 1 p.m. On April 18, the forward 56th Guards Tank Brigade of the 7th Guards Tank Corps crossed the Spree near Bresingen. By evening, the main forces of the corps were already on the other side. In the afternoon, Front Commander Konev personally went to this area and decided to lead the 6th Guards Tank Corps, transferred from the Katlov, Zergen area, through this crossing. The second echelon of Rybalko’s army, the 9th Mechanized Corps, was sent to the same area.
The 7th Guards Tank Corps with the infantry of the 102nd Rifle Corps wedged 4 km into the third line of enemy defense and by the end of the day advanced 12 km, reaching the Gross-Osnig-Döbbern line. The rapid advance of our tankers, who quickly crossed the river and captured a bridgehead on the western bank of the Spree, did not allow the Germans to use the 344th Infantry Division, which they did not have time to move to third position. The troops of the 27th Rifle Corps and the 10th Guards Tank Corps achieved great success. They also crossed the Spree in the area of Bilov on the move and broke through the third line of enemy defense 5 km deep. By the end of the day, our troops reached the Klein-Bukov, Gross-Bukov line, having advanced 13 km in a day. The second echelon of Lelyushenko’s tank army, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, was sent to the Bilov area.
Thus, the armies of Pukhov, Rybalko and Lelyushenko successfully crossed a large water line - the Spree and captured a bridgehead up to 10 km wide and 5 km deep. The prerequisites were created for the further development of the offensive and maneuver of mobile formations towards Berlin. The quick actions of the engineering troops, which ensured the construction of bridges across the Spree, ensured the timely crossing of the main forces of the front's strike group to the western bank of the river. By the end of April 18, sappers had built four bridges.
Zhadov's 5th Guards Army with the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps took the stronghold of Trebendorf and the northern part of Weiswasser on April 18. Developing offensives in the difficult conditions of a continuous forest, Soviet troops reached the Spree and began the battle for a large enemy defense center - Spremberg. The troops of the center - the 34th Guards Rifle Corps crossed the Spree and Kleine Spree rivers and broke through the third line of enemy defense.
In the Dresden direction, Polish troops, overcoming difficult terrain and numerous obstacles, took the large defense center of Niska during a stubborn battle. The 2nd Army of the Polish Army advanced 9 km and completed the breakthrough of the second line of enemy defense. The 1st Polish tank corps of General Kimbar advanced in the general direction of Bautzen and broke away from the infantry by 5 km. By the end of the day, Polish tankers took the city of Förstgen and fought for Ober und Nieder Elsa. On the same day, Baranov’s 1st Guards Cavalry Corps was introduced into the breakthrough, breaking away from the infantry by several kilometers. The right flank of the 52nd Army with the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps took Weissenberg and, without encountering much resistance, advanced 20 km in a day. The left flank divisions of the 52nd Army fought heavy battles all day with the 1st Parachute Tank Division "Hermann Goering" and enemy infantry. The Germans were able to push our troops back 3-4 km.
ISU-152 on the march. 1st Ukrainian Front, April 1945
Crossing of the Spree by troops of the 3rd Guards. tank army. Wooden stakes marked a ford for tanks crossing the river
T-34-85 tanks of the 1st Polish Tank Corps. April 1945
Results
Over three days of stubborn fighting, from April 16 to 18, Konev’s armies broke through the Niessen defensive line of the German army on the 35-kilometer Forst-Muskau section and the 20-kilometer Steinbach-Penzich section, and advanced 30 km west in both directions. Soviet troops in the offensive area of the front's main strike group broke through all three enemy defense lines. The exit of formations of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies to the left bank of the Spree River in the offensive zones of the 13th and 5th Guards armies allowed the command to develop an offensive to the west, to the Elbe and begin maneuvering towards the German capital.
The German 4th Panzer Army suffered a serious defeat and two attacks by the 1st Ukrainian Front (the main strike group and an auxiliary group) on Spremberg and Bautzen were divided into three separate parts: the Cottbus group, the troops defending in the Muskauer Forst forest, and the Görlitz group grouping. Several German divisions, including the Brandenburg motorized division, were completely destroyed.
The German command, trying to stop our troops on the second and third lines of defense, brought into the battle from the reserve of the 3rd Tank Army, Army Group Center and the reserve of the main command 11 divisions, including 5 tank and 1 motorized (21st, 20th I Panzer Divisions, Panzer Division "Führer's Guard", 10th SS Panzer Division "Frunsberg", 1st Parachute Panzer Division "Hermann Goering" and 2nd Parachute Motorized Division "Hermann Goering").
The massive use of artillery and tanks provided the infantry with favorable offensive conditions. The entire 30-kilometer strip of the Nijsen defensive line was broken through by the efforts of the first echelon rifle corps with the support of tank and mechanized corps of the first echelon tank armies. Rifle corps of the second echelons of combined arms armies were not brought into battle. The second echelons of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies also remained unused. This ensured the speed of further offensive and maneuver. As a result, the expediency of introducing the first echelons of tank armies into battle from the first day of the operation was confirmed by the very course of events. The front's strike force broke through three enemy defense lines and repelled counterattacks by 11 enemy reserve divisions.
The engineering troops and aviation played a major role in the success of the operation. Soviet planes destroyed enemy strongholds and attacked German reserves. On April 18, the main efforts of the Soviet air army were aimed at destroying the main centers of enemy resistance on the Spree River - Cottbus and Spremberg. In total, on April 16-18, the 2nd Air Army made more than 7,500 sorties and destroyed 155 German aircraft in air battles.
