Commodity and money relations during the period of war communism. The monetary system of the state during the period of war communism. Financial transformations during the NEP period
From August 1918, the post of People's Commissar of Finance of the RSFSR was held by Krestinsky (until the end of 1922). His appointment marked the beginning of the VC policy. The leadership of the Krestinskys came during the Civil War. The VC period was characterized by almost complete ignorance of eco. laws of social development and the role of money, depreciated millions of times as a result of inflation (monetary terms appear - piece (thousand rubles), lemon, lemonard. The general collapse of the economy, the need for strict centralization of supplies, the state’s struggle against private trade were accompanied by the naturalization of relations. Features of financial policy The VC were “extraordinary taxes” on the exploiting classes.
A one-time ten-billion-dollar emergency tax was established for the bourgeois classes. the total collection in May 1919 did not even reach a billion rubles.
Other taxes (income and trade) also did not produce results. The excise form of taxation (nationalization, centralization) lost its significance and was abolished. In 1920, the People's Bank was liquidated, so there was no credit or banks in Russia for 2 years.
The most important material source at that time was the surplus appropriation system. Substantial masses of goods were traded in semi-legal markets, and the state sought to extract these resources for its own purposes. With the help of emission. The entire amount of withdrawals through issue amounted to 1,163 million pre-war rubles, and withdrawals through surplus appropriation amounted to 931 million pre-war rubles. The Soviet government wanted to destroy money and replace it with the labor unit.
Thus, emissions, surplus appropriation and cash taxes provided the state with material resources. transformations during the Civil War.
Despite the extreme unpopularity among the population, the policies of the VK allowed the communists to remain in power. However, by the beginning of 1921, the VC had exhausted itself, and in February 1921 all cash taxes were abolished, emissions were stopped, and surplus appropriation was replaced by a tax in kind. radical transformations and restoration of financial mechanisms began.
27. Financial transformations during the NEP period
By the beginning of the 1920s. Russia found itself in a state of political, economic, and financial crisis, to overcome which the NEP was adopted, the resuscitation of the market began, and commodity-money relations began to develop. The task was set to recreate credit institutions. In the fall of 1921, the State Bank was established, and soon a monetary reform was carried out, which stabilized the country's financial system. The USSR Ministry of Finance from November. 1922 headed by Sokolnikov. The main merit of People's Commissar Kerensky is ( 1922–1924) monetary reform, which resulted in the withdrawal of 886.5 quadrillion old rubles from circulation and the creation of a hard national currency - the golden chervonets. Transformations followed: the introduction of an extensive system of taxes, loans and credit operations. As a result, in 1924, after the famine of 1921, thanks to the NEP, the country not only fed its population, but also sold 180 million pounds of grain abroad. Established State bank. Thus the foundation of the monetary economy of Soviet Russia was laid. The nationalized industry began to rebuild on new self-supporting principles. Lending to industrial and trade enterprises on a commercial basis began. Until the ruble stabilizes, State. the bank issued loans at high interest rates: from 8 to 12% per month, but gradually the interest rate decreased. In 1922, the South-Eastern, the first commercial bank in Soviet Russia, arose. At the end of 1922, a number of banks emerged: Industrial Bank for financing industry, Elektrobank for electrification, Vneshtorgbank for foreign trade, and savings banks were established to mobilize the population's savings. A decree was issued on the establishment of the state. labor savings banks. In the summer of 1922, subscriptions to the first state were opened. grain loan for a total amount of 10 million poods of rye grain. In 1922, stock exchanges were organized to carry out transactions with the Central Bank. There was a “black exchange”, or “American”. She was unofficially recognized by the authorities. They sold any currency, gold, valuable furs. The purchase of canceled securities also took place there. As a result, stocks and bonds, which in 1919-1920. met like a wrapper, disappeared and ended up abroad. Simultaneously with the monetary reform, tax reform was carried out. The transition from natural taxation to monetary taxation. taxes were established on tobacco, alcoholic beverages, beer, matches, and honey. Already at the end of 1923 the main source of state income. The budget began to include deductions from the profits of enterprises, rather than taxes from the population. The main result of the tax reform was the elimination of the budget deficit since 1924.
War communism
Under these conditions, the government was forced to take the path of naturalization of economic relations. The means of production and consumer goods produced at nationalized enterprises were not sold for money, but were distributed centrally using orders and cards. By the beginning of 1921, 93% of all wages were paid in kind. The measures taken at least somehow normalized the work of nationalized enterprises and protected the material interests of workers. The displacement of commodity-money relations and their replacement by direct product exchange, the introduction of a system of natural accounting changed the attitude towards money as an economic category. In 1920-1921 In economic theory, several projects for measuring social costs on a non-monetary basis have been discussed. (The concept of “energy intensity”, “purely material accounting”, “labor hours”, “threads as a form of working money”.)
The consequence of the depreciation of money was that the urban and rural bourgeoisie lost their monetary savings. However, the Soviet state could not completely abandon the use of money. Z.V. Atlas in his book “The Socialist Monetary System” [21 writes that the production of money during the years of war communism was the only thriving industry. At the same time, the paradox of the monetary system of the period of war communism was that the more the scope of use of money narrowed, the more acute its shortage was felt. Therefore, both central and local authorities of the Soviet government were forced to constantly deal with monetary problems. The issue of rapidly depreciating paper money remained almost the only source of cash revenue for the state budget. The issued money circulated on the private market, the basis of which was small-scale peasant farming. Along with money, goods in high demand, such as salt and flour, also played the role of a universal equivalent on the private market. This complicated economic ties between individual regions of the country, gave rise to baggage, speculation, and undermined the financial base of the state, which could not control and regulate the development of small-scale farming. Thus, even under the conditions of war communism, money retained its role, but performed it in a unique form.
