The simplest method of historical research. Principles and methods of historical research
Stage I. Selecting an object and setting a research problem.
Each historical study has its own object: an event, human activity, processes. It is beyond the power of an individual historian, or even many, to embrace the entire historical reality. Therefore, it is necessary to define a research problem aimed at solving a scientific problem. The problem highlights the unknown in the object of knowledge in the form of questions that the researcher must answer. The research problem determines not only the range of phenomena, but also the aspects and goals of the study. In the course of the historian’s work, all these components of the research task can be clarified.
The relevance of choosing a particular problem is dictated by the logic of science itself. It is also important how much it is in demand by modern society.
Two things should be kept in mind. Firstly, relevance is not necessarily periods of history close to us. Antiquity is no less relevant than modern times. Secondly, if the topic you have taken on has not been studied before, this in itself does not mean relevance: perhaps it does not need to be studied yet. We must prove that your topic will help solve serious scientific problems and shed additional light on subjects that interest us.
The most important point is taking into account the results achieved by historical science by the time scientific work began. We are talking about a historiographical review in a book or dissertation, which should substantiate the research problem, reveal the main directions and stages of research into a scientific problem, the methodology of scientific directions, the source base of their works and scientific significance. This analysis will identify unresolved problems, those aspects of the study that have not received adequate coverage or need to be corrected.
This analysis will allow you to determine the purpose and objectives of your work, and determine its place in the general stream of research. Historiographical justification is the most important stage of any research. In many ways, it determines the success of the historian’s work. It can be used to judge the degree of erudition and depth of problem posing. You need to strive for an objective assessment of the work of historians who wrote before you. There should be no nihilism towards predecessors, even if you consider their views outdated. It is necessary to look at what new things these historians gave in comparison with their predecessors, and not to find out what they do not have, based on modern positions - to observe the principle of historicism. But at the same time, we need to strive for a non-standard formulation of problems, look for new ways to solve them, taking into account the latest achievements of historical and related sciences, attract new sources, and go “breadth and depth” of the problem.
Stage II - identification of the source and information basis and selection of research methods.
Any historical problem can be solved only if there are sources containing the necessary information about the object of knowledge. The historian must use already known sources that other researchers have used before him: mastering new techniques, he can extract new information in accordance with the goals of the study and the chosen aspect of the study. In addition, the historian usually introduces new sources into scientific circulation and thereby enriches science. Of course, you need to know what sources of information existed during the period under study and you need to understand the system of existing archives and libraries in order to find the sources.
It is necessary to involve all the knowledge in the field of source studies, which studies the problems of searching, selecting, establishing the authenticity, and reliability of information from sources. You need to use the vast experience accumulated by historians and study the literature on the source study of the problem that interests you.
Sources need to be collected as many as necessary and sufficient to complete the task, to ensure qualitative and quantitative representation of specific data. What is important is not the formal number of sources, but their information richness. There is no need to clutter the study with unimportant facts. Excessive information can, of course, be used in further research, but at the moment it can complicate the achievement of the goal.
At the same time, there should be enough sources to solve the problems posed. According to I. Kovalchenko, the qualitative representativeness of the included information is determined by the extent to which it reveals the essential properties and connections of the object. The historian uses previously acquired knowledge about the object. If information from sources is not enough, the research problem must be adjusted. As for quantitative representativeness, it refers to mass sources. If there is not enough data, the study should be postponed.
Considering the claims of modern postmodernists that sources do not provide an idea of historical reality, it should be emphasized that without sources there can be no serious scientific research; it is necessary to constantly improve the methodology of source analysis, to overcome the difficulties of extracting information from sources that postmodernists point out.
At this stage of the research, it is necessary to decide on the system of methods that should be used. We have already noted that extra-source knowledge and the historian’s methodological arsenal are of decisive importance both in the selection and interpretation of sources and in the choice of methods.
Based on general philosophical, general scientific and general historical methods, the characteristics of which were given above, the historian determines specific problem-solving methods of research. There are a lot of them, and they are determined by the specifics of the object of study. It is at this level that an interdisciplinary approach is used, methods of sociology, psychology, etc. are used. But the main ones are general historical methods - genetic, comparative historical, etc. Mass phenomena require quantitative methods, but if there are not enough quantitative indicators, one should limit oneself to descriptive ones methods.
Of course, this is one of the most important and difficult aspects of research: you need to choose the most effective methods. Only the erudition and experience of a historian will help here. As a rule, young researchers experience the greatest difficulties here, and the help of a supervisor or consultant is invaluable.
The third stage is Reconstruction and the empirical level of knowledge of historical reality.
After completing the preliminary stage, which was discussed above, the period of actual research into the phenomena and processes of historical reality begins. I. Kovalchenko distinguishes two levels of knowledge - empirical and theoretical. On the first, the phenomenon is cognized, on the second, the essence is revealed and theoretical knowledge is formed. The identification of these stages is very arbitrary; in the practice of a historian they are intertwined: at the first stage the historian cannot do without theory, and at the second - without empirical material. But the fact is that the historian faces two dangers: going into empiricism, collecting facts that do not lead to generalizations, or, conversely, falling into sociologization, breaking away from historical facts: both undermine the prestige of historical science.
At the empirical level, based on the set goal and the existing scientific hypothesis, the range of phenomena and ways to identify and systematize scientific facts are determined. Moreover, the facts in historical research have a self-sufficient significance, they speak “for themselves”, and are not mere material for further operations. The historian subsumes the available data under certain scientific categories. Facts characterizing the phenomena are established. Empirical facts are systematized, compared, etc. To study the object of knowledge, a system of facts is needed. It is necessary to provide a representative system of facts. Here the entire arsenal of tools comes to the rescue: logical methods of extracting hidden information, intuition, imagination, especially a lot depends on erudition, accumulated knowledge. If the facts are still not enough, you need to adjust the research problem or abandon its solution. True, sometimes incomplete data can be compensated in the process of abstract-logical analysis at the theoretical level as a result of categorical synthesis.
Fourth stage. Explanation and theoretical level of knowledge. There has been a long debate about the ultimate goal of historical research. For any science, this goal is explanation. But V. Dilthey once put forward the idea that a historian cannot explain history, or at best, understand it.
In the 20th century, more and more people came to the conclusion that the historian should not limit himself to describing events, he should explain them. K. Hempel argued that a scientific explanation of a historical event means bringing it under some kind of law. True, this will not explain a specific event in its entirety, but only a certain aspect. W. Drey argued with Hempel, who defended the model of rational motivational explanation of certain human actions.
In addition, there are other types of explanation. Cause-and-effect (casual), when the objective and subjective causes of events and the results of human activity are revealed.
A genetic explanation reveals the essence of processes in their temporal expression. Explains the genesis and origin of events and processes.
Structural explanation - the essence is revealed through the analysis of the structures of social systems, structural-forming features, elements of systems and their relationships are identified.
A functional explanation is a type of structural explanation that allows us to understand the functioning of the system.
First, a hypothesis (theoretical scheme) is put forward. It is verified by facts, concepts and theories available to the historian. If it does not stand up to criticism, it is rejected, a new idea is put forward, a new hypothesis is born. The complete form of explanation is historical theory.
The role of theory in historical research. In explaining historical events, theory plays a decisive role. In history, theory generalizes and explains facts, connections and relationships based on concepts, ideas and laws. In theory, facts appear not in themselves, but in the form of concepts. The integrating principle is the idea. Building a theory requires creativity, a high level of cognition, and often the development of models.
Theory is involved in setting the research problem, selecting facts, and directing the research process. It performs important methodological functions. It is hardly possible to derive a theory from facts alone. Deductively, you can apply a theory to facts, but you cannot test a theory with facts alone. Logicians believe that a theory, as a complex system, can neither be completely proven nor disproved: there will always be facts for and against. Any theory explains only a certain class of phenomena and is not applicable in other cases.
There is no single axiomatic theory of the historical process that would be shared by all historians. Historians rarely develop their own theories; more often they borrow theories and models from sociology, anthropology, psychology, etc.
Historical theories come in different levels of generalization: fundamental and particular theories. Fundamental ones are theories of socio-economic formations, the theory of civilizations, cyclical theories of the historical process, the theory of modernization, etc.
Particular theories are, for example, the theory of the medieval city, imperialism, etc. Sociological theories of population mobility, conflictology and many others are used. In theory, its subjectivity, completeness, adequacy, interpretability and verifiability are valued. K. Popper believes that the author of any theory must try to refute it himself (the principle of falsifiability). And only after making sure of its suitability for analyzing facts, apply it. The result depends on the accuracy of the choice of theory; there may be mistakes: the imposition of an artificial construction on the facts, insufficient selection of facts. The discovery of new phenomena and relationships may require a change in theory.
The role of concepts and categories in explanation. Concepts are formed at the theoretical level of cognition. Historians have their own conceptual and categorical apparatus and are constantly improving it. Unlike the exact sciences, concepts are less defined, and the set of features and scope depend on the historian. Therefore, the concepts are polysemantic, constantly evolving and being refined by each researcher. According to semantics, G. Frege identifies a trinity in each concept: name, objective meaning (denotation), meaning, concept.
The historical concept is neither a fragment of reality nor a speculative construction; it is the result of the cognitive activity of the historian and, at the same time, a means of knowledge. It is woven into the fabric of historical research and can be the subject of independent logical analysis, but logical analysis cannot be separated from the objective, substantive side of knowledge.
The historical concept never coincides with reality. It summarizes the essence of the phenomena. It does not include all the features of an object, but only the essential ones. The discrepancy between concept and reality is explained by the individuality of historical events; they are repeated rarely and in various forms and almost never in their “pure” form. The concept cannot accommodate the complexity and diversity of historical reality. The asynchrony of the historical process also explains the discrepancy between concept and reality. The concept is poorer than a concrete historical event; it covers only the general logic of the event and schematizes the actual event. As soon as the historian is convinced that a concept does not correspond to the achieved level of knowledge, he seeks to clarify the concept. This is the main task of the study.
The historian needs the concept to understand specific events. It is difficult for historians to agree on an unambiguous definition of the concept. These definitions are always insufficient. Historical reality is richer than any concept. Concepts are polysemantic; if we rigidly define a concept, we will close the path further research and stop in the process of learning. Let us remember that the strict definition of a nation in Russian historiography has led to the fact that no history scientific research on the formation of nations in Europe, and indeed in Russia, did not appear at all. The concept should be open for further clarification and expansion of its content. The concept should be definite and stable, but should not be a universal master key. Finally, the concept cannot be divorced from reality, a specific era. The principle of historicism must not be violated, otherwise it will become meaningless.
Historical science has a certain system of developed concepts. The conceptual apparatus is constantly developing, old concepts are being clarified, and new ones are emerging. In connection with the development of an interdisciplinary approach, concepts from other sciences are used.
Concepts can be individual and general, there are specific and generic concepts, and finally, concrete and abstract. The complexity of operating concepts is due to the multifunctionality and vagueness of terms.
The language is characterized by polyvariant vocabulary. After all, the historian uses ordinary, natural, and not formalized artificial language.
Along with concepts, the historian uses categories - broad, extremely general concepts. These are generic concepts.
There are different levels of categories. Philosophical: movement, space, time, quality, quantity, contradiction, part, whole, individual, general, cause, effect, form, content and others.
Of particular note is the use of concepts and categories of related sciences, in particular, sociology, psychology, and human sciences. Using concepts from other sciences (in particular, mathematics) requires special knowledge and great care. But today, in the context of the integration of public and humanities with history this is necessary, although it requires additional knowledge from the researcher.
Incorrect handling of concepts leads to errors. I. Kovalchenko believes that the historian puts specific data under one category or another. This is where differences in the approach of individual historians are revealed. Different opinions are a manifestation of the activity of the cognizer. Disputes and discussions are the most important means of clarifying concepts and developing scientific research. Not a single scientific direction can lay claim to the ultimate truth.
Scientific disputes must be conducted correctly in form and have the goal of deepening knowledge, discussing new approaches, and clearly revealing the content of the concepts used. It is unacceptable to simplify or distort the views of your opponent.
The main thing is the constructive focus of discussions, and not sticking labels and humiliating opponents.
The logical structure of historical knowledge certainly deserves further development and clarification. In the book by K. Khvostova, V. Finn “Problems of historical knowledge in the light of modern interdisciplinary research” (1997), a special chapter is devoted to this problem. The authors highlight the main parts of this structure, the stages of logical constructions.
The authors emphasize the importance of a priori “prerequisite” knowledge, philosophical and worldview climate, and the state of historical science. All this is passed through the personality of the historian, who rethinks history in a broad sense.
The historian must pay special attention to the logical systematization of knowledge, formalization of his judgments, clarification of the concepts used, and formulation of the concept of his work. The logical structure of a historical work is hidden, disguised as natural language. But there is a logical structure, and attention must be paid to it. The authors identify four stages of topic analysis. The first is to create an argument for or against the inclusion of a system of statements (a priori or based on sources). The second is the analysis of cause-and-effect relationships (the logic of “discovery”). Third - situational logic (according to K. Popper). And finally, the fourth is creating a concept.
The historian masters the logic of argumentation. He uses evidence, axioms, plausible reasoning, masters rhetoric, and methods of persuasion.
The attempt of the book's authors to mathematically express the logical structure of historical research is worthy of attention, although it is difficult to understand for a historian who does not know mathematics. Perhaps this is one of the most complex and little-studied problems in the logic of historical research, although philosophers have dealt with it. But historians do not yet have such research, which negatively affects the training of young historians.
Historical concept. This is the most important final component of the study, the result of studying the material, logical constructions, testing theoretical hypotheses and formulating a generalization of factual material. The historical concept is used to evaluate the work of a historian and his contribution to science. Particular attention is paid to the logical consistency and evidence of the concept. Historians either create new concepts or clarify the old ones in some way. This is the main path of development of science.
The historical concept is embedded in the text of a historical essay; as a rule, it is briefly formulated in the conclusions or conclusion of the work. The historical concept, unlike theoretical schemes, is not abstract, but concrete. She systematizes the material and explains it. Unlike theory, the historical concept is concrete. This is the result, as noted earlier, of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete.
