Partisan movement in 1812. The partisan movement is “the club of the people’s war”


  1. One of the first detachments was formed in the Dukhovshchinsky district, it was organized by Alexander Dmitrievich Leslie, the landowner of the village of Stankovo, with the assistance of his siblings Peter, Grigory, Yegor and the blessing of the father of Major General Dmitry Egorovich Leslie, who lived on the Kapyrevshchina estate, the detachment consisted of more than 200 serfs and yard peasants. The partisans carried out raids and ambushes. Operating in forest areas along the Dukhovshchina-Krasny-Gusino roads. In the Krasninsky district, a detachment of the headman of one of the villages, Semyon Arkhipov, acted. Semyon Arkhipov and his two comrades were captured with a French gun in their hands - on the orders of Napoleon shot. Later, the artist Vereshchagin painted the painting “With a gun in his hands? - Shoot!” based on these events. In the city of Sychevka, a self-defense detachment was formed, the warriors carried out patrol duty, escorted prisoners. In the Porechsky district, the partisans of citizen Nikita Minchenkov captured the banner of a French regiment, took a courier with important mail. In the Sychevsky district, the partisan detachment was led by a retired major of the Suvorov Army, Semyon Emelyanov, elder Vasilisa Kozhina, peasant woman Kh. Gorshkova led a detachment of teenagers and peasant women, armed with pitchforks and scythes. For refusing to give food, the French shot her husband. The names of brave young partisans are known: Fyodor Kolychev, Sergei Nikolsky, Ilya Nosov, Vasily Lavrov, Timofey Konoplin, Ivan Lebedev. In parallel with Kozhina’s detachment, the detachments of Agap Ivanov, Sergei Mironov, Maxim Vasiliev, Andrei Stepanov, Anton Fedorov, and Vasily Nikitin operated in Sychevsky district. Headman of the village Levshino, on the river Vazuze in hand-to-hand combat destroyed more than 10 enemy soldiers, after which with his body he propped up the door of the hut where the French were feasting, bleeding, and held them until fellow villagers approached, who arrived in time and destroyed them with pitchforks and axes. In Gzhatsk district, partisans of the villages of Zibkovo and Basmany smashed the enemy under the command of Yermolai Chetvertakov, a soldier of the Russian army, they controlled over 40 kilometers of terrain, destroyed more than 1000 soldiers and officers of the invaders. The detachment numbered over 300 people. A peasant from the village of Novoselki, Dukhovshchinsky district, Semyon Silaev repeated the feat of I. Susanin. Napoleon's adjutant admitted: " We didn’t meet a single peasant anywhere, or anyone who could serve as our guide.” In the area of ​​Roslavl, detachments of Ivan Golikov, Savva Morozov, and Ivaan Tepishev operated. The Dorogobuzh partisans—commander Ermolai Vasiliev, the Gzhatsky partisans—commander Fedor—left a glorious memory of themselves. Potapov. The troops of Denis Davydov instilled fear and panic in the ranks of the enemy, distinguished by their audacity and speed of raids. In total, dozens of detachments of people's avengers operated on the territory of the Smolensk region, destroying many soldiers of the great army. Mikhail Kutuzov in his address to the Smolyan residents wrote: “Worthy Smolensk inhabitants are kind compatriots! With the liveliest delight I am informed from everywhere about your unparalleled experiences and loyalty and devotion to your dear Fatherland. In the most severe of your own disasters, you show the steadfastness of your own spirit. . . The enemy could damage your walls, send your property into ruins and ashes, put heavy shackles on you, but he could not and will not be able to defeat and conquer your hearts!

    Denis Davydov

    With a gun in hand? -Shoot!