Currency reform 1922-1924
After the end of the Civil War, all efforts of the state were aimed at restoring commodity-money relations in the country and strengthening money circulation. By regulating commodity-money relations, the government hoped to use money as an instrument of national accounting, control and planning. In March 1921, at the X Congress of the RCP, it was discussed and adopted new economic policy (NEP). Proving the need to develop commodity-money relations in the interests of restoring the national economy and strengthening the elements of the socialist economy, V.I. Lenin emphasized: “... money turnover is a thing that perfectly checks the satisfactoriness of the country’s turnover, and when this turnover is incorrect, then unnecessary pieces of paper are obtained from money.” In the process of implementing the NEP, the monetary reform of 1922-1924 played an important role in the formation and development of the first monetary system of the USSR. During it, all the elements that form the concept of a monetary system were legally defined.
The monetary unit of the USSR was declared chervonets, or 10 rub. Its gold content was established - 1 spool or 78.24 shares of pure gold, which corresponded to the gold content of the pre-revolutionary ten-ruble gold coin.
At the first stage of the monetary reform, chervonets were issued into circulation. It is important to emphasize that the chervonets were issued not to cover the budget deficit, but to service economic turnover. The monopoly right to issue chervonets was granted to the State Bank of the USSR. Like bank notes, they were issued by the bank for circulation in the process of short-term lending to the national economy. Moreover, loans were provided only for easily salable inventory items. Bank loans in chervonets replaced, as a rule, commodity bills. To remove chervonets from circulation, it was decided that State Bank loans provided in chervonets should be repaid with them. Therefore, the amount of chervonets in circulation was limited by the need of economic turnover for means of payment. They were credit money not only in form, but also in essence. Their issue was limited both by the needs of economic turnover and by the assets on the balance sheet of the State Bank. Thus, according to the law, chervonets issued for circulation were backed by at least 25% with precious metals, stable foreign currency at the exchange rate for gold, and 75% with easily marketable goods, short-term bills and other short-term obligations. To maintain the stability of the chervonets in relation to gold, the state allowed, within certain limits, its exchange for gold (in coins and bars) and stable foreign currency. In addition, the state accepted chervonets at face value in payment of state debts and payments levied by law in gold. Thus, the necessary conditions were created to maintain the stability of the chervonets. It established itself in circulation as hard currency.
Solving the problem of maintaining the stability of the national currency was not easy. Firstly, the country had a large budget deficit, which was covered by issuing a constantly depreciating new currency - Sovznak. In this regard, there was a parallel circulation of two currencies - the chervonets and the sovznak. Secondly, with the transition to the NEP, gold and foreign currency took a strong position in circulation as a stable currency. That is why, until March 1923, from 30 to 50% of the chervonets authorized for issue remained in the cash desk of the State Bank Board, i.e. were not put into circulation. As the position of the chervonets strengthened in 1923, there was a gradual transition from the gold calculation of all monetary transactions to the chervonets. State budget revenues and expenses, the volume of business transactions, tax payments, wages, etc. began to be calculated in chervonets. There was no longer any need to use royal gold coins and foreign currency as means of circulation and payment. The right to issue chervonets granted to the State Bank expanded its capabilities for lending to the national economy. The consumption of their own working capital by enterprises, associated with the depreciation of money, stopped, and normal conditions were created for the development of commercial and bank loans. All this made it possible to strengthen the principles of self-financing in the national economy, increase the budget revenue base and reduce the budget deficit.
However, the issue of Sovznak to cover the budget deficit continued until mid-1924. To reduce the nominal volume of the money supply and facilitate payments in the country, two redenominations of Sovznak1 were carried out: the first at the end of 1921, and the second at the end of 1922. With the first denomination, 10,000 rubles . all previous issues were equal to 1 rub. banknotes of the 1922 model. When carrying out the second denomination, 100 rubles. model 1922 were exchanged for 1 ruble. sample 1923. On March 1, 1924, the number of Sovznak in circulation without taking into account two denominations was fantastic - 809.6 quadrillion rubles. Even with small turnover it was necessary to operate with millions of rubles.
As Sovznak depreciated, the circulation of chervonets continued to expand. If initially they served commercial turnover between enterprises, enterprises and the financial and credit system, then later they began to be used in the field of retail trade. Thus, for some time the country had a system of parallel circulation of two currencies.
The system of parallel circulation of currencies was a step towards restoring commodity-money relations in the country and strengthening money circulation. At the same time, it contained serious contradictions. Chervonets, as a large denomination banknote, was the currency of the city. Prices for agricultural products were low, so the peasant market was served mainly by sovznaks. From the depreciation of the latter, peasants suffered great material losses. There was a threat of a reduction in agricultural production and the naturalization of peasant farming. The urban population also suffered from the depreciation of the sovznak. Losses in the family budgets of workers and employees ranged from 20 to 30%. All this required the completion of the begun monetary reform. The necessary economic prerequisites for this, as well as the formation of a new monetary system, were created by the beginning of 1924.
The second stage of monetary reform was marked by the release treasury notes and withdrawal of depreciated Sovznak from circulation. In February-March 1924, the Soviet government issued decrees on the release into circulation of state treasury notes in denomination 1; 3; 5 rubles, termination of the issue of Sovznak, minting and release of silver and copper coins, withdrawal of Sovznak from circulation. The latter was carried out by redeeming them at the following rate: 1 rub. treasury notes were exchanged for 50 thousand rubles. banknotes of the 1923 model. Apart from two denominations carried out in 1921 and 1922, the exchange rate was 50 billion rubles. all old banknotes from the October Revolution for 1 ruble. new.
Treasury notes differed from chervonets not only in the denomination of banknotes, but also in their economic nature. Until mid-1924, the issue of treasury notes was used by the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR to cover the budget deficit. Their release into circulation did not require bank collateral in gold, goods or credit obligations. As legal tender, treasury notes were provided with all the property of the state. To maintain the stability of money circulation in the country, the issue of treasury notes was limited. In 1924, the limit of the emission right of the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR to issue treasury notes was no more than 50% of bank notes issued in circulation, in 1928 - no more than 75%, and in 1930 - no more than 100%. In 1925, in connection with the elimination of the budget deficit, the issue of treasury notes was completely transferred to the State Bank. Along with the issue of bank notes, the issue of treasury notes became one of the bank's credit resources. The treasury nature of the issue was preserved for the metal coin, the income from which went to the budget.