Checking the research results is the final stage of the historian’s work. We are aware of the relativity of the results obtained. But misconceptions are also relative. An erroneous result is useful for science - it shows the dead-end nature of the chosen methods and approaches. Meanwhile, every relative truth carries within itself a piece of the absolute, and the share of the latter increases: Objective truth is always concrete. The main way checking the results obtained - criticism. Historians, getting acquainted with a new work, immediately notice strengths and weaknesses. A content-logical analysis is carried out. Hypothesis testing is carried out by exclusion or inclusion in a broader problem. If the result contradicts the general system, the scientific problem needs to be adjusted. The main thing is to check the reliability of the author’s arguments and conclusions. The criteria for scientific character, in addition to reliability, include subjectivity, validity and consistency. Other historians, noticing weaknesses in the work, will write again on the same topic, using new sources and methods. The path of knowledge is endless and always thorny.
You can find reliable information and gain new historical knowledge methods studying history. As is known, any process of cognition, including the knowledge of history, consists of three components: the object of historical knowledge, the researcher and the method of cognition.
In order to develop an objective picture of the historical process, historical science must rely on a certain methodology that would make it possible to organize all the material accumulated by researchers.
Methodology(from the ancient Greek methodos - the path of research and logos - teaching) history is a theory of knowledge, including the doctrine of structure, logical organization, principles and means of obtaining historical knowledge. She develops the conceptual framework of science, general techniques and standards for obtaining knowledge about the past, deals with systematization and interpretation of the data obtained in order to clarify the essence of the historical process and reconstruct it in all its specificity and integrity. However, in historical science, as in any other science, there is no single methodology: differences in worldview and understanding of the nature of social development lead to the use of different methodological research techniques. In addition, the methodology itself is constantly in development, replenished with more and more new methods of historical knowledge.
Under methods Historical research should understand the ways of studying historical patterns through their specific manifestations - historical facts, ways of extracting new knowledge from facts.
Methods and principles
There are three types of methods in science:
Philosophical (basic) - empirical and theoretical, observation and experiment, isolation and generalization, abstraction and concretization, analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, etc.
General scientific – descriptive, comparative, comparative-historical, structural, typological, structural-typological, systemic,
Special (specific scientific) - reconstruction, historical-genetic, phenomenological (the study of historical phenomena, what is given in the sensory and mental intuition of a person), hermeneutic (the art and theory of interpretation of texts), etc.
The following methods are widely used by modern researchers:
Historical method - this is the path, the method of action through which the researcher acquires new historical knowledge.
The main historical methods of scientific research often include four methods: historical-genetic, historical-comparative, historical-typological and historical-systemic.
The most common in historical research is historical-genetic method. Its essence comes down to the consistent disclosure of the properties and functions of the object being studied in the process of its change. When using this method, cognition proceeds from the individual to the particular, and then to the general and universal. The advantage and at the same time disadvantage of this method is that when it is used, the individual characteristics of the researcher are revealed more clearly than in other cases. One of its weaknesses can be considered that an excessive desire to detail various aspects of the problem being studied can lead to an unfair exaggeration of unimportant elements and smoothing out the most important ones. Such a disproportion will lead to a misconception about the essence of the process, event or phenomenon being studied.
Historical-comparative method. The objective basis for its use is that socio-historical development is a repeating, internally determined, natural process. Many events that took place at different times and on different scales are similar in many ways and different from each other in many ways. Therefore, by comparing them, it becomes possible to explain the content of the facts and phenomena under consideration. This is the main cognitive significance of the historical-comparative method.
The right to exist as an independent method has historical-typological method. Typology (classification) serves to organize historical phenomena, events, objects in the form of qualitatively defined types (classes) based on their inherent common features and differences. For example, when studying the history of World War II, a historian can raise the question of the balance of power between the Hitler and anti-Hitler coalitions. In this case, the warring parties can be conditionally divided into two groups. Then the sides of each group will differ only in one way - their attitude towards Germany's allies or enemies. In other respects they may differ significantly. In particular, the anti-Hitler coalition will include socialist countries and capitalist countries (by the end of the war there will be more than 50 states). But this is a simple classification that does not give a sufficiently complete idea of the contribution of these countries to the common victory, but rather, on the contrary, is capable of developing erroneous knowledge about the role of these states in the war. If the task is to identify the role of each state in carrying out successful operations, destroying enemy manpower and equipment, liberating occupied territories, and so on, then the states of the anti-Hitler coalition corresponding to these indicators will be a typical grouping, and the study procedure itself will be a typology.
In current conditions, when historical research is increasingly characterized by a holistic coverage of history, it is increasingly used historical-systemic method, that is, a method using which the unity of events and phenomena in socio-historical development is studied. For example, considering the history of Russia not as some kind of independent process, but as a result of interaction with other states in the form of one of the elements in the development of the history of the entire civilization.
In addition, the following methods are widely used;
Dialectical method, which requires all phenomena and events to be considered in their development and in connection with other phenomena and events;
Chronological method, the essence of which is that events are presented strictly in temporal (chronological) order;
The problem-chronological method examines individual aspects (problems) in the life of society (state) in their strictly historical and chronological order;
Chronological-problematic method, in which the study of history is carried out by periods or eras, and within them - by problems;
The synchronous method is used less frequently; with its help, it is possible to establish a connection between individual phenomena and processes occurring at the same time, but in different parts of the country or beyond its borders.
Periodization method;
Retrospective;
Statistical;
Sociological method. research taken from sociology and used to study and research contemporary issues
Structural-functional method. Its essence lies in decomposing the object under study into its component parts and identifying the internal connection, conditionality, and relationship between them.
In addition, historical research also uses general scientific methods of cognition: analysis, synthesis, extrapolation, as well as mathematical, statistical, retrospective, system-structural, etc. These methods complement each other
It is important to consider that these and other existing methods are used in combination with each other, complementing each other. The use of any one method in the process of historical knowledge only removes the researcher from objectivity.
Principles of studying historical facts
Historical research is carried out on the basis of certain principles. Under principles It is customary to understand the basic, initial position of any theory, teaching, science, or worldview. The principles are based on objective laws of social historical development. The most important principles of historical research are: the principle of historicism, the principle of objectivity, the principle of a spatio-temporal approach to the event being studied.
The basic scientific principles are the following:
The principle of historicism presupposes the need to evaluate historical processes not from the standpoint of today's experience, but taking into account the specific historical situation. It requires the researcher to take into account the level of theoretical knowledge of the participants in a particular historical process, their social consciousness, practical experience, capabilities and means for making optimal decisions. An event or person cannot be considered simultaneously or abstractly, outside of temporal positions.
The principle of historicism is closely related to the principle of objectivity
Principle of objectivity involves relying on facts in their true content, not distorted or adjusted to fit a scheme. This principle requires considering each phenomenon in its versatility and inconsistency, in the totality of both positive and negative aspects. The main thing in ensuring the principle of objectivity is the personality of the historian: his theoretical views, culture of methodology, professional skill and honesty. This principle requires the scientist to study and illuminate each phenomenon or event in its entirety, in the totality of its positive and negative aspects. Finding the truth for a true scientist is more important than party, class and other interests.
Principle spatio-temporal approach to the analysis of the processes of social development suggests that outside the categories of social space and time as forms of social existence it is not possible to characterize social development itself. This means that the same laws of social development cannot be applied to different historical eras. With changes in specific historical conditions, changes in the form of manifestation of the law may occur, expansion or narrowing of the scope of its action (as happened, for example, with the evolution of the law of class struggle.
The principle of the social approach involves consideration of historical and economic processes taking into account the social interests of various segments of the population, various forms of their manifestation in society. This principle (also called the principle of the class, party approach) obliges us to correlate class and narrow group interests with universal ones, taking into account the subjective aspect of the practical activities of governments, parties, and individuals.
The principle of alternativeness determines the degree of probability of the occurrence of a particular event, phenomenon, process based on an analysis of objective realities and possibilities. Recognition of historical alternativeness allows us to re-evaluate the path of each country, see the untapped possibilities of the process, and draw lessons for the future.
Methodological concepts of the historical process.
History is one of the oldest sciences, about 2500 years old. During this time, many conceptual approaches to the study of the historical past of mankind have developed and functioned in historical science. For a long time, it was dominated by subjectivist and objective-idealistic methodologies.
From the standpoint of subjectivism, the historical process was explained by the actions of outstanding historical figures: Caesars, Shahs, Kings, Emperors, Generals, etc. According to this approach, their talented actions or, conversely, mistakes and inactions, led to certain historical events, the totality and interconnection of which determined the course of the historical process.
The objectively idealistic concept assigned a decisive role in the historical process to the manifestation of superhuman forces: Divine will, Providence, the Absolute Idea, the World Spirit, etc. With this interpretation, the historical process acquired a strictly purposeful and orderly character. Under the influence of these superhuman forces, society was supposedly moving towards a predetermined goal. People, individual historical figures acted only as a means, an instrument in the hands of these faceless forces.
An attempt to put the methodology of historical research on a scientific basis was first made by the German thinker K. Marx. He formulated concept of materialistic understanding of history , based on 4 main principles:
The unity of humanity, and, consequently, the unity of the historical process;
Historical pattern, i.e. recognition of the action in the historical process of general stable laws of social development;
Determinism - recognition of the existence of cause-and-effect relationships and dependencies in the historical process;
Progress, i.e. the progressive development of society, rising to higher and higher levels of its development.
The Marxist materialist explanation of history is based on formational approach to the historical process. Marx believed that if humanity as a single whole develops naturally, progressively, then each part of it must go through all stages of this development. These stages in the Marxist theory of knowledge are called socio-economic formations. The concept of “socio-economic formation” is key in Marxism in explaining the driving forces of the historical process and the periodization of history.
basis socio-economic formation and, according to Marx, is one or another mode of production. It is characterized by the level of development of the productive forces of society and the nature of production relations corresponding to this level. The totality of production relations and methods of production constitute the economic basis of a social formation, on which all other relations in society (political, legal, ideological, religious, etc.), as well as state and public institutions, science, culture, morality, are built on and on which depend. morality, etc. Thus, the concept of socio-economic formation includes all the diversity of the life of society at one or another stage of its development. The economic basis determines the qualitative feature of a given formation, and the superstructure generated by it characterizes the uniqueness of the social and spiritual life of the people of this formation.
From point of view formational approach, The human community in its historical development goes through five main stages (formations):
primitive communal
slaveholding,
feudal,
capitalist and
communist (socialism is the first phase of the communist formation). The transition from one formation to another is carried out on the basis social revolution. The economic basis of the social revolution is the conflict between the productive forces of society, which have reached a new, higher level, and the outdated system of production relations.
In the political sphere, this conflict manifests itself in the growth of irreconcilable, antagonistic contradictions in society, in the intensification of the class struggle between the oppressors and the oppressed. Social conflict is resolved by revolution, which brings a new class to political power. In accordance with the objective laws of development, this class forms a new economic basis and political superstructure of society. Thus, according to Marxist-Leninist theory, a new socio-economic formation is being formed.
At first glance, this concept creates a clear model of the entire historical development of society. The history of mankind appears before us as an objective, natural, progressive process. However, the formational approach to understanding the history of social development is not without significant drawbacks.
Firstly, it assumes the unilinear nature of historical development. The specific experience of the development of individual countries and regions shows that not all of them fit into the strict framework of the five socio-economic formations. The formational approach, therefore, does not reflect the diversity and multivariance of historical development. It lacks a spatiotemporal approach to the analysis of social development processes.
Secondly, the formational approach strictly connects all changes in society with the economic basis, economic relations. Considering the historical process from the standpoint of determinism, i.e. Attaching decisive importance in explaining historical phenomena to objective, extra-personal factors, this approach assigns a secondary role to the main subject of history - man. This ignores the human factor, downplays the personal content of the historical process, and along with it the spiritual factors of historical development.
Thirdly, the formational approach absolutizes the role of conflict relations in society, gives the class struggle and violence decisive importance in the progressive historical development. However, as the historical experience of the last fifty years shows, in many countries and regions the manifestation of these “locomotives of history” is limited. In the post-war period in Western Europe, for example, a reformist modernization of social structures was carried out. While not eliminating the inequality between labor and capital, it nevertheless significantly increased the living standards of wage workers and sharply reduced the intensity of the class struggle.
Fourthly, the formational approach is associated with elements of social utopianism and even providentialism (a religious and philosophical view according to which the development of human society, the sources of its movement and purpose are determined by mysterious forces external to the historical process - providence, God). The formational concept based on the law of “negation of negation” assumes the inevitability of the development of the historical process from primitive communal communism (classless primitive communal socio-economic formation) through class (slave, feudal and capitalist) formations to scientific communism (classless communist formation). The inevitability of the onset of the communist era, the “welfare society” runs like a red thread through all Marxist theory and ideology. The utopian nature of these postulates has been fully revealed in recent decades in the Soviet Union and other so-called countries. socialist system.
In modern historical science, the formational methodological concept is opposed to methodology civilizational approach to the process of development of human society. The civilizational approach allows scientists to move away from a one-dimensional picture of the world and take into account the uniqueness of the development paths of individual regions, countries and peoples.
The concept of “civilization” has become widely established in modern Western historiography, politics, and philosophy. The most prominent representatives of the civilizational concept of social development among Western researchers are M. Weber, A. Toynbee, O. Spengler and a number of other prominent scientists.
However, for many decades, Soviet social science, in presenting the course of the world-historical process, placed the main emphasis on the theory of socio-economic formations, because the cornerstone of this theory is the substantiation of the revolutionary replacement of capitalism by socialism. And only in the late 80s - early 90s. In the domestic scientific literature, the shortcomings of the rigid five-fold approach to history began to be revealed. The requirement to complement the formational approach with a civilizational one sounded like an imperative.