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, 47th, 60th armies, 3rd Guards Tank and the 2nd Air Army. Subsequently it included 1st, 3rd, 5th Guards, 6th, 18th, 21st, 28th, 31st, 52nd, 59th Armies, 1st and 4th Guards , 1st, 2nd, 4th and 6th tank armies, 8th Air Army and 2nd Army of the Polish Army.From November 3 to November 13, 1943, front troops carried out the Kyiv strategic offensive operation, during which they liberated Kyiv on November 6 and advanced west from the Dnieper to 150 km. Then, on November 13 - December 22, 1943, they carried out the Kyiv defensive operation, as a result of which they thwarted the plans of the German command to recapture Kiev and eliminate the strategic bridgehead of Soviet troops.
Subsequently, December 24, 1943 - January 14, 1944, front troops carried out the Zhitomir-Berdichev operation, moving forward almost 200 km, deeply enveloping the German Army Group South from the north and creating favorable conditions for organizing offensive operations on the Right Bank Ukraine.
In the winter of 1944, the troops of the left flank of the front, in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, participated in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation (January 24 - February 17), as a result of which over 10 enemy divisions were surrounded and destroyed. At the same time, the armies of the right flank carried out the Rivne-Lutsk operation (January 27 - February 11, 1944) and took an advantageous position to strike the flank and rear of the German Army Group South from the north. The main forces of Army Group South were defeated in March - April by troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts.
Having carried out the Proskurov-Chernivtsi operation (March 4 - April 17, 1944), the front troops reached the Carpathians and, in cooperation with the troops2nd Ukrainian Front cut the strategic front of German troops into two parts.
In the summer of 1944, during the Lviv-Sandomierz strategic operation (July 13 - August 29), the German army group “Northern Ukraine” was defeated, the western regions of Ukraine, the south-eastern regions of Poland were liberated from the enemy, and a large Sandomierz bridgehead was captured on the left bank of the Vistula .
In the winter of 1945, front troops carried out the Sandomierz-Silesian operation (January 12 - February 3), during which the southern regions of Poland were liberated, the Oder was crossed and military operations were transferred to German territory. In February, as a result of the Lower Silesian operation (February 8 - 24), front troops reached the Neisse River and took up an advantageous position for an attack on Berlin.
In the second half of March 1945, the troops of the left flank of the front carried out the Upper Silesian operation (March 15 - 31), surrounded and then destroyed the Oppeln and Ratibor enemy groups.
In April - May 1945, front troops participated in the Berlin Strategic Operation (April 16 - May 8), and then in the Prague Strategic Operation (May 6 - 11), during which the defeat of the German armed forces was completed.
The front was disbanded on June 10, 1945 on the basis of the Supreme Command Headquarters directive No. 11096 of May 29, 1945; its field department was reorganized into the department of the Central Group of Forces.
On July 6, 1944, the front was formed to participate in the Lvov-Sandomierz strategic operation1st and 2ndhorse-mechanized groups.
Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front participated in the following operations:
- Strategic Operations:
- Berlin Strategic Offensive Operation 1945;
- Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation of 1945;
- East Carpathian strategic offensive operation of 1944;
- Dnieper-Carpathian strategic offensive operation of 1943-44;
- Kyiv strategic offensive operation of 1943;
- Lviv-Sandomierz strategic offensive operation of 1944;
- Prague strategic offensive operation of 1945.
- Front-line and army operations:
- Bukrinskaya offensive operation of 1943;
- Upper Silesian offensive operation of 1945;
- Dresden-Prague offensive operation of 1945;
- Zhitomir-Berdich offensive operation of 1943-44;
- Carpathian-Dukla offensive operation of 1944;
- Carpathian-Uzhgorod offensive operation of 1944;
- Kyiv defensive operation 1943;
- Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation of 1944;
- Cottbus-Potsdam offensive operation 1945;
- Lviv offensive operation of 1944;
- Lyutezh offensive operation of 1943;
- Lower Silesian offensive operation of 1945;
- Operation to expand the bridgehead in the Sandomierz area in 1944;
- Proskurov-Chernivtsi offensive operation of 1944;
- Rivne-Lutsk offensive operation of 1944;
- Sandomierz offensive operation of 1944;
- Sandomierz-Silesian offensive operation of 1945;
- Stanislav offensive operation of 1944;
- Sudetenland offensive operation 1945;
- Stremberg-Torgau offensive operation of 1945.
FIRST UKRAINIAN FRONT - operational-strategic formation of Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War in the southwestern direction in 1943-1945 .
Ob-ra-zo-van October 20, 1943 at the Headquarters of the Verkhov-no-go Main-no-ko-man-do-va-niya in re-zul-ta-te per-re -the name of the Vo-ro-tender front. Included the 13th, 27th, 38th, 40th, 47th, 60th General Military Army, 3rd Guards Tank Army and 2nd Air Force Army; subsequently at different times: 1st, 3rd and 5th Guards, 6th, 18th, 21st, 28th, 31st, 52nd and 59th General War Guards, 1st and 4th Guards Tank Armies, 1st, 2nd, 4th and 6th Tank Armies and 8th Air Force Armies, 2 the 1st Army of the Polish Army, and after the end of the military operations also the 4th, 7th and 9th Guards Armies and the Romanian 1st -th and 4th armies.
The troops of the First Ukrainian Front in the 1st half of November carried out the Kiev offensive operation of 1943: November 6th -li Ki-ev and moved west from the Dnieper to 150 km, and then as a result of the Ki-ev defensive operation -tions of 1943 disrupted the German plans. co-man-do-va-niya ov-la-det Kiev and whether-to-vi-di-ro-vat strategic bridge-darm of the Soviet troops (see Kiev-operations tion 1943). In the subsequent implementation of the Zhi-to-mir-sko-Ber-di-chev-operation of 1943-1944 and, moving forward up to 200 km, deep-bo-ko oh-va-ti-li with se-ve-ra germ. army group "South" (commander - Field Marshal E. von Manstein) and have you created favorable conditions for the next offensive operations to destroy the Wehrmacht troops in the Right-to-be-registered Ukraine. In January-February 1944, the First Ukrainian Front, together with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, with its left wing, trained in Kor-sun -Shev-chen-kov operation of 1944, as a result of which it was ok-ru-but and destroyed over 10 di -vi-ziy pro-tiv-ni-ka. At the same time, the army of the right wing of the First Ukrainian Front was carrying out the Riv-no-Lutsk operation of 1944 and you were behind -a good position for attacking the flank and rear of the German army group “South” from the north. The main forces of this group were destroyed by the troops of the First Ukrainian Front in March-the-ap-re-le in interaction with the troops -mi 2nd Ukrainian Front.