Thus, as a result of the reform of 1922-1924. A new monetary system emerged in the USSR. The types of banknotes, the name of the monetary unit, its gold content, the procedure for issuing banknotes, their security, and economic instruments for regulating the money supply in circulation were determined. The development of non-cash payments provided for by law was essential for the organization of the latter. Formed as a result of the reform of 1922-1924. the new monetary system existed with minor changes of a non-fundamental nature until the beginning of 1990.
This reform was carried out in a difficult economic and political environment: a destroyed economy, a financial blockade, a sharp reduction in gold reserves. On the eve of its implementation, the country's gold reserves amounted to 8.7% of the gold reserves of Tsarist Russia before the First World War and 13% of the gold reserves on the eve of the monetary reform of S.Yu. Witte. The Soviet government managed to create a new monetary system in a short time, strengthen the purchasing power of the ruble and increase the role of money in managing social production. To maintain the established parity (1 chervonets was equal to 10 rubles in treasury notes), the Soviet government widely used the techniques available to it - state regulation of commodity prices and commodity intervention. In 1922-1924. The Soviet state already owned the overwhelming majority of industrial products, the resources of the credit system, all railway transport, foreign trade, and a significant part of the country's wholesale trade. By regulating wholesale and retail prices, maneuvering inventory and monetary resources, the state actively influenced the purchasing power of money and its circulation in the national economy.
On November 7, 1917, at six o'clock in the morning, by order of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee, armed sailors of the Guards Fleet Crew, without encountering any resistance, occupied the building of the State Bank. During the day, representatives of the new government demanded money from the Bank. In response, the management of the State Bank instructed to stop servicing clients. On November 12, the State Bank was presented with a demand to open a current account in the Petrograd office in the name of the Council of People's Commissars and samples of signatures of V.I. Lenin and temporary deputy people's commissar of finance V.R. Menzhinsky were presented. But Bank employees continued to carry out transactions on the basis of financial documents issued by the Ministry of Finance. Even the one-day arrest of the Bank Manager I.P. Shipov did not force them to change their position. From November 8 to November 23, 1917, the State Bank did not serve clients, but during this time it continued to carry out its main function - emission. 610 million rubles were put into circulation. and 459 million rubles were sent to the Bank's offices and branches.
In December 1917, the reorganization of the country's credit system began. On December 8, 1917, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On the abolition of the Noble Land Bank and the Peasant Land Bank" was adopted. The land, equipment and city real estate owned by these credit organizations were transferred to peasants, state farms and local bodies of Soviet power that were being organized at that time.
One of the issues in the theory and practice of socialist construction, which was generally resolved by V.I. Lenin, even before the October Revolution, raised the question of the role of commodity-money relations and the ways of their use in the national economy under the dictatorship of the proletariat.
The first step of the Soviet government in the field of monetary circulation was the decree of December 14, 1917 “On the nationalization of private banks.”
The nationalization of the banking system meant not only its transfer to the state and the centralization of management, but also the rapid withering away of the previous functions of banks. Only one was preserved and carried out - the issuance of credit notes, but with nationalization it acquired a completely different character. The point is not even that it became purely treasury in its essence; what is important is that the ideology of monetary policy pursued by the Soviet government in the early years was based on “detachment from the previous capitalist relationships in production and the eventual elimination of any influence of money on the ratio economic elements."
The question of what money should be like under socialism first arose in the spring of 1918, when the inability of the old form of circulation to solve new problems became obvious. However, the Soviet government did not have a strict plan for the new monetary circulation. During the Civil War, attitudes towards money changed several times. At the first stage, it was believed that for the transition period money should be saved by replacing old units with new ones.
By the spring of 1918, as part of the general economic development plan adopted by the First All-Russian Congress of National Economic Councils, a program was developed to restore the country's financial economy through monetary reform and reorganization of banking. It envisaged the completion of the nationalization of banks, a gradual transition to compulsory current accounts covering the entire population, the widest development of check circulation and transfers, and the creation of a general accounting department for all nationalized enterprises. As part of the approved program, the congress decided to replace pre-revolutionary money with new ones. In the summer of 1918, the production of a “new type of paper signs” called “account signs of the RSFSR” began.
The turning point in relation to money was the transition of the organization of the national economy to the principles of military communism, which began in the fall of 1918, and lasted until the second half of 1921.
During the years of war communism, when the idea of the possibility of a forced transition to socialism-communism became widespread, many economists began to consider the exclusion of commodity-money relations from national economic relations as one of the primary tasks. The naturalization of the country's economic life, forced by economic collapse, seemed to be a natural, logical process, and this in practice led to an even greater naturalization of economic relations, a reduction in the role of money in economic circulation and to its gradual elimination as such.
Taking into account the peculiarities of the country's economic situation during the period of war communism and the practical task posed of eliminating commodity-money relations in 1919-1920, many Soviet economists directed their efforts to develop issues of organizing a cashless economy. One of the most pressing problems that needed to be solved in order to completely eliminate money from economic circulation was to find a new form of economic accounting that did not require the use of cost indicators. This task was all the more urgent because in the conditions of the depreciation of money and the disorder of the entire financial economy, monetary accounting did not give the desired effect, since it not only did not reflect, but often distorted the results of the production activities of enterprises. In the process of work, a variety of, sometimes opposing, points of view emerged.
The next stage in the development of money is associated with the transition to a new economic policy. The NEP caused profound changes in the economic mechanism. Recognition of the need for a market turned the products of labor into goods, the category of price came into its own, and the guiding principle of Soviet power in the field of finance became “the restoration of monetary circulation on a metal basis (gold).” The first step in this direction was the revival of the activities of the State Bank of the RSFSR. It was established with the aim of promoting credit and other banking operations to the development of industry, agriculture and trade turnover, as well as with the aim of concentrating money circulation and carrying out other measures aimed at establishing correct monetary circulation. However, the newly created State Bank had a number of specific features that distinguished it from state banks in capitalist countries. The bank did not take any part in regulating money circulation, since the issue of Sovznak was carried out by Narkomfin.
