The politics of stagnation in brief. Period of stagnation in the USSR


(first, and since 1966 General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee), A.N. Kosygin (Chairman of the Council of Ministers), M.A. Suslov (Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for Ideology). Under their leadership, with increasing ideological pressure, economic reform began to be carried out 1965, conceived under N.S. Khrushchev. The reform began with the liquidation of economic councils and the restoration of central line ministries. At the same time, enterprises gained some independence in economic activities (self-accounting).

In agriculture, restrictions on private farming were partially lifted and allocations were increased. There has been an increase in the production of agricultural machinery, an increase in the role of agricultural science, and an increase in purchase prices. However, strict centralization and planning from above put an end to these trends and led to the displacement of self-financing. Conservative tendencies finally prevailed after the 25th Congress of the CPSU in March 1976. From that time on, the “era of developed socialism” began in the USSR, closely associated with the rule of L.I. Brezhnev.

It is necessary to note the main features of this period, which was later called the “era of stagnation.” The main priorities in the economy remained heavy industry and military-industrial complex, and development of new oil and gas fields. The sale of raw materials and energy to developed countries provided foreign currency that was used to patch holes in the economy. The country was unable to effectively solve the problems of economic modernization.

A new technological revolution was taking place in the world, accelerating the transition of advanced countries from industrial to post-industrial (information) society, based on the use of cybernetics, microelectronics, and information technology. In the new conditions of global development, computerization, the growth of knowledge-intensive industries, and resource- and energy-saving technologies acquired great importance. The USSR lagged significantly behind advanced countries, produced obsolete products, and continued to develop industries characteristic of the industrial period. But the main reason for the lag was crisis of the entire socialist system.

A characteristic feature of this period is considered strengthening of administrative centralization of the economy and growth of the bureaucratic apparatus. Crisis phenomena in the national economy have become especially acute since the late 70s. Despite the increase in investment in agriculture, the expansion of collective farm rights, the introduction of collective farmers' salaries and the expansion of personal plots, the principle of collective farming and several lean years led to a sharp decline in agricultural production.


The Soviet Union began to regularly purchase grain and other products abroad. Accepted in 1982 The “food program” did not produce practical results. The depletion of the raw material base, the unfavorable demographic situation, the physical deterioration of equipment, the increase in military expenditures, confusion in the organization of labor, and the lack of material interest led to a drop in production rates, a decrease in the return on investment and the level of consumption.

Negative phenomena were also observed in public life. A decrease in the birth rate and an increase in mortality have led to an aggravation of the demographic situation in the country. There was a sharp increase in the urban population due to the outflow of people from rural areas. Constitution of the USSR 1977 Article 6 established the dominant role of the CPSU in the political system. The party elite has stabilized. At the same time, active resistance to the system grew in society, dissident movement . Representatives of the intelligentsia, religious people and some national minorities expressed their dissatisfaction with the omnipotence of the party apparatus.

Foreign policy of the Brezhnev era was more dynamic. The goal of Soviet diplomacy in relations with socialist countries is to eliminate the threat of the collapse of the military and economic union. In this regard, the following events should be noted: the entry of troops of five countries participating in the Warsaw Pact into Czechoslovakia in 1968 with the aim of suppressing the liberal movement; attempts in 1970 and 1980 by introducing martial law, stop the labor movement in Poland; material and military support for North Vietnam in the American-Vietnamese War of the late 60s - first half of the 70s; a sharp deterioration in relations with China, leading to border military conflicts.

Relations between the USSR and Western countries in the 70s are usually called the period "discharge". This process was marked by a departure from the harsh confrontation of the Cold War and the conclusion of a series of bilateral agreements on economic, scientific and cultural cooperation with Western countries. Agreements were also signed on the limitation of strategic and conventional weapons with France, and with Germany on the non-use of force in resolving controversial issues about post-war borders. In 1972 L.I. Brezhnev and R. Nixon signed a number of agreements on the limitation of strategic weapons.

The culmination of the détente process was the signing by the leaders of European countries, the USA and Canada in Helsinki August 1, 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). At this meeting, an act on human rights was adopted, also signed by the Soviet delegation. However, the violation of human rights in the USSR, the expansion of “socialism” into African and Asian countries, especially the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan (December 1979) The process of detente was finally curtailed.