Carrying out the Pro-sku-rov-sko-Cher-no-vits operation of 1944, the troops of the First Ukrainian Front went to Kar-pa-tam and, mutually -fighting with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, split the strategic front of the German troops into 2 parts. In the summer, during the Lvov-San-do-Mir operation of 1944, the German army group was at the same time “ Northern Ukraine" (Colonel General I. Gar-pe), os-in-bo-zh-de-ny from the western regions of Ukraine, south -eastern regions of Poland and occupied by the left bank of the Wis-la San-do-Mirsky bridge-darm. In January, the war of the First Ukrainian Front pro-ve-de-na San-do-mir-sko-Siles-skaya operation of 1945, os-vo-bo-zh- de-ns of the southern regions of Poland, for-si-ro-va-on the Oder River (Od-ra) and transfers of military actions in the territory to-ria of Germany. In February, as a result of the Nizh-ne-si-lez operation of 1945, the front troops went to the Neisse river, behind you-have-a-year-old position for a-stu-p-le-tion in Berlin and oh-w-you-have-a-great-position-from-no-she- nyu to the upper-ne-si-lez-skaya group-pi-rov-ke pro-tiv-ni-ka. In the 2nd half of March, the left wing of the First Ukrainian Front carried out the Verkh-ne-si-lez operation 1945 years: ok-ru-on and destroy-on op-peln-skaya, raz-thunder-le-na ra-ti-bor-skaya group-pi-rov-ki against-tiv-ni- ka. In April-May, the troops of the First Ukrainian Front participated in the Berlin operation of 1945, then in
1st Ukrainian Front
The beginning of February was a time of hope both for G.K. Zhukov and K.K. Rokossovsky, and for I.S. Konev. The commanders of the three fronts understood perfectly well that stopping the offensive meant for the enemy a long-awaited pause to stabilize the front and improve the defense. The initial plan for the operation, which later became known as the Lower Silesian operation, was presented by the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front to Headquarters on January 28, ten days earlier than Zhukov's plan for the capture of Berlin. In February, Konev planned to make up for lost time due to the need to concentrate efforts against the enemy group in the Silesian industrial region.
The plan submitted for approval to Headquarters was truly grandiose. I. S. Konev planned to launch three attacks on the enemy simultaneously: two from the bridgeheads north and south of Breslau and the third along the Sudeten Mountains. The first two attacks were aimed at defeating the enemy’s Breslau-Dresden group and “by 25.2.45, the main forces would reach the Elbe River” (44). The troops of the right wing of the front were supposed to, in cooperation with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, capture Berlin. It was precisely the need to reach a level with the 1st Belorussian Front, which had seized a bridgehead 60 km from Berlin, that determined the appearance of the offensive plan of I. S. Konev’s troops almost two weeks earlier than Zhukov’s plan of February 10, mentioned above. The greater depth of missions required active flank protection. To do this, a third strike was launched from a bridgehead southwest of Oppeln along the northern slopes of the Sudeten Mountains. He was supposed to contribute to the solution of the main task carried out by the troops of the right wing and the center of the front. The offensive was supposed to begin on February 5–6.
Returning the center of gravity of operations to the right flank of the front required a regrouping of troops. In particular, the 3rd Guards was returning from Silesia. tank army and regrouped from one bridgehead to another 52nd Army. As a result of the regrouping carried out between January 29 and February 7, four combined arms (3rd Guards, 13th, 52nd and 6th) and two tank (3rd Guards and 4th) armies were deployed on the right wing of the front , as well as one tank (25th) and one mechanized (7th Guards) corps. The main forces of the front's main attack group deployed on a bridgehead north-west of Breslau. This strike force was given the task of I.S. Konev to defeat the opposing enemy and reach the river. Neisse, and subsequently develop an offensive bypassing Berlin from the southwest. Thus, the operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front was linked with the likely actions of the 1st Belorussian Front.
The second strike group, consisting of the 5th Guards and 21st Armies with the 4th Guards and 31st Tank Corps operationally subordinate to them, was deployed on a bridgehead south of Breslau. By the beginning of the preparations for the operation, the troops of these armies were already conducting intense offensive battles to expand the occupied bridgehead. The troops deployed on the bridgehead south of Breslau were supposed to, in cooperation with the left-flank troops of the main strike group, defeat the enemy’s Breslau group and subsequently advance in the Dresden direction.
Abandoned armored personnel carrier SdKfz-251. Silesia, February 1945
After the big January offensive, I. S. Konev’s armies operated in a zone of about 500 km. This made it significantly more difficult to create the necessary concentrations in the direction of the main attack and to allocate reserves to counter the crises that inevitably arise during the offensive. To create the necessary tactical densities, all four combined arms armies of the main strike group had to operate in the same operational echelon. The formation of the armies (with the exception of the 13th Army) was also single-echelon. Most of the first echelon rifle corps were also lined up in one line. The armies advancing in the center and on the left wing of the front also had a single-echelon formation. In addition, they had to prepare for the offensive by continuing the struggle for a bridgehead on the western bank of the Oder. The first days of February, units of the 4th Tank Army, together with rifle formations, repelled the attacks of the Brandenburg and Hermann Goering. From February 1 to 7, the 4th Tank Army lost 42 combat vehicles, nullifying the efforts of repairers to restore damaged tanks and self-propelled guns.
