Fighting near Lake Khasan. A short course in history. Fighting near Lake Khasan
Having been defeated during the intervention against Soviet Russia, in 1922 the Japanese were forced to evacuate from Vladivostok, but in the future they did not lose hope of subjugating the vast Asian territories of the USSR, right up to the Urals. By the early 1930s. The militarists took over in Japanese ruling circles. Japanese troops repeatedly staged military provocations against the Soviet Union from the territory of Manchuria they occupied in 1931-1932. In the summer of 1938, Japan with large military forces violated the Soviet border in the south of Primorye near Lake. Hassan. The 19th Infantry Division took part directly in the invasion. In addition, the 15th and 20th infantry divisions and other units were moving towards the combat area. On July 29, 1938, Japanese troops, after a series of attacks, throwing back the border units, captured the tactically advantageous Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills, relying on which they threatened the entire Posyet region. Troops of the future 39th Rifle Corps (formed on August 2, 1938, commander - corps commander G.N. Stern) took part in repelling the Japanese invasion. As soon as the provocation became known, the 40th Infantry Division of Colonel V.K. was concentrated in the conflict area. Bazarova. On July 31, the Primorsky Army and the Pacific Fleet were put on alert. The 32nd Infantry Division (Colonel N.E. Berzarin) and the 2nd Mechanized Brigade were additionally sent to the Lake Khasan area. The 2nd Mechanized Brigade was formed in April 1932 in Kyiv, and in 1934 it was transferred to the Far East. In October 1938, it was reorganized into the 42nd Light Tank Brigade. Just before the start of the conflict, Colonel A.P. took command of the brigade. Panfilov. The brigade was armed with, among other things, 94 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks. The brigade also includes a company of fire-reinforced HT-26s (5 serviceable units). In addition, the 32nd Rifle Division had a 32nd separate tank battalion (Major M.V. Alimov) with T-26s. The same battalion (Senior Lieutenant Sitnikov) was in the 40th Rifle Division. With considerable difficulty, the attack was repulsed and the border was restored, however, this incident revealed shortcomings in the management and training of troops. Miscalculations were used to justify repression. Many commanders, including one of the five first Marshals of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher were arrested and then shot.
ENTRY IN I.M.MAISKY’S DIARY OF APRIL 12, 1938 ABOUT THE CONVERSATION WITH SUN FO
Sun Fo spent 6 weeks in Moscow. Negotiated with the Soviet government about assistance to China. He left satisfied and expressed gratitude to me for the careful implementation of the agreements we concluded in Moscow. However, Sun Fo apparently did not immediately become satisfied with the Moscow negotiations. As far as I could understand from his somewhat vague explanations in this part (in general, he speaks very clearly, precisely and frankly), on his way to Moscow, he hoped to convince the Soviet government of the need for a military action by the USSR against Japan in alliance with China. The Soviet government rejected such a proposal, but promised energetic assistance by sending weapons, airplanes, etc. The results are visible in the course of military operations in China. There is no doubt that the Chinese successes of three weeks are largely due to the arrival of our aircraft, our tanks, our artillery, etc. It is not surprising that Sun Fo now feels almost triumphant. The details of his decisive conversation with Comrade are curious. “I was told,” Sun Fo said, “that I would see your leader on a certain day, but they did not indicate the exact date. I got ready. I'm sitting at the embassy and waiting. Evening comes - 8 o'clock, 9 o'clock, 10 o'clock, 11 o'clock... Nothing!.. Somewhat disappointed, I decided to go to bed. He undressed and climbed into bed. Suddenly, at a quarter to twelve they came for me: “Please, they are waiting for you!” I jumped up, got dressed and drove off. Along with Stalin were Molotov and Voroshilov. At the end, Mikoyan and Yezhov also came. Our conversation lasted from 12 at night to 5 1/2 in the morning. And then everything was decided.” It was during this conversation, according to Sun Fo, that the Soviet government rejected direct military participation of the USSR in the fight against Japan. The motives put forward by Comrade Stalin in defense of such a line of behavior, as transmitted by Sun Fo, boil down to the following: 1) a military action by the USSR would immediately unite the entire Japanese nation, which is now far from united in supporting Japanese aggression in China; 2) a military offensive by the USSR, on the contrary, could frighten the right-wing elements in China and, thus, split the united national front that has now been created there; 3) a military offensive by the USSR with the prospect of our victory would frighten England and the USA and could turn the current sympathy of both countries for China into its opposite; 4) a military offensive by the USSR - and this is especially important - would be used by Germany to attack our country in Europe, and this would unleash world war. For all the above reasons, Comrade Stalin considers an open military action by the USSR against Japan inappropriate. But he is ready to help China in every possible way by supplying weapons, etc. (Sun Fo is the head of the Chinese special mission sent to the USSR, England and France; Chiang Kai-shek’s confidant, millionaire). Published: Sokolov V.V. two meetings between Sun Fo and I.V. Stalin in 1938-1939. // New and recent history. 1999. N6.
HEAD OF THE PODGORNAYA BORDER POST P. TERESHKIN
On July 29, the head of the political department of the district, divisional commissar Bogdanov, and Colonel Grebnik arrived at the height of Zaozernaya. ...At the beginning of the conversation, Lieutenant Makhalin urgently called me by phone. I reported to Bogdanov. In response: “Let them act independently, do not allow the Japanese into our territory...”. Makhalin calls again and in an excited voice says: “A large detachment of Japanese violated the border and began to attack the border detachment’s locations, we will fight to the death, avenge us!” The connection was interrupted. I asked permission from divisional commissar Bogdanov to hold Makhalin’s group with heavy machine gun fire. I was refused this with the reasoning that this would cause retaliatory actions by the Japanese in the area of Zaozernaya Heights. Then I sent 2 squads under the command of Chernopyatko and Bataroshin to help Lieutenant Makhalin. Soon, divisional commissar Bogdanov and department head Grebnik left for Posiet. From the memoirs of Hero of the Soviet Union P.F. Tereshkina
ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR DEFENSE OF THE USSR No. 0071, August 4, 1938
IN last days The Japanese in the Posyet region suddenly attacked our border units and captured part of Soviet territory near Lake Khasan. This new military provocation met with due resistance on our part. However, the Japanese stubbornly cling to Soviet territory, despite heavy losses of their troops. The provocative actions of the Japanese military are obviously calculated on our peacefulness and restraint. The Japanese believe that the Soviet Union and the Red Army will endlessly tolerate the brazen provocations of their military, which, under the guise of local border incidents, began to seize entire chunks of Soviet territory. We don’t want a single inch of foreign land, including Manchurian and Korean, but we will never give up even an inch of our own, Soviet land, to anyone, including the Japanese invaders! In order to be ready to repel provocative attacks of the Japanese-Manchus and in order to be ready at any moment to deliver a powerful blow to the burrowing, insolent Japanese aggressors along the entire front, immediately bring the troops of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front and the Trans-Baikal Military District to full combat readiness, for which I order: 1 Immediately return to their units all command, political, commanding and Red Army personnel from all types of work, secondments and vacations. 2. The Military Council of the DKFront take measures to cover the borders of the front. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account that if a new provocation arises from the Japanese-Manchus, then the covering troops with aircraft and tanks must be ready, upon special orders from Moscow, for an immediate powerful, crushing blow. 3. Bring the air forces of the DKFront and the Western Military District to full combat readiness: a) relocate air units to field airfields, providing them with air defense systems and reliable communications, having strong fists for powerful strikes; b) establish constant duty of fighter flights in full readiness for immediate departure; c) provide units at field airfields with bombs, ammunition for at least 2 sorties, at remote airfields for 5 sorties and fuel for 5 sorties; d) provide all flight personnel with oxygen devices for high-altitude flights and the required amount of oxygen; check and seal devices; e) The military councils of the DKFront, ZabVO, 1st and 2nd armies and the Khabarovsk group immediately, through special flight technical groups, together with the command, verify the readiness of the aircraft’s equipment, weapons and instruments. This check should be carried out at least four times a month. Commanders and commissars of air units should check daily; f) commanders and commissars of air units ensure the speed of refueling aircraft, hanging bombs and filling with cartridges; g) all commanders of the air forces of the specified front, armies, district and Khabarovsk group immediately have the stock of bombs, aircraft cartridges, fuel and technical personnel in charge of storing weapons and fuel checked, immediately eliminating all discovered shortcomings. 4. A. The Military Councils of the Democratic Front and the Western Military District should put all fortified areas on full combat readiness, reinforcing them, if necessary, with field troops. B. In fortified areas, their commandants: a) immediately install fully weapons and equipment in all structures; b) fill military installations with the required standard amount of ammunition and property; c) install wire barriers in important directions and build anti-tank obstacles; d) fully provide combat installations, command posts and field troops occupying fortified areas with communications means; e) establish a permanent military guard, patrol and observation service. 5. Rifle, cavalry and tank units must be placed in camps or bivouacs with combat support measures (security, duty units, air surveillance and air defense), having reliable communications within the formation. 6. In tank units, place cartridges in combat vehicles, have tanks constantly refueled and fully ready for immediate action. 7. In rifle and cavalry units: a) restore the full regular number of units in the units; b) check the readiness of mobilized plans for formations and units; c) issue the weapons and ammunition assigned to the soldiers to the units, where they are stored in a sealed form under the responsibility of the duty officer; d) transported supplies of ammunition should be placed in charging boxes and carts; e) commission repair horses at least 3 years old and check forging. Reforge horse train with old forging; f) have weapons and other property ready for quick delivery. 