In November 1982, Yu.V. became secretary general. Andropov, who held this post until 1984. He was replaced in February 1984 by K.U. Chernenko led the country for just over a year and died in March 1985. Andropov’s domestic policy was characterized by attempts to morally cleanse the party and eliminate the most blatant manifestations of corruption in the “family circles” of the party apparatus. Andropov also made attempts to strengthen labor discipline in production. Sanctions against violators were tightened, but after a slight increase in labor productivity in the first half of 1983, everything remained the same.

In the foreign policy of this period, tensions between East and West reached their highest point. In November 1983, all negotiations regarding weapons were interrupted. This situation continued until he came to power in April 1985

The history of any country, as a rule, is divided by scientists into certain periods of development. For example, when talking about Russia in the 17th-18th centuries, they often highlight the era of Peter the Great, Palace coups, and Catherine’s reforms. In turn, the 20th century is divided into the period of Stalinism, thaw, stagnation, and perestroika. Each of us has a different attitude towards them. For example, some characterize the period of stagnation in the USSR exclusively negatively, while others consider it perhaps the best Soviet era. Let's try to understand this in more detail.

Definition of the concept

What do historians mean when they talk about a period of stagnation? Mainly an era in the development of the country, which was distinguished by a relatively high standard of living of Soviet citizens, stability in all spheres of public life, as well as the absence of serious political and social upheavals.

The term “stagnation” came into use after Mikhail Gorbachev delivered a report at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party. The Secretary General used it to explain the slowdown in the country's economic progress. On the contrary, according to him, stagnation began to clearly appear in Soviet society.

The era of prosperity

Like any historical period, the time frame for stagnation is rather arbitrary. Most often it refers to the time when the country was led by Leonid Brezhnev. However, it is also wrong to think that immediately after his death perestroika began in the USSR. Approximately, historians define the years of the period of stagnation as follows: from 1964 to 1986. Thus, it covers the reign of L. Brezhnev, Y. Andropov and K. Chernenko.

The word “stagnation” evokes negative associations for most of us. Nevertheless, many researchers do not equate this era with a complete lack of forward movement in the country. Moreover, they indicate that during the twenty years of stagnation, the Soviet Union actually achieved its greatest prosperity in various spheres of state life, which is not a bad thing to know.

"Golden Age" of the USSR

This is how the years when the country was led by Leonid Brezhnev are sometimes characterized. The period of stagnation, and few people remember this, began with the introduction of cost accounting - a system of economic relations that is inherent in a capitalist economy. Even under the conditions of a planned socialist economy, the results of the 8th Five-Year Plan were impressive.

However, economic achievements were not the only ones. The Soviet Union has achieved great success in space exploration, sports, and culture. The living standards of Soviet people have risen, their social security has increased, and their confidence in the future has strengthened.

Industry

However, as many scientists note, the stability in the economy of those years was associated, on the one hand, with a sharp increase in world oil prices, and on the other, with the discovery of black gold deposits in Siberia. Thus, the country's leadership could postpone further reforms without losing profits. Although economic growth slowed down during the period of stagnation, oil revenues for the time being mitigated the consequences of this negative process.

During these years, many large enterprises were built in the USSR, including an automobile plant in Tolyatti. In 1974, thousands of Komsomol members went to the taiga to build the BAM railway, which, according to the Soviet leadership, was supposed to play a key role in the development of the Far East. The construction turned out to be another long-term construction project, and one that has not yet paid off.

Agricultural sector

In the 70s, the situation in agriculture worsened. After the agrarian reform, many collective farmers began to move to cities, and students who did not have the necessary skills came en masse to harvest the crops. The agricultural sector of the Soviet economy gradually declined, and by the mid-80s the threat of a food crisis was imminent in the country. Shortages of goods and long lines outside stores have become a common feature of everyday life during the period of stagnation.

Social paradox

And yet, in comparison with previous periods in the history of the Soviet Union, the years of stagnation were more favorable. Goods and products were relatively cheap, most citizens had the opportunity to travel to the sea in the summer or relax for free in trade union boarding houses and sanatoriums. In 1967, the country switched to a five-day working week, and many people became able to purchase household appliances and cars.

In this case, of course, we are not talking about comparing the well-being of Soviet citizens with the standard of living in Western countries. In this regard, the USSR was definitely a loser.