The bank's issuing function arose later, when it issued bank notes, designated in the new gold monetary unit - the chervonets. The Chervonets contained 1 spool - 78.24 shares of pure gold, which was equal to the gold content of the previous Russian ten-ruble coin. Based on this ratio, the State Bank had to regulate the exchange rate of the chervonets in foreign currency. No fixed quantitative connection was established between the chervonets and the sovzkak.
The banknotes were backed by: - gold and foreign stable currency, accepted commercial bills and easily marketable goods of the public sector. Bank notes could be exchanged for gold. The beginning of the exchange should have been established by a special government act, but it was never adopted. At the same time, Soviet notes remained in circulation, and their number continued to grow due to the state budget deficit, to cover which they were printed.
The final moment of the monetary reform was the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of February 5, 1924, in accordance with which treasury notes of the Narkomfin were issued into circulation. 10 rubles in treasury notes were equal to one chervonets. Thus, through the gold content of the chervonets, the ruble de facto acquired a gold content and began to be called chervonets, in contrast to the ruble represented in Sovznaki.
According to the law, the total amount of treasury notes in circulation should not exceed half the amount of chervonets circulating in the country. A little later, a fixed rate of Sovznak in chervonets was announced and their redemption began in exchange for treasury notes.
As a result of the monetary reform of 1922-1924. In the Soviet Union, a monetary system emerged, the originality of which was determined by the following circumstances:
- 1. The monetary system was based on the interaction of two irredeemable types of money: banknotes and treasury notes. Banknotes were backed by gold and had gold parity, but there was no gold currency circulation. The advantage of such a system was that there could be no shortage of means of payment, and at the same time the danger of an increase in paper money was neutralized by the regulation of the issue of bank notes.
- 2. Chervonets, as the basis of the national currency system, assumed, on the one hand, interconnection, and on the other, the autonomy of its exchange rate and domestic purchasing power. The foreign exchange rate was based on the monopoly of foreign trade and foreign exchange interventions; domestic purchasing power - on price stability in the socialized production sector.
During the period of civil war and foreign intervention, the Soviet government pursued a policy called war communism.
Goal: to ensure the mobilization of all the country's resources - labor, food, goods - and their direct distribution in accordance with wartime needs.
Methods:
- food appropriation, i.e., the delivery by peasants to the state of all surpluses, and sometimes even part of the food they need at a fixed price. Surplus appropriation was introduced for bread, grain fodder, meat, potatoes, and agricultural raw materials;
- replacing commodity exchange with product exchange;
- introduction of a card system (rationing system);
- transition to payment in kind;
- abolition of payment for services provided by the state (transportation, residential premises, utilities, use of mail, telegraph, telephone, etc.);
- changing the forms of distribution of the social product. All production of enterprises was credited to national funds. To carry out their activities, enterprises received the necessary resources from centralized funds.
- narrowing the scope of money use. They were used to calculate wages due to workers and employees and were paid in sovznakh. Monetary allowances were paid to Red Army personnel and their families. Small business and operating expenses of enterprises were made in cash.
As a result of the revolution and the subsequent civil war, foreign military intervention, the ruble as a Russian national monetary unit ceased to exist both in form, being fragmented into many varieties and new formations, and in essence, depreciating to a vanishingly small value. On the territory of the former empire, numerous political formations formed that tried to issue their own money. In circulation were: former royal issues, “Kerenki”, “Sovznaki”. National currencies of Poland and the Baltic republics that gained state independence were issued. Emissions of national Soviet republics - Ukraine, Belarus, Far East, Transcaucasia, Central Asia. Money surrogates: “white” governments; occupation money of the interventionists; unauthorized and disorderly releases of local authorities, all kinds of public, cooperative and private enterprises and organizations.
During the civil war, about 200 types of various banknotes issued by different authorities were in circulation simultaneously on the territory of the former Russian state. During 1917-21, the amount of money increased 76 times. This entire conglomerate of banknotes that were issued uncontrollably and immediately lost their value created chaos and the collapse of previous monetary relations and connections.
The revolutionary actions of the Soviet government to destroy the mechanisms of banking, commercial and state credit led to a further swelling of the money supply and an increase in inflation. The establishment of a state monopoly of banking through nationalization and centralization of the network of banking institutions led to the paralysis of an extensive and ramified monetary system serving industrial and trade exchange. The consequence of this was a sharp contraction of non-cash money turnover and an expansion of cash, which led to additional demand for cash banknotes. The elimination of the state credit system turned emissions into practically the only source of satisfying the financial needs of the state. This is eloquently evidenced by the data in Table 5.
Table 5 - Financing of government expenditures in Russia and the RSFSR
(billion rubles)
*including emergency revolutionary indemnity in the amount of 10 billion rubles.
Source: Dyachenko V.P. Soviet finances in the first phase of development of the socialist state. - M., 1947, p.31-33,123-124,186-187
The economic policy of the Soviet government was aimed at eliminating market relations and replacing them with an equalization and distribution system. Coinciding with civil war and foreign intervention, this policy became known as “war communism.” Through the policy of War Communism, the Bolshevik Party tried to make a great leap into the realm of equality and social justice, where all elements of bourgeois exploitation, including money, were supposed to disappear.
Prominent Soviet specialists of those years presented the methods of war communism in the field of monetary circulation as follows:
- Sokolnikov G.Ya. “The turning point in the financial policy of the Soviet government occurred in the fall of 1918, along with a general change in the policy line towards war communism. In the field of monetary circulation, the era of war communism gave orientation towards the complete elimination of money, the organization of non-monetary payments, and the direct distribution of produced values.”