8. At air defense points, install artillery and machine gun units in position, relocate fighter aircraft to operational airfields and raise the VNOS system, checking the connection of VNOS posts with command posts and airfields of the fighter unit. 9. Fully provide transport parts with rubber, spare parts and fuel. 10. The military councils of the DKFront, the 1st and 2nd armies, the Khabarovsk group and the Western Military District: a) fully provide the units with all required property and ammunition according to wartime standards at the expense of the front-line (district, army) warehouses; b) put warehouses in order, and first of all, ammunition warehouses: dismantle the property stored in them, check the readiness of warehouses for the rapid release of property, review the security of warehouses and strengthen the main ones at the expense of secondary objects; c) conduct combat alerts of units and subunits. When raising units on combat alert, check their equipment and material security to the smallest detail in accordance with established standards and report cards. At the same time, conduct tactical exercises as part of formations, in which units raised on combat alert will act, obtaining from each commander, soldier and staff excellent knowledge of the terrain and combat conditions in their sector. Monitor the organization of communications at all levels of the headquarters service; d) reverse Special attention for training in night operations and repelling surprise enemy attacks at night and in fog, training their units in operations at night and in fog. I would like to draw the special attention of the entire command staff to this; e) in support units of border troops: 1) commanders of support units to develop on the ground, together with commanders of border units, a plan for border defense in their sectors. Provide technical communication between support units and the command of border units and with their direct superiors; 2) strengthen continuous military surveillance abroad, especially be vigilant at night; 3) study in detail the topography of their plots on the territory of the USSR; 4) store weapons and ammunition of support units in units, ensuring their uninterrupted food supply. 11. All measures to bring units into full combat readiness must be carried out while maintaining military secrets. 12. Commanders and commissars of all military formations should check all units and eliminate all detected deficiencies on the spot. About the results of verifications and measures taken report in code to the command of units and formations, the Military Councils of the Democratic Front, the 1st and 2nd armies, the Khabarovsk Army Group of Forces and the ZabVO once every five days, to the command of the DC Front and the ZabVO to report to the General Staff of the Red Army at the same time. Report receipt of this order and its communication to the executors no later than 24 hours on 08/06/38.37. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Army Commander 1st Rank B. Shaposhnikov
Present: Voroshilov, Stalin, Shchadenko... Blucher. Listened: About the events on the lake. Hassan. The Main Military Council, having heard a report from the NGO on the situation in the DKF [Far Eastern Red Banner Front] in connection with the events at Lake. Khasan, as well as the explanations of the front commander Comrade Blucher and the deputy front commander, member of the military council Mazepov, and having discussed this issue, we came to the following conclusions: 1. Combat operations near the lake. Khasan were a comprehensive test of the mobilization and combat readiness of not only those units that directly took part in them, but also of all DCF troops without exception. 2. The events of these few days revealed huge shortcomings in the composition of the DCF. The combat training of the troops, headquarters and command and control personnel of the front turned out to be at an unacceptably low level. The military units were torn apart and incapable of combat; The supply of military units is not organized. It was discovered that the Far Eastern theater was poorly prepared for war (roads, bridges, communications). Storage, conservation and accounting of mobilization and emergency reserves, both in front-line warehouses and military units, found themselves in a chaotic state. In addition to all this, it was discovered that the most important directives of the Main Military Council and NGOs were criminally not implemented by the front command for a long time. As a result of this unacceptable state of the front troops, we suffered significant losses in this relatively small clash - 408 people. killed and 2807 wounded. These losses cannot be justified either by the extremely difficult terrain in which our troops had to operate, or by the three times greater losses of the Japanese. The number of our troops, the participation of our aviation and tanks in operations gave us such advantages that our losses in battles could be much smaller... Moreover, the percentage of losses of command and political personnel is unnaturally high - about 40%, which once again proves that The Japanese were defeated and thrown beyond our borders only thanks to the fighting enthusiasm of the fighters, junior commanders, middle and senior command and political personnel, who were ready to sacrifice themselves, defending the honor and inviolability of the territory of their great socialist Motherland, as well as thanks to the skillful management of operations against the Japanese, i.e. Stern and the correct leadership of Comrade Rychagov in the actions of our aviation (...) During the period of hostilities, we had to resort to cobbling together units from different units and individual fighters, allowing harmful organizational improvisation, creating all kinds of confusion, which could not but affect the actions of our troops. The troops advanced to the border on a combat alert completely unprepared... In many cases, entire artillery batteries found themselves at the front without shells, spare barrels for machine guns were not fitted in advance, rifles were issued unsighted, and many soldiers, and even one of the rifle units of the 32nd division , arrived at the front without rifles or gas masks at all. Despite the huge reserves of clothing, many soldiers were sent into battle in completely worn-out shoes, half-footed; a large number of Red Army soldiers were without overcoats. Commanders and staffs lacked maps of the combat area. All types of troops, especially the infantry, showed an inability to act on the battlefield, to maneuver, to combine movement and fire, to apply themselves to the terrain... tank units were used ineptly, as a result of which they suffered heavy losses in materiel. The culprit for these major shortcomings and for the excessive losses we suffered in a relatively small clash are the commanders, commissars and chiefs of all levels of the DKF and, first of all, the commander of the DKF, Marshal Blucher... The Main Military Council decides: 1. The administration of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front is to be disbanded. 2. Marshal Blucher should be removed from the post of commander of the DKF troops and left at the disposal of the Main Military Council of the Red Army. 3. Create two separate armies from the DKF troops, directly subordinate to the NPO... RGVA. F. 4. Op. 18. D. 46. L. 183-189 Blucher V. (1890-1938). Since 1929, commander of the Separate Far Eastern Red Banner Army. In the summer of 1938 - commander of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front. Arrested and shot in 1938. Rehabilitated after 1953. Stern G. (1900-1941). In 1938 - chief of staff of the Far Eastern Front. In 1941 - Colonel General, Head of the Main Directorate of Air Defense of the NPO of the USSR. Arrested on June 7, 1941 on charges of participation in an anti-Soviet military conspiratorial organization. Shot without trial on October 28, 1941. Rehabilitated in 1954. Rychagov P. (1911-1941) - Lieutenant General of Aviation (1940). In 1938 - commander of the Air Force of the Primorsky Group of the Far Eastern Front, 1st Separate Red Banner Army. In 1940 - Head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force. Arrested on June 24, 1941 on charges of participation in an anti-Soviet military conspiratorial organization. Shot without trial on October 28, 1941. Rehabilitated in 1954.
ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR DEFENSE OF THE USSR No. 0169, September 8, 1938
On the imposition of penalties on the command of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front for violating the orders of the NKO On August 7, 1938, during the period of hot battles with the Japanese in the area of Lake Khasan, the deputy commander of the DKFront, corps commander Comrade Filatov, signed an order on the disbandment of medical battalions and field hospitals in the rifle divisions located in battles. The Military Council of the 1st Army delayed the execution of this order. On August 17, the corps commander, Comrade Filatov, made another gross mistake - he ordered the deputy commander of the front air force to provide a DB-3 aircraft for the transfer of a representative of the NKVD from Khabarovsk to the city of Chita, thereby violating the orders of NKO No. 022 of 1934 and [No. 022] of 1936, categorically prohibiting the use of combat aircraft as transport vehicles. Asked on my orders why the plane was provided, and even the DB-3, Comrade Filatov reported that he had given the order to provide the plane, but did not indicate the type of plane; Meanwhile, Comrade Senatorov reported to me that Comrade Filatov’s written order specifically indicated DB-3. Thus, Comrade Filatov did not find the courage to admit his mistake, did not tell the truth, trying to shift the blame to Comrade Senatorov. In turn, the deputy commander of the DKFront Air Force, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel Comrade Senatorov, having received and executed the order of the Corps Commander Comrade Filatov to send an aircraft for the specified purpose, did not report to him about the illegality of this order. Wine vol. Filatov and Senatorov is aggravated all the more so because they, having violated my orders, also did not take the necessary measures to organize this flight, and the plane crashed on the way back from Chita to Khabarovsk and 3 crew members were killed. For a frivolous attitude towards service and violation of NKO orders No. 022 of 1934 and No. 022 of 1936, I severely reprimand Comrade Commander Filatov. I put Colonel Comrade Senatorov on notice for violating NKO orders No. 022 of 1934 and 1936. I warn you that for the use of combat aircraft for purposes not related to combat and training missions, I will severely punish those responsible. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov
The thirties of the 20th century turned out to be extremely difficult for the whole world. This applies to both the internal situation in many countries of the world and the international situation. After all, global contradictions developed more and more on the world stage during this period. One of them was the Soviet-Japanese conflict at the end of the decade.