The civilizational approach to the historical process and social phenomena has a number of serious advantages over the formational one:
Firstly, its methodological principles are applicable to the history of any country or group of countries and to any historical time. It is focused on understanding the history of society, taking into account the specifics of individual countries and regions and, to a certain extent, is universal in nature;
Secondly, the focus on taking into account the specifics of individual human communities makes it possible to consider history as a multilinear and multivariate process;
Thirdly, the civilizational approach does not reject, but, on the contrary, presupposes the integrity and unity of human history. From the point of view of this approach, individual civilizations as integral systems that include various elements (economic, political, social, science, culture, religion, etc.) are comparable to each other. This makes it possible to widely use the comparative historical method of research. As a result of this approach, the history of individual countries, peoples, regions is not considered in itself, in comparison with the history of other countries, peoples, regions, civilizations. This makes it possible to better understand historical processes and identify the peculiarities of the development of individual countries;
Fourthly, the definition of clear criteria for the development of the world community allows researchers to fairly fully assess the level of development of certain countries and regions, their contribution to the development of world civilization;
Fifthly, in contrast to the formational approach, where the dominant role belongs to economic factors, the formational approach gives its due place in the historical process to spiritual, moral and intellectual human factors. Therefore, when characterizing a particular civilization, such factors as religion, culture, and the mentality of the people play an important role.
However, the civilizational approach also contains a number of significant flaws. This, first of all, refers to the amorphous nature of the criteria for determining types of civilization. It is known that in the development of some civilizations the economic principle is decisive, in others it is the political principle, in others it is the religious principle, and in others it is the cultural principle. Particularly great difficulties arise when assessing the type of civilization, when its most important essential principle is the mentality of society.
In addition, in civilizational methodology the problems of the driving forces of the historical process, the direction and meaning of historical development are not clearly developed.
It is also important to emphasize that the last quarter of the twentieth century was marked by intense reassessment of values. Many scientists perceive this phenomenon as a spiritual revolution, which prepares the arrival of a new system of social life or, as they say today, a new world order, i.e. a qualitatively new stage in the development of world civilization. In the context of the unfolding intellectual revolution, there is a crisis not only of the Marxist methodology of knowledge, but also of almost all areas of major classical theories of knowledge with their philosophical, ideological and logical-methodological foundations. According to Professor V. Yadov, world sociological thought today “casts doubt on the suitability of all classical social theories developed in the past”
The crisis in the theory of knowledge of the surrounding world is caused, first of all, by the fact that modern human society is entering a new era of its development, which is usually called a turning point. In a variety of forms, the trends inherent in the new order of development are affirmed - the trends in the formation of a multidimensional world. Previously existing theories of knowledge (including Marxism) were focused on the development of machine civilization. Marxism in its essence is the logic and theory of machine civilization. However, this theory in one form or another extended to both earlier and future forms of social development.
Today, humanity is experiencing a change from the industrial paradigm of social progress to post-industrial, informational, which indicates its entry into a new world civilization. And this, in turn, necessitates the creation of an appropriate logical and methodological tool for understanding social development.
Among the new methodological approaches to the problems of global social development, the concept of a multifundamental multidimensional world should be highlighted. One of the criteria for multidimensionality is the equation of the part and the whole. In the multidimensional picture of a social system, such parts as culture, science, economics, politics, etc. are not less than the whole, but are of equal order and equal in power (equal in essence) with it. In other words, multidimensionality is not a relationship between a social system and its private spheres, levels, subsystems, and not a relationship between structures, one of which is determined by the basic, primary, fundamental, etc. This relationship is revealed at a deeper level: between such structures, each of which is an equivalent individual dimension of the social whole into which it is included.
Recently, researchers have demonstrated an increasing commitment to a nonlinear (synergetic) style of thinking. Having emerged in the field of physics and chemistry and acquiring the corresponding mathematical support, synergetics quickly expanded beyond the scope of these sciences, and soon biologists, and after them social scientists, found themselves under its powerful influence.
Using synergetics as a methodology, historical processes are studied in their multidimensional form. The central place in the study is occupied by issues of self-organization, self-development in open and closed systems. Society appears as a nonlinear system with an integrating system-forming factor. The role of this factor in different systems can be played by different subsystems, including not always the economic sphere. Much depends on the reaction of society to the challenge of the “external environment” and the dynamics of internal processes. The reaction of society is aimed at achieving the most useful result within the framework of appropriate value orientations.
Synergetics considers the development of society as a nonlinear system, which is carried out through two models: evolutionary and bifurcation. The evolutionary model is characterized by the action of various determinations. They are not limited to cause-and-effect relationships, but also include functional, target, correlation, systemic and other types of determinations. A distinctive feature of the evolutionary model is the immutability of system quality, which is determined through the system-forming factor. Throughout the entire stage of evolutionary development, the system-forming factor manifests itself as a special activity of a specific set of systems that play a leading role in the life of society at a given period of time.
According to the evolutionary model, the sustainable development of society is replaced by an increase in internal disequilibrium - a weakening of connections within the system - which indicates an impending crisis. In a state of maximum internal disequilibrium, society enters a bifurcation phase of development, after which the previous systemic quality is destroyed. The old determinations are not in effect here, the new ones have not yet unfolded. Under these conditions, alternative opportunities for reaching new systemic connections arise. The choice of one path or another at the bifurcation point depends on the effect of fluctuation (random factor), first of all, on the activities of specific people. It is a specific historical person (or persons) who bring the system to a new systemic quality. Moreover, the choice of path is made based on individual attitudes and preferences.
The role of chance and freedom at the bifurcation point is not just great, it is fundamental. This allows us to single out the class of unstable systems as an independent object of study, along with stable systems. The effect of the randomness factor indicates that the historical development of each society is individual and unique.
Recognizing the multiplicity of development paths of various societies, laying out individual routes through bifurcation points, synergetics understands a general historical pattern not as a single path of historical development, but as common principles of “walking” along different historical routes. Thus, synergetics allows us to overcome the limitations of classical approaches in history. It combines the idea of evolutionism with the idea of multivariate historical process. Historical synergetics gives scientific status to the problem of the “historical fate of Russia”, which has been debated for more than a century and a half.
Among modern non-traditional concepts of historical development, the systemic sociocultural theory of our compatriot A.S. deserves special attention. Akhiezer, outlined in his three-volume study “Russia: criticism of historical experience”. It is important to emphasize that the author considers the new systemic view of Russian history from a non-Marxist methodological position and against the general background of the world historical process. The study is not limited to a purely Russian framework, only to modernity, but illuminates both the retrospective and the prospects of world civilization
Traditional ideas for Marxism about the determining role of economic relations, about the leading role of the working class, in general about class relations in the historical process, about exploitation, about surplus value, etc. are not relevant in the system of categories that A. Akhiezer is developing. In fact, the main subject of the author’s research was the sociocultural potential of Russian society. The theory is based on the category of reproduction. For Akhiezer, this category is different from Marxist ideas about simple and expanded production. It acts as a general philosophical category, focusing on the need for constant reconstruction, restoration and development of all aspects of social existence, focusing on the need to maintain and preserve what has already been achieved. It is in this, according to Akhiezer, that the viability of society is manifested, the ability to avoid social catastrophes, destruction and death of social systems.
The author views culture as the experience of understanding the world created and acquired by a person, and social relations as organizational forms that realize this cultural experience. There is never an identity between culture and social relations. Moreover, an indispensable condition for human life, the life of society, and the course of history is the contradiction between them. The normal process of development of society continues until the contradiction passes a certain point, beyond which the destruction of both culture and social relations begins.
In Russia, the sociocultural contradiction has resulted in such a sharp form as a split. It is in the split that Akhiezer sees the explanation of why historical inertia operates so strongly in Russia. A split is the lack of dialogue between the values and ideals of the bulk of the population, on the one hand, and the ruling, as well as the spiritual elite, on the other, the incompatibility of the semantic fields of different socio-cultural groups. The consequence of the split is a situation where people and society cannot become subjects of their own history. As a result, spontaneous forces operate in it, throwing society from one extreme to another, leading it from catastrophe to catastrophe.
The schism occurs and is reproduced in all spheres of public life, including in the cultural and spiritual spheres. Due to the reproduction of the split, all attempts by the Russian ruling elite to radically change the situation and overcome the split led to nothing. Akhiezer sees the mechanism of the split in the following. In the East, traditional (syncretistic) forms of worldview translate new realities into their own language, i.e. there is a synthesis of traditional and modern cultures, which can become dynamic and not impede development. In the West, new ideals grew from popular soil and the contradictions between the cultural innovations of a liberal society and traditional culture were pushed into the background. In Russia, these contradictions still persist and are even worsening. Coming into contact with traditional ones, new ideals here form not a synthesis, but a hybrid, which often results in the strengthening of their old anti-modernization content. Therefore, every step forward can also become a rollback. The hybrid of liberalism with traditionalism in Russia has shown its limited possibilities, since traditionalism occupied too much of a place in our country. This is the explanation of why in our society the ideals of the past are often defended by full-blooded, integral individuals, while reformers look fragile and wavering. However, the split in Russia is not some inherent attribute of Russian society, but the result of the development of the historical situation. And therefore, despite its centuries-old existence, it is temporary, transitory.
The theory created by A. Akhiezer can also be defined as the theory of transitional social systems. Traditional society (Eastern civilization) is not familiar with the contradictions that plague Russia. Western society (liberal civilization) also successfully avoided them (at least in sharp conflict forms). In this regard, many researchers consider Russia as a special, third mega-civilization - Eurasian. However, the Eurasian civilization is not absolutely unique. This is, rather, a special case of situations common to countries that are late in their development. It is no coincidence that they are called “catching up civilizations.”
A. Akhiezer, thus, moved away from the linear scheme (positivist, pragmatic), which studies historical processes in some fixed general units, and presented us with a voluminous, multidimensional vision of history. The center of his research is the process of reproduction, recrystallization of the sociocultural whole. There appears a view of society not as something linear and progressively developing, but as a living organism capable of changing its characteristics under the influence of external subjective factors. Moreover, this social organism is characterized by repeating cyclical development. The author sees the possibility of stopping such development on the paths of globalization of our internal development, i.e. complete transition to a global civilizational path of development.
Today we observe in science processes of synthesis of sciences based on the development of complex research methods.
All major creative scientific and scientific-technical problems today are solved through the creation of creative and scientific groups, laboratories, research institutes, uniting scientists of different specialties. In the course of joint work on specific projects, a new scientific language common to various sciences is developed and there is an intensive exchange of information accumulated during the period of scientific differentiation. This allows researchers to predict the formation and development of a unified science or a return to the period of undifferentiated science only at a different level.
Since the beginning of the 20th century. There is a growing understanding among philosophers and historians of the relationship and interdependence of various factors interacting in human society. Moreover, at different stages of human development, the role of various factors and their place in the life of an individual and society change.
Thus, in the early stages of human development, biological and geographical factors seem to be decisive, then economic, and finally, in our time, technical and scientific. Modern historical science examines the entire set of factors, their interweaving and interaction. A significant contribution to the formation of this approach was made by representatives of Russian philosophy, one of the founders of scientific sociology P. Sorokin, as well as the historical school “Annals”, which developed mainly in France in 1929 (J. Annaly, as well as the scientist geophysicist Vernadsky, philosopher B. Russell, historian M. Block, etc.) This concept is called the civilizational or cultural approach to history.
Today, the development of this concept continues, moving from the level of scientific hypotheses to the level of curricula for colleges and universities. In accordance with this concept, human history is divided into three main periods: savagery (the period of gathering and hunting), barbarism (the period of agrarian culture), and the period of industrial civilization. Obviously, this periodization is based on the nature of the activities of most people in a given society at a given time. The civilizational approach to history does not deny, but organically includes both chronological and formational approaches. At the same time, there are differences in periodization. They are clearly visible from the table below.
Periodization of world history in various methodological approaches of historical science.
|
Chronological |
Formational |
Civilization |
|
1. ANCIENT WORLD: since ancient times BC |
1. PRIMITIVE COMMUNAL since ancient times up to 3500 BC |
1.WILDLIFE: from > 3 million years BC up to 10 thousand years BC |
|
2. MIDDLE AGES: From the 5th century AD Until the 15th century |
2. SLAVE OWNERSHIP: From 3500 BC until the 5th century AD |
2. BARBARY: 10,000 BC – Mid-18th century |
|
3. NEW TIME: from the 16th century to 1917 |
3.FEUDAL FORMATION: From V to XVI century 3. CAPITALISM: from the 16th century to 1917 |
3. INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION: End of the 18th century. – 1970s |
|
4. RECENT HISTORY: from 1917 to our days |
4. SOCIALISM: 1917 to present day |
4. POST-INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION since the 1970s and the foreseeable future |
|
5.COMMUNISM: not very distant future. |
Any scientific research is a systematic process. The set of procedures performed in historical research breaks down into the following main stages: selection of an object and formulation of a research problem; identifying the source and information basis for its solution and developing research methods; reconstruction of the historical reality under study and its empirical knowledge; explanation and theoretical knowledge; determination of the truth and value of the acquired knowledge and its evaluation. All these stages, firstly, are consistently and closely interrelated and, secondly, consist of a whole set of research procedures that require appropriate methods. Therefore, with a more detailed disclosure of the logical structure of historical research, it is possible to identify a significantly larger number of its internal stages\ In this case, we limit ourselves to only the indicated main ones, because this does not mean revealing the entire sequence of procedures that make up historical research, but only a statement of the most significant methodological problems solved in it.
1. Statement of the research problem
Each historical scientific study (like any other) has its own object of knowledge. It is some part of objective historical reality, taken in one or another of its spatio-temporal manifestations. The scale of this reality can be very different, from individual events to complex social systems and processes.
- See: Grishin B. A. Logic of historical research. M., 1961; Gerasimov I. G. Scientific research. M., 1972; It's him. Structure of scientific research (philosophical analysis of cognitive activity). M., 1985.