- Zheleznov V.Ya. - the head of the Institute of Economic Research of the Narkomfin of the RSFSR noted: “the value of money has fallen to extraordinary proportions and continues to fall, threatening complete depreciation - it doesn’t matter, you can do without it and even should, because money is a fetish that blinds the ignorant and inert masses and preserves its charm only among people infected with old social prejudices. You can transfer the entire economy to natural payments, distribute everything that anyone needs from public stores, and everyone’s needs will be satisfied no worse than before.”
- Yurovsky L.N. noted that the ideas of economic policy of 1918-20 were not immediately concretized.... State power, focusing on the complete elimination of all capitalist and generally all commodity-money relations, built an economic order in which money should have become redundant.
The planned measures to eliminate the market and replace commodity-money relations with centralized state accounting and distribution were practically implemented in a series of legislative acts of the Soviet government. They provided for: the introduction of surplus appropriation for grain and all other agricultural products; nationalization of domestic trade; establishment of labor service; requisition and confiscation of valuables. From November 1918 to May 1921, 17 decrees were adopted on the abolition of various types of monetary payments and on the free provision and supply of the vast majority of goods and services.
As the economy became more naturalized, the importance of money and credit diminished. Nationalized enterprises were transferred to budget financing. A kind of apotheosis of “demonetization” and naturalization of the economy was the decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of January 19, 1920 “On the abolition of the People’s Bank.” In 1920, the People's Bank was abolished, and its assets and liabilities were transferred to Narkomfin. Policymakers were instructed to develop a project for the creation and implementation of a special labor currency unit instead of money.
The banknotes put into circulation were officially called not banknotes, but banknotes. Formal control over their release in the form of an authorized emission ceiling was abolished in May 1919. By decree of the Council of People's Commissars of May 15, 1919, emissions were permitted within the limits of the actual needs of the national economy. They did not find any harm in the operation of the machine that printed paper money, but saw it as a convenient way to destroy the bourgeoisie through the disorder of monetary circulation.
The rejection of money and the general pursuit of “in kind” with its catastrophic shortage spun inflation to the level of hyperinflation. From October 1917 to June 1921, the amount of money in circulation issued by the central government alone increased 120 times, and the price level rose 8 thousand times.
War communism lasted three years, but the monetary system was destroyed almost to the ground (see table 6). The Soviet government survived, but there was a bureaucratization of the economy, which deprived producers of any initiative. Speaking to representatives of the financial departments of the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets on May 18, 1918, V.I. Lenin defined
Table 6 - War Communism and Monetary Circulation
| | Oct.1917 | Dec 1918 | Dec 1919 | Dec 1920 | June 1921 |
| Money supply in circulation (billion rubles) | 19,6 | 61,3 | 225,0 | 1168,6 | 2347,2 |
| October 1917=1 | 1 | 3 | 12 | 60 | 120 |
| Million rubles in 1913 prices | 1919 | 374 | 93 | 70 | 29 |
| Volume of paper issues per month (billion rubles) | 2 | 4 | 33 | 173 | 225 |
| Million rubles in 1913 prices | 196 | 24 | 13 | 10 | 3 |
| Retail price index: -to the level of 1913 | 10,2 | 164 | 2420 | 16800 | 80700 |
| -to the level of October 1917 | 1 | 16 | 237 | 1647 | 7911 |
lt;§ 1. “War communism” and the breakdown of the monetary system. - § 2. The collapse of the monetary system and the price gap. - § 3. Naturalization of the economy and the course towards eliminating money. - § 4. Theory and practice of the withering away of money. - The problem of economic accounting under socialism. - Projects of non-cash economic accounting. - § 5. Development of commodity exchange and the emergence of local equivalents. - Expanded form of value. - General reform of value. - § 6. Sovznaki as substitutes for local goods - money. - § 7. Reasons for the “survivability” of the sovznak.
In October 1917, the proletariat inherited from the bourgeoisie a fundamentally disrupted monetary system. All the cream of the emission tax had already been skimmed by the tsarist and provisional governments, which in total siphoned from the population by inflation of commodity values by more than 7 billion gold rubles. Having broken the resistance of State Bank officials by armed force, the Soviet government took possession of the emission apparatus and used it to finance the “costs of the revolution.”
§ 1. The printing press served the proletariat as a means of fighting the bourgeoisie, along with firearms.
The time from mid-1918 to April 1921 is usually called the period of “war communism.” During the period of War Communism, everything was mobilized to fight the internal and external bourgeoisie.
“Our entire economy, both as a whole and in individual parts, was thoroughly imbued with wartime conditions. Taking us into account, we had to set our task to collect a certain amount of food, completely disregarding what place it would take in the general economic turnover” (Lenin). Such a policy was necessary in the conditions of a brutal civil war. “In the war conditions in which we were placed, this policy was correct. We had no other possibility than the maximum use of an immediate monopoly, up to the confiscation of all surpluses, at least without any compensation... This was a merci caused not by economic conditions, but prescribed to us largely by military conditions” (Lenin). Since “military communism” “was forced by war and ruin,” “it was not and cannot be a policy that corresponds to the economic tasks of the proletariat. It was a temporary measure” (Lenin).
The introduction of surplus appropriation and numerous and general labor duties, the nationalization of all production down to the smallest enterprises, centralized (through the so-called “headquarters”, i.e. the main departments of individual industries) management of all industry, the abolition of the free market and centralized supply of the population and the Red Army. army products - these are the characteristic features of this period. All these measures led to the fact that the sphere of market exchange was extremely narrowed: meanwhile, paper money emissions continued to grow; but its real value fell due to the continuous increase in the rate of depreciation of Sovznak.
§ 2. The following table shows the growth of the money supply and the fall in its real value.
Real price
An extraordinary reduction in the sphere of market exchange, a catastrophic increase in the velocity of circulation of money with a continuous increase in emission, these are the reasons for such a sharp depreciation of sovznas. The rate of depreciation constantly (except for the 2nd half of 1920) outstripped the rate of emission, as can be seen from diagram No. 5 on page 172.