  2. Thanks for the link, I'll read it one of these days
  3. Let's, friends, first find out who the partisans of 1812 were and whether they were the armed peasants about whom they talk a lot? Partisans were the name given to temporarily created detachments from REGULAR units and Cossacks of the ACTUAL army. These were the well-known detachments of I.S. Dorokhov, D.V. Davydov, A.N. Seslavin, A.S. Figner and others. These detachments were purposefully created by the command of the Russian army for operations in the rear and on communications of Napoleon's army. In the Smolensk, Kaluga, and Moscow provinces, peasant armed self-defense units were spontaneously created, which performed the functions of protecting exclusively their own and nearby villages from looting. They did not carry out deep raids behind enemy lines, did not carry out sabotage work, and did not interrupt communications. It is IMPOSSIBLE to call such detachments partisans! No one ever called them that. For example, in the reports of the leader of the nobility of the Sychevsky district, Nikolai Matveevich Nakhimov, to the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, M.I. Kutuzov, there is not a single mention of the fact that partisan detachments were created. “Upon the approach of the enemy, according to my instructions, the peasants in each village were armed with pikes, taking turns from these horse patrols, which, having heard or noticed about the enemy, should immediately let the city police officer know and to the nearest villages, and that from the villages armed “The peasants, upon the first notice, immediately came to the appointed place,” he wrote in a report dated September 3, 1812. And further: “... the peasants not only eagerly flocked, armed with pikes, but even with scythes and stakes, and at the command of the police officer, without fear of bullets and bayonets, surrounded, rushed at the enemy, hit them, took them prisoner and scattered them.” And again, not a word about these being partisans. His Serene Highness Prince and Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov noted in his “Leaflets” that “Peasants from villages adjacent to the theater of war inflict the greatest harm on the enemy... They kill the enemy in large numbers, and take those taken prisoner to the army.” And again, not a word that the peasants were partisans. There is not a single document in any archive relating to the Patriotic War of 1812 indicating peasant detachments as partisans. The historiography of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries specifically indicated and quite definitely separated the actions of partisans and peasant armed self-defense units without comparing these concepts. The actions of the latter took place as a “people's war”, a term used by famous historians of the 19th century: Buturlin D. P. (“History of Emperor Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812”, parts 1-2, St. Petersburg, 1823-1824), Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky A.I. (“Description of the Patriotic War in 1812 according to the Highest command...”, parts 1-4, St. Petersburg, 1839), Bogdanovich M.I. (“History of the Patriotic War of 1812 according to reliable sources”, vol. 1-3, St. Petersburg, 1859-1860), Slezskinsky A. (“People’s War in the Smolensk province...” // Russian Archive, 1901, book .2.), and even earlier Akhsharumov D.I. (“Description of the War of 1812”, St. Petersburg, 1819) and many others. This term was also used by L.N. Tolstoy. Remember, “the club of the PEOPLE’S WAR...” The clichéd mention of the “partisan movement of the masses” on the territory of Smolensk and other provinces is striking. Guerrilla MOVEMENT - implies unified leadership, organized and purposeful nature of certain actions. Is it possible to talk about a unified leadership of the masses, even if the Smolensk governor, Baron K. Ash, disappeared in an unknown direction, and temporary control of the province was transferred to the Kaluga governor? Was there a Headquarters for the partisan movement in 1812? Was the nature of the peasant armed self-defense units purposeful and organized? Was there interaction and coordination between the actions of these units? Perhaps peasants carried out raids behind enemy lines? Of course not! So where did the idea that peasant detachments are partisans, united in a certain movement, come from and become firmly entrenched in the minds of many generations? The expression “peasant partisan movement” appeared at least 130 years after the Patriotic War of 1812 and was “invented” in Soviet period. Soviet historians, by analogy with the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, put a sign of identity between two completely different wars, without particularly thinking about historical justice, historical truth.
    This is what I wanted to tell you, friends. By the way, well-known historians have repeatedly spoken on this issue - Professor A.I. Popov, Markov and others. And the topic of Kozhina, Kurin, Emelyanov and other so-called partisans is separate. If you're interested, let's talk.
  4. Quote(Colonel @ October 15, 2011, 10:05 pm)
    ..... Partisans were the name given to temporarily created detachments from REGULAR units and Cossacks of the ACTUAL army. These were the well-known detachments of I.S. Dorokhov, D.V. Davydov, A.N. Seslavin, A.S. Figner and others. These detachments were purposefully created by the command of the Russian army for operations in the rear and on communications of Napoleon's army. The expression “peasant partisan movement” appeared at least 130 years after the Patriotic War of 1812 and was “invented” during the Soviet period. Soviet historians, by analogy with the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, put a sign of identity between two completely different wars, without particularly thinking about historical justice, historical truth.