Objective historical reality, which has many inherent properties and connections, cannot be reflected in all its diversity. only a single study, but even a series of them. Because of this, in any study not only an object of knowledge is selected, but also a research task aimed at solving a specific scientific problem is consciously set or implied. Scientific problem 2 is the ones that arose in the process scientific knowledge a question or set of questions, the solution of which has practical or scientific-educational significance. False problems, i.e., artificially posed questions that have neither scientific nor practical significance, should be distinguished from truly scientific problems that objectively arose and are of significant interest. The problem highlights the unknown in the object of knowledge in the form of questions, which form the basis for setting specific research tasks. The research task not only reveals the range of reality phenomena to be studied, but also determines specific aspects and goals of their study, because these aspects and goals can be diverse. Of course, all this does not exclude “free” research search, which can lead to very significant results and even unexpected discoveries.
When choosing an object to study and setting a research problem, the historian must proceed, firstly, from taking into account the practical needs of our time and, secondly, from the state of knowledge of the reality under study, the degree of its scientific knowledge. In this regard, both the object of knowledge and the problem being solved must be relevant, i.e. be of practical and scientific-educational interest.
To actively meet social needs, historians must have a good knowledge of modernity and the demand it places on historical knowledge in various temporal and substantive aspects. Moreover, the historian must not only satisfy one or another already defined need for historical knowledge, but also show, as was indicated when characterizing the social functions of historical science, activity and persistence in translating the results of historical research into social practice.
- 2 See: Berkov V.F. Scientific problem. Minsk, 1979; Karpovich V.N. Problem. Hypothesis. Law. Novosibirsk, 1980.
As for the modern era in the development of Soviet society, among the many problems to which historians can contribute, attention should be paid to two. First of all, this is the role of the human factor in all manifestations and at all levels in accelerating social progress. Therefore, along with revealing the internal conditionality and patterns of socio-historical development, it is necessary to increase attention to identifying the subjective-historical factors of this development, to showing their interaction with objective factors, to analyzing the mechanisms of this interaction. In addition, the study of the past should serve to improve the ways and methods of predicting the subsequent course of modern development. History opens up great opportunities here that are not only not used, but are not even properly realized. They consist in the fact that, as indicated, by studying the “past present” and predicting the “past future” that follows it, the historian has the opportunity to compare these forecasts with the real course of development and, on this basis, develop effective principles, ways and methods of making forecasts. Historians must solve this problem together with forecasting specialists - economists, sociologists, mathematicians, etc.
In light of the above, it is also obvious that the practical relevance of historical research is not determined by its temporal proximity to modernity alone, although, naturally, the recent past in many aspects contains more that is practically significant for solving the problems of current development than distant eras . But this is only in general. In general, only with a broad, comprehensive and deep knowledge of the past can historical science fully meet the needs of our time.
A justified choice of an object of historical research and especially the formulation of a research problem and the choice of ways and methods for solving it require indispensable consideration of the degree of study of the phenomena and processes of historical reality under consideration. Historical knowledge, like any other scientific knowledge based on Marxist theory and methodology, is a continuous and progressive process, the continuation of which can be successful only on the basis of taking into account its previous progress and the results achieved. In historical science, the solution to this problem, as is known, is dealt with by a special historical discipline - historiography. The importance of knowledge of the previous development of historical science for the practice of current historical research was responsible for its emergence.
The concept of “historiography” is used in different senses. Most often, historiography means one or another set of scientific works on socio-historical development. In this sense, they talk about historiography on the history of the Middle Ages, modern history, national history or the historiography of the Decembrist movement, the peasant reform of 1861, etc., meaning all historical literature on these subjects that has arisen throughout history of their study. In another version of this approach, historiography means the totality of historical works created in a particular historical era, i.e. at one or another stage of development of historical science, regardless of their thematic content (for example, French historiography of the restoration era, Russian historiography of the period of imperialism, Soviet historiography of the Great Patriotic War etc.).
The study of the history of historical science has two aspects. The first one is general state and the development of historical science in a particular country (or a number of countries) throughout its history or in certain historical periods. It is aimed at identifying the patterns and features of the development of historical science, its main stages and directions, their inherent theoretical and methodological foundations and specific historical concepts, as well as the social conditions for the functioning of historical science and its influence on social life etc. The second aspect comes down to studying the history of the development of individual problems, that is, historiographic analysis covers the entire set of historical studies devoted to the study of certain phenomena of socio-historical development. In the conditions of an acute ideological struggle between Marxist and bourgeois ideologies and in the field of historical science, a special branch of Marxist problematic historiographic research has become work on the criticism of non-Marxist research on certain subjects of the past, primarily on the history of our country.
Finally, the works themselves on the history of historical science (in their indicated variants) become the object of special study, and a type of work arose that is called the historiography of historiography.
Thus, in the practice of historical research, the term “historiography” has acquired the character of a generic concept, including a number of its types. To avoid confusion in the use of concepts, it would be advisable for each of them to be designated by a specific term. Over time, this will probably happen. At the moment, there is a tendency to mean by historiography research on the history of historical science, both in general and in relation to the history of the development of its individual problems. In this regard, the totality of historical works created in a particular era or devoted to the study of certain eras or individual phenomena of the past is better called not historiography, but historical works of such and such an era or works about such and such an era. then historical eras and historical phenomena.
The purpose of the historiographic substantiation of the research task is to reveal the main stages and directions that took place in the study of the relevant phenomena or processes, the theoretical and methodological approaches from which representatives of different directions proceeded, the source information base and methods of study, the results obtained and their scientific significance in the history of the study of the historical reality in question. On this basis, those aspects of it can be identified. realities that either did not receive proper coverage or were completely outside the research field of view. The formulation of the research problem should be aimed at their study. Its implementation is aimed at obtaining new knowledge about the phenomena and processes being studied.
The historiographic substantiation of the research problem is the most important stage in any historical research. A successful solution to the issues that arise here requires adherence to the principles common to historical science - historicism, partisanship and objectivity. It is clear that in historiographic research these principles have their own specific manifestation and are associated with the solution of a number of specific methodological problems.
One of them is the definition of those criteria on the basis of which significantly different areas of historical science should be distinguished, engaged in the study of the historical reality under consideration (and the historical past in general). The basis here should be the identification of the social and class positions of historians, for it is these positions that primarily determine the degree of objectivity of research, as well as their target specification. At the same time, within the framework of unified social-class trends in historical science, there may be internal movements that differ both in the degree of scientific objectivity and in the content of specific historical concepts. These differences are determined by the theoretical and methodological premises underlying these concepts. Thus, the historical concepts of bourgeois historical science in the field of theory are based on idealism, and on vulgar materialism, and on pluralism, and in methodology - on subjectivism, objectivism and relativism. But different theoretical and methodological approaches do not take the internal currents of bourgeois historical science beyond the limits of their single bourgeois class essence.
Thus, the directions of historical science should be distinguished by party-class essence, and their internal currents - by differences in the theory and methodology of historical knowledge. The main stages in the development of both historical science as a whole and in the study of individual phenomena and processes of the past are characterized by a certain combination of directions inherent in a particular period of history. Significant changes in the relationship between these directions (for example, the transition of a leading role from one direction to another) mean a transition from one stage to another.
Different stages in the study of the past and certain of its phenomena and processes also take place in Soviet historical science. But these stages after the establishment of Marxist theory and methodology of historical knowledge in Soviet historical science in the mid-30s differ not in ideological-class orientation and theoretical-methodological equipment, as bourgeois historiographers sometimes try to portray, but in the relationship between differentiation and integration in the development of historical science, the nature of its source basis and methods of historical research, and thereby the theoretical, methodological and specific scientific level of these studies and their social and scientific significance.
An important place in the historiographic substantiation of the research task is the assessment of scientific results obtained by individual researchers, schools, movements and directions of historical science. Obviously, this assessment must be objective and historical. Objectivity requires the exclusion of any givenness, freedom from both nihilism and conservatism, that is, from both underestimation and overestimation of the results obtained. Historicism obliges us to judge the scientific merits of historians, as well as all scientists, not by what they did not provide in comparison with current state science, but by the fact that they gave something new in comparison with their predecessors 3. When identifying this new thing, it is necessary to take into account the nature of the approach to the object of knowledge, the specific factual basis of its study, the theoretical and methodological principles and methods of this study, the specific scientific results obtained, their novelty and contribution to the coverage of the problem and to the general development. the development of historical science, practical and applied orientation and significance of the research and its role in social practice.
In general, historiographic analysis makes it possible to identify the degree of previous knowledge of the object of research, identify existing gaps, unresolved and controversial problems, the validity of the approaches taken and the methods used, etc., and on this basis put forward a research problem.
When setting up a research problem, there should be no intention to confirm or refute any previously obtained results. This may lead along the wrong and, in any case, limited path. Something can only be objectively refuted or confirmed based on the results of the research being conducted.
In order for the research task not only to fill existing gaps or to continue the planned lines of research based on already developed approaches and methods, but also to allow the possibility of obtaining significantly new results, it must be oriented towards attracting new sources or extracting new information from known sources and the use of other approaches and methods for studying the reality under consideration. Of course, this in no way means the illegality of research conducted on the basis of already tested and proven sources, approaches and methods used to analyze the same or similar phenomena considered in a different spatial or temporal expression. Moreover, such studies, covering massive historical phenomena and processes, the study of which requires collective efforts, must certainly be carried out on the basis of unified approaches and methods, because only in this way can comparable and reducible results be obtained. But such research develops science in breadth, which is extremely important, but does not remove the task of developing it in depth, for which new approaches are needed.
Naturally, a non-standard formulation of a research problem requires not a simple summing up of the results of the previous study of the object under consideration, but also a deep theoretical and methodological analysis of these results and possible other directions and approaches for its further research.
This is the main range of specific methodological problems solved when choosing an object and setting a research problem.
A research problem in historical science can be solved only if there are sources containing the necessary information about the object of knowledge. Therefore, the most important stage in the structure of historical research is the formation of its source and information basis. Here the historian can use both already known and attract new sources, the search for which, especially in archives, requires certain knowledge and skills. In particular, it is necessary to know both the system of accumulation and storage of social information in the historical era under study, and the structure of modern archival and library collections. The study of related issues is carried out by such disciplines auxiliary to historical science as archaeography, archival studies, documentary studies, etc.
The problems of selecting, establishing the authenticity, reliability and accuracy of historical sources, as well as methods of processing and analyzing the information they contain, are developed by source studies, which, like historiography, is a special historical discipline. Historians have accumulated extensive experience working with sources, and there is a huge amount of both general and specialized literature on source study. Let us note only some of the most significant specific methodological aspects related to providing the source and information basis for historical research.
Identification, selection and critical analysis of sources should be focused on ensuring the qualitative and quantitative representativeness of specific historical data necessary to solve the problem. This depends not only, and often not so much, on the number of sources involved, but also, first of all, on their information value. Therefore, the often manifested desire to use as many sources as possible not only does not produce results in itself, but can also lead to cluttering the research with facts that are of little significance or are completely unnecessary for solving the task at hand. At the same time, determining the optimal amount of information necessary for research is often very difficult, and, as a rule, historical studies contain some kind of redundant information. This in itself is not a disadvantage, because this information can further serve as the basis for new approaches to the object of knowledge and for setting new research tasks. It is only important that it does not complicate the achievement of the desired goal. All this determines the need to select from sources such specific historical data that have high-quality representativeness.
The qualitative representativeness of information about the object of knowledge included in the analysis is determined by the extent to which it reveals the features, properties and connections inherent in this object that are essential in terms of the task at hand. The practical provision of this representativeness can be complicated by a number of circumstances.
Firstly, it may not be easy, as already noted, to determine the very composition of even direct features that express the essential properties of an object. This situation arises in cases where we are talking about complex historical phenomena and processes, especially in the stage of formation or transition from one state to another. Here, it is possible to establish the necessary signs only when a relatively high level of previous study of the phenomena under study has already been achieved, that is, when the available knowledge is specific theoretical and reveals the basic patterns of the functioning and development of the corresponding historical reality.
Secondly, it turns out to be even more difficult to preliminarily determine those essential relationships that may be inherent in the elements and properties of a particular social system. This makes it difficult to select features included in the analysis.
Thirdly, the sources may not contain directly expressed essential features of the object necessary to solve the problem.
In the first two situations, the difficulties that arise can be overcome by increasing the number of features introduced into the analysis. With a large number of indicators contained in sources, it may be necessary to select and analyze several of their options. In cases where data on mass phenomena and processes characterized by a large number of characteristics are used, it may be advisable to perform preliminary experimental processing of a sample of these data.
When the sources do not contain the necessary direct data, this data can be obtained by extracting hidden information, i.e. increasing the information output of sources. However, despite the fact that, in principle, sources contain an unlimited amount of hidden information, this does not mean that it can be obtained in each specific study. If, due to the content poverty of the available sources or the unclear ways and methods of extracting hidden information from them, it is not possible to form a qualitatively representative set of features, adjustments should be made to the formulation of the research problem, since its solution on the basis of an unrepresentative system of indicators can lead to erroneous results.
As for the quantitative representativeness of the data involved, it is associated with the study of mass historical phenomena and processes based on sample data, covering only a part of the objects from the totality being studied. The formation of quantitatively representative sample data will be discussed in the second part of this work. It is obvious that if the data available in the sources are not quantitatively representative for the study of the task at hand, this task, as well as in the case of non-representativeness of qualitative characteristics, must undergo appropriate adjustment or its solution must be postponed until the data necessary for this are identified .
In general, as we see, the solution to a particular research problem does not simply require a representative source and information basis: the formulation of the problem itself must be linked to these foundations. This is one of the most important specific methodological principles and a normative requirement that must be observed in any historical research.
The next link in the logical structure of historical research is the selection or development of a system of research methods. In any historical research, it is a complex of methods that is used. The very formulation of the research problem requires, as indicated, certain approaches and methods both in establishing the needs for a given historical knowledge and in assessing the state of knowledge of the problem. A special range of methods is used to solve source study problems. These are methods for identifying the necessary sources, and critically checking the reliability and accuracy of the data used, and determining their qualitative and quantitative representativeness, etc. A specific set of methods is necessary for systematization, processing and analysis of specific data at the stage of reconstruction of the reality being studied and at the empirical level of its cognition, as well as at the stage of explanation of facts, their categorical-essential synthesis and final generalization, i.e. at the theoretical level of cognition.