But the paper money flow during this period was exhausted by one centralized issue of sovznak by the Soviet government. Since the spring of 1919, local issues of banknotes have become extremely widespread due to the fragmentation of the entire current territory of the USSR into many politically or economically isolated regions and districts and even individual cities, even county ones.
§ 2. The period of “war communism” is a period of paper-money chaos unprecedented in history. The collapse of the unity of the monetary system reflected the profound disintegration of economic ties of a previously integral economic organism and, in turn, aggravated the general economic degradation (decline). Prices not only grew from day to day, even from hour to hour, but most importantly, the single price disappeared. Over the same period, for the same product - rye flour - prices in Sovznak in Leningrad were 23.8 times higher than in Saratov, and 15 times higher than in Ulyanovsk. Each area set its own prices, and the further one area was from another, the greater the price gap. No less sharp was the difference in the prices of goods in the same market. For example, on the Moscow market in October 1920, prices for butter, sugar, millet and herring increased in comparison with 1913 by more than 10 thousand times;
Diagram No. b
The ratio of the rate of increase in the money supply and price growth in percentage from 1918 to 1921 in the USSR
| 1 1 masses - Rising prices | ||||||
| (NOAH | ||||||
| (In pro | cents) | |||||
| gt; 1 | ||||||
| I" | ||||||
| "--V | To | |||||
| # # # | G\\ | |||||
| і # # # | ||||||
| 1 ^ | / # G | |||||
| 1 # 1 # | h | |||||
| 1 \" / / 1 i | ||||||
| 1/ 1# | - | |||||
1918 1918
II
p ¦ o
1919
I
1919
II
1920
1
’920
II
1921
I
And
1921
II
I
400
80
60
40
20
300
80
60
40
20
200
80
60
40
20
100
80
60
40
20
0
It is significant that the rise in prices in the second half of each year, in connection with the sale of the harvest, slows down significantly, even with an increase in the rate of emission, as for example in the second half of 1919 and 1920. This slowdown in the rate of depreciation of money in the second half of 1920 was so significant that the increase in emissions as a percentage turned out to be even slightly greater than the depreciation of the Soviet sign.
prices for meat, milk and eggs range from 5 thousand to 10 thousand times, and for cabbage and fresh fish - less than 5 thousand times. Food prices in general have increased many times; more than the prices of luxury goods. The market was generally driven underground, and although in fact it existed everywhere during the period of “war communism,” the sphere of market turnover and, consequently, the sphere of money circulation turned out to be very narrowed. This, along with the greatly increased speed of circulation of money, explains why by July 1, 1921, the commodity circulation of the entire Union was satisfied by the money supply, the real value of which was equal to only 29 million rubles.
§ 3. The further the monetary-market trade turnover went, the more it was supplanted, on the one hand, by the state, free supply of products in kind, and on the other hand, by illegal private trade exchange.
The further, the more for workers * and employees the main source of supply became rations (a fixed standard for planned supply established by the state), and not the purchase of goods on the market for sovznaki. So, according to L. Kritsman, in the central Russian budget
worker state supplies in kind amounted to: in 1918 - 41%, in 1919 - 63%, in 1920 - 75%. Also, in the overall real state budget, monetary income and expenditure by 1920 played an insignificant role. According to S. Golovanov's assumptions, the entire state income for 1920 (including gross income from nationalized sectors of the national economy) was equal to 1,726 million gold rubles. Of this amount, the share of cash expenses based on his calculations accounted for only 126 million rubles, or 7.3*/0. Of course, these figures are approximate, because there is no data for precise calculations, but the ratio of the monetary and natural parts of the budget should have been approximately the same. Thus, the astronomical figures of paper money emission in 1920 actually brought the state very modest real income. The main support of the budget was not emissions, but the receipt of products in kind from the peasantry through surplus appropriation and from industry through the direct withdrawal of all products needed by the state and their planned distribution.
§ 4. During this period, practical steps were taken towards replacing cash flow with non-monetary accounting calculations. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 23, 1919 established a certain procedure for settlements between nationalized and municipalized enterprises and institutions under state control. Calculations were to be made, as stated in the decree, “accounting method without the participation of banknotes.” By decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 6, 1920, these decisions were extended to cooperation. Finally, by the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of July 25, 1920, on requisitions and confiscations, private individuals were ordered to deposit into current accounts in state treasuries all cash in excess of twenty times the minimum tariff rate of the given locality per person. Thus, the Soviet government at that time took measures (which were not limited to the above decrees) to narrow the scope of monetary circulation. Thus, the 2nd session of the All-Russian Dietary Commission on June 18, 1920, based on the report of the NKF, adopted a resolution in which the activities of the NKF were recognized, expressed “in the desire to establish / non-monetary settlements for the destruction of the monetary system - generally corresponding to the main tasks of the economic and administrative development of the RSFSR.” VDIK instructed to take effective measures to implement the new economic management system.
In connection with the general course towards narrowing the scope of monetary circulation, the question arose of replacing the previous monetary accounting with a new unified method for assessing and accounting for economic activity. How to calculate the effect of production work? How can one determine which products are more profitable to produce if there is no common unit of accounting for labor productivity? And doesn’t the establishment of one or another unit of accounting again mean a return to money, at least as a measure of value? These issues of organizing economic accounting in a socialist society during this period acquired enormous practical importance and it is not surprising that there was a lively discussion of them in scientific and business circles.
Our economists have proposed a number of projects for economic development - “A, XX XVX
A ¦ ¦*
public accounting and evaluation under socialism. Some proposed introducing direct economic cost accounting for each type of product separately, while others put forward a unified principle for estimating costs for all types of products. On the other hand, among these latest projects, some put forward the principle of bound (ration) distribution of products, others of free distribution. In the latter case, each worker would be issued a labor bond, for which he could receive any products of equal “labor value”. A significant part of the projects came down to the establishment of a single “labor unit” of accounting and distribution, which was called a “thread”. According to the Krewe’s proposal, the basic unit of “labor” value is considered to be “an hour of simple unskilled socially necessary labor.”