True to his principle of using tank armies, I. S. Konev set the tank armies the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses together with combined arms armies, and then getting ahead and building on their success. The front commander later recalled: “In this situation, I considered such a decision to be completely justified.
Without this, our rifle divisions, tired of long battles and largely drained of blood, would not have solved the problems facing them...” (45). In addition, the front did not have ammunition for long-term artillery preparation due to the stretched communications and was forced to rely on tanks. All the activities of the front command and the hard work of front-line and army transport only ensured the restoration of spent supplies.
Commander of the 1st Parachute Tank Division Max Lemke.
The condition of the tank armies at that time was not brilliant, but it was quite possible to conduct offensive operations. As of February 1, the 4th Tank Army had 414 serviceable tanks and self-propelled guns (283 T-34, 26 IS-2, 8 SU-122, 24 SU-85, 25 SU-76 and 43 SU-57) (46) . Another 121 tanks were under repair. Lelyushenko's army numbered 38,405 people, including 5,880 officers, 13,260 sergeants and 19,265 privates. Due to significant losses, the army became a typical officer-sergeant association for the final period with a low number of rifle companies. Realizing the weakening of the infantry component of his army, Lelyushenko asked Konev to give him at least an ordinary infantry formation: “I ask that in the upcoming operation one rifle division be placed under operational subordination, which I can put on tanks and the presence of which will allow the army to successfully consolidate captured areas in the operational depth of the enemy , and also comb forest areas” (47). The army commander also asked to transfer one of the front’s tank corps to his subordination. The front commander satisfied only the first request of the commander of the 4th Tank Army: from 23.00 on February 7, Lelyushenko’s army was subordinate to the 112th Infantry Division of Colonel D.T. Zhukov. The army commander transferred one rifle regiment to his reserve, and transferred the division itself to the operational subordination of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps.
To top off all the problems, there was bad weather on February 8, and the 1st Ukrainian Front was deprived of air support. The offensive began at 6:00 am on 8 February after a short 50-minute artillery barrage. Interestingly, on February 8, both sides attacked: units of “Hermann Goering” continued to attack the bridgehead from the west. In the first two days of the offensive, the troops of the main strike group broke through the enemy’s defenses on a front of 80 km. Combined arms armies penetrated to a depth of 10 to 15 km, and tank armies - from 30 to 60 km.
The “opening” of the bridgehead on the Oder by the 4th Panzer Army was organized in such a way that the tank and mechanized corps started from the northern and southern fronts of the bridgehead, and then struck towards each other. Thus, an encirclement of the enemy was formed in the forests northwest of Luben. Units of the Brandenburg, Hermann Goering and 20th Panzer-Grenadier Divisions were surrounded.
On February 9, Major General Necker was relieved of command of the 1st Parachute Tank Division "Hermann Goering" and replaced by Colonel Max Lemke. Lemke became the last commander of the unit. It is significant that the Luftwaffe mechanized formation was commanded by Wehrmacht officers who had no prior connection with Goering’s department. Before taking over as commander of the Hermann Goering, Lemke commanded a reconnaissance battalion and a motorized infantry regiment. His predecessor was also a tank commander who, since 1943, had been training Luftwaffe field units. At first, the encircled German divisions tried to make their way to the north-west, but were stopped by units of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps on the approaches to Polkwitz. Having failed to break through to the northwest, the encirclement partly changed the direction of the breakthrough: now they were making their way strictly to the west. Here the remnants of several divisions were met by the 63rd Tank Brigade of the 10th Guards. tank corps. Tanks from ambushes shot at infantry columns, tanks, vehicles and armored personnel carriers making their way to the west. The tankers of Belov's corps found themselves on the path of the remnants of the Grossdeutschland corps, since the 4th Tank Army was forced to bypass a large forest area (Primkenauer Forst) and both of its corps began to take the same route on February 10. By a strange coincidence, the Soviet 10th Guards. The tank corps, like its opponent on the other side of the front, changed its commander: instead of Colonel N.D. Chuprov, on February 10, Lieutenant General E.E. Belov (previously deputy D.D. Lelyushenko) was appointed.
The forests soon became a refuge for the encircled people. Turn of the 10th Guards. tank corps bypassing Primkenauer Forst allowed "Grossdeutschland" to fight its way west through the wooded area near Kotzenau. A massive attack between the villages of Weissbig and Wolfendorf allowed the Germans to crush the anti-tank guns of the 10th Guards, which were placed behind a barrier. tank corps and go into the forests. Already on February 12, units of “Brandenburg” and “Hermann Goering” reached Sprötau and became involved in battles for the city.
Meanwhile, the 4th Tank Army continued its offensive in a westerly direction. During February 11, 6th Guards. The mechanized corps walked 35 km and reached the river. Beaver. At this time, the 10th Guards. The tank corps fought for Shprotau. Using the success of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps, Lelyushenko removed the 10th Guards. tank corps from the protracted assault on Shprotau and sent it to cross the river. Beaver at Sorau's. The 4th Tank Army at that time was the undisputed leader of the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front: the 3rd Guards Army, due to its weak combat strength, lagged behind, in the offensive zone of the 3rd Guards. tank army r. The Bober flowed 20 - 30 km to the east, and parts of Rybalko’s army were just approaching the river. The “yellow jersey of the leader” and the open flanks that arose in connection with this required Lelyushenko to withdraw two tank brigades to reserve. The situation began to heat up.