It is obvious that the set of methods used will always have its own specificity, determined by the content and target nature of the research problem, i.e. properties of the reality being studied and the purposes of its study, as well as the source and information capabilities of its solution. That is why there are a huge number of specific problem-solving (or, in other words, specific scientific) methods.
Despite the fact that specific problem-solving methods are various combinations of general scientific methods and are based on one or another special scientific (in this case general historical) method or a combination of these methods, each of them has qualitative certainty and integrity, and is not just a simple combination of general scientific methods applied to the study of one or another specific reality, as is sometimes believed. The effectiveness and efficiency of general scientific methods is manifested only in specific scientific methods, through which only the interaction of the cognizing subject with the cognizable object can be carried out, i.e. a cognitive process takes place. In this regard, it is legitimate to believe that general scientific and special scientific methods, figuratively speaking, are unified intellectual means developed in the process of long-term cognitive experience, certain “details” and “assemblies” from which various specific and specialized methods can be constructed to act as a “machine” producing scientific knowledge.
From what has been said, it is obvious that any general characteristic of the process of developing methods for solving specific research problems can only consist in revealing those methodological approaches and principles that should be followed in this case. First of all, you need to pay attention to the following points.
The starting point when developing methods for solving a given research problem should be taking into account (within the framework of this task) the objective meaningful nature of the object under study, expressed by its inherent features and properties, as well as its spatial and temporal extent. It is obvious that the study of, say, economic and ideological phenomena requires different approaches and methods, because the main essence of the former depended primarily on those general patterns that determined the functioning and development of certain specific economic phenomena, and the essence of the latter determined by their social and class nature. Therefore, the methods used should make it possible, in the first case, to reveal the manifestation of the general in the particular, and in the second case, to reduce the ideal to the social. It is clear that the methods for studying individual (single) and mass phenomena, as well as phenomena considered in statics and dynamics, etc., will also be different.
The nature of the reality being studied, considered in the light of the task at hand, first of all makes it possible to determine those general historical methods that can be applied to solve this problem. If, for example, the task is to reveal the essence of socio-political and other views of individual representatives of one or another direction of social thought, then in this case the most effective will be either the historical-genetic or historical-comparative method, or both at the same time. When studying the decomposition of the peasantry or when studying the social structure of the working class, the historical-typological method in combination with the historical-systemic one will be an adequate method.
Further, the nature of the reality being studied and the achieved level of its knowledge make it possible to determine those basic general scientific methods through which the chosen general historical method will be implemented. In this case, first of all, it is necessary to establish the possibility of using the most effective of these methods - the method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete, which allows us to understand the essence of the reality being studied in organic unity with the diversity of phenomena expressing it. To apply this method, it is required that the existing knowledge about this reality allows either the isolation of its original cell or the construction of an ideal object expressing it. If such an approach turns out to be possible, then the possibility of using methods of deduction, synthesis and modeling will thereby be predetermined. Otherwise, you will initially have to limit yourself to the methods of ascending from the concrete to the abstract and inductive analysis.
Along with the nature of the reality being studied and the achieved level of its knowledge, the design of the method is largely determined by the state of the source-information base of the problem being solved. The choice of both general historical and general scientific methods depends on it. It is clear, for example, that mass phenomena of socio-historical development can be most deeply studied when using quantitative methods. But it may turn out that the sources do not contain quantitative indicators about these phenomena and give them only a generalized descriptive characteristic. Then, despite the feasibility of using quantitative methods, we will have to limit ourselves to descriptive methods.
The nature of the source-information basis of the study determines, in particular, the possibility of using the historical approach and method itself, that is, revealing the essence of the reality being studied by identifying its history. If the sources contain information about this reality only in relation to any one time moment, then its history cannot be revealed directly. It can be judged only by the results obtained by the logical method.
Thus, adequate and effective research methods can be developed only with careful consideration of, firstly, the nature of the reality being studied, revealed on the basis of existing, primarily theoretical, knowledge about it, and, secondly, the source and information base for her decisions. This makes it possible to identify the main general historical and general scientific research methods, which in their totality form the basis of the specific scientific (specific problem-based) method.
However, the development of a specific scientific method is not limited to defining the set of necessary general historical and general scientific methods. Actually, their selection exhausts only one side of the development of a specific scientific method - the ways and principles are identified, as well as the associated regulatory requirements for successful research, i.e. The theoretical and methodological foundations of a specific scientific method are being developed. But the method also includes certain rules and procedures (methodology) and requires the necessary tools and instruments (research technique).
Specific scientific methods, on the one hand, are determined by the principles and regulatory requirements of the method, and on the other hand, they also depend on the nature of the data used. The form in which the information is recorded (descriptive, quantitative, pictorial) and its type (primary or aggregated summary, continuous or selective) are especially important here. Ultimately, any concrete scientific method represents an organic and unique unity of theoretical and methodological premises, methodology and research technology. It is in concrete scientific methods that the unity of materialist dialectics as a theory, methodology and logic of scientific (in this case scientific-historical) knowledge appears in a concretely expressed form.
All non-Marxist approaches to the development of specific methods of historical research do not provide such unity, and therefore do not ensure consistent objectivity of the cognitive process.
It is obvious that the most effective method should be chosen to solve the research problem. This is a method that allows one to adequately reveal the essence of the reality being studied using the simplest available cognitive tools. Unjustified complication of the method leads to unnecessary expenditure of funds and research efforts. But, on the other hand, it is impossible to simplify the methods, because this can lead to erroneous results. The power of the method must correspond to the research problem. Thus, already at the initial At the stage of any research, a historian must solve a number of important specific methodological problems related to setting a research problem, providing a source and information basis and developing methods for solving it.
2. Reconstruction of historical reality and the empirical level of its knowledge
Setting up a research problem, identifying source and information possibilities for solving it, and developing methods for solving it open the way to conducting your own research. It has stages that differ in the level of knowledge gained. These stages and levels are expressed in empirical and theoretical knowledge.
It should be noted that the similarities and differences between empirical and theoretical knowledge, the internal mechanism and methods of obtaining them, the relationship between empirical knowledge and sensory-figurative knowledge and other issues have not only been and are being discussed by representatives of different philosophical directions, but are also interpreted differently by Soviet specialists in philosophical problems of scientific knowledge 4. Of course, in this case there is no need to consider the existing discrepancies. Let us dwell only on that approach to these problems that seems most convincing from the standpoint of historical research. Its main essence is the following 5.
- 4 See: Shvyrev V.S. Theoretical and empirical in scientific knowledge. M., 1978; Materialistic dialectics. T. 2. Ch. III; Theoretical and empirical in modern scientific knowledge: Sat. articles. M., 1984; as well as the above-mentioned works of N.K. Vakhtomin, P.V. Kopnin, V.A. Lektorsky, A.V. Slavin and others. Problems of empirical and theoretical in historical knowledge are considered in the works of G.M. Ivanov , A. M. Korshunova, V. V. Kosolapova, A. I. Rakitova, Yu. V. Petrova, etc.
- 5 This approach is most clearly stated in the indicated work of N.K. Vakhtomin (Chapter IV) and in the second volume of the work “Materialistic Dialectics” (Chapter III).
- 6 See: Zviglyanich V.A. Logical-epistemological and social aspects of the categories of appearance and essence. Kyiv, 1980; Velik A.P. Social form of movement: phenomenon and essence. M., 1982.
The diverse features and properties, relationships and contradictions of objective reality lead to the fact that in it the phenomenon and essence do not coincide. A concrete expression of the essence is a phenomenon. Moreover, the phenomenon is diverse, but the essence is one. In the process of sensory perception of reality, its images are formed. The content of sensory images, based on the human experience of perception of reality, does not depend on “the methodological and other settings of the subject, on the categorical structure of his thinking... on the contrary, the latter is forced to adapt to this content”\ i.e. this content draws an objective picture of reality.
Of course, individual sensations of people may be different, but the transformation of sensations into a complete sensory image occurs on the basis of ideas developed by long-term social practice of perceiving the world. Individual variations in sensations seem to cancel each other out 8 .
Further, the objective nature of sensory images, their independence from thinking does not mean a gap between the sensory and the rational. The sensual and rational are closely interconnected. Already the choice of an object for perception and its purpose are determined by thinking, not to mention the fact that the process of cognition represents the organic unity of a sensory and rational approach to reality. It is also obvious that the objectivity of a sensory image does not guarantee the truth of the final result of cognition obtained at the stage of analyzing sensory images by thinking. There may be errors in cognition, but they do not arise at the stage of sensory perception (in its natural-normal conditions), but at the stage of rational cognition, that is, they are generated by thinking.
Another important feature of sensory perception is that the sensory image “always contains more information about reality than we are aware of” 9 . This makes it possible to “transition beyond sensory perceptions to the existence of things outside of us” 10, that is, to the knowledge of reality as the unity of appearance and essence. But, since the phenomenon and the essence do not coincide and the essence cannot be perceived directly, “the task of science,” K. Marx pointed out, “is to reduce the visible movement, which only appears in the phenomenon, to the real one.” internal movement" 11. Knowledge proceeds, V.I. Lenin emphasized, “from phenomenon to essence, from essence of the first, so to speak, order, to essence of the second order, etc. without end” 12 . Therefore, in the process of the emergence of knowledge, two stages, or levels, are distinguished. In the first of them, the phenomenon is cognized and empirical knowledge arises, and in the second, the essence is revealed and theoretical knowledge is formed.
- 7 Materialistic dialectics. T. 2. P. 107.
- 8 See: Dubinin I. I., Guslyakova L. G. Dynamics of everyday consciousness. Minsk, 1985; Gubanov N.I. Sensory reflection: analysis of the problem in the light of modern science. M., 1986.
- 9 Materialistic dialectics. T. 2. P. 103.
- 10 Lenin V.I. Poli. collection Op. T. 18. P. 121.
- 11 Marx K., Engels F. Soch. 2nd ed. T. 25. Part I. P. 343.
- 12 Lenin V.I. Poly. collection Op. T. 29. P. 227.
In the light of this approach, the illegitimateness of the existing identification of empirical knowledge with the sensory component in cognition, and the theoretical one with the rational one, is obvious. Scientific knowledge is explanatory knowledge, and therefore, in both empirical and theoretical forms, it is based on thinking. Sensory perception characterizes reality in the form of images, which are a set of certain data about the external features and properties of this reality. These data are explained in empirical knowledge.
There are different opinions about what knowledge is empirical and what is theoretical. There is a widespread idea: since a phenomenon supposedly reflects only the external in an object, then empirical knowledge as knowledge about a phenomenon also reflects only external features and object properties. Theoretical knowledge is a reflection of the internal properties of an object. Based on this, knowledge obtained in experimental sciences is primarily classified as empirical. This opinion is also shared by some specialists in theoretical and methodological problems of historical science. Thus, one of the works states that “empirical cognition aims to obtain direct experimental knowledge. The subject directly interacts with the object of knowledge (source), the result of which is scientific facts" Theoretical knowledge “emerges as a result of further transformation of empirical data using logical means” 13 . The unjustified transformation of a source into an object of knowledge, which has already been discussed, is, in fact, due to the desire to prove the possibility of direct contact between the historian and the object and obtaining experimental knowledge that characterizes the external features of phenomena.
Another and, it seems, quite reasonable understanding of the content and relationship between empirical and theoretical knowledge comes down to the following. A phenomenon is understood primarily as individual features and relationships of an object, which can be both external and internal. Therefore, empirical knowledge is knowledge not only about the external in an object, but also about the internal. The specificity of this knowledge “lies in the fact that it is knowledge about a separate relation or separate relations, taken separately, and theoretical knowledge is about the essence, about such a relation that forms the basis of individual relations” 14, reflects the reality being studied as an integrity , possessing essential-substantive, qualitative certainty. This understanding of the essence of empirical knowledge excludes the view, widespread among researchers, including historians, that empirical knowledge provides only facts that can only be explained in theoretical knowledge 15 .
- 13 Petrov Yu. V. Practice and historical science. pp. 313, 317.
- 14 Vakhtomin N. K - Decree. Op. P. 167.
- 15 See: Rakitov A.I. Decree. Op. P. 270.
In historical science, where the empirical is associated primarily with descriptiveness, the traditional interpretation of the nature of this knowledge suggests its kinship with pure ideographicism. This is not true. Empirical knowledge is also explanatory knowledge. Another thing is that this explanation covers reality only in the form of a phenomenon. Therefore, empirical knowledge is only the initial stage, one of the stages and levels of knowledge of reality.
Empirical knowledge explains data obtained by sensory perception. This explanation leads to the knowledge of reality as a phenomenon. Theoretical knowledge explains the phenomenon, that is, there is a transition to an understanding of reality as an essence. The transition from sensory perception to empirical knowledge, and from it to theoretical knowledge, represents a generalization, a reduction to a certain unity in the first case of sensory data, and in the second - empirical facts. The means of such generalization both at the stage of obtaining empirical knowledge and at the stage of forming theoretical knowledge is categorical synthesis. Therefore, it is quite justified to assert that it is unlawful to reduce the methods of obtaining empirical knowledge only to experiments, observations, descriptions, measurements, i.e., to the totality of what is considered as experience, and theoretical knowledge - only to formal logical processes. procedures. Firstly, thinking with its inherent substantive approach and formal logical procedures appears in experience. How, for example, can one carry out a measurement without first defining its goals, without identifying the characteristics to be measured, without establishing units and methods of measurement, etc.? Secondly, even in theoretical analysis it is impossible to make do with only those data characterizing the object that were obtained experimentally. Other data that lie outside the scope of experience are also needed. In historical science, such data are called “extra-source knowledge.” It represents the totality of all the knowledge that the historian possesses in addition to what he extracts from the source.