The most developed project for economic accounting under socialism was proposed by S. G. Strumilin. The problem, in his opinion, “reduces to solving a mathematical problem about what distribution of the country’s productive resources can ensure maximum satisfaction of needs with a minimum of labor costs.” The labor expended in accordance with the above principle will be considered socially necessary; as a unit of accounting, Strumilin proposed “accepting the value of the product of labor of one normal worker of the first tariff category when he fulfills the production norm by 100%.”
Also, the “working group of the Currency Subcommittee of the NKF” wrote in its project: “The average product of one normal day of simple labor at its normal intensity for a given type of work is taken as a unit of labor accounting. The designated labor accounting unit is given the name “thread”. The Council of Labor and Defense is charged with developing and establishing: 1) rules for bringing complex labor to simple; 2) a standard price list of all economic goods and services that are subject to accounting, expressed in threads, and 3) a procedure for periodically, as necessary, revising these rules and price lists.” But what was “entrusted” to the Council of Labor and Defense and Defense was the most important and difficult. Of course, it is possible to more or less accurately take into account how much specific labor is spent on a particular product (if the costs of raw materials are also expressed in labor units), but how to establish how much socially necessary and simple labor is spent, how to reduce complex labor to simple? For the central bodies of economic management this would be very difficult, but not. an impossible task. If there were planned accounting of social consumption, on the one hand, and given technical conditions, on the other hand, it would be possible to establish what kind of labor in each industry is socially necessary. It is also quite POSSIBLE to reduce COMPLEX labor to simple labor if the required labor expenditure to obtain a particular qualification is precisely established. However, this point will not play a role in a communist society, because, assuming a high development of technology, in this society the principle will be carried out: “from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs.” But in the absence of this possibility, i.e., when the conditions of technical development do not yet make it possible to fully satisfy all social needs, it will certainly be necessary to distribute products taking into account the labor expended by each producer, and therefore it will be necessary to reduce complex labor to Simple.
The most consistent with the socialist system were projects for the introduction of universal economic accounting in labor units - threads. These threads seem to be very similar to Owen's "labor bonds" or other similar attempts to directly determine the value of products in labor units (see Chapter XVIII). But the significant difference between them is that the projects of our threads were based on more or less solid ground in the form of nationalization and centralized organization of all industry (and hence the theoretical possibility of establishing the amount of socially necessary labor spent on products), while Owen wanted introduce an organized and “fair exchange” according to. “labor value” in the presence of private ownership of the means of production and complete anarchy of all production.
But weren’t these threads essentially the same money, just named differently? Bourgeois economists usually give a positive answer to this question, but this is completely wrong. “With social production, money capital disappears. Society distributes labor and means of production among various branches of labor. Producers may perhaps receive paper certificates by which they extract from the public consumer supply the quantity of products corresponding to their working hours. These certificates are not money at all. They do not convert” (K. Marx).
§ 5. But the projects for introducing universal and unified economic accounting in trades and the distribution of products in “paper certificates” expressed in trades were not implemented in practice.
The fact is that the obligatory condition under which “money can be liquidated”, according to the resolution of the VIII Congress of the RCP, “the complete organization of communist production and distribution,” could not be achieved either in 1918, or in 1919, or in 1920 If large-scale production had already been socialized and organized (and it still is), then many millions of peasant farms still remained a disorganized mass, and the state actually did not have the opportunity, on the one hand, to extract all the grain surpluses, and, on the other hand, to supply the peasantry in the required quantity with urban products. The implementation of food appropriation constantly lagged behind plans; It was established that the peasantry still had significant reserves of grain. All this bread went to the “underground market”; despite all the repressions, market trade continued to exist.
And since there is a market, it means, as we already know, there must be prices and money. We further know that real money is only one specific commodity, for example gold. What product was money on the “underground market” in the era of “war communism”, what was the measure of value here? To answer this question we must recall what was discussed in Chapter I, namely the four forms of value. In the “underground market” during the period of “war communism,” relationships developed that can be subsumed under both simple and detailed forms, and under the general form. When the urban population experienced real hunger, and the rural population experienced an acute need for a whole range of products, such as bread, textiles, etc., there could be no question of gold being the universal commodity equivalent. Gold itself turned into an ordinary commodity and, moreover, significantly less valuable than before the war, in contrast to, for example, goods such as bread or salt.Already in 1918, gold could buy goods with an index 10 times less than before the war, i.e. gold A ruble in goods was worth only a ten-kopeck piece.
The market, driven underground, and also deprived of money, was therefore a defective market. But since the market existed, and market relations, at least in an ugly form and in a limited volume, developed, new money had to be created. And we are precisely observing this process of development of new types of goods-money during this period.
Trading “under the counter,” that is, illegally, sellers and buyers established random exchange equivalents in each individual case, since there was no universal equivalent.
Here is an example of the establishment in Kaluga in January 1919, according to F. Termitin, of exchange proportions corresponding, according to Marx’s theory, to the expanded form of value (since one particular commodity did not appear here as a universal equivalent):
1 lb. soap = 2 lbs. millet,
22 lbs. kerosene = 15 lbs. peas,
1 overcoat = 101/2 FU3-kernel cereals, 3 lbs. salt = 30 lb. oats,
1 pair of boots = 30 ft. buckwheat, U2 FUN* shag = 1 lb. lard
Since simple exchange relations were simultaneously established in the market between a long series of goods, these relations can be called an expanded form of value, such as: 1 cart of firewood = 672 pounds of kerosene, or 1 overcoat, or -15 pounds. poly (proportion taken from Weisberg’s book “Money and Prices”). Such proportions were established in all markets, and this was inevitable as long as market relations existed.
The most popular and most valuable goods become universal equivalents. Usually, not only in different areas, but even in the same area, there were several equivalents. These commodity equivalents constantly fought with each other for the position of monetary, i.e., universal and unified equivalent. Thus, in Moscow in 1920, the strongest contenders for the “money throne”, vacated after the “deposition” of gold, were salt and baked bread. “We have all the data to consider,” says Weisberg, “salt for Moscow in 1920 as a scale of prices, an instrument of circulation and a means of accumulation.” There were other contenders in other places. Anyone who went to a village to buy food always first found out “what they exchange for in this village,” for example, salt or bread or kerosene, and in accordance with this, took with him a certain amount of this equivalent.