    I agree with you, Colonel, the term has been “overused.” M.I. Kutuzov in a letter to D.V. Davydov: “And for this I remain in full confidence that you, continuing to act to the great harm of the enemy, will make yourself a reputation as an excellent partisan.” Although V.I. Dal defines this term in a military interpretation as “the head of a light, flying detachment that causes harm through sudden assassination attempts...”, nevertheless, the Military Encyclopedic Lexicon (1856 edition, volume 10, p. 183) explains that "Pratisan detachments are composed, depending on their purpose; according to the terrain and circumstances, then from one, then from two or even three types of weapons. The troops of partisan detachments should be light: rangers, hussars, lancers. And where they are, Cossacks and the like irregular horsemen, mounted guns or rocket teams. Dragoons and mounted riflemen, trained to operate on foot and on horseback, are also very useful."

  5. Quote(Pavel @ October 15, 2011, 23:33)
    I agree with you, Colonel, the term has been “overused.” M.I. Kutuzov in a letter to D.V. Davydov: “And for this I remain in full confidence that you, by continuing to act to the great harm of the enemy, will make yourself a reputation as an excellent partisan.” Although V.I. Dal defines this term in a military interpretation as “the head of a light, flying detachment that causes harm through sudden assassination attempts...”, nevertheless, the Military Encyclopedic Lexicon (1856 edition, volume 10, p. 183) explains that "Pratisan detachments are composed, depending on their purpose; according to the terrain and circumstances, then from one, then from two or even three types of weapons. The troops of partisan detachments should be light: rangers, hussars, lancers. And where they are, Cossacks and the like irregular horsemen, mounted guns or rocket teams. Dragoons and mounted riflemen, trained to operate on foot and on horseback, are also very useful."

    You once again confirmed my words. Thank you! Partisans are, first of all, regular troops, primarily mobile and irregular, i.e. Cossacks, which is the same, and what cannot (especially during the Patriotic War of 1812) be said about armed peasant self-defense detachments, which, as a rule, arose spontaneously. And further. You cannot stretch the same blanket of the Great Patriotic War over the War of 1812 - the size, and not only that, is different.

  6. All the best to everyone. I don’t quite agree with some statements. Coordinated actions behind enemy lines of individual units and units of the regular army are reconnaissance and sabotage operations. But the actions of armed non-military people are organized according to the principle of militia, police, self-defense units, spontaneous gangs, etc., etc. there is partisanship.
    As for the partisan movement in 1812, I would divide it into three categories:
    1 - actions of the regular army, which include operations of detachments under the leadership of the Russian officers listed above, both in service and retirees.
    2 - the actions of peasants whose villages found themselves in the zone of hostilities. Houses burned down, the harvest was trampled, neither the sovereign nor the landowner cared about the peasants, but, excuse me, they needed something to eat. So God’s servants gathered in bands, armed themselves with what, and smashed whoever they meet on the roads, not for patriotic reasons, but out of extreme need and despair...
    and 3 - mutually beneficial cooperation. This happened in the occupied territories that were not heavily damaged by the fighting. As an example, I propose to consider the so-called blockade of the Bobruisk fortress. While retreating, Bagration took all the soldiers who were more or less fit for duty, even the prisoners were amnestied. Only the sick and wounded. That is, the garrison, although it numbered 5,000 people, was incapable of active actions outside the fortifications. The only mobile and combat-ready unit was a combined Cossack detachment, consisting of baggage and security Cossacks, with a total number of 240 people. So these two and a half hundred managed to spoil the blood of the Poles, the Austrians and the French...If you analyze the official reports and presentations for awards of that period, it is impossible not to note that the Cossacks constantly turned out to be at the right time time, at the right time place, and sometimes bypassing more than one enemy garrison. This is simply not possible without active and conscientious assistance from the local population. And they came to this very simply. At first, the local population was absolutely indifferent to the arrival of the French. After all, they were annexed to the RI only in 1793 year. And for some 20 years it was the third power. But at the Diet in Vilna, Napoleon promised to revive the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and in return demanded “bread and hay.” And where could the homeless gentry get food and fodder in the required quantities... Here they began to diligently rob the peasants. And they, in turn, sided with the Russians. Simple arithmetic: the Cossacks always had fresh and reliable information and reliable guides, and they didn’t have a headache about what to do with a lost convoy - not a single horse with a cart, not a single a sack of grain, an armful of hay will not fall to the enemies, and the soldiers scattering through the forest will be caught, crushed and quietly buried, so as not to tell lies. And on the other hand, even a small convoy for a fortress village vegetating in terrible poverty is manna from heaven. And patriotism , faith, king and fatherland are propaganda and show-offs attached after the victory.
    Let me make a reservation right away: I am not trying to belittle the importance of the partisan movement in both that and other wars. And I bow to the courage and heroism of my ancestors who, not being soldiers, sometimes having no idea about military affairs, fought like real heroes. After all, one can say that it was they who defended their land 100%, standing on it. Eternal memory and unfading glory to them.
  7. All the best to everyone. I don’t quite agree with some statements. Coordinated Action behind enemy lines, individual units and units of the regular army are reconnaissance and sabotage operations. But the actions of armed non-military people are organized according to the principle militia, police, self-defense units, spontaneous gangs etc. is partisanship.