The main thing is that neither the data of experience nor formal logical procedures by themselves can provide knowledge about either the phenomenon or the essence. This knowledge, as correctly emphasized by a number of researchers, can only be obtained as a result of categorical synthesis. It is clear that categorical synthesis at the level of empirical and theoretical knowledge has significant differences. Firstly, its substantive basis is different. At the empirical level, data from sensory perception are synthesized, and at the theoretical level, empirical facts are synthesized. Secondly, synthesis is carried out by subsuming data under categories of different nature and content.
These are the main most general points related to the empirical and theoretical levels of scientific knowledge that must be taken into account in any research.
Let's look more specifically at what the internal mechanism for obtaining empirical knowledge is 16.
The initial basis for obtaining empirical knowledge is sensory data. They reflect individual visible diverse features and relationships of reality. These features and relationships objectively represent facts that act as a manifestation of the hidden true essence of the subject. In this sense, a phenomenon is a fact of reality. But in this meaning the phenomenon is not perceived sensually. For sensibility, only individual features of an object are real. It is possible to reveal phenomena as objective facts characterizing an object only in thinking, which is what happens in empirical knowledge. The essence of empirical knowledge, therefore, is that the facts of reality are reflected by consciousness and act as facts of knowledge about phenomena. Speaking about fact-reality and fact-knowledge, it should be recalled that among philosophers there is a widespread opinion that fact is an epistemological-cognitive category that appears in knowledge. In relation to objective reality, we must talk not about facts, but about the phenomena that the fact reflects. However, the rejection of fact as a phenomenon of reality is unjustified, especially in the light of widespread subjective-idealistic ideas about scientific facts as purely mental constructions. The authors of the general work “Materialistic Dialectics” proceed from the fact that a fact acts both as reality and as knowledge about it. “The totality of these facts constitutes the content of empirical knowledge; they reflect individual phenomena, i.e. features , relationships and dependencies of reality. They do not provide a holistic understanding of the subject and characterize it, as they say, “on the one hand” and “on the other hand”. Therefore, empirical knowledge, despite all its concreteness, is inherently one-sided and abstract. It snatches from the reality being studied a certain a variety of facts and phenomena, without revealing their interrelationships and without presenting this diversity as a certain integrity.
- 16 See: Saiko S.P. Dialectics of empirical and theoretical in historical knowledge. Alma-Ata, 1975; Zviglyanzh V. A. Logical-epistemological and social aspects of the category of appearance and essence. Kyiv, 1980; Elsukov A. N. Empirical knowledge and facts of science. Minsk, 1981; Abdullaeva M.N. Problems of adequacy of reflection at the empirical level of scientific knowledge. Tashkent, 1982.
- 17 Materialistic dialectics. T. 2. pp. 115-116.
Facts-knowledge about facts-reality, i.e., about phenomena, are created in experience, which must be considered, as noted, broadly (experiments, observations, descriptions, measurements, etc.). Experience can be the result of a purposeful research approach to the reality being studied. Then, based on the set goal, the range of phenomena to be studied, ways and specific methods of identifying and systematizing data are determined. But empirical knowledge can also be obtained in the process of ordinary practical activity. It differs from the scientific-empirical one in that its occurrence, as a rule, is not associated with a specific cognitive goal and it is acquired to solve certain practical problems. Therefore, special methods for obtaining knowledge are not developed 18.
Empirical scientific knowledge can be used in practical activities. Certain consequences of an empirical nature can be deduced from it. It can be the basis for identifying individual patterns. In short, empirical knowledge in itself has significant cognitive value 19, which is especially great in the social sciences and humanities. This is due to the specifics of their object of knowledge. The combination of objective and subjective, natural-lawful and consciously purposeful in it leads to the fact that socio-historical facts carry a directly detectable socio-political and emotional load. They can “speak for themselves,” that is, be the basis for practical conclusions and actions.
Now about the main thing - about how, at the stage of empirical knowledge, categorical synthesis is carried out, which makes this knowledge explanatory.
- 18 See: Dubinin I.I., Guslyakova L.G. Decree. Op.
- 19 See: Oizerman T.N. Empirical and theoretical: difference, opposition, unity // Issue. philosophy. 1985. No. 12; 1986. No. 1.
Categorical synthesis of sensory data, which leads to the discovery of facts and phenomena, is carried out in experience. In experience, these data are categorized. Since empirical knowledge reflects a separate attitude (by attitude is meant a separate side, feature, connection, etc., inherent in reality), then sensory data is subsumed under categories that reflect similar relationships. In general, these categories are: “phenomenon”, “similarity”, “difference”, “individual”, “general”, “space”, “time”, “quality”, “quantity”, “measure” and etc., because objectively every relationship appears as a phenomenon, can be individual and general, flows in space and time, has quality, quantity and measure, etc. In relation to specific areas of reality, categories that reflect the properties of the corresponding reality are used in categorical synthesis at the stage of empirical cognition. As a result, facts characterizing the phenomena are established. These facts constitute the content of empirical knowledge. Empirical facts can be systematized, classified, generalized, compared and subjected to other types of processing. For a comprehensive coverage of the object of knowledge, what is needed is not individual facts, but a system or even systems of facts when this object is complex.
Very important in general and modern stage The development of science is particularly important in identifying the quantitative characteristics of relevant phenomena, which requires their measurement. Only knowledge of the quantitative measure of phenomena makes it possible to establish the limits of their qualitative certainty. In this way, the most complete knowledge of reality is achieved.
This is the basic essence of empirical knowledge. It has its own specifics in historical research. This specificity lies in the fact that knowledge facts about the facts of the historical reality being studied are revealed on the basis of the facts of the historical source, i.e., in the process of cognition, a doubly subjectivized reflective reconstruction of the object under study occurs. It has already been noted that since historical sources, despite all the limitlessness of the explicit and hidden information they contain, characterize historical reality selectively, the problem arises of the possibility of an adequate unambiguous reconstruction of the object of knowledge in the light of the posed research problem. Everything that happened in the past has already happened and is therefore invariant. Knowledge of the past in its invariance is the task of historical science. In his polemics with P. Struve, defending an objective Marxist approach to the study of social reality, V.I. Lenin considered it obligatory for a Marxist to “reduce the whole matter to clarifying what exists and why it exists exactly this way and not otherwise” 20 .
- 20 Lenin V.I. Poli. collection Op. T. 1. P. 457.
- 21 Lappo-Danilevsky A. S. Methodology of history. St. Petersburg, 1910. Issue. I. P. 287 (emphasis added by us. - I.K.)..
- 22 Ibid. P. 290.
Before moving on to consider the extent to which an invariant reconstruction of the historical past is possible, let us recall that the dialectical-materialist reconstruction of historical reality is fundamentally different from the subjectivist reproduction of the past. Subjective idealism, as is known, denies the possibility of objective knowledge of the past, considering the source of knowledge about the past to be the consciousness of the historian and that this “knowledge” itself is carried out through the construction (construction) of the reality being studied by the historian. For example, A. S. Lappo-Danilevsky, the most prominent representative of the subjective-idealistic trend in Russian bourgeois historiography, pointed out that the historian, relying on sensory empathy for the events of the past, “is primarily concerned with the scientific construction of concrete reality, and not its “image,” i.e., reflection 21. Lacking the scientific concepts necessary for this, he “develops them himself in relation to the objects he studies and depending on the cognitive goals that he pursues” 22 . This is the position of all representatives of the subjectivist methodology of historical knowledge.
Subjectivism is also inherent in those representatives of modern non-Marxist historical science who, although they do not deny the reality of the past as an object of knowledge, consider it possible to construct various kinds of counterfactual historical situations when studying it. Such situations are arbitrary constructions of the historian and depict the past not as it really was, but as the historian would like to see it.
As a rule, representatives of bourgeois objectivism are also far from a real reconstruction of the past. They are characterized by focusing attention on those phenomena and aspects of the historical past, the coverage of which corresponds to the class interests of the bourgeoisie, and by keeping silent and obscuring those phenomena that contradict them. The failure of bourgeois objectivism as a methodology of historical knowledge is deeply revealed by V.I. Lenin in his polemic with P. Struve. Characterizing the development of capitalism in post-reform Russia, Struve in every possible way emphasized its progressive sides and kept silent about the antagonistic contradictions inherent in it 23.
The Marxist methodology of historical knowledge requires a comprehensive reconstruction and knowledge of historical reality in its objective invariance. But such a reconstruction does not cause difficulties only if the historical sources contain in directly expressed form the information necessary to solve the research problem. All that is required is to ensure the representativeness of the formed system of facts. However, when solving very many, one might even say the absolute majority of research problems, the sources do not provide the necessary directly expressed information, and it is necessary to extract hidden, structural information from them. The way to extract it has been known for a long time. This is identifying relationships. Historians have also developed many specific methods for such extraction. Not only logical methods play an important role, but also other factors: sensory experience, intuition, scientific imagination 24 . When reconstructing the past based on extracting hidden information from sources, the historian uses not only the images of the past that he has accumulated, but also the images stored in the public memory of mankind, being recorded in linguistic and sign systems 25.
- 23 See: Lenin V.I. The economic content of populism and its criticism in Struve’s book // Complete. collection Op. T. 1. P. 455-457, 492-493, etc.
- 24 See: Ivanov G.M., Korshunov A.M., Petrov Yu.V. Methodological problems of historical knowledge. P. 65 et seq.; Petrov Yu. V. Practice and historical science. P. 283 et seq.
- 25 Ivanov G. M., Korshunov A. M., Petrov Yu. V. Decree. Op. P. 69.
Just like intuition and imagination, these images help to establish connections and thereby reveal hidden information from sources. It is clear that the historian’s “reserve” of historical images and his inclination towards intuition and imagination largely depend on his scientific erudition, i.e. on the amount of knowledge he possesses.
In general, historians have achieved significant success in reconstructing historical reality by widely identifying hidden information from sources (the experience accumulated to date requires special study and generalization). Archaeologists are more active in this regard, although the task of reconstruction is especially difficult for them due to its multifaceted nature. First of all, it is necessary to reconstruct them as a whole from fragments of objects. Then, using selected sets of these objects, reconstruct them as an integral complex, and on the basis of these complexes, reconstruct the manifestations of historical reality itself. Of primary importance in this matter is the spatial and temporal localization of the discovered monuments. When reconstructing historical reality, archaeologists, along with material sources, widely use written sources, sphragistic materials, etc., as well as natural scientific methods 26 .
Historians extract especially large volumes of hidden information from written sources that characterize mass historical phenomena and processes and contain a large number of different indicators. The increasingly widespread use of mathematical methods and computers when working with these sources opens up virtually limitless possibilities for historians to extract hidden information and reconstruct mass phenomena and processes on its basis. Soviet historians achieved the most significant results in this regard in the study of socio-economic development.
There are many striking examples of successful reconstruction and important individual historical phenomena. Let us point out, for example, the reconstruction by the Soviet historian V.I. Koretsky of the decree of 1592/1593. on the introduction of reserved years, which is of significant importance in revealing the progress of the enslavement of peasants in Russia 27 .
- 26 See: Yanin V.L. Essays on integrated source study. Medieval Novgorod. M.. 1977; Problems of reconstructions in archaeology. Novosibirsk, 1985.
- 27 See: Koretsky V.I. Enslavement of peasants and class struggle in Russia in the second half of the 16th century. M., 1970.
At the same time, extracting hidden information in cases where there are few sources or they are poor in content or their information is contradictory may not allow obtaining a representative system of facts that unambiguously reconstructs the reality being studied. In practice, this is most often expressed in the fact that there are significant gaps in the system of facts reflecting this reality. It was indicated above that in such cases one should either adjust the research problem or generally refrain from solving it until the necessary facts are identified. But this, naturally, does not exclude the legitimacy of finding ways or solving a problem in the presence of gaps in specific factual information or filling these gaps on the basis of indirect or calculated data. Historians encounter this situation very often, and methodological development of the problems that arise here is necessary. In this regard, we note the following.
First of all, in many cases it is quite possible to solve a research problem even if there are gaps in empirical facts, because their incompleteness, as is well known, can be compensated in the process of abstract logical analysis at the theoretical level of knowledge as a result of categorical synthesis. Consequently, the final assessment of the extent to which the empirical system of facts that reconstructs the reality under study is representative for solving the task at hand can only be given as a result of their analysis and synthesis at the theoretical level of knowledge. An assessment of the representativeness of information from sources in the process of reconstructing the reality under study by describing it, i.e., at the empirical level of knowledge, in general can only be preliminary. This, of course, does not exclude the fact that the test of representativeness should be carried out at this (empirical) level, and the insufficiency of the available information may well be discovered.
Further, in historical science, as in other sciences, various methods are used to fill gaps in the data used. In itself, such replenishment is quite acceptable. In practice, it is carried out by temporal or spatial extrapolation of known properties and states of similar phenomena to the phenomena under study 28 . But since spatial and temporal variations in the properties of even similar phenomena and objects can be very significant, filling in the gaps by analogy is at best approximate or may not be justified at all. This kind of danger is especially great when, to characterize certain phenomena of a certain era, they use the properties and meanings inherent in these phenomena in a much later period up to the present. Therefore some general principle, on the basis of which one can assess the correctness of filling gaps in the available information.
- 28 About extrapolation as a means of scientific knowledge. See: Popova N. L. Extrapolation as a means of scientific knowledge and an integrative factor in science. Kyiv, 1985.
It is usually assumed that the completed data does not contradict the existing facts about the event or process being studied. This important requirement can indeed be in many cases an essential criterion for the correctness of the gap filling being carried out or its admissibility in general.
But such an approach is possible only in cases where the nature of the connection of the feature being replenished with other features inherent in the reality being studied as a specific system is known. And this requires certain knowledge about the structure of a given system, which is achieved at a relatively high level of knowledge of the reality in question. It should also be borne in mind that any system, along with a certain stability and harmony, also has internal contradictions. Therefore, the consistency of the replenished data with the existing ones can have both a direct and inverse relationship, or there may be no such relationship at all.