Background to the battles for Lake Khasan
The leadership of the Soviet Union is literally obsessed with internal (counter-revolutionary) and external threats. And this idea is to a large extent justified. The threat is clearly unfolding in the west. In the east, China was occupied in the mid-1930s, which was already casting predatory glances at Soviet lands. Thus, in the first half of 1938, powerful anti-Soviet propaganda unfolded in this country, calling for a “war against communism” and an outright seizure of territories. Such Japanese aggression is facilitated by their newly acquired coalition partner - Germany. The situation is aggravated by the fact that Western states, England and France, are in every possible way delaying the signing of any treaty with the USSR on mutual defense, thereby hoping to provoke the mutual destruction of their natural enemies: Stalin and Hitler. This provocation is spreading
and on Soviet-Japanese relations. At the beginning, the Japanese government increasingly begins to talk about fictitious “disputed territories.” At the beginning of July, Lake Khasan, located in the border zone, becomes the center of events. The formations of the Kwantung Army are beginning to concentrate more and more here. The Japanese side justified these actions by the fact that the border zones of the USSR located near this lake are the territories of Manchuria. The latter region, in general, was not historically Japanese in any way; it belonged to China. But China in previous years was itself occupied by the imperial army. On July 15, 1938, Japan demanded the withdrawal of Soviet border forces from this territory, citing the fact that they belonged to China. However, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted harshly to such a statement, providing copies of the agreement between Russia and the Celestial Empire dating back to 1886, which included relevant maps proving the Soviet side was right.
The beginning of the battle for Lake Khasan
However, Japan had no intention of retreating. The inability to substantiate her claims to Lake Khasan did not stop her. Of course, Soviet defense was also strengthened in this area. The first attack came on July 29, when a company of the Kwantung Army crossed and attacked one of the heights. At the cost of significant losses, the Japanese managed to capture this height. However, already on the morning of July 30, stronger forces came to the aid of the Soviet border guards. The Japanese unsuccessfully attacked their opponents' defenses for several days, losing a significant amount of equipment and manpower every day. The Battle of Lake Khasan was completed on August 11. On this day, a truce was declared between the troops. By mutual agreement of the parties, it was decided that the interstate border should be established in accordance with the treaty between Russia and China of 1886, since no later agreement on this matter existed at that time. Thus, Lake Khasan became a silent reminder of such an inglorious campaign for new territories.
Monument to the heroes of the battles near Lake Khasan who died in the struggle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland. © Yuri Somov/RIA Novosti
An attempt to calculate how old the guys who fought then should be now (from September 1925 to September 1939 they were drafted into the army at the age of 21) is disheartening - 98 years old; In our country, men very rarely live to such years. Apparently, the concept of veteran is being used more and more widely - and memorial events now involve soldiers who have taken up the baton from other conflicts in which Russia participated.
Several years ago, one of the authors of this material had the opportunity to communicate at another such event with an alleged participant in the Soviet-Japanese battles for Khasan - and, it seems, the only one. It was difficult to communicate with him due to the veteran’s age, but we still managed to find out that he did fight with the Japanese, although not here in Primorye, but a little later in Mongolia, on Khalkhin Gol. The difference, in principle, is small - there the old man’s peers fought with the Japanese in the steppes and sands, here in Primorye they broke through under heavy Japanese artillery fire and drowned in swamp slurry near Lake Khasan more than half a century ago.
The following is an attempt at a new analysis of past events and a discussion of the border situation decades later, in 1998. However, even in 2013, domestic historiography ignores the events of those days: publicly available sources talk about the battles on Khasan in a rather vague and general way; the exact number of Russians killed then is still unknown; There were and still are no decent studies and monuments. Therefore, the authors are making an attempt by re-publication to attract public attention to this page of national history.
Historical reference. “If there’s war tomorrow…”
Panorama of Lake Khasan.
Having occupied Korea in 1905, and in 1931 the three northeastern provinces of China and created the friendly state of Manchukuo in Manchuria on March 9, the Japanese Empire reached the borders of the USSR. According to the Otsu plan, developed by the Japanese General Staff, war with the USSR was planned in 1934, but the protracted fighting in China forced the Japanese government to postpone the attack. Discord and disputes between countries with varying degrees of intensity lasted for years, but gradually reached a climax.
Marshal Blucher in 1938. © RIA Novosti
On July 1, 1938, the Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army was deployed to the Red Banner Far Eastern Front (KDVF) under the command of Marshal Blucher. The armies of the front, by order of the Soviet government, were put on alert.
On July 15, 1938, the Japanese government demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Soviet territory west of Khasan Island, as well as a revision of the former Russian-Chinese border. The Soviet government refused.
Having intelligence about the concentration of Japanese regular troops near Lake Khasan, the Military Council of the KDVF issued a directive to the 1st (Primorsk) Army to concentrate reinforced battalions from the 40th Infantry Division in the Zarechye area. The air defense system was brought to full combat readiness, units of the Posyet border detachment took up defense on the border heights of Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya.
Business trip in 1998. Razdolnoye, Primorsky Krai.
The commander of the Red Army watches the battle near Lake Khasan. © RIA Novosti
Irony, or maybe a sign of the times - we got to the site of the Soviet-Japanese massacre in a used Japanese Toyota Carina. Well raised, with 14-inch wheels, the car still quite often caught the ground with its bottom as soon as we passed Razdolnoye. Well, the quality of the roads in these parts has hardly changed since then: we reached the village of Khasan and the border swamps only thanks to the skill of the driver. He also owns the aphorism, expressed under a cannonade of rubble on the body of the car.
- Wild people - cars here drive right on the ground! - said Zhenya.
The driver Zhenya was from civilized Vladivostok and looked at its surroundings condescendingly. It was 8 o'clock in the morning and the rising sun over Razdolny showed us a wild picture: through the fog and fumes of a swamp manured near a cow farm, the skeleton of... a trolleybus appeared! A little to the side we found a couple more!
Lake Khasan, junction with the swamp.
“This is their cemetery,” the driver said thoughtfully. - They come here to die!..
Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny - future marshal and people's commissar of defense of the USSR. © RIA Novosti
Since tsarist times, Razdolnoye has been a fairly powerful base of Russian troops in these parts. During the Empire, a rifle brigade, an artillery division and a coastal dragoon regiment were located here - the only regular cavalry unit east of the Urals at that time; the rest of the cavalrymen here were Cossacks. By the way, Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny, the future marshal and People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, once served in this very regiment. Nikolai Nikolaevich Kravtsov, the grandfather of our guide-local historian Dmitry Ancha, also served here as a fireworksman for a battery of a cavalry regiment. However, now we are interested in the year 38...
“At about the same hours, only in 1938, the 40th Infantry Division of the Soviet troops moved from Razdolnoye towards the border at the end of June,” Ancha said.
Historical reference. “On this day the samurai decided...
Lieutenant Mahalin is the hero of these battles.
At about 14:00 on July 29, 1938, a company of the border gendarmerie attacked the height, which was defended by 10 border guards led by Lieutenant Makhalin. After a 6-hour battle, the height was abandoned, the lieutenant and five border guards were killed, the rest were wounded.
On the night of June 30-31, 1938, units of the Japanese 19th Infantry Division with forces of more than a regiment attacked the Zaozernaya height, which was defended by border guards of the Posyetsky border detachment and a company of the 119th regiment of the 40th Infantry Division. After a fierce battle on the morning of July 31, the Zaozernaya height was abandoned. The Japanese division began an offensive deep into Soviet territory.
Business trip 1998. Primorsky Territory: “Oh, roads!..”