In this way, the expanded form of value is transformed for each individual region into a universal form.
flour.
Here is an example of this universal form of value (also taken from life), in which rye flour is the universal equivalent:
30 lb. kerosene 10 lbs. soap 3 lbs. shag 10 arsh. calico
“If,” said Marx, “all commodities expressed their value in silver, wheat or copper, then silver, wheat or copper would be measures of value, therefore, universal equivalents.”
However, since in this period our “equivalent form” was nowhere firmly fused with the natural form” of any specific commodity, we essentially did not yet have real, fully developed money. The general form of value has not yet transformed into the monetary form of value. Since there was no single equivalent on the “underground market” for the entire economic system of the USSR, it means that in the USSR during this period there was no real money that had completed its development.
§ 6. But along with these equivalents - underdeveloped money - there was something that we all called “money”, namely sovznaki. Paper money is not money, but only substitutes or representatives of money. Once gold ceased to be real money, paper money had to find some other point of support, but there was no such single point. Hence the complete instability of Sovznak and the greatest confusion in prices. In one area, they said: “a shirt costs 10 pounds. flour, and in Sovznak. Today it costs 20 billion rubles.” and the shirt seller received 20 billion rubles, with which he could buy 10 pounds. flour. In that. the same day in another area they said this: “a shirt costs 5 pounds. salt, and today it is worth 10 billion rubles in Sovznak.” And it turned out that the same shirt costs 20 billion rubles here, and 10 billion rubles there. Since different equivalents appeared in different regions, sovznak had to substitute salt, flour, chintz, etc.
If real and fully developed money—gold, i.e., a universal and single equivalent—functioned as a measure of value and a means of accumulation, then such a situation could not exist: Soviet signs would depreciate more evenly.
But precisely in view of the severance of economic ties, profound changes in production and consumption, the illegal situation of the market, disruption of transport, etc., each region established its own equivalents, and each region in its own way established the value of a given commodity the equivalent - “half money” is replaced by the Sovznak bills in circulation. This absence of a single commodity-monetary basis for Sovznak is the uniqueness of the situation on the “underground market.” Sovznaki were deprived of a strong, uniform, established monetary basis for the entire society - a measure of value. lt;
§ 7. If in some areas equivalents developed, “at least temporarily performing the functions of money (a measure of value, a means of circulation,” and payment and an instrument of accumulation), then the question arises, why, nevertheless, in the localities the market did not completely abolish, sovztsaki. and did not replace them entirely with flour or salt as a means of circulation?
¦ This is explained by the fact that the indicated equivalents were \" iisklfchielyo local equivalents that were valid only within the narrow limits of these areas. However, the entire economic connection between:
12 3. Atlas. Money and credit
was never broken by individual markets, and this connection could only be expressed in monetary form. If in a given region the equivalent was corn, and in another region - salt, then it is obvious that a person who had at his disposal a certain amount of the equivalent in a given region could not use it as a means of purchase in another region where he was another equivalent. It was also necessary to establish a certain value proportion between local equivalents. And these proportions could only be established in such a way that all local equivalents were expressed in a certain (albeit changing from day to day) quantity of universal and mandatory admission throughout the territory of Soviet power paper money - substitutes for all local equivalents.
Thus, thanks to the existence of sovznak, a certain unity was introduced into inter-district market relations. All goods in local markets were expressed in a certain number of units of local equivalents, and these latter - in a certain amount of banknotes, and thus the equivalents of all regions received a single form of expression in coins.
In addition, it should also be taken into account that the “commodity form” of local equivalents, such as flour and salt, is not fully adapted to perform all monetary functions. How could you, for example, pay with flour for one box of matches, etc.? Flattering equivalents did not have the necessary qualities of a monetary commodity - portability, high value with a small volume *, different quality, etc., which gold has under normal conditions.
Consequently, despite the continuously falling value of Sovznak, which represented a huge inconvenience for commodity circulation, operating in the “underground market” with Sovznak was an economic necessity.
So, while in our institutions there were discussions on non-trading as methods of socialist accounting and distribution, in the economic system of the USSR there was a process of formation of “underground”, illegal and therefore unregulated “monetary systems”
Literature.
- Weisberg, Money and prices. 3VL 1925.
- Prof. JI. Yurovsky, Monetary policy of Soviet power. M. 1928,
- Prof. 3. S. Zhatsenelenbaum, Monetary circulation in Russia 1914 -1924.
- Prof. S. A. Falkner, Problems of the theory and practice of emission management. M. 3924.
- Collection “Our monetary circulation”, ed. L. Yurovskaya. M « 1926.
- E. A. Preobrazhensky. Paper money. Giz. 1920.
- L. Zhritsman, The Heroic Period of the Russian Revolution, ed. 2. M. .1. 1926.
- Describe the state of money circulation and the process of naturalization! varodtskogo economy during the period of war communism.
- During this period, what economic accounting projects were put forward under the socio-kmach?
- What money was real money, that is, was it a measure of value under war communism and at the beginning of the NEP?
- Were Sovznaki substitutes for any particular type of real money?
- What are the reasons for the “survivability” of the Soviet sign?
More on the topic CHAPTER XV. MONEY CIRCULATION DURING THE PERIOD OF WAR COMMUNISM:
- 5. Soviet model of \r\neconomics and Soviet \r\neconomic science
- CHAPTER XII. MAIN POINTS FROM THE HISTORY OF MONETARY CIRCULATION AND MONETARY THEORIES.
- CHAPTER XV. MONEY CIRCULATION DURING THE PERIOD OF WAR COMMUNISM
- CHAPTER XVI. MONETARY CIRCULATION UNDER NEP BEFORE THE MONETARY REFORM OF 1924