Realizing the threat to the flanks, D. D. Lelyushenko nevertheless continued the offensive. From those captured on the river. Beaver bridgeheads of the 4th Tank Army corps rushed further to the west. At 14.00 on February 14, the 16th mechanized brigade of the 6th mechanized corps reached the river. Neisse and started a battle for the crossing. The 49th Mechanized Brigade and the 112th Rifle Division were 5–7 km from Neisse. 17th Guards The mechanized brigade and the 93rd separate brigade covered the right flank of the army in the Christianstadt area. Advancing on a parallel route, the 10th Guards. The tank corps reached the river on the same day. Neisse with 6 tanks with a landing of machine gunners from the 62nd Tank Brigade. The 61st Tank Brigade of the same corps remained in the Sorau area to cover the left flank of the army. 63rd Tank Brigade of the 10th Guards. tank corps crossed the river at 9.00. Beaver also moved forward to cover the left flank of the army in the Sorau area. The troops of the 13th Army were still far behind Lelyushenko’s tankers who had escaped to the Neisse.
On the right flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the 3rd Guards. The army surrounded the last "festung" of the "C" line - Glogau. Having blocked this grouping with part of their forces, V.N. Gordov’s troops continued to develop their offensive in the northwestern direction. By February 15, the army troops managed to advance to the river. Beaver at the front from its mouth to Naumburg.
The gap between the combined arms and tank formations was immediately exploited by the enemy. The command of the German 4th Panzer Army planned a counter-offensive with the forces of two tank corps: the XXIV Panzer Corps and the Grossdeutschland tank corps, which had fought its way out of encirclement. Nering's XXIV Panzer Corps at that time included the 16th Panzer Division, the 72nd, 88th and 342nd Infantry Divisions. Accordingly, the divisions Brandenburg, Hermann Goering and the 20th Panzergrenadier Division were subordinate to the headquarters of the Grossdeutschland corps. The commander of “Greater Germany,” General Saucken, shortly before the start of the counterattack, left for East Prussia, and Lieutenant General Georg Jauer became the new corps commander. On the morning of February 14, the Germans launched an offensive in two attack groups, trying to repel units of the 4th Tank Army that had broken through to the Neisse from crossings on the river. Beaver. The defensive actions of the 93rd separate tank brigade, 17th mechanized brigade, 22nd self-propelled artillery and 63rd tank brigade managed to prevent the enemy from reaching the crossings. However, as a result of the counterattack, the Germans managed to achieve success - the groups advancing from the north and south united and cut off the main forces of the 4th Tank Army from the rear and troops of the 13th Army.
The commander of the 4th Tank Army was forced to turn the 6th mechanized corps that had reached the Neisse by 180 degrees. At 11.30 on February 16, he sent the following order to the forward formations:
“To the commander of the 10th TK for urgent transfer to the commander of the 6th MK (it seems that there was no direct contact with the headquarters of the 6th MK at that time. - A.I.).
The commander of the 6th MK should leave cover on the river. Neisse and the 112th SD in the Sommerfeld area and with the main forces immediately strike through Sommerfeld towards the 93rd detachment brigade.
To convey the beginning of action” (48).
6th Guards The mechanized corps began to break through the corridor at 15.20 on February 16 with an attack on Sommerfeld. A detachment of the 28th Heavy Tank Regiment, a battalion of the 49th Mechanized Brigade, and one regiment of the 112th Infantry Division with the support of the PC division made its way to the east.
At the same time, relief operations were prepared by the forces of the 93rd separate tank brigade and the 280th rifle division. The brigade and division attacked Benau from the west on the afternoon of February 16. The city was defended by units of the SS Dirlewanger brigade. Since the ground became wet due to the thaw, the tanks were forced to abandon off-road detour maneuvers and advance along the road. The "Faustniks" holed up in the houses forced the tanks to stay 100 meters behind the infantry advancing through the streets of Benau. On February 16, it was not possible to take Benau. Advanced units of the 4th Tank Army and units on the river. The beaver was still separated by 10–15 km.
On February 17, the crisis still persisted. The combined detachment of the 6th Mechanized Corps bypassed Sommerfeld and began to advance towards Benau from the west, but was counterattacked from Sommerfeld and stopped. The 17th Mechanized Brigade, the 93rd Separate Tank Brigade and the 280th Rifle Division continued the assault on Benau. Optimism was inspired only by the fact that the troops of the 3rd Guards. and the 13th armies finally reached the advanced formations to the river. Beaver. Concerned about the situation of his advanced units, Lelyushenko sent a report to front headquarters at 23.15 on February 17, which could be called “panic”: “Due to the fact that for two days the troops of 13 A have not moved forward, I ask permission to turn back all units of the army , located on the river. Neisse with the aim of delivering a general attack on Zorau, Benau and defeating the enemy’s Benaus group together with units of 13 A. In the future, together with 13 A, again advance to the Neisse River” (49).
The commander of the 4th Tank Army actually proposed abandoning the fight for bridgeheads on the river. Neisse, allow the enemy to gain a foothold on the river line or even on the approaches to it. This decision was unacceptable and was not approved. Instead, the detachment of the 6th Mechanized Corps, making its way to the east, was reinforced by the 61st Tank Brigade of the 10th Guards. tank corps. By 5 p.m. on February 18, the reinforced unit made its way to the western outskirts of Benau. The relief group continued to storm Benau on the afternoon of February 18, this time the tanks were reinforced by two SU-57 batteries from the 22nd Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade. Soviet bombers and attack aircraft bombed and strafed the Germans in Benau and north of the city.
On the afternoon of February 19, Benau was finally captured. Communication between the units that reached the Neisse and the rear was restored. The units deployed to Benau began to move towards Neisse. In turn, the commander of the German 4th Tank Army on February 19 ordered to stop the counterattack and withdraw from the battle. The army of D. D. Lelyushenko was completely concentrated on the river. Neisse by the morning of February 21. However, the danger to the flanks still remained, and part of the forces were deployed to the north. But the offensive did not continue. At 5.25 on February 22, directive No. 109/op was transmitted from front headquarters with the following content:
« I order: By the morning of 2/24/45, concentrate 4 TA in the area (claim) Raudten, Seebnitz, Krumlinge, Luben.