    Click to expand...

    Somehow you lumped everything into one pile: militia, police, self-defense units... The militia was attached to the army, the police was disbanded in 1807, self-defense units have already been said.

    And than. Where and who coordinated the actions of the partisan detachments? And in general, the concept of rear in 1812 is very conditional, because there was no front line.

  8. Either I didn’t quite clearly express my thoughts, or you didn’t understand me correctly. I’m just trying to separate the combat operations of army units carried out on the orders or with the knowledge of some regular army commander (there was no other coordination at that time could) and spontaneous armed uprisings in the occupied territory. For example: can the raid of the 5000th corps of General Ertel behind the Poles to the cities of Glussk and Bobruisk at the end of September be classified as partisan? And I indicated the principles for the formation of partisan units applicable to any historical period, be it the Spitamen uprising in Sogdiana, the American militia of George Washington or the partisan movement during the Second World War.
    The army has always had a front, flanks and rear, as well as the concepts of combat and logistics support, territory occupied by the enemy, rear and frontline communications, rear, reserve and other bases, temporary military or occupation administration. Without all this, beautiful formations with the beat of drums and friendly volleys on the battlefields... And a continuous front line drawn on the map of military operations is not the most important thing in a war, although one cannot help but admit that its location is the ultimate goal of the massacre...
  9. Either I didn’t quite clearly express my thoughts, or you didn’t understand me correctly. I’m just trying to separate the combat operations of army units carried out on the orders or with the knowledge of some regular army commander (there was no other coordination at that time could) and spontaneous armed uprisings in the occupied territory. For example: can the raid of the 5000th corps of General Ertel behind the Poles to the cities of Glussk and Bobruisk at the end of September be classified as partisan? And I indicated the principles for the formation of partisan units applicable to any historical period, be it the Spitamen uprising in Sogdiana, the American militia of George Washington or the partisan movement during the Second World War.
    The army has always had a front, flanks and rear, as well as the concepts of combat and logistics support, territory occupied by the enemy, rear and frontline communications, rear, reserve and other bases, temporary military or occupation administration. Without all this, beautiful formations with the beat of drums and friendly volleys on the battlefields... And a continuous front line drawn on the map of military operations is not the most important thing in a war, although one cannot help but admit that its location is the ultimate goal of the massacre...

    Click to expand...

    This is your main mistake. In different historical periods, the concept of "partisan" had different meanings and it is under no circumstances possible to unite them under a single denominator. It is impossible to cover the War of 1812 with the blanket of the Second World War, but many are doing it, trying to do it. As a result, incorrect interpretations, judgments, and conclusions appear, which even (unfortunately) end up in textbooks.
    During the Second World War, for propaganda purposes, an identity was made between the two wars. Yes, as a means of propaganda, raising morale and other things - it is acceptable, but as a historical reality - it is absurd.