The broken road with signs of sporadic repairs brought to mind the lyrics of the pop song “our asphalt is laid in places and not much, so that every invader gets stuck on the approaches.” Signs with local names flashed along it. After a collision with the Chinese on Damansky Island in 1968, all of them (names) immediately became Russian-speaking and native. Suifun was turned into the Razdolnaya River, we came across all of Ivanovka, Vinogradovka...
The road went under the railway bridge with the inscription on it: “Greetings to the participants of the Khasan battles!” Both this inscription and the bridge were created from concrete by the Japanese. Not in ’38, when they drowned these very heroes of Hassan in the swamps, but after ’45, when we won.
Historical reference. “We were waiting for a fight...”
The defeat of the Japanese militarists at Lake Khasan on July 29-August 11, 1938.
On August 2, 1938, the 118th, 119th and 120th regiments of the 40th Infantry Division went on the offensive. As a result of the fighting on August 2–3, most of the territory captured by the Japanese was liberated, but the border heights controlling the entire territory around Hassan remained with the Japanese.
Having suffered heavy losses, units of the 40th Infantry Division began to dig in. By the evening of August 3, the Soviet offensive had run out of steam. The impossibility of carrying out an offensive operation with the forces of one division became obvious to the command of the KDVF.
Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov. © Petrusov/RIA Novosti
On August 3, 1938, People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov sent a directive to the front command on the concentration of the reinforced 39th Rifle Corps in the conflict area, consisting of the 32nd, 39th, 40th Rifle Divisions and the 2nd Separate Mechanized Brigade with a total strength of 32,860 people , 345 tanks, 609 guns. Command of the corps was entrusted to Corps Commander Stern. The ground forces were to be supported by 180 bombers and 70 fighters.
Business trip 1998. Slavyanka of the Primorsky Territory: “With a watering can and a notepad, or even with a machine gun...”
While waiting for reinforcements from another local historian - this time from the district administration - we examined and photographed a couple of monuments in Slavyanka. Near the local archive building stood a restored and freshly painted green MS-1, pulled out of the Khasan swamps about 30 years ago.
Tank MS-1.
- Is this a tank?! — our driver was shocked. – Then my “Karina” is an armored train!
We were amazed – and not for the last time! – the hopeless dedication of our ancestors. Small, like a humpbacked “Cossack”, with thin bulletproof armor, a small cannon and a machine gun, MS-1 tanks here stormed the Japanese defense, which was saturated with artillery, in 1938.
Historical reference. “Who can predict in advance the difficult path of rifle companies ...”
Patrol of Soviet border guards in the area of Lake Khasan. 1938 © Viktor Temin, Soviet photojournalist
The enemy hastily created a stable defense, resting his flanks on the Tumen-Ula River (Tumannaya today). The basis of the defense was the border heights, from which there was an excellent view of the entire depth of the location of the Soviet troops and their front-line communications. The southern section of the defense was reliably covered by Lake Khasan, making a frontal attack impossible. In front of the northern section of the defense there was a large plain consisting of a continuous chain of lakes, river channels, quicksand swamps with depths from 0.5 to 2.5 meters (the ancient bed of the Tumen-Ula River) - impassable for tanks and difficult to pass for infantry.
The Japanese command concentrated the 19th Infantry Division, a cavalry brigade, three machine-gun battalions, artillery, anti-aircraft and other special units with a total number of over 20 thousand soldiers and officers on the bridgehead. For every kilometer of defense there were over 80 guns and mortars, and on the flanks of the defense there were over 100 machine guns per kilometer of front. One kilometer = 1,000 meters. Divide a thousand meters of front by 100 machine guns = 10 meters of the firing sector for each machine gun: no need to aim!
Ambassador of Japan to the USSR Shigemitsu.
On August 4, 1938, the Japanese Ambassador to the USSR Shigemitsu visited the USSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs with a proposal to resolve the conflict diplomatically. The Soviet government refused.
Business trip 1998. Kraskino, Primorsky Krai.
Let's move on. Our local historians, now together, are inspecting the surrounding monuments. There are several of them in Kraskino, but the two most noticeable are the private multi-storey palace of the head of the local administration who stole back in the 90s and the huge bronze soldier “Vanechka” at a height dominating the area. The locals call him “Vanechka”. They wrote “Lucy” on its pedestal and left behind broken bottles and banana peels. And about ten meters down the slope there is an excellent pillbox, from the embrasure of which a wonderful view of the official’s palace opens up. The palace, by the way, is nice, red brick. The large-scale complex of local customs buildings is also made of the same material...
While looking for a gas station, we got lost. We see a local sitting by the road.
The guy—either drunk or stoned—answered thoughtfully:
Historical reference. “The armor is strong and our tanks are fast...”, and also “When Comrade Stalin gives us the order...”
On August 3–5, 1938, units of the 39th Rifle Corps arrived at the site of the fighting. However, the redeployment of units proceeded slowly and by the beginning of the offensive on August 6, 15,600 people, 1,014 machine guns, 237 guns, and 285 tanks were concentrated directly in the combat area.
Having suffered losses in the battles of August 2–3, the 40th Infantry Division, the 40th Separate Tank Battalion, the 2nd Tank and Reconnaissance Battalions of the 2nd Separate Mechanized Brigade took up positions south of Lake Khasan. The 32nd Rifle Division, 32nd Separate Tank Battalion, 3rd Tank Battalion of the 2nd Separate Mechanized Brigade took up positions north of Lake Khasan.
Japanese soldiers dug in at the height of Zaozernaya.
Sapper units hastily laid roads for tanks through the swamps. Heavy rains on August 4–5 raised the water level in the swamps and Lake Khasan by a meter, which was an additional difficulty for the Soviet troops.
On August 5, 1938, the commander of the 38th Rifle Corps, Stern, gave the units a combat order: on August 6, go on a general offensive and, with simultaneous attacks from the north and south, squeeze and destroy enemy troops in the zone between the Tumen-Ula River and Lake Khasan.
Soviet military leader Stern. © RIA Novosti
The 32nd Rifle Division (Colonel Berzarin, who in 7 years will be the commandant of captured Berlin) with the 32nd separate tank battalion and the 3rd tank battalion of the 2nd separate mechanized brigade must deliver the main blow from the north and capture the Bezymyannaya height, and subsequently together with units of the 40th Infantry Division, throw the enemy off the Zaozernaya hill.
Nikolai Berzarin during his vacation on the shores of the Amur Bay in 1937. © RIA Novosti
The 40th Rifle Division (Colonel Bazarov) with the 40th separate tank battalion, 2nd tank and reconnaissance battalions of the 2nd separate mechanized brigade should launch an auxiliary strike from the southeast in the direction of the Machine Gun Hill, and then to Zaozernaya, so that together with the 32nd Infantry Division to throw the Japanese off it. The 39th Rifle Division with the 121st Cavalry Regiment, motorized rifle and tank battalions of the 2nd Separate Mechanized Brigade moved forward to secure the right flank of the corps at the Novokievka line, height 106.9.
Infantry and mounted platoons from the 40th Infantry Division practice offensive combat techniques before launching an attack on Japanese positions. Lake Khasan area, August 1938.
According to the battle plan, before the start of the attack, three massive air raids were envisaged (commanded by brigade commander Rychagov) and a 45-minute artillery preparation. The battle plan was approved by the Front Military Council, and then by the People's Commissar of Defense.
Aviation commander, brigade commander Rychagov.
Marshal Blucher and Corporal Stern were clearly aware of the depravity of this plan. The Japanese defense had to be stormed head-on through terrain unsuitable for an offensive, without having the necessary superiority in manpower - three to one.
However, by personal order of Stalin, it was strictly forbidden to cross state border and expand the conflict area. To monitor the implementation of this order, the head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army, Mehlis, was sent to Blucher’s headquarters.
Head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Mehlis.
As a result, the territory of active hostilities did not exceed 15 square kilometers, of which almost two-thirds were occupied by Lake Khasan and the adjacent swamps. The terrible overcrowding of the Soviet troops is evidenced by the fact that the headquarters of the army commander were 4 kilometers from the Japanese trenches, the division headquarters were 500–700 meters away, and the regimental headquarters were even closer.
Having an overwhelming superiority in armored vehicles, the Soviet command could not use it effectively. Only along two narrow field roads at the southern and northern ends of Lake Khasan could tanks really reach the Japanese defense. The width of these passages nowhere exceeded 10 meters.
Business trip 1998. Demarcation: “We don’t want even an inch of someone else’s land, but we won’t give up even an inch of our own...”
After checking the documents at the Posyet border detachment, the same procedure was performed at outpost -13.