Make the march secretly, at night. The march begins in the evening of 22.2.45.
Thirty T-34 tanks with the most exhausted motor resources, as well as SU-122 and IS-122, will be transferred to Army Commander 13 to staff 88 tank tanks and 327 gsap.
In the new region, the army was hastily brought into order” (50).
Tank Pz.IV, knocked out in the Breslau area. 1st Ukrainian Front, February 1945
On the afternoon of February 22, 6th Guards. mechanized and 10th Guards. The tank corps surrendered their positions on the Neisse to the troops of the 13th Army. The planned exit by February 25 with the main forces to the Elbe River had to be forgotten for now. From February 8 to 22, 257 vehicles (162 T-34, 22 IS-2, 12 SU-122, 16 SU-85, 20 SU-76, 23 SU-57 and 6 Valentines) were out of action in the 4th Tank Army "), including permanently 127 tanks and self-propelled guns (95 T-34, 7 IS-2, 2 SU-122, 7 SU-85, 10 SU-76, 4 SU-57 and 2 Valentine) (51) . At this stage of hostilities, most of the losses of D. D. Lelyushenko’s army were due to enemy artillery - 201 tanks, or 75% of the total number of those out of action. Faust cartridges accounted for 20 tanks, or 7.8% of losses.
3rd Guards The tank army of P. S. Rybalko initially managed without such adventures, crossing the river on February 10. Beaver and R. Kweiss in the area west of Bunzlau. However, the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front soon faced the problem of combining forward movement and securing the flank. Again, as in January 1945, the main efforts were concentrated on a strike in a western direction. Both tank armies were here. The encirclement of Breslau was entrusted to the combined arms armies - the 5th Guards and 6th. The first received as a means of developing the success of the 7th Guards. mechanized corps, and the second - 4th Guards. tank corps. The secondary importance of the capture of Breslau led to a deviation from the standards of conducting an encirclement operation. The offensive of the Soviet troops in this direction did not involve a strike in depth to ensure the outer front of encirclement. Accordingly, the 6th Army, turning south to meet the 5th Guards Army, was forced to allocate forces to provide cover from the southwest. The dispersion of forces led to difficulties in moving forward. The army actually stopped at the approaches to Breslau. In turn, the 6th Army's turn to Breslau forced the front command to deploy the 52nd Army to cover the left flank of the front. Again, as in January, the group advancing to the west began to melt away.
I. S. Konev, again, as in January 1945, was forced on February 12 to deploy Rybalko’s tank army from west to east from the Bunzlau area to Breslau. Once again, the offensive to the west was deprived of a strong mobile unification. At first, I. S. Konev decided to make do with turning two buildings. At 6.00 on February 12, the front commander ordered the 3rd Guards. tank army forces of the 7th Guards. tank and 9th mechanized corps strike to the southeast towards the 7th Guards. mechanized and 31st tank corps. After closing the encirclement ring, it was planned, in cooperation with the 5th Guards and 6th armies, to defeat the enemy’s Breslau grouping. Only 6th Guards. To the tank corps, Konev retained the task of attacking in a western direction - to Görlitz.
Carrying out the assigned task, the brigades of the 7th Guards. The tank corps, having made a night march from the Bunzlau area, on the morning of February 12 began fighting with enemy tanks and infantry at the Rauske, Ossich line and by 18 o'clock captured these settlements. At the same time, the 69th and 70th mechanized brigades of the 9th mechanized corps captured the cities of Jauer and Striegau, and the 91st tank brigade captured Guchdorf. 7th Guards The tank corps, advancing in an eastern direction, reached the Albrechtzau-Kant line by 18.00 on February 13, where it linked up with the 7th Guards. mechanized body. On the night of February 14, units of the 32nd Guards. Rifle Corps 5th Guards. armies in the Rothsurben area linked up with the 7th Guards. mechanized corps, surrounding the city of Breslau. The 1st Ukrainian Front acquired a new “festung”.
The front commander entrusted the liquidation of the enemy group encircled in the Breslau area to the troops of the 6th Army of General V. A. Gluzdovsky. The original plan to allocate the 6th Army to the reserve had to be forgotten. The corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army were ordered to withdraw from the battle, replenish supplies and put their military equipment and weapons in order. The 9th Mechanized Corps began regrouping on February 14, even before the formations of the 5th Guards Army, which were supposed to replace it on the morning of February 15, entered the area it occupied. This was discovered by enemy intelligence. The brigades of the 9th Mechanized Corps, reformed into marching columns, were suddenly attacked from the south by the enemy's 8th Panzer Division at noon. The 69th mechanized brigade of Colonel S.G. Litvinov entered into a difficult battle with superior tank forces at the Gross-Rosen, Guchdorf line. The danger was eliminated only thanks to the correct and quick decision of General P. S. Rybalko. On his orders, brigades of the 9th Mechanized and 7th Guards Tank Corps launched a flank attack on the enemy and stopped his advance. Fighting with the counterattacking enemy continued until February 15. On February 15, as part of the 3rd Guards. The tank army had 418 tanks and self-propelled guns left.
After changing units of the 3rd Guards. The tank army infantry was returned to the direction of the main attack and had to resume the offensive in a westerly direction. P. S. Rybalko tried to make a move with his knight and encircle the enemy group defending the approaches to Görlitz with two strikes in converging directions. The northern claw of the “Cannes” was formed by the 6th Guards. tank corps, advancing from the northeast, and the south - the 7th Guards. tank corps advancing from the east.