Foreign policy

During the period of stagnation, the country's leadership pursued a dual policy. On the one hand, important agreements were signed aimed at relieving international tension. On the other hand, the USSR sent troops to Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979). These displays of military power caused great damage to the country's image on the world stage.

In the early 70s, the Soviet Union overtook the United States in nuclear potential. The military buildup had disastrous consequences for the country's economy. Enormous funds from the state budget were directed not to the development of industry and agriculture, but to the needs of army designers. Such militarization undermined the already degrading economy of the country.

Fight against dissent

Although under L. I. Brezhnev the atmosphere of total fear disappeared, this in no way means that during the years when he stood at the helm of power, discontent could be freely expressed in the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the KGB, especially after the events in Czechoslovakia, intensified the fight against dissidents. True, the main method of intimidation was now not camps, but psychiatric hospitals. There was no talk of freedom of speech; the party completely controlled art, making it the mouthpiece of official propaganda.

Results

Despite some positive aspects, in general the period of stagnation became a prelude to perestroika. The need for change in the mid-80s was no longer recognized only by dissidents, but also by the party leadership. The main reasons that prompted M. Gorbachev to make a report on economic stagnation were:

  • ineffectiveness of command methods of managing the national economy;
  • collapse of the financial system;
  • the USSR's lag in technology;
  • commodity and food shortages;
  • falling living standards;
  • decline in world oil prices;
  • lack of economic reforms.

However, for many Soviet citizens, the years of L.I. Brezhnev’s rule became synonymous with stability and prosperity.

After the dismissal of N. Khrushchev, in October 1964, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, L. Brezhnev became the General Secretary of the Central Committee: Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - A. Kosygin; member of the Presidium responsible for the ideological sphere is M. Suslov.

All power, including legislative power, was concentrated in the hands of executive bodies: the highest, permanently functioning body of state power - the Presidium of the Supreme Council, the highest executive body - the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and locally - the executive committees of the Soviets. The Supreme Council of the USSR, consisting of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities, was subordinate to the Supreme Councils of the union and autonomous republics, the Councils of regions, cities and districts. The main feature of the party-state system of the USSR was the increase in the bureaucratic apparatus, which by the 80s had increased to 18 million people and became one of the largest in the world. Under Brezhnev, his personal secretariat gained significant size. The emphasis on personnel work was increased, the previous pre-Khrushchev structure of party, Komsomol and trade union bodies was restored. Regional, regional and district committees of the party were restored instead of the previous fictitious ones. rural economic councils were abolished and large state committees were created (Goskomtsen, Gossnab, State Committee for Science and Technology). In 1977, a new (“Brezhnev”) Constitution of the USSR was adopted, which strengthened the party’s control over government bodies and consolidated the successes achieved along the way. building so-called developed socialism.

THE ERA OF BREZHNEV (1964–1985)

"Golden Age" of nomenklatura

Although the leaders who replaced Khrushchev had differences, they were united on the main points. It was necessary to strengthen power and calmly enjoy the achieved position. Later they finally became convinced that trying to rebuild the system was very dangerous and troublesome. It's better not to touch anything. It was during this era that the formation of the gigantic bureaucratic machine of socialism was completed, and all its fundamental defects were clearly revealed. Gradually, some of Khrushchev’s measures, which to one degree or another limited the nomenklatura, were canceled, and sectoral ministries were restored.

Political life now took place much calmer and even more secretly than before. Using his position as General Secretary (Secretary General), L.I. Brezhnev, who did not seem like a leader, became the main leader. Once again it became clear that under the dominance of the CPSU, the position of the Secretary General of the Central Committee is key. It was with her help that both Stalin and Khrushchev were able to “take away” power from their more prominent comrades.

During the years of Brezhnev's rule, the position of the ruling layer strengthened, and its well-being increased. The nomenklatura was still a caste that had everything special: apartments, dachas, trips abroad, hospitals, etc. She did not know any shortages, since she also purchased goods in special stores. That is why those in power were especially interested in low prices: the more difficult it was for an ordinary citizen to buy something, the more valuable the nomenclature’s ruble was.