Therefore, if there is no clear idea of the nature of the relationship between the characteristics of the system, then filling in the gaps, and consequently the entire reconstruction, based on the principle of data consistency, cannot be unambiguous. They will inevitably have a number of options and will be hypothetical in nature. True, in practice, even in these cases, researchers stop only at one reconstruction option, the most probable from their point of view, although, strictly speaking, a number of possible options or at least the polar ones. Of course, even in this form, the reconstruction should be based on objective factual data and the consequences arising from them, and not on the arbitrary constructions of the historian. He only identifies reconstruction options allowed by these data and conducts a comparative assessment of them.
- 29 See: Guseinova A. S., Pavlovsky Yu. P., Ustinov V. A. Experience in simulation modeling of the historical process. M., 1984.
An even more complex situation arises in cases where the data from sources that can be used for reconstruction turn out to be scattered, ambiguous and contradictory. Here, it is most advisable to refrain from a detailed reconstruction of the phenomena and processes being studied by filling in the gaps in the sources and limit ourselves to a general description of their essence based on a theoretical generalization of the available facts, because an attempt to specify, given the limited and ambiguous source data, can give so many options that the choice of one of these will be entirely subjective. This point has to be emphasized because the use of mathematical methods and computers in historical research has given rise to some mathematicians’ erroneous idea of the possibility of concretizing historical phenomena and processes through simulation modeling on the basis of extremely limited and scattered initial data down to detailed “ reconstruction” of the dynamics of historical phenomena, based on fragmentary static information. The practical purpose of imitation is seen here in creating a whole set of “states” of the object of study, to enable the historian to choose one of the options 29 .
However, as a method of reconstructing the past, imitation can be used with great caution and within very limited limits. Based on taking into account the objective possibilities contained in the reality under study, simulation should not just provide a set of options, but reveal those objective limits within which the invariant was contained, in which this or that historical event or process was realized. Using mathematical methods, these limits can be expressed quantitatively.
Thus, the reconstruction of the historical reality under study, the formation of a representative system of scientific facts reflecting the facts of reality, is an extremely responsible and complex process at the empirical stage of historical research.
A system (or systems) of scientific facts identified at the empirical stage of historical research represents a scientific description of the reality being studied within the framework of the research task. Historical scientific description is not equivalent to simple descriptiveness (ideographism), as is often believed 30 . It is a reflection of the properties, relationships and interactions recorded in a certain sign system that are inherent in objective historical reality and necessary for the specific disclosure at the theoretical stage of knowledge of general patterns and spatio-temporal features of its functioning and development.
- 30 For historical descriptions, see: Rakitov A.I. Historical knowledge. Ch. 5
Historical descriptions can be recorded in natural language form, which is most often the case, as well as in the form of systems of quantitative indicators, in graphical form, or as encoded machine-readable data. Descriptions can be either primary information or various kinds of generalized summaries of it. As indicated, at the empirical level of knowledge, scientific facts that reconstruct the reality being studied can be subject to various types of processing (systematization, classification, mathematical processing of quantitative indicators, etc.). In this regard, it should be noted that the current attempts to consider primary information about mass phenomena and processes as more valuable than aggregated (consolidated) information are illegal. Historical reality is an organic combination of the individual, the particular, the general and the universal, and it is in this unity that it must be cognized. Therefore, for a historian, primary data that characterizes historical reality at the individual level, and aggregated information at different levels, without which it is impossible to know the particular, the general and the universal, are equally necessary and valuable. For a historian, the practical value of primary and summary data is always specific. It depends on the content of the research problem.
This is the main range of general and specific methodological problems solved at the empirical level of historical research.
3. Explanation and theoretical level in historical knowledge
At the empirical level of knowledge, the prerequisites for the transition to theoretical knowledge are formed. The result of empirical knowledge is knowledge of phenomena, but since “a phenomenon is... a manifestation of essence” 31, prerequisites are created for the transition to theoretical knowledge. In theoretical knowledge, the deep essential nature of objective reality is comprehended, and therefore the transition from empirical knowledge to theoretical knowledge is necessary 32.
Theoretical knowledge differs from empirical knowledge in its initial foundations, target orientation, the nature of the categories used in it, the form of expression of knowledge and methods of studying it.
The basis of empirical knowledge is data from sensory perception, theoretical knowledge is based on empirical facts. The goal of empirical knowledge is to reveal the phenomenon, while theoretical knowledge is to reveal the essence. In empirical knowledge, categories appear that characterize individual features of an object, since phenomena as such appear on their own. The categories of theoretical knowledge reflect, first of all, relationships, because the essence is manifested in relationships and connections. Basic general categories theoretical knowledge are such philosophical categories as “essence”, “connection”, “interconnection”, “interaction”, “opposite”, “unity”, “contradiction”, “development”, etc. In combination with general scientific and Using special scientific categories, they, in the process of categorical synthesis, make it possible to reveal the essence of the objects of reality under study. The main form of expression of knowledge at the empirical stage is scientific facts, at the theoretical stage - hypotheses, concepts and theories.
- 31 Lenin V.I. Poli. collection Op. T. 29. P. 154.
- 32 On general problems of theoretical knowledge, see: Fofanov V.P. Social activity and theoretical reflection. Novosibirsk, 1986; Petrov Yu. A. Methodological problems of theoretical knowledge. M., 1986.
At the empirical stage, the reality under study is known through its description (in historical research based on information from sources), and at the theoretical stage, through its explanation. If a description, as indicated, is a reflection of individual properties, relationships and interconnections, that is, it reveals reality as a set of phenomena that express it, then a scientific explanation is “the revelation of the essence of the object being explained” 33 . It is carried out by identifying the most significant features and connections, trends and patterns of genesis, functioning and development of an object. An explanation gives a synthesized idea of the cognizable reality; it reveals the understanding of this reality by the cognizing subject, which consists in understanding the internal nature of the reality being studied, the causes and trends of development, etc. To understand and scientifically explain this reality, movement is necessary knowledge from phenomenon to essence. “To understand,” V.I. Lenin pointed out, “one must empirically begin to understand, study, and rise from the empiric to the general. To learn to swim, you need to get into the water" 34 .
A large literature is devoted to the problems of understanding and explanation in science in general and in historical science in particular 35 . The central questions are about the principles and types of historical explanation. As a scientific procedure aimed at revealing the inner essential nature of the historical reality being studied, explanation is subject to the general dialectical-materialistic principles of scientific knowledge. As is known, they are objectivity, partisanship and historicism. In addition, concreteness is an important principle of historical explanation.
In any explanation as a logical procedure, two components are combined: explandum - a set of provisions that describe the phenomenon being explained, and explansum - a set of explanatory sentences. Historical explanations are usually presented in natural language form and can include both explicit (explicitly expressed) and implicit (implicitly expressed) parts. For a clear and unambiguous perception and understanding of the historical explanation by the reader of a historical work, it must be explicit. Unfortunately, historians do not always take this into account.
- 33 Nikitin E. P. Explanation is the function of science. M., 1970. P. 14.
- 34 Lenin V.I. Poli. collection Op. T. 29. P. 187.
- 35 See: Kon I.S. On disputes about the logic of historical explanation//Philosophical problems of historical science. M., 1969; Doroshenko M. N. “Understanding” and its role in historical knowledge // The role of scientific principles and concepts in social research. L., 1976; Pork A. A. Historical explanation. Tallinn, 1981; Yudin B. G. Explanation and understanding in historical research // Issue. philosophy. 1981. No. 9; Nikitin E.P. The nature of justification. M., 1981; Problems of explanation and understanding in scientific knowledge. M., 1982; Egorova V. S. The problem of explanation in studies of civil history // Philosophy. Sciences. 1983. No. 1; Gorsky D.P. Generalization and cognition. M., 1985; Bystritsky E. K. Scientific knowledge and the problem of understanding. Kyiv, 1986, as well as the indicated works by G. M. Ivanov, A. M. Korshunov, Yu. Petrov (chap. IV), A. M. Rakitov (chap. 8), A. I. Uvarov (chap. II) etc.
Any scientific explanation uses two types of knowledge. Firstly, this is knowledge about objective reality, which is obtained at the empirical stage of its study and is expressed in its description. In historical research, this is the so-called “source” knowledge. Secondly, this is all other knowledge both about this reality and about the scientific picture of the world in general. In historical science, this knowledge is called “extra-source”. Without knowledge of the second kind, it is impossible to scientifically explain and understand the object of knowledge. The possibility of deep penetration into inner essence the phenomena being studied.
A number of options for classifying historical explanations have been proposed. The following types are distinguished: explanation through law, explanations causal (causal), genetic, structural and functional. This division is conditional, because most often the explanation is complex, that is, it uses various types.
The most fundamental type of historical explanation is explanation through law. It is the laws of genesis, functioning and development of socio-historical reality that most deeply express its essential nature. Emphasizing this, V.I. Lenin, as indicated, noted that “the law is something durable (remaining) in the phenomenon”, “the law and the essence of the concept are homogeneous (one-order) or rather, one-degree” 36, “the law is a reflection of the essential in movement of the universe" 37 . Laws are used to explain, first of all, phenomena and processes that are objective and by their nature mass.
Cause-and-effect explanations arising from the universality of relationships objectively inherent in historical reality are widespread in historical science. They are primarily used in revealing certain results of human activity, historical events and situations in which the active role of the human, i.e. subjective, factor is clearly expressed. Of course, behind this factor lie certain objective circumstances, but they are manifested in the nature of subjective actions. So, for example, when we say that one of the the most important reasons The collapse of Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 was due to the high morale of the Russian army, we attribute Napoleon's defeat to one of the subjective historical factors. We highlight this factor explicitly (explicitly). But implicitly (implicitly) in this explanation it is also meant that the high morale of the Russian army was due to the fair nature of the war for Russia, to the fact that the struggle was waged to preserve the country’s independence. And this is already an objective circumstance and expresses a certain historical pattern - the struggle of peoples for their independence gives rise to moral and spiritual uplift. Ultimately, the explanation given is not only causal, but also an explanation through law.
- 36 Lenin V.I. Poli. collection Op. T. 29. P. 136.
- 37 Ibid. P. 137.
Genetic explanations are necessary in cases where the task is to explain the essence of historical phenomena or processes in their specific temporal expression. Let's say we want to understand the essential content of the raznochinsky stage in the liberation movement in Russia, which, as we know, began after the fall of serfdom. To fully understand this essence, in particular the fact that at the head of the liberation movement were raznochintsy and objectively the struggle was waged for bourgeois-democratic transformations carried out through a popular, peasant revolution, is only possible taking into account the fact that the raznochinsky stage was preceded by the nobility stage, when at the head of the liberation, revolutionary movement were advanced representatives of the nobility, who were terribly far from the people, were afraid of the people and therefore fought for the interests of the people without the people. But here, too, the genetic explanation, i.e., revealing the essence of the raznochinsky stage of the liberation movement as the stage that replaced the noble one, is combined with a causal explanation (the change in the social composition of the participants in the revolutionary movement led to the radicalization of its program, strategy and tactics) and an explanation through the law (radical changes in the socio-economic system, expressed in the elimination of serfdom and the transition to capitalism, naturally and inevitably led to changes in the social structure of society and in the alignment of class and socio-political forces). Thus, in this case, the explanation is complex and its genetic variety acts only as the leading approach and method.
Structural explanation, i.e., revealing the essence through analysis of the structure of the corresponding socio-historical systems, can be used in the study of any of these systems. The main task of explanation here is to identify the main, system-forming features inherent in the elements of the system, and to establish the nature of their relationship. The identification of system-forming features is associated with the analysis of the meaningful, substantial nature of the system.
Analysis of the structural relationships of system-forming features reveals those basic patterns that are characteristic of the system under study, because “a law is a relationship”™ and “if one or another type of connection of elements is essential and necessary for a given system, then it has the character of a law of its structure.” ry" ze. Thus, a structural explanation, “identifying the essence through a structural analysis of systems, is the most effective, because it leads to the direct disclosure of the laws inherent in historical reality.
- Lenin V.I. Poly. collection Op. T. 29. P. 138.
- Gancharuk S.I. Laws of development and functioning of society. M., 1977. P. 103.
A functional explanation is a variation of a structural explanation. As indicated, in functional analysis the characterized system is considered as a subsystem or even an element of a social system of a higher level. Analysis of the structure of the latter makes it possible to identify the relationships of the system under study with the environment in which it is located, and thereby reveal the patterns of its functioning. Functional explanation is an effective means of identifying the essence of various social systems at various levels of their functioning.
Until now, we have been talking about explaining the genesis, functioning and development of various mass or collective phenomena and processes. But in historical development, individual, single events also play an important role, although this role is not as significant as the supporters of the subjectivist methodology of historical knowledge imagine. But these events also have a certain essence that requires clarification and explanation.
There are several types of explanations for single acts of activity 40 . The main one is the motivational explanation. It consists in the fact that the essence of the action is explained by an incentive motive, which usually expresses a certain interest and pursues a corresponding goal. Another type is an explanation through normativity. The nature of the subject’s actions here is determined by the norms and traditions of behavior generally accepted in the relevant social environment. one type is a psychological-emotional explanation.The nature of the action here depends on the psychological-emotional traits of a historical figure (hardness, gentleness, timidity, compassion, respect, love, hatred, etc.).
Thus, there is a whole set of historical explanations. All of them have the goal of revealing the essence of the historical reality being studied. However, the types of historical explanations themselves do not reveal the entire complex mechanism of cognition of the internal essence of the historical reality being studied, which is the prerogative of the theoretical level of cognition. The disclosure of this mechanism is all the more important because it represents a complex creative process in which various scientific methods are used, and not a simple logical transformation of knowledge obtained at the empirical stage.
- 40 See: Pork A. A. Historical explanation. pp. 189 et seq.
The process of obtaining theoretical knowledge is much more complex than the process of obtaining empirical knowledge. The process of obtaining theoretical knowledge has its own internal stages. In objective reality, the essence is a single internal basis of objects, a system of internal connections inherent to them, which are actually expressed in phenomena that reveal individual features, connections, trends in the functioning and development of these objects. This means that in reality the essence appears in organic unity with the phenomenon.