7th Guards The tank corps, fulfilling its assigned task, reached the Kweis River in the Lauban area, but encountered strong fire resistance from the left bank of the river and was unable to cross it. In turn, the 6th Guards Tank Corps launched an offensive along the highway from Neudorf to Görlitz, but, having encountered organized resistance on the right bank of the Gross-Tschirne River, fought stubborn battles all day on February 17 4–5 km west of the Kweis River. The first days of the offensive showed that the division of the army into two “claws” at that time did not correspond to the situation. The tank army was already weakened by more than a month of fighting, and rapid advance was not possible. Realizing his mistake, P.S. Rybalko decided to gather both corps into a single fist in the direction of action of the 6th Guards. tank corps. At the direction of the army commander, corps commander Major General S. A. Ivanov sent the 54th and 55th Guards Tank Brigades to cross the Kweis River in the zone of action of the 6th Guards Tank Corps in the Neudorf area. It was assumed that with such a maneuver it would be possible to bypass Lauban from the north and, with a strike from the north-west, in cooperation with the 56th Tank and 23rd Motorized Rifle Brigades advancing from the east, capture it.
However, this maneuver failed to achieve a decisive result. By 8.00 on February 17, the 54th and 55th Guards Tank Brigades crossed the Kweis River and reached the Neudorf area, where they were met by heavy fire from enemy tanks and were forced to go on the defensive on the southern outskirts of Neudorf. During February 17, the 56th Tank and 23rd Motorized Rifle Brigades, overcoming enemy fire resistance, slowly advanced to the eastern outskirts of Lauban. The city was defended by combat groups of the 6th People's Grenadier and 17th Panzer Divisions. The first was reorganized after the disaster in Poland and received a company of Hetzer tank destroyers. The 17th Panzer Division, having been fairly battered during the Vistula-Oder operation, was reorganized in early February 1945 and received 28 Pz.IV/70(V) tank destroyers and 16 Pz.IV tanks for completion. In addition to self-propelled guns and tanks maneuvering through the streets in the center of Lauban, Soviet tanks encountered obstacles made of grooves in the form of rails vertically fixed in concrete.
The withdrawal of two tank brigades from the area east of Lauban weakened the flank of the 7th Guards. tank corps, as a result of which Rybalko’s army was soon put in a difficult position. The 8th Panzer Division was withdrawn to the area southeast of Lauban, and on the morning of February 18 began an attack on the flank and rear of units of the 7th Guards. tank corps on the outskirts of Lauban. The 56th Tank Brigade, advancing on Lauban, was forced to stop attacks and turn 180 degrees, facing east.
In the second echelon of the 3rd Guards. The 9th Mechanized Corps was moving into the tank army. At first he helped repulse the counterattack of the 8th Panzer Division in the Levenberg area, but was soon attacked himself. The enemy brought up the 10th Panzer-Grenadier and 408th Infantry Divisions, and the counter-offensive of the GA “Center” continued. The commander of the 9th Mechanized Corps, Lieutenant General I.P. Sukhov, decided to deploy all his forces on a wide front from Levenberg to Goldberg and repel the enemy’s counterattack at this line. Corps brigades fought heavy defensive battles here on February 19 and 20.
In the combat log of the operational command headquarters for February 20, 1945, there is the following entry: “In general, it should be noted that over the past 14 days in the zone of Army Group Center, our troops have achieved significant successes, although their strength has been reduced to a minimum. The operation owes its success, among other things, to the flexible command, which quickly changed the direction of attack of tank formations and formed strike groups” (52). Indeed, Schörner managed to stop with counterattacks the breakthrough to the west of both the 4th Tank Army of D. D. Lelyushenko and the 3rd Guards. Tank Army P. S. Rybalko.
Tank T-34-85, shot down on Lauban Street. March 1945. This tank with a chipped turret side became the “hero” of German propaganda newsreels. On the car you can see the number “402” and the inscription “named after Kalin[in].”
During February 20–21, troops of the 3rd Guards. The tank army continued to advance in the direction of Görlitz. The street battles in Lauban were especially fierce, where the enemy defended every house, widely using Faust cartridges against the advancing tanks. Lauban was defended by units of the 6th People's Grenadier and 17th Tank Divisions, which retreated from the Vistula and were replenished as part of Army Group Center. The formations of P.S. Rybalko’s army suffered heavy losses. On February 21, there were 15–20 tanks in tank brigades. The entire 7th Guards Tank Corps had only 55 tanks in service, and 48 tanks remained in the 9th Mechanized Corps.
Crisis in the offensive of the 3rd Guards. tank army caused displeasure among the Supreme Commander-in-Chief himself. I. S. Konev recalled: “On that day, when the fascist German units began to reach the rear of the 3rd Tank Army, Stalin called me and expressed concern: “What is happening there in the Third Tank Army? Where is it located there?” I replied that Rybalko’s army was fighting very intense battles in the Lauban area, but I thought nothing special had happened to it. The army is fighting in a difficult situation, but this is a common thing for tank troops. Stalin's call found me at the command post of the 52nd Army, not far from Lauban. I assured the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that if the situation becomes more difficult, we will take all necessary measures on the spot” (53).
To break the enemy's resistance in Lauban, the 51st and 53rd Guards were deployed against him. tank brigades of the 6th Guards Tank Corps, part of the forces of the 9th Mechanized Corps. The units advancing on Lauban were reinforced by the 16th self-propelled artillery brigade, 57th Guards. a heavy tank regiment and several artillery and mortar regiments. Soon the infantry caught up with the tankers. On February 22, in the offensive zone of the 6th Guards. The tank corps was promoted to the 254th Infantry Division of the 52nd Army.