The nomenklatura did not represent a completely isolated layer from the people. Rather, they were numerous concentric circles, and the closer each of them stood to the population, the less power they had. Accordingly, an increasing number of positions and professions became the privilege of the nomenclature, for example, teachers of higher educational institutions. And the defense of a candidate's dissertation began to be surrounded by such complex rules, recommendations, directions that it was very reminiscent of the painful path of a medieval student to a master.

The upper layers of the nomenklatura were now increasingly replenished with people from the lower ones; for the most part, these positions were opened only for relatives and friends of high leaders. This, for example, is the path of Brezhnev’s son-in-law Churbanov, who from an ordinary officer became a general and deputy minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But those who had already found themselves in the corresponding circle began to leave it much less often: they were, as it were, moved from one leadership place to another. Because of the nomenklatura’s love for “warm places,” the number of officials in the country grew much faster than the total number of workers.

Relations within the nomenklatura system were characterized by veneration of rank, bribery and various “gifts”, displacement of talented people, rubbish with superiors, appointment of only one’s own to positions (and in some, especially non-Russian, republics, sale of positions), etc. Despite the lack of jurisdiction of the highest leaders of ordinary laws, various scandalous cases often broke out that could not be hushed up, such as the “big caviar case,” when high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Fisheries illegally sold black caviar abroad.

The Brezhnev era is undoubtedly the “golden age” of the nomenklatura. But it ended as soon as production and consumption finally came to a standstill.

Economy: reforms and stagnation.

The Brezhnev era was later called a “stagnant period.” The term “stagnation” originates from the political report of the Central Committee to the 27th Congress of the CPSU, read by M. S. Gorbachev, in which it was stated that “stagnation phenomena began to appear in the life of society” both in the economic and social spheres. Most often, this term refers to the period from L.I. Brezhnev’s coming to power (mid-1960s) to the beginning of perestroika (second half of the 1980s), marked by the absence of any serious upheavals in the political life of the country, as well as social stability and relatively high standard of living (as opposed to the era of the 1920s-1950s). However, the “stagnation” did not begin immediately. On the contrary, in 1965 they proclaimed an economic reform, conceived under Khrushchev. Its essence was to give enterprises more freedom, to force them to fight to increase profits and profitability, to link the results of labor and earnings (for this purpose, part of the profit was left to enterprises to pay bonuses, etc.).

The reform has yielded some results and revived the economy. The increase in purchasing prices had a positive impact in agriculture. However, its limited nature very soon became apparent. Deepening the transformations meant weakening the power of the nomenklatura, which they did not want to do. Therefore, gradually everything returned to its previous place. The plan and gross indicators remained the main thing. Branch ministries continued to take all profits from those who performed better and divide everything at their own discretion.

The main reason for the failure of the reform was the very essence of the Soviet model of socialism (unlike the Yugoslav, Hungarian or Chinese): the strict concentration of all resources in the center, a gigantic system of redistribution. There were officials in power who saw their purpose as planning for everyone, distributing and controlling. And they did not want to reduce their power. The underlying reason for this system was the dominance of the military-industrial complex. It was not possible to make this sector market-oriented.

The main customer and consumer of weapons was the state itself, which spared no expense on them. A huge number of heavy and even light industry enterprises were tied to the defense industry, operating in secrecy. There could be no talk of any kind of self-financing here. And in order to ease the burden of military expenses, the state sent all the best to the military-industrial complex. Therefore, it did not want to allow the free sale of raw materials, materials, energy, or the free movement of workers of certain qualifications. Without this, what kind of market can we talk about? So all the enterprises remained tightly tied to each other by controlling and planning bodies without the opportunity to look for partners themselves, to decide what and how much to produce.

Production was much more subordinated to the convenience of planning and control by officials than to the interests of the consumer or the amount of profit. It should, according to the planners, constantly grow, and “from what has been achieved,” that is, from the indicators of the previous period. As a result, it was often mainly military or non-essential production that grew. The costs of such growth became more and more significant, the economy became more and more “costly” in nature. In essence, growth was for the sake of growth. But the country was no longer able to pay more and more money for it. It began to slow down until it reached almost zero. Indeed, there was “stagnation” in the economy, and with it a crisis of the system. Returning to the reasons for the failure of the reform, let’s say that the main opportunity to abandon it was oil revenues. The Soviet Union actively developed oil and gas fields in Siberia and the North (as well as other mineral resources in the vast expanses of the East, North, Kazakhstan, etc.). Since the beginning of the 70s, world oil prices have increased many times. This gave the USSR a huge influx of foreign currency. All foreign trade was restructured: the main exports were oil, gas and other raw materials (as well as weapons), the main imports were machinery, equipment, goods for the population and food. Of course, the currency was actively spent on bribing foreign parties and movements, espionage and intelligence, trips abroad, etc., etc. Thus, the leadership received a powerful source of maintaining the system without changes. The flow of petrodollars finally buried the economic reform. The import of grain, meat, etc. made it possible to maintain the unprofitable collective and state farm system. Meanwhile, despite all the efforts and enormous costs, the results in agriculture were even worse than in industry.