- Demarcation? So they gave away the land! – said her boss, commenting on recent events. (Immediately after the first publication of this material in 1998, he was removed from his post for being too frank with journalists. The authors did not have the opportunity to apologize to the officer for such an involuntary “set-up”, we are doing it now - better late than never: everyone does their work, and the evolution of management is unpredictable).
- How did you give it away?!
- Yes so! They made some noise, became indignant, and then slowly gave in. True, we gave less than the Chinese wanted to take.
And so it turned out. After many hours of walking excursions, checking maps of different scales, measuring them lengthwise and crosswise with a ruler, we discovered that we can talk about a piece of swamp with an area of 1 square meter. km. Although at first there was talk of a concession of 7 square meters. km. It would seem - what is 1 kilometer? However, 1 kilometer here, ceded to Damansky, several Amur islands near Khabarovsk. The Japanese need a few more islands of the Kuril chain...
Either Mikhail Lomonosov was wrong, or times have changed, but now it is not Russia that is growing into Siberia, but its Asian neighbors. “A sixth of the land with the short name Rus” suddenly became one eighth and everything continues to dry out. Of course, a piece of swamp is not God knows what. Especially if you don’t count the Russians who died at this place.
But it is the number of those killed in the 1938 war that needs correction.
Historical reference. "Pilots, bombs, planes..."
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, member of the Politburo Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin and leader of the Red Army, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov. © Ivan Shagin/RIA Novosti
To carry out a successful offensive operation, it was necessary to strike through tank-accessible areas: in the south - at the junction of three borders (Korea, China, Russia), in the north - bypassing the Khasan swamps, crossing the state border, going to the rear of the Japanese defense and throwing the enemy into the river. However, bound by Stalin’s decision, the Soviet command was forced to act on the principle “we don’t want five of someone else’s land, but we won’t give up even an inch of our own”: they were not ordered to cross the state border.
On the morning of August 6, 1938, the artillery divisions carried out shooting at benchmarks and proceeded to engage targets. Low and thick clouds made adjustments to the plan for the assault, scheduled for 12:00 - the aircraft were unable to take off from the airfields. The artillery preparation dragged on and developed into a duel with Japanese batteries.
Soviet commanders on the shore of Lake Khasan during the invasion of Japanese troops. © RIA Novosti
At 15:10 the clouds cleared and Soviet aircraft took off from the airfields in three groups. At 16:00 the first group of light bombers bombed the Japanese positions. Following it, a fighter air brigade attacked ground targets. The last to bomb the rear of the Japanese were heavy bombers. Immediately after the air raid, the artillery barrage was repeated. Exactly at 17:00, with the support of tanks, the infantry went on the attack.
SSS plane.
The air raid did not live up to the hopes placed on it. IN as soon as possible control of the Japanese troops was restored, enemy artillery and machine guns opened brutal fire. The 32nd Division, advancing in the north, suffered the most from it. The infantry, having difficulty crossing the swamp, suffered heavy losses and was forced to lie down several times.
I-15 fighter.
Tanks that did not have the ability to maneuver and moved along the roads were shot at by Japanese artillery. Until they reached the solid soil of the oxbow spits located in the center of the swamp, dozens of cars were hit or drowned.
However, the oxbow spits turned out to be a trap - behind them lay another one and a half kilometers of swamps and small lakes, making further movement of the tanks completely impossible.
The tanks were shot at by Japanese artillery, just like at a training ground, and many of the crews were burned along with the vehicles. The infantry, having lost the support of tanks, continued to move through the swamps towards the Japanese defenses, but lay down under targeted machine-gun and artillery fire.
Local historian Dmitry Ancha says:
A damaged Soviet T-26 tank on a slope in the combat area.
— What this tank “breakthrough” looked like as a whole cannot be understood with a rational mind; one can only “believe” and judge by the only episode described in the book “Years in Armor” by Colonel General D.A. Dragunsky, who served in the 32nd separate tank battalion in August 1938: “On August 6, the general assault on enemy positions began. The 3rd company, which I commanded, was advancing on the Bezymyannaya height, a hundred tanks were marching with us... There was incredible heat in the tank, it was impossible to breathe, shell casings burned our hands. Through the scope I saw only the bright blue sky. And suddenly something exploded in the car. Smoke and dirt obscured my eyes. The tank turned to the left, began to fall down and, burying itself up to its turret in the swamp, froze in a deathly spasm. Only after jumping out of the tank did I understand what had happened. Bloodied crew members stood in front of me. Driver Andrei Surov was not among them. The tank was hit by two Japanese shells: the first one tore off the driver’s leg, the second one pierced his head. There were two ragged round holes on the right side of our T-26.”
Judging by the description of the area and the location of the holes, Dragunsky’s tank collapsed from the road embankment, the same embankment protected him from Japanese fire, otherwise it is unknown whether he would have been able to leave the car at all. What happened to the “hundreds of tanks” that went along with Dragunsky’s tank will perhaps someday become known.
In the “Generalized and Systematized Material on the Combat Losses of the Red Army during the Border Conflict at Lake Khasan,” 87 more tankers are listed along with Surov—almost thirty full crews of the T-26. However, as can be seen from the example of Dragunsky, not all crews in full strength perished with their vehicles, and there were undoubtedly more than thirty destroyed Soviet tanks.
“We’ll meet in hand-to-hand combat for the last time tomorrow...”
The Red Army soldiers go on the attack. The vicinity of Lake Khasan. © Victor Temin
Over the next three days, in the swamps, under continuous fire from the Japanese from the front and from the right flank, 5 battalions of the 94th and 96th rifle regiments of the 32nd rifle division were in a semi-circle. Without movement or the ability to carry out the wounded, they were simply destroyed. Only towards the end of August 9, having suffered very heavy losses, were they able to get to the Japanese front line and gain a foothold in front of them on the eastern slope of the border watershed.
The losses were further aggravated by the fact that units of the division arrived at the battle site on the evening of August 5, their commanders did not have the opportunity to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the area, and the border guards who walked in the front ranks and indicated the direction of movement were, for the most part, already killed.
The 40th Rifle Division and the tank units attached to it operated more successfully. By the end of August 6, they captured Machine Gun Hill and reached the Zaozernaya hill. A red flag was raised over her.
Bombing of the Zaozernaya hill.
During the following hours of the night, both sides did not undertake active actions. The intensity of the shooting decreased somewhat; it was carried out blindly. From time to time, short hand-to-hand fights broke out when individual units of the warring parties clashed in the dark. Soviet tanks retreated to their original positions.
The result of the battles on August 6 was disappointing. In the northern sector, Soviet troops did not even come close to the Japanese defenses. In the south they wedged into it, captured the Zaozernaya hill, but there was practically no way to firmly hold it.
Being an excellent point for adjusting artillery fire, the conical hill with a narrow top was poorly suited for defense. Whoever occupies it controls the entire territory on both sides of the border. To protect Zaozernaya, the Japanese created a multi-tiered system of trenches and trenches on Soviet soil - from west bank Lake Khasan to the top.
There was no doubt that with the onset of morning counterattacks would begin in order to regain lost positions, that it was urgently necessary to dig in on the western slope of the watershed, creating a similar defense on enemy territory, but there was an order: do not cross the border.
The above applied not only to Zaozernaya. In order to maintain the border watershed, it was necessary to take the same measures in other areas, which, under the supervision of Mehlis, seemed completely impossible. Moreover, in strict accordance with the plan of the offensive operation, a suicidal decision was made to repeat the attack of tanks and infantry through the swamps on the morning of August 7 in the sector of the 32nd Infantry Division.
“Well, well, well,” says the machine gunner, “knock, knock, knock,” says the machine gun...
Panorama of Lake Khasan.
And this attack ended badly. The tanks burned and sank, the infantry that advanced forward was laid in the swamp and methodically shot. Subsequently, seeing the hopelessness of attacks through the swamp, the Soviet command threw the remaining units into a narrow corridor between the swamps and the northern shore of Lake Khasan in the direction of the Bezymyannaya Hill, occasionally launching attacks on the left flank of the Japanese defense along the edge of the swamps in order to weaken the Japanese fire on the battalions sandwiched in a quagmire, and, if possible, unblock them.
However, this became possible only towards the end of August 9, when the Japanese command transferred a significant part of manpower and equipment from the left flank of the defense to the right in order to compensate for the increasing losses. In the sector of the 40th Infantry Division, at dawn on August 7, fierce attacks by Japanese infantry began with the goal of regaining the Zaozernaya hill and other lost positions on the border watershed.