February 24, when the fighting for Lauban was still going on, is considered the last day of the Upper Silesian operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Formally, this day can be considered the moment the Soviet command refused to implement the original operation plan. “Festungs” in the front line of I. S. Konev became one of the longest-lived: Glogau capitulated only on April 1, and Breslau held out until the very end - its garrison laid down its arms only on May 6. Front losses in the period from February 8 to February 24 amounted to 99,386 people (23,577 irretrievable losses and 75,809 sanitary losses). As a result of the Lower Silesian operation, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front came level with the positions of the 1st Belorussian Front on the Oder bridgeheads. This provided the troops of two fronts with a favorable position for launching an attack on Berlin.
The battle for Lauban did not calm down after February 24, but continued to blaze with renewed vigor. All formations of the 7th Guards were concentrated against Lauban. tank and 9th mechanized corps, as well as the 214th rifle division, army and attached artillery units. However, the fighting became protracted. Another dramatic turn of events followed when the Führer Escort and Führer Grenadiers divisions from Pomerania and the 21st Panzer Division from the Küstrin area were transferred to Laubahn. On the basis of the control of the XXIV Tank Corps, the so-called Nering group was formed, consisting of the LVII and XXXIX tank corps. The first included the 408th Division, the 103rd Tank Brigade, the 8th Tank Division and the Fuhrer Escort Division. In the second - the battle group of the 6th People's Grenadier Division, the battle group of the 17th Panzer Division, the Führer Grenadiers division and units of the 21st Panzer Division. From defense, enemy units near Lauban switched to a counteroffensive. Such attention to the Lauban area was associated not only with the desire to defeat the 3rd Guards. tank army, but also with economic issues - in this area there was a railway connecting central Germany with Silesia. This railway line was also essential for supplying the troops of Army Group Center. In the event of the loss of Lauban, Scherner's troops would have to be content with small railway lines coming from the Czech Republic. For these reasons, the command of the German 17th Army planned a counteroffensive of impressive proportions by the standards of 1945.
The German counteroffensive began on the night of March 2. It was built on the traditional idea of attacking the flanks in converging directions, bypassing Lauban from the north and south. The northern wing of the offensive was formed by General Decker's XXXIX Panzer Corps, and the southern wing by General Kirchner's LVII Panzer Corps. They were supposed to connect on the Görlitz - Bunzlau highway. The 6th People's Grenadier Division defended in the center of Cannes. During March 4–5, the enemy’s northern attack group pushed back the brigades of the 6th Guards. tank corps in the Hennersdorf, Steibersdorf sector, crossed the Kweiss River and reached the Logau area (on the banks of the Kweiss northeast of Lauban). The southern attack group (8th Panzer Division and the Fuhrer Escort Division) made its way through the battle formations of the 9th Mechanized Corps and reached the Naumburg area. The two German pincers had only a few kilometers left to connect. Having assessed the current situation, P.S. Rybalko, with the permission of the front commander, gave the order for the withdrawal of the troops subordinate to him from Lauban. On the morning of March 6, army troops, together with rifle formations of the 52nd Army, took up defense on lines 5–6 km north and east of Lauban.
From March 6 to 12, the corps of the 3rd Tank Army repelled enemy attacks along with units of the 52nd Army. On March 13–14, army formations were withdrawn to the second echelon of the front to the area south of Bunzlau to be replenished with personnel and equipment. By this time, the army had 255 tanks and self-propelled guns in service. Although the 3rd Guards. The tank army did not achieve success at Lauban, and the German counteroffensive also did not achieve its goal.
In general, the February offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front should be characterized as an attempt to break far forward with an open flank. Even in 1945, the enemy did not forgive such liberties. The natural result was strong flank attacks by the enemy, which led to the temporary encirclement of the 4th Tank Army and the semi-encirclement of the 3rd Guards. tank army. The general situation in 1945 made it possible to avoid catastrophic consequences similar to the battle for Kharkov in March 1943. However, Stalin’s words “If you and Konev do not advance, then Zhukov will not advance anywhere” turned out to be prophetic. The advance of the 1st Ukrainian Front in February 1945 was moderate and did not favor an attack on Berlin, even if everything was calm in Pomerania.
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At the same time, the armies of the right wing carried out the Rivne-Lutsk operation. During the Proskurov-Chernigov and Lvov-Sandomierz operations, the western regions of Ukraine, the south-eastern regions of Poland were liberated and the large Sandomierz bridgehead was captured. In January - March 1945, front troops carried out the Sandomierz-Silesian, Lower Silesian and Upper Silesian offensive operations, occupying an advantageous position for attacks on Berlin and in the Dresden-Prague direction. In April - May, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, in cooperation with the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, participated in the Berlin Operation, and then in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts in the Prague Operation, during which The defeat of the armed forces of Nazi Germany was completed. On June 10, 1945, the 1st Ukrainian Front was disbanded, its field control was reorganized into the control of the Central Group of Forces. Commanders:
N. F. Vatutin (October 1943 - March 1944), army general;
G. K. Zhukov (March - April 1944), Marshal of the Soviet Union;
I. S. Konev (May 1944 - June 1945), Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Members of the Military Council:
N. S. Khrushchev (October 1943 - August 1944), lieutenant general;
K. V. Krainyukov (October 1943 - June 1945), major general, since March 1944 lieutenant general.
Chiefs of Staff:
S. P. Ivanov (October - November 1943), lieutenant general;
A. N. Bogolyubov (November 1943 - April 1944), lieutenant general;
V. D. Sokolovsky (April 1944 - April 1945), army general;
I. E. Petrov (April - June 1945), army general.
Literature:
Konev I. S., "Notes of the front commander. 1943-1945", 3rd ed., Moscow, 1982;
Krainyukov K.V., "From the Dnieper to the Vistula", Moscow, 1971;
Krainyukov K.V., "Weapons of a special kind", Moscow, 1978.
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