  10. Greetings. In many respects, of course, you are right. But I would not base judgments on how, in which country and at what time people were called who waged armed struggle with the enemy separately from the regular, irregular and any other army. Among the ancient Russian supporters, among the Dutch Gezes, the Balkan and Carpathian Haiduks, the Afghan Mujahideen, the tactics of action were the same: surprise attacks, raids, ambushes, searches, sabotage, sabotage, intelligence collection... Depending on the historical period, terrain, state and nationality, the details and methods of execution changed tasks, movement and camouflage, weapons and technical equipment and the ideological side of the issue. The partisan movement arose in almost the same way: at first, isolated, spontaneous actions or skirmishes, gradually gaining scope (usually due to growing opposition from the enemy) and entering into interaction with the regular army , either creating one on the basis of its units; or sliding towards robbery, unrest and anarchy...
    An important point is that people who fought on the side of the winners were called patriots, partisans, heroes, etc., and those who supported the losers were traitors, traitors and terrorists...
    If we look at the War of 1812 from this point of view, then in my opinion the main reason that determined such a rapid and massive deployment of partisan warfare in the territory occupied by Napoleon was the communal way of life of the main part of the population. The population of each village, town or town was a community, that is, an organized a cohesive and manageable community, under the leadership of a village or church elder, voit, etc. Moreover, the community is capable of existing autonomously from higher authorities. Therefore, when the enemy approached, people went into the forests in an organized manner along with their families, property, livestock. And there the men, armed at first with what, became fighters .And if the landowner, a retired officer, did not run away, but headed, organized basic military training, and the church burned down along with the village and the priest also joined as a commissar, then the result was a unit that should no longer be neglected. Maybe they were inferior to the soldiers of the great army in technical equipment, discipline and personal training, but they fought on their territory, could move off roads, and most importantly they had something to fight for, and this is not some abstract faith, king, fatherland, but quite understandable to everyone family, children, property and own life.

Patriotic War of 1812. Guerrilla movement

Introduction

The partisan movement was a vivid expression of the national character of the Patriotic War of 1812. Having broken out after the invasion of Napoleonic troops into Lithuania and Belarus, it developed every day, took on more active forms and became a formidable force.

At first, the partisan movement was spontaneous, consisting of performances of small, scattered partisan detachments, then it captured entire regions. Large detachments began to be created, thousands of national heroes appeared, and talented organizers of the partisan struggle emerged.

Why did the disenfranchised peasantry, mercilessly oppressed by the feudal landowners, rise up to fight against their seemingly “liberator”? Napoleon did not even think about any liberation of the peasants from serfdom or improvement of their powerless situation. If at first promising phrases were uttered about the emancipation of the serfs and there was even talk about the need to issue some kind of proclamation, then this was only a tactical move with the help of which Napoleon hoped to intimidate the landowners.

Napoleon understood that the liberation of Russian serfs would inevitably lead to revolutionary consequences, which is what he feared most. Yes, this did not meet his political goals when joining Russia. According to Napoleon's comrades, it was “important for him to strengthen monarchism in France and it was difficult for him to preach revolution to Russia.”

The purpose of the work is to consider Denis Davydov as a hero of the partisan war and a poet. Work objectives to consider:

    Reasons for the emergence of partisan movements

    Partisan movement of D. Davydov

    Denis Davydov as a poet

1. Reasons for the emergence of partisan detachments

The beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 is associated with the manifesto of Alexander I of July 6, 1812, which supposedly allowed the peasants to take up arms and actively participate in the struggle. In reality the situation was different. Without waiting for orders from their superiors, when the French approached, residents fled into the forests and swamps, often leaving their homes to be looted and burned.

The peasants quickly realized that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position than they had been in before. The peasants also associated the fight against foreign enslavers with the hope of liberating them from serfdom.

At the beginning of the war, the struggle of the peasants acquired the character of mass abandonment of villages and villages and the movement of the population to forests and areas remote from military operations. And although this was still a passive form of struggle, it created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic army. The French troops, having a limited supply of food and fodder, quickly began to experience an acute shortage of them. This immediately affected the deterioration of the general condition of the army: horses began to die, soldiers began to starve, and looting intensified. Even before Vilna, more than 10 thousand horses died.