Since the 50s, a scientific and technological revolution (STR) began in the world, associated with the introduction of electronics, artificial materials, automation, etc. We could not reduce the technological gap with the West. It was possible to withstand competition with him only in the military sphere through excessive effort and industrial espionage. Constant talk about “combining the advantages of socialism with the achievements of scientific and technological revolution” only emphasized our backwardness. When planning, enterprises had no incentives for technical progress; inventors only annoyed managers. Under these conditions, the Brezhnev team decided that oil exports could solve the problem of backwardness. The country began to sharply increase purchases of modern equipment abroad. In just 4 years from 1972 to 1976, the import of Western equipment increased 4 (!) times. Thus, the government was able to somewhat increase labor productivity, increase production, and organize the production of many modern goods. But by doing this, she completely corrupted our business executives, lowered the already low technical level of engineers, and drove her designers into a corner.

By the beginning of the 80s, the country had exhausted its growth opportunities by attracting new workers, developing new fields, and building enterprises. When world oil prices began to decline sharply, this meant a crisis for the entire socialist system. She is too used to petrodollars.

The period of stagnation was one of the quietest for citizens of the Soviet Union. Stagnation in the USSR is briefly characterized by many scientists as a period in which all spheres of the life of the state were in a state of stability. There was neither an economic crisis nor technological progress. In the history of the state, this period can rightly be called its heyday.

Like all other periods, this does not have a clearly defined period. Scientists often disagree with each other, arguing about the beginning and end of the period of stagnation. Most agree that stagnation is a period that lasted approximately 20 years, from Brezhnev's rise to power in 1964 until Gorbachev's rise to power, or more precisely, the start of his Perestroika policy in 1986. It was Gorbachev who first described stagnation in the USSR; he briefly expressed it by saying that stagnation appeared in the development of the state and public life. Thus, we owe the generally accepted name of this period to Gorbachev.

You should not perceive the period of stagnation as a purely negative phenomenon. It should be noted that at this time the Soviet Union reached its heyday. New cities were constantly being built, production potential was expanding, and space programs continued to operate. The USSR began to take part in international activities, restoring its reputation as an adequate partner. The level of well-being of the country's residents has also increased significantly. During this period there were no serious economic or political shocks; people began to believe in the future. However, modern historians determine that such stability was achieved thanks to the high cost of oil on the international market. Abundant supplies of “black gold” abroad made it possible to fill the state treasury without carrying out effective reforms and without improving the economic potential of the country. Economic growth stopped, and the state felt calm only through the export of raw materials. However, it looked like the calm before the storm.

Apparently, the country's leadership sensed some alarming signs, both within society and in international politics. In order to defuse the situation in the state itself and put pressure on the oil market, a military intervention was carried out in Afghanistan. An unsuccessful and aimless war, in which the entire civilized world stood on the side of the state’s sovereignty, undermined the shaky foundations of the state during Perestroika.

The period of Brezhnev stagnation

The period of stagnation (era of stagnation) is a period in the development of the Soviet Union, which is characterized by relative stability in all spheres of life, the absence of serious political and economic upheavals and an increase in the well-being of citizens.

The era of stagnation is usually understood as the period between the coming to power of L.I. Brezhnev in the mid-1960s and the beginning of perestroika in the early 1980s. On average, we can roughly designate the years of stagnation from 1964 to 1986.

The concept of a period of stagnation

The term “stagnation” was first coined in a political report by M.S. Gorbachev at the 27th Congress of the CPSU Central Committee, when he noted in his speech that certain stagnation phenomena began to appear in the development of the Soviet Union and the lives of citizens. Since then, the term has become widely used by politicians, economists and historians.