After a fierce battle that escalated into hand-to-hand combat, they managed to do it for a while. A Japanese fire adjustment point was again deployed on Zaozernaya, and the “blind” heavy guns and armored train located across the river on the Korean side could shoot accurately.
Border conflict in the area of Lake Khasan in August 1938. A Soviet officer interrogates a captured Japanese soldier. © From the funds of the Museum of the Soviet Army/RIA Novosti
Imperial Air Force combat aircraft appeared in the air, but the overwhelming advantage Soviet aviation negated all the efforts of the Japanese pilots. However, they shot down several Soviet vehicles.
The Soviet troops had to start all over again. Again, under the cover of tanks, the infantry went on the attack. The strength of Japanese fire is evidenced by the fact that the height on the southern section of the border, which had not previously had a name, around which one of the three Japanese machine gun battalions (44 heavy machine guns) and machine gun platoons of an infantry regiment (about 60 light machine guns) dug in, has since and is called Machine Gun Hill. These almost 100 machine guns held at gunpoint a section of the front only a kilometer long and wide from 70 to 250 meters.
Again, at the cost of heavy losses, the Japanese were partially driven out of the border watershed, Zaozernaya was returned, but after some time a new Japanese attack followed, and Zaozernaya was lost again. And so several times a day.
Soviet soldiers plant a red battle flag at the height of Zaozernaya during the events on Lake Khasan. © RIA Novosti
The next three days were marked by successive attacks and counterattacks, which developed into an endless hand-to-hand fight. With the onset of dusk, Soviet tanks retreated to their original lines, the fire almost subsided. Units of the warring parties tried to gain a foothold on the lines where night found them. At dawn, those who had lost their positions tried to regain them, the aviation carried out bombing strikes, and artillery fired continuously. Ammunition was delivered to Soviet troops mainly along the shortest route - through Lake Khasan - and almost always under fire.
Monument on the Zaozernaya hill.
The question of the number of victims of the Hassan battles of 1938 has been unclear since the conflict itself and remains so to this day. The approximate estimates of 300-500-700 human lives wandering through the pages of various publications do not stand up to the test of analysis of both archival and memoir data and battle sites .
Primorsky local historian Dmitry Ancha has been studying the Soviet-Japanese conflict for several years and has a personal, so to speak, interest:
— My grandfather, Nikolai Nikolaevich Kravtsov, fought there. He was wounded, lay in the swamp for two days - and still survived! Neither what he said nor the picture recreated by me coincides in any way with official version. The small area of the bridgehead and its extreme saturation with enormous military forces and equipment gave rise to an unprecedented intensity of battles.
“That’s true,” the border guard confirmed. – I’m not a historian, but as an officer I can say that the theater of military operations was oversaturated with manpower and equipment by a factor of 50! I don’t remember anything like this in the history of wars.
Let’s sketch a picture “generally, roughly, visibly.” Following the border guards, larger and better-equipped formations enter the battle, one after another. The Japanese had already occupied all the heights in the area, dug up the front with full-length trenches and filled the defense with weapons to the point of impossibility. Just think - 100 machine guns per 1 km, not counting other weapons! And across the hills - right from the border, which cannot be crossed - they land and plant their heavy cannons in a canopy. All heights are at the adversaries - and the fire is adjusted in the best possible way. What 300–700 dead can we talk about? It looks like so many could have died in just one day. Soviet troops were driven into the swamps, regiment after regiment. They not only died, but also recaptured some areas from the Japanese, and then were again forced out by them. And so not once, not twice.
Soviet tank attacks - through the swamps to the hills - are terrible! And all this - masses of people, hundreds of tanks, tens of thousands of guns of all calibers - in the line of sight of the naked human eye. No need to aim!
Business trip 1998. “Our dead will not leave us in trouble...”
In the response received by local historian from Slavyanka Andrei Karpov from the archives of the Soviet Army , The official loss data is given: “40th Division: wounded. – 2,073, ub. – 253; 32nd Division: wounded. – 642, ub. – 119; 2nd mechanized brigade: wounded. – 61, ub. – 45; dept. communications battalion: wounded. – no, kill - 5; 39th Corps Artillery Regiment: wounded. - no, ub. – 2“.
Summing up, we get the following figures: 2,776 wounded and 479 killed. Not only are not all units and units participating in the battles listed here, but can even these numbers be trusted? Note that the data on losses was submitted by the surviving commanders higher up the chain of command on August 11, that is, on the day the hostilities ceased.
People who had not yet come to their senses, deaf from the gunfire and stunned by the blood - what information could they provide about their comrades, whose bodies were still cooling in the bushes and swamps, at the bottom of the lake?!
In 1988, after a typhoon common in these places, water flows rushing from the Zaozernaya hill eroded a piece of land closer to the lake. In an area of approximately 50 by 50 meters, border guards collected and reburied the remains of 78 people. Without making any excavations - only what the rain washed away...
The trenches of the Japanese defense are still clearly visible. You can admire the cleverness of the location of the firing points, if you don’t think about the fact that they poured lead on our fellow citizens. My grandfather could have been here, but it turned out to be Dima’s grandfather...
Dmitry Ancha says:
- After being wounded, he came to his senses in... Khabarovsk! But field medical battalions and powerful hospitals in Razdolny, Ussuriysk, and Vladivostok were located much closer. Isn't this another indirect evidence that all the surrounding hospitals were simply filled with wounded in the battles of Hassan? Unfortunately, we only have indirect evidence that the number of deaths is enormous. For example, in the district there are now about 20 monuments dating back to that time. Almost all of them are mass graves, that is, mass graves. But even before 1988 there were more than 50 of them, although these are not all burials, but only the definitely known ones. Then, for the 50th anniversary, the military decided to gather together all the dead and pulled off several dozen pedestals with armored personnel carriers. But they had no idea of the scale of the work they were taking on. They didn't finish it. Where to look for these graves now? This is the wilds, a year or two - and everything is overgrown...
— In 1995, I walked through all the hollows here. And if they ask me where these darkness of the dead are, where the graves are, I will answer this: swamps, Lake Khasan - there are even more of them, drowned. And the trenches - how many of them are still here. And then... Imagine the end of the fighting, mountains of corpses decomposing in the 30-degree heat. An epidemic can break out at any moment - and what are the identifications, what are the statistics?! To the trenches! Pour in lime and cover with soil! By the way, there was a similar picture after 1945 in the Kuril Islands, I was there too...
Summary:
Family crypt of the Brynner family. © kiowa_mike.livejournal.com
- Solution? There can only be one solution: we cannot be Mankurts, Ivans-of-kinship-not-remembering. Have to search. Serious, systematic, multi-year and funded work in archives is needed. Excavations are needed. What's going on! – people destroy, trample on their past! In the village of Bezverkhovo, the family crypt of the Brynner family, the most authoritative founding fathers of Vladivostok, its spirit, was destroyed; their remains were thrown into the sea. Bronze letters torn off - non-ferrous metal! - from the monument to the great Ussuri citizen Mikhail Yankovsky. The same story in Vladivostok with the monument to Polytechnicians who died during the war - a bronze machine gun weighing 15 kilograms was cut off from it... Of course, we are late, 60 years have passed. But here, as in the song: “It’s not the dead who need this, the living need this…”
Historical reference. “One more, last effort...”
The Japanese on Zaozernaya.
The conflict has reached a positional deadlock. The losses were mounting. And not only from the Soviet side. The Japanese command was forced to transfer forces to the threatened right flank of defense from the left, which eased the position of the 32nd Soviet division; bring arriving units of the 20th Infantry Division into battle “on wheels.” The Soviet command gradually introduced units of the reserve 39th Rifle Division into battle.
In fact, both sides have exhausted their capabilities. New reserves were required, but intensifying the conflict was not part of the plans of the Soviet and Japanese governments.
On August 10, with a last incredible effort, Japanese units were driven almost everywhere beyond the state border. On this day, a meeting of the Japanese Military Council was held, which noted the impossibility of continuing hostilities against the USSR and decided to enter into negotiations to stop them. On the same day, a proposal from the Japanese government to end the conflict was transmitted through diplomatic channels.
On the night of August 10-11, Stalin had a telephone conversation with the commander of the KDVF, Blucher. That same night, leaving all power to commander Stern, in a chaise along a road broken by tanks under horse guard, Blucher arrived at Razdolnaya station, where a special train was waiting for him. On August 11, 1938, hostilities ceased and the state border was restored.
Business trip 1998. „Dedicated to the living…„
Panorama of the surroundings of Lake Khasan.