The actions of peasant partisan detachments were both defensive and offensive in nature. In the area of ​​Vitebsk, Orsha, and Mogilev, detachments of peasant partisans made frequent day and night raids on enemy convoys, destroyed their foragers, and captured French soldiers. Napoleon was forced to remind the chief of staff Berthier more and more often about the large losses in people and strictly ordered the allocation of an increasing number of troops to cover the foragers.

2. Partisan detachment of Denis Davydov

Along with the formation of large peasant partisan detachments and their activities, army partisan detachments played a major role in the war. The first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly.

Its commander was General F.F. Wintsengerode, who led the united Kazan Dragoon, Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of ​​​​Dukhovshchina.

After the invasion of Napoleonic troops, peasants began to go into the forests, partisan heroes began to create peasant detachments and attack individual French teams. The struggle of the partisan detachments unfolded with particular force after the fall of Smolensk and Moscow. The partisan troops boldly attacked the enemy and captured the French. Kutuzov allocated a detachment to operate behind enemy lines under the leadership of D. Davydov, whose detachment disrupted the enemy’s communication routes, freed prisoners, and inspired the local population to fight the invaders. Following the example of Denisov’s detachment, by October 1812, 36 Cossacks, 7 cavalry, 5 infantry regiments, 3 battalions of rangers and other units, including artillery, were operating.

Residents of the Roslavl district created several mounted and foot partisan detachments, arming them with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their district from the enemy, but also attacked the marauders making their way into the neighboring Elny district. Many partisan detachments operated in Yukhnovsky district. Having organized defense along the Ugra River, they blocked the enemy’s path in Kaluga and provided significant assistance to the army partisans of Denis Davydov’s detachment.

The detachment of Denis Davydov was a real threat for the French. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment. Together with his hussars, he retreated as part of Bagration’s army to Borodin. A passionate desire to bring even greater benefit in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov to “ask for a separate detachment.” He was strengthened in this intention by Lieutenant M.F. Orlov, who was sent to Smolensk to clarify the fate of the seriously wounded General P.A. Tuchkov, who was captured. After returning from Smolensk, Orlov spoke about the unrest and poor rear protection in the French army.

While driving through the territory occupied by Napoleonic troops, he realized how vulnerable the French food warehouses, guarded by small detachments, were. At the same time, he saw how difficult it was for flying peasant detachments to fight without a coordinated plan of action. According to Orlov, small army detachments sent behind enemy lines could inflict great damage on him and help the actions of the partisans.

D. Davydov asked General P.I. Bagration to allow him to organize a partisan detachment to operate behind enemy lines. For a “test,” Kutuzov allowed Davydov to take 50 hussars and -1280 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, Davydov began bold raids behind enemy lines. In the very first skirmishes near Tsarev - Zaimishch, Slavkoy, he achieved success: he defeated several French detachments and captured a convoy with ammunition.

In the fall of 1812, partisan detachments surrounded the French army in a continuous mobile ring.

A detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Davydov, reinforced by two Cossack regiments, operated between Smolensk and Gzhatsk. A detachment of General I.S. Dorokhov operated from Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk. Captain A.S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow.

In the area of ​​Mozhaisk and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I.M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks. Between Borovsk and Moscow, the roads were controlled by a detachment of captain A. N. Seslavin. Colonel N.D. Kudashiv was sent to the Serpukhov road with two Cossack regiments. On the Ryazan road there was a detachment of Colonel I. E. Efremov. From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of F.F. Wintsengerode, who, separating small detachments from himself to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked access for Napoleon’s troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region.

The partisan detachments operated in difficult conditions. At first there were many difficulties. Even residents of villages and villages at first treated the partisans with great distrust, often mistaking them for enemy soldiers. Often the hussars had to dress in peasant caftans and grow beards.

The partisan detachments did not stand in one place, they were constantly on the move, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The partisans' actions were sudden and swift. To swoop down out of the blue and quickly hide became the main rule of the partisans.

The detachments attacked individual teams, foragers, transports, took away weapons and distributed them to the peasants, and took dozens and hundreds of prisoners.

Davydov’s detachment on the evening of September 3, 1812 went to Tsarev-Zamishch. Not reaching 6 versts to the village, Davydov sent reconnaissance there, which established that there was a large French convoy with shells, guarded by 250 horsemen. The detachment at the edge of the forest was discovered by French foragers, who rushed