It should be noted that the term does not have an unambiguous interpretation, since stagnation is understood as both positive and negative phenomena. On the one hand, it was during these twenty years, according to historians, that the USSR reached its highest development - a huge number of large and small cities were built, the military industry was actively developing, the Soviet Union began to explore space and became a leader in this area; The country has also achieved significant success in sports, the cultural sphere and a variety of sectors, including the social sphere - the level of well-being of citizens has increased significantly, and confidence in the future has appeared. Stability is the main term that describes that period.

However, the concept of “stagnation” has another meaning. The country's economy virtually ceased its development during this period. By a fortunate coincidence, the so-called “oil boom” occurred and prices for black gold rose, which allowed the country’s leadership to make a profit simply from the sale of oil. At the same time, the economy itself did not develop and required reforms, but due to the general welfare, less attention was paid to this than required. Because of this, many people call the period of stagnation “the calm before the storm.”

Thus, on the one hand, at this time the USSR reached its highest peak, provided citizens with stability and became one of the world powers, and on the other hand, laid a not very good foundation for the economic development of the country in the future - during the period of perestroika.

Brezhnev's "era of stagnation" (a term coined Mikhail Gorbachev) arose from a combination of many factors: a long “arms race” between two superpowers, the USSR and the USA; the Soviet Union's decision to participate in international trade, thereby abandoning economic isolation but ignoring the changes taking place in Western societies; the growing severity of its foreign policy, which manifested itself, for example, in sending Soviet tanks to suppress Prague Spring 1968; interventions in Afghanistan; a bureaucracy oppressing the country, made up of elderly personnel; lack of economic reforms; corruption, commodity hunger and other economic problems unresolved under Brezhnev. Social stagnation within the country was intensified by the growing need for unskilled workers, a general labor shortage, and a decline in productivity and labor discipline. In the late 1960s and 1970s, Brezhnev, albeit sporadically, with the help Alexey Nikolaevich Kosygin, tried to introduce some innovations into the economy, but they were extremely limited and therefore did not give noticeable results. These innovations included economic reform of 1965, undertaken on the initiative of A. N. Kosygin. Its origins partly go back to Khrushchev. This reform was curtailed by the Central Committee, although it recognized the existence of economic problems.

Caricature of Brezhnev by Estonian-American artist E. Valtman

In 1973, the growth of the Soviet economy slowed. It began to lag behind the West due to the high level of spending on the armed forces and too little spending on light industry and consumer goods. Agriculture of the USSR could not feed the urban population, much less provide them with the increase in living standards that the government promised as the main fruit of “mature socialism.” One of the most famous critics of Brezhnev’s economic policies, Mikhail Gorbachev, later called the economic stagnation of the Brezhnev period “the lowest stage of socialism.” The growth rate of the USSR's gross national product in the 1970s decreased markedly compared to the rates of the 1950s and 1960s. They lagged behind the levels of Western Europe and the United States. GNP growth slowed to 1–2% per year, and in the technology sector the lag was even more obvious. Since the early 1980s, the Soviet Union was clearly in economic stagnation. During Brezhnev's final years, the CIA reported that the Soviet economy peaked in the 1970s, then accounting for 57% of American GDP. The development gap between the two countries was widening.

The last significant reform undertaken by the Kosygin government (and the last in the pre-perestroika era in general) was a joint resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers entitled “On improving planning and enhancing the impact of the economic mechanism on increasing production efficiency and quality of work,” also known as the 1979 reform. This The measure, unlike the 1965 reform, was aimed at expanding the influence of the central government on the economy by expanding the duties and responsibilities of ministries. But in 1980 Kosygin died, and his successor Nikolai Tikhonov had a conservative approach to economics. The “Reform of 1979” was almost never implemented.

Speech by L. I. Brezhnev on Japanese television, 1977

The Soviet Union's Eleventh Five-Year Plan reflected all these disappointing facts, calling for economic growth of only 4–5%. During the previous tenth five-year period, it was planned to increase production by 6.1%, but this goal was also not achieved. Brezhnev somehow avoided economic collapse by trading with Western Europe and the Arab world. Even some Eastern Bloc countries became economically more developed than the Soviet Union during the Brezhnev era of stagnation.