However, for its cognition, the essence must initially be abstracted from the phenomenon and understood as such. In this regard, theoretical knowledge, like empirical knowledge, is abstract at a certain stage. But the nature of this abstraction is different. Empirical knowledge is abstract in the sense that in it individual features of an object appear on their own, without connection with its other properties. In theoretical knowledge, the essence initially appears as something general without connection with the specific.
Since the basis for knowledge of the essence are phenomena expressed in empirical knowledge as concrete scientific facts, in theoretical knowledge it is necessary to ascend from the concrete to the abstract. F. Engels wrote about this: “In our thoughts we raise the individual from singularity to particularity, and from this latter to universality... we find and state the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory” 41. The transition from the concrete to the abstract is one of the stages in theoretical knowledge.
The movement from empirical to theoretical knowledge begins with the question of how to explain the empirical facts identified to solve the scientific problem posed at the beginning of the study. The search for an answer to the question that has arisen consists of putting forward a certain idea, based on which one can reveal the unified internal meaning of the facts. This disclosure is carried out through categorical synthesis. It consists in the fact that facts are subsumed under philosophical, general scientific and specially scientific categories corresponding to the original idea. The result of such a synthesis will be the formation of a scientific concept that reveals the general internal meaning of empirical facts. Such a synthesis may have several levels, or stages, leading to the final result.
The idea is the main core of theoretical knowledge, its leading principle, which characterizes the object as a whole, and thereby reveals its essence, in contrast to empirical concepts - facts that reflect only phenomena. V.I. Lenin emphasized Hegel’s thought that “Begriff (concept - I.K.) is not yet the highest concept: even higher is the deed = the unity of Begriff with reality” 42.
- 41 Marx K., Engels F. Op. 2nd ed. T. 20. P. 548.
- 42 Lenin V.I. Poly. collection Op. T. 29. P. 151.
Proposing an idea, which in general comes down to identifying or forming those categories on the basis of which a synthesis of facts can be carried out, is a complex creative search, and by no means only a formal logical process, although this search also includes such logical procedures such as comparison, generalization, abstraction. The most important role here is played by intuition and imagination and other subjective aspects in cognition, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
An explanation of the essence of phenomena on the basis of a put forward idea and a categorical synthesis of empirical facts is initially hypothetical, i.e. probabilistic, in nature. Explaining the essence of facts through hypotheses that have one or another probability of truth is a completely natural way in the process of theoretical knowledge of reality, and a hypothesis is one of the important forms of scientific-theoretical knowledge and a method of obtaining it 43 . It appears in this form at the initial stage of essential cognition of phenomena. In those areas of knowledge where proving the truth of scientific hypotheses is hampered by the difficulty of obtaining the facts necessary for this, scientific knowledge can remain in a hypothetical form for a long time. There are many such areas in historical science. These are, first of all, the most ancient periods of history, and even phenomena of other eras, poorly reflected in historical sources.It is in their interpretation that various points of view about the essence of historical phenomena and processes are most widespread.
But in general, in the process of historical knowledge of reality, a hypothetical approach to revealing the essence of the phenomena being studied is only one of the stages. The truth of the hypothesis must be verified by new empirically observable facts. If new facts confirm the proposed explanation of the essence of phenomena, hypothetical theoretical knowledge becomes true theoretical knowledge. If new facts refute the proposed explanation of the essence of the phenomena, then the hypothesis must be rejected and the analysis must return to its original basis. We need to search for a new idea, synthesize facts based on other categories and put forward a new hypothesis, which must again be tested, and so on until its truth is proven.
- 43 See: Karpovich V.N. Problem. Hypothesis. Law; Merkulov I.P. Method of hypotheses in the history of scientific knowledge. M., 1984.
- 44 Lenin V.I. Poly. collection Op. T. 26. P. 241.
- 45 Ibid. T. 29. P. 252.
However, achieving true theoretical knowledge about the essence of the phenomena being studied does not complete the process of their knowledge. Being the result of abstraction from the concrete, this knowledge characterizes the essence as such, abstractly. But, as V.I. Lenin pointed out, “the concept of purity is a certain narrowness, one-sidedness of human knowledge, which does not fully embrace the subject in all its complexity” 4\ At the same time, an initial abstraction from the concreteness of the phenomenon is necessary in order to - having clarified the general, then return to the specific and thereby cognize reality as the unity of phenomenon and essence. “The movement of knowledge towards an object,” emphasized V.I. Lenin, “can always proceed only dialectically: to move away in order to get more accurately” 45. “An infinite sum of general concepts, laws, etc. gives the concrete in its completeness” 46 . That's why final stage theoretical knowledge is the reverse ascent from the abstract to the concrete. The essence of this ascent is that it removes abstraction, on the one hand, from the phenomenon, which at the empirical stage appears as individually isolated, and on the other, from the essence, which at the theoretical stage is considered initially in isolation from the phenomenon. Now they act as a unity in which the phenomenon, without losing its individuality, acquires the features of a certain universality, that is, from formal singularity it turns into meaningful concreteness, and the essence, while remaining universal, acquires a certain range of individual concreteness. Thus, reality appears in consciousness in unity and opposition, as a synthesis of the individual and the general, the random and the natural, form and content, and if measurements are made, then of quantity and quality.
In the process of ascending back from the abstract to the concrete, concrete theoretical knowledge arises and the highest level in scientific knowledge is achieved. Therefore, the ascent from the abstract to the concrete belongs to the most basic and effective methods of scientific research. The completed form of concrete theoretical knowledge is scientific theories. In relation to the study of certain specific phenomena and processes, these are concrete scientific theories.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 Ivanov G. M., Korshunov N. M., Petrov Yu. V. Decree. Op. P. 215.
- 48 Ibid. P. 216.
“Historical theory is the most complete and concentrated expression of knowledge in historical science; it generalizes and synthesizes the facts obtained by the historian at the empirical level of research; with its help, the functions of explaining and predicting the phenomena of historical reality are carried out, natural relationships are revealed within an integral social organization.” An integral social organization in relation to the specific scientific (or specific problem) level of historical theory is various kinds of social systems and processes. In this form, historical knowledge “is characterized by an abstract nature, and the reality represented in it is given in a conceptual model,” which is “an idealized scheme of reality obtained through abstraction” 48 . Such essentially meaningful models serve as the basis for deductive knowledge of historical reality by ascending from the abstract to the concrete, including with the help of mathematical modeling. The unifying principle of the components of the theory (the concepts, categories, laws included in it) is, as indicated, the idea underlying it. A concrete scientific theory, like any scientific theory, has the properties of systematicity, universality and logical consistency 49 .
In the literature on the theory and methodology of historical knowledge, the opinion is expressed that historical science, along with specific scientific theories that reflect the knowledge of individual phenomena, aspects and processes of socio-historical development, “should have its own level of theory, i.e. i.e., the level of categorical knowledge corresponding to its cognitive function” 50. In other words, there must be a level of theory inherent in historical science as a whole. They also express the idea that in general theoretical history should be developed as a branch of historical science 51 .
The opinion about the need for a level of theory inherent in historical science as a whole is beyond doubt. It should only be noted that Marxist historical science has such a theory. This is historical materialism. It is a theory about the most general laws of socio-historical development as an integral dynamic system. In this regard, the opinion of those philosophers who distinguish three aspects in historical materialism - philosophical, sociological and historical 52 - seems completely justified.
In the historical aspect, historical materialism represents that general theoretical historical knowledge, that “theoretical history”, the necessity of which is spoken by philosophers and historians. The fulfillment by historical materialism of the functions of a general theory of historical science in no way detracts from its role as an integral part of Marxist philosophy and as a general sociological theory.
- See: Karpovich V.N. Systematicity of theoretical knowledge (Logical aspect). Novosibirsk, 1984.
- Varg M. A. Categories and methods of historical science. P. 15.
- Uvarov A. N. Epistemological aspect of theory in historical science. pp. 12-13.
- See, for example: Bagaturia G. A. Marx’s first great discovery. Formation and development of a materialistic understanding of history//Marx the historian. M., 1968; Zhelenina I. A. On three aspects of the Maoxist theory of historical knowledge // Vestn. Moscow State University. Ser. 7. Philosophy. 1985. No. 2.
The unawareness of many philosophers and historians of the undoubted fact that historical materialism, being a sociological theory and method of cognition, at the same time represents a general historical theory, leads to certain costs in both historical and philosophical research. - Dovaniyah. For historians, this often leads to the transformation of historical research into an illustration of the provisions of historical materialism, on the one hand, and to the search for answers to specific questions in these provisions, on the other. Thus, the methodological role of historical materialism is underestimated. Philosophers, proceeding from the fact that historical materialism is the science of the most general laws of social development, do not turn to historical material and do not properly generalize even the fundamental results of historical research. As a result, many of their works on historical materialism turn out to be too abstract and therefore of little use for the practice of historical research.
Eliminating these shortcomings is an important task of historical and philosophical research and one of the ways to improve their scientific level.
Methodology is an integral part of scientific knowledge
Any discipline, in order to have scientific status, must inevitably acquire a clear systematic approach and methodology of knowledge. Otherwise, in the absence of a methodological apparatus, strictly speaking, it cannot be considered a science. A striking example Such a statement is the existence of a number of alternative views (like homeopathy). The historical discipline, taking shape as a science, of course, also over time acquired its own scientific apparatus and acquired methods of historical research.
Peculiarities
It is interesting that research methods in history are not always purely historical; sometimes they are borrowed from other sciences. Thus, much was taken from sociology, geography, philosophy, ethnography, etc. However, history has one important feature that is unique to it. This is the only scientific discipline, the object and subject of research of which do not exist in real time, which complicates their study, significantly reduces the capabilities of its methodological apparatus, and also adds inconvenience to the researcher, who inevitably projects on the logic and motivation of past eras own experience and beliefs.
A variety of historical methods of knowledge
Methods of historical research can be classified in different ways. However, these methods formulated by historians are divided mainly into the following: logical knowledge, general scientific methods, special, interdisciplinary.
Logical or philosophical methods of historical research represent the most elementary elements of common sense in the study of a subject: generalization, analysis, comparison, analogy.
General scientific methods
These are those methods of historical research that do not belong only to history, but extend in general to the methods of scientific knowledge, such as the following: scientific experiment, measurement, hypothesis building, and so on.
Special methods
They are the main ones and characteristic of a particular story. There are also a lot of them, but the following are the main ones. Ideographic (narrative), which consists in the most accurate description of facts (of course, a description of reality and facts has a place in any study, but in history it has a very special character). Retrospective method, which consists of tracking the chronicle preceding the event of interest in order to identify its causes. Closely related to it is the historical-genetic method aimed at studying early development event of interest. The historical-comparative method is based on the search for what is common and different in phenomena occurring in distant time and geographical periods, that is, on identifying patterns. The logical successor of the previous method is the historical-typological method, which is based on the found patterns of phenomena, events, cultures, and creates their classification for simpler subsequent analysis. The chronological method involves a strict presentation of factual material in the correct sequence.
Interdisciplinary methods
Methods of historical research include interdisciplinary ones. For example, quantitative, borrowed from mathematics. Or socio-psychological. And geography did not just give history a cartographic method of research based on close work with maps. The purpose of the latter is to identify patterns and causes of historical events. A special discipline was born - historical geography, which studies the influence of geographical and climatic features on the course of history.
Thus, methods of historical research are the most important basis for history as a science.
The methodology of historical science allows us to summarize historical facts and put together a holistic picture of the past. Methodology is a doctrine of methods for studying historical facts. The methodology is a set of methods. Method - a way of studying historical patterns through their specific manifestations - facts. Historians use many methods, including:
The historical-genetic method consists of studying historical phenomena in the process of their development - from origin to death or current state.
The historical-comparative method consists of comparing historical objects in space and time and identifying similarities and differences between them.
Using the historical-typological method, common features of historical events are identified and homogeneous stages in their development are identified. There is a classification of historical phenomena, events, objects.
The ideographic method consists of describing events and phenomena.
Systemic method - consists of revealing the internal mechanisms of functioning and development, analyzing the system and structure of a particular phenomenon.
Retrospective method - with its help you can consistently penetrate into the past in order to identify the cause of an event and restore its course.
Synchronous method - consists of studying various historical events that occurred at the same time in order to establish connections between them.
Chronological method (problem-chronological) - consists of studying the sequence of historical events in time or by periods, and within them by problems.
The periodization method allows us to establish periods of historical development based on identifying qualitative changes in society that reveal decisive directions in its movement.
When using these methods, it is necessary to rely on the following principles of historical research:
Historicism obliges us to consider all events and phenomena in their interrelation and interdependence. Events taking into account this principle are considered in the context of what happened, and not separately.
Objectivity obliges us to consider all events and phenomena unbiasedly, objectively, without preferences.
1.4 History functions
What does the study of history give? History performs a wide variety of functions in society.
The cognitive function is that studying the past allows you to discover new knowledge about it.
The intellectual-developmental function is that the study of history develops logical thinking. To understand the reasons for the events that took place, it is necessary to restore the logical chain of all decisions that led to certain consequences.
The practical-recommendatory function lies in the fact that the patterns of social development revealed by history help to develop a scientifically based political course, avoiding the mistakes of the past. Close to it is the prognostic function, which lies in the fact that the study of history allows us to foresee the future.
The educational function is that the study of history forms a civic position in everyone and contributes to the formation of such qualities as devotion, duty, love for the Motherland, responsibility and honesty. Without knowledge of the history of the Fatherland, it is impossible to become a real citizen, aware of his involvement in the fate of Russia, and ready to sacrifice himself for its sake.
The worldview function lies in the fact that the study of history forms a holistic system of views on the world, society, and man’s place in it. This allows you to form your attitude to the events of the current period and predict possible future developments of the situation in similar circumstances.
The function of social memory is that history is a way of collective self-identification and allows one to realize one’s belonging to a particular society, state. A society devoid of historical memory becomes an easy target for any manipulation. He who does not remember the past cannot have a future.