Returning to Vladivostok, the crew of the expeditionary Karina made room and took on board two teenage girls who were hitchhiking into the city in the middle of the night. “The tribe is young and unfamiliar” shared a cigarette and hinted that they also drink vodka.
— Girls, do you know anything about border demarcation?
- Wha-oh?! We are decent girls, by the way! And you promised not to pester!
- No! I mean... Ugh!.. Well, do you know about the Khasan battles? Are you from these places?
- Ahh! – the girls calmed down. – When was it with the Germans, in the last century?
- Ooh! – the driver shook his head.
- Guys, don’t you know how to get gas out of a Sprite?...
P.S. – Andrey Karpov called from Slavyanka. After we left, he measured the river connecting the swamp with the lake with a pole, and discovered differences in depth in an area suggesting the presence of 2-3 tanks under water. This is exactly the direction of their attack in the 38th. There is nothing more to assume there.
P.P.S. – Discussing the affairs of the past days, Primorye local historian Dmitry Ancha clarified that there was no normal road to those places then, and there is still no one today, in the summer of 2013: “people drive straight on the ground”...
Soviet time
Conflict on Lake Khasan
Patrol of Soviet border guards in the area of Lake Khasan, 1938
Throughout the 20-30s. In the 20th century, the aggressiveness of Japan steadily increased, trying to meet the growing needs of the economy and state at the expense of its Far Eastern neighbors. The active opposition of the Soviet Union to Japanese expansion in Southeast Asia created tension in relations between states, manifested in numerous local conflicts. Only on the border with Manchuria in 1936-1938. More than 200 border skirmishes occurred. The Japanese detained several Soviet ships, accusing them of violating Japan's maritime borders.
On July 15, 1938, the Charge d'Affaires of Japan in the USSR appeared at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet border guards from the heights in the area of Lake Khasan. After the Japanese representative was presented with the Hunchun Agreement between Russia and China of 1886 and the map attached to it, irrefutably indicating that Lake Khasan and the heights adjacent to it from the west are on Soviet territory and that, therefore, there are no violations in this no area, he retreated. However, on July 20, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Shigemitsu, repeated his claims to the Khasan area. When it was pointed out to him that such claims were unfounded, the ambassador said: if Japan's demands are not met, it will use force. It should be said that on July 19, 1938, the Soviet embassy in Tokyo was raided, and literally a few days later a border incident occurred between the USSR and Japan in the area of Lake Khasan (Primorye).
The Red Army soldiers go on the attack. Surroundings of Lake Khasan
The reason for the conflict was the construction of a fortification by Soviet border guards, which, according to the Japanese, crossed the border line.
In response, on July 29, 1938, a Japanese company, under the cover of fog, violated the state border of the USSR, shouting “banzai” and attacked Bezymyannaya Height. The night before, a detachment of 11 border guards, led by the assistant head of the outpost, Lieutenant Alexei Makhalin, arrived at this height. The Japanese chains surrounded the trench more and more tightly, and the border guards were running out of ammunition. Eleven soldiers heroically repelled the onslaught of superior enemy forces for several hours, and several border guards died. Then Alexey Makhalin decides to break through the encirclement with hand-to-hand combat. He rises to his full height and says “Forward! For the Motherland! rushes with the fighters into a counterattack. They managed to break through the encirclement. But out of the eleven, six defenders of Nameless remained alive. Alexey Makhalin also died. (He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously). At the cost of heavy losses, the Japanese managed to take control of the heights. But soon a group of border guards and a rifle company under the command of Lieutenant D. Levchenko arrived at the battlefield. With a bold bayonet attack and grenades, our soldiers knocked out the invaders from the heights.
At dawn on July 30, enemy artillery brought down dense, concentrated fire onto the heights. And then the Japanese attacked several times, but Lieutenant Levchenko’s company fought to the death. The company commander himself was wounded three times, but did not leave the battle. A battery of anti-tank guns under Lieutenant I. Lazarev came to the aid of Levchenko’s unit and shot the Japanese with direct fire. One of our gunners died. Lazarev, wounded in the shoulder, took his place. The artillerymen managed to suppress several enemy machine guns and almost destroy the enemy company. It was with difficulty that the battery commander was forced to leave for dressing. A day later he was back in action and fought until final success.
Japanese soldiers dug in at Zaozernaya heights
The Japanese invaders decided to deliver a new and main blow in the area of the Zaozernaya hill. Anticipating this, the command of the Posyet border detachment (Colonel K.E. Grebennik) organized the defense of Zaozernaya. The northern slope of the height was guarded by a detachment of border guards under the command of Lieutenant Tereshkin. In the center and on the southern slope of Zaozernaya there was a reserve outpost of Lieutenant Khristolubov and a squad of fighters of a maneuver group with two crews of heavy machine guns. On the southern bank of Khasan there was a branch of Gilfan Batarshin. Their task was to cover the command post of the squad leader and prevent the Japanese from reaching the rear of the border guards. Senior Lieutenant Bykhovtsev’s group strengthened on Bezymyannaya. Near the height was the 2nd company of the 119th regiment of the 40th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant Levchenko. Each height was a small, independently operating stronghold. Approximately halfway between the heights there was a group of Lieutenant Ratnikov, covering the flanks with reinforced units. Ratnikov had 16 soldiers with a machine gun. In addition, it was assigned a platoon of small-caliber guns and four T-26 light tanks. However, when the battle began, it turned out that the forces of the border defenders were meager. The lesson at Bezymyannaya was useful for the Japanese, and they brought into action two reinforced divisions with a total number of up to 20 thousand people, about 200 guns and mortars, three armored trains, and a battalion of tanks. The Japanese pinned great hopes on their “suicide bombers” who also took part in the battle.
On the night of July 31, a Japanese regiment, with artillery support, attacked Zaozernaya. The defenders of the hill returned fire, and then counterattacked the enemy and drove him back. Four times the Japanese rushed to Zaozernaya and each time they were forced to retreat with losses. A powerful avalanche of Japanese troops, although at the cost of heavy losses, managed to push back our fighters and reach the lake. Then, by decision of the government, units of the First Maritime Army entered the battle; its soldiers and commanders fought heroically alongside the border guards. During fierce military clashes on August 9, 1938, Soviet troops managed to dislodge the enemy from only part of the disputed territories. The Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya hills were completely occupied later, after the conflict was resolved diplomatically.
Bombing of Zaozernaya Hill
The events on Lake Khasan, for all their complexity and ambiguity, clearly demonstrated the military power of the USSR. The experience of fighting with the regular Japanese army greatly helped the training of our soldiers and commanders during the battles at Khalkhin Gol in 1939 and in the Manchurian strategic operation in August 1945.
Aviators, tank crews, and artillerymen also made a significant contribution to the overall success of repelling the enemy. Accurate bomb strikes fell on the heads of the invaders, the enemy was thrown to the ground by dashing tank attacks, and destroyed by irresistible and powerful artillery salvoes. The campaign of Japanese troops to Lake Khasan ended ingloriously. After August 9, the Japanese government had no choice but to enter into negotiations to end hostilities. On August 10, the USSR government proposed a truce to the Japanese side. The Japanese government accepted our terms, also agreeing to create a commission to resolve the controversial border issue. For the massive heroism shown in the battles near Lake Khasan, thousands of Soviet soldiers were awarded high state awards, many became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Settlements, streets, schools, and ships were named after the heroes.
Gabriel Tsobekhia
This coming Sunday in the Primorsky Territory, the authorities intend to organize magnificent celebrations dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the battles on Lake Khasan, between the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army and Japanese troops in the area where in 1938 the borders of the USSR, Japanese-occupied Korea and the Tokyo-controlled puppet state converged Manchukuo.
The Khasan battles began on July 29, 1938 and lasted until August 11. In Soviet times, it was customary to talk about the events on Lake Khasan as one of the classic examples of the valor of Soviet soldiers and the art of Red commanders. But there is a completely different point of view on the battle at Lake Khasan - both on who started it and why, and at what cost a very dubious victory was achieved in it.
This is what Vladimir Voronov, a historian and journalist, an expert in the field of military and foreign policy doctrines of the USSR of the 30s, thinks.
Victory at Lake Khasan, at Khalkhin Gol and in the Soviet-Finnish War is such a “holy trinity” that I remember from a young age when it came to official Soviet military history before the start of the Great Patriotic War. When the Soviet Union began to collapse, very unsightly archival documents and facts came to light. It turned out that everything happened “somewhat differently.” The first two conflicts and supposedly militarily skillful victories, with little bloodshed, over militaristic Japan on the eve of 1941 became important element propaganda and ideas about the invincibility of the Red Army in any war. The song “Three Tankers” appeared and so on...
Khasan and Khalkhin Gol are fundamentally different events with different backgrounds. If the battles at Lake Khasan were not fully prepared and were provoked by the actions of the Soviet side, then the battle on the Khalkhin Gol River in 1939 was a Japanese initiative and Japanese aggression. Moreover, in both cases this initiative was non-strategic in nature. But the scale of Khalkhin Gol is, of course, much higher. I would say that if there had not been Khasan, there would have been no Khalkhin Gol. The battles of 1938 and how the Red Army behaved in a real battle gave the Japanese the idea to carry out an already prepared operation on Khalkhin Gol. What the Soviet side planned at Lake Khasan was not something that was not implemented - but, by conceiving actions on Khasan and being the initiator of them, the USSR, to put it mildly, ended up in the bag.
- Why do you think that, in military terms, it is difficult for the Soviet side to be proud of the course and results of the battles at Lake Khasan?
Because terrible losses were suffered. Until the 60s of the 20th century, data on losses on Khasan were not published at all. It is believed that 759 Red Army soldiers and border guards were killed on Khasan, and 3,279 were wounded. These are official data, which staff historians of the Ministry of Defense stubbornly cling to to this day. But already at the very beginning of our century, such losses of the Red Army were documented: at least 1,112 people were killed, at least 100 died from wounds, 95 were missing. Generally speaking, the remains of killed Red Army soldiers are still being found on Lake Khasan.
It is generally accepted that as a result of Stalin's repressions on the eve of the Second World War, the flower of military thought in the USSR was destroyed, and that if Tukhachevsky, Blucher, Yakir and others had remained alive, there would not have been the nightmarish defeats of 1941-1942. I don't want to go off on a tangent now and talk about " Great Terror"late 30s. But is it possible that under the repressed commanders whom I mentioned, if they had remained alive, the beginning of the war with Nazi Germany would have been the same? After all, the same Marshal Vasily Blucher received a terrible reprimand from Stalin towards the end of the events on Lake Khasan - for inability, for slowness and for terrible losses. Is it likely that these commanders remained Civil War commanders until the end of their lives? And their knowledge and skills are outdated?
I will neither dispute nor deny this. But the accusations against Blucher regarding his leadership at Lake Khasan are not founded for at least one reason. He didn't plan this operation. This operation was planned over his head. He had nothing to carry it out, from the point of view of command personnel at that time. On the Red Banner Far Eastern Front, into which the Special Far Eastern Red Banner Army was renamed in June 1938, the shortfall in command personnel was 85 percent. This is 1937-1938 - there was an intensive destruction of command personnel, everywhere, and on Far East, which took on terrifying forms. Comrade Blucher also participated in this destruction - and it could not have been otherwise! For two years in a row, the valiant commanders of the Red Army were concerned about only one thing - their own survival. They spoke at party meetings, they wrote denunciations. No military training! No military training! During these two years, not a single military exercise was held! What maps did the red commanders use to fight in 1938? These were cards, formally, with the stamp of the General Staff and all the marks “top secret”, and so on. But in fact, these were maps compiled by the cartographic division of the NKVD, with deliberate changes made there, “maps for foreign tourists.” And suddenly in August 1938 it was discovered that the swamps were not indicated on these maps, that the roads were completely different. All Soviet artillery got stuck in the swamp and was shot by the Japanese with direct fire from the commanding heights. The artillerymen suffered particularly heavy losses. And Soviet tanks got stuck in swamps that were not on the maps.
Why did Japan need this conflict? It is known that in Tokyo at that time there existed, relatively speaking, an “army party,” which wanted, perhaps, to go north and west, against China and the USSR, and a “navy party,” which was preparing expansion to the south and east, against the United States and Great Britain. Before the conflict at Lake Khasan, one of the top leaders of the NKVD, Genrikh Lyushkov, ran over to the Japanese and told him, perhaps, what potential the Red Army actually had in the Far East. Could it happen that a local conflict would result in a full-scale land war? Or was it a “shooting”, a test of strength on both sides?
Lyushkov, nevertheless, due to the nature of his activity, hardly had detailed information about the combat capability of the Red Army. He, of course, knew the Far East very well, he knew the capabilities of the Red Army very well, but he was not able to lay out what, for example, the chief of staff of the unit knew. He could give the Japanese approximate data. But yes, these data shocked the Japanese, because it turned out that the Red Army in the Far East had a threefold numerical superiority. And the Japanese did not plan any serious operations against the Soviet Union in 1938 and had absolutely no desire to get involved in a serious military conflict. This was a forced reaction of the Japanese to the fighting. They could not leave without consequences, from their point of view, the brazen attempts to seize the dominant hills on the territory of Korea controlled by them, and Manchukuo - the area in question is the point of convergence of the then Korean, Manchurian and Soviet borders. Because the Soviet border guards captured hills not on Soviet territory - and carried out engineering support, which threatened serious consequences for the Japanese. A bridgehead could be created there, from which Japanese territory could be shot deep into, over a very long distance, and a large-scale offensive could be carried out. Therefore, their task after the start of the conflict was nothing more than establishing control over the Japanese hills. The Japanese did not enter even one meter or one millimeter into Soviet territory.
- How did the conflict formally begin?
The conflict arose after an unexpected inspection of a number of senior leaders of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD, headed by Mikhail Frinovsky, in July, after Lyushkov’s escape, when, together with the head of the local border detachment, a group of senior NKVD command personnel entered Japanese territory, where a group of Manchus worked under the protection of Japanese gendarmes . And when the Japanese gendarmes, without using force, asked them to leave, they were shot at point-blank range by NKVD soldiers with revolvers! Then, when, already during the battles on Khasan, Stalin, “accidentally” walking along the corridors of the People’s Commissariat of Defense on August 1, suddenly “accidentally” wandered into Voroshilov’s office and “accidentally” contacted Blucher in a direct line, he tried to report to him how the matter really stood . And in response he received from Stalin: “You, Comrade Blucher, don’t want to fight the Japanese? Say so.”
And many facts indicate that this operation was prepared in advance on the Soviet side. At the same time, she prepared, as always, extremely poorly, as evidenced by the results. By July 1, the Special Far Eastern Red Banner Army was deployed to the Red Banner Far Eastern Front. What does it look like that during the first two days of fighting, the Red Army instantly concentrated an entire army corps at Lake Khasan? “By chance” a corps of 32 thousand people was walking in the border zone? Formally, one 19th Infantry Division fought on the Japanese side, but in reality it was an incomplete regiment. According to the Japanese captured documents that the Soviet troops received in 1938, it is clear that this “division” had a shortage of officers, a shortage of personnel, it was formed not from personnel, but from literally just hastily called up reservists.
The main forces of the Japanese ground army were deployed in China. Then China was their target! Tokyo did not need an open conflict with the Soviet Union at all, because the Japanese had already fought with the Soviet Union in China. A huge Soviet aviation group operated there; Soviet pilots flew Soviet fighters and bombers, albeit with Chinese markings. Soviet infantry commanders led Chinese units into battle. Several hundred Soviet military advisers were already in China. In 1938, the Japanese General Staff categorically prohibited the use of aviation against Soviet troops! At a meeting in Tokyo, after the first shots were fired at Lake Khasan, it was said - exclusively defensive actions! We’ll return what was ours, formally put the flag back on the hill, and that’s it, nothing more is needed! According to Soviet official data, the Red Army deployed over 600 guns and about 400 tanks for this operation. But the Japanese didn’t have a single tank there!
The USSR, in this case, already in 1938 was planning a large-scale invasion of northern Korea and Manchuria? And the attack at Lake Khasan was a preparatory operation?
It was, I would say, in fact, rather an internal political operation, for the sake of achieving, first of all, internal political goals - namely, a kind of special operation against Blucher. Stalin was in a wild rage after Lyushkov's flight to the Japanese, and at the same time he had long been sharpening his grudge against Blucher, who for over 10 years had been an almost unlimited governor and master of a huge region. According to Stalin, “his time has come.” But Comrade Stalin always played multi-move games! That is, it was impossible to simply arrest Blucher! This would be banal, especially since the name of Blucher still shone in society. There were two tasks - to show a certain fig to the Japanese, and to blame Blucher. And the Japanese also had to respond adequately for Lyushkov, from Stalin’s point of view. Well, the great Stalin decided to play a “two-move” - to strengthen his positions both inside and outside. Because for the USSR and the Red Army, the Khasan hills had, for the future, higher value, they led the army to the expanses of Manchuria, then there was operational space. But they did not take the Japanese anywhere except the swamps, through which they would not be able to advance anywhere in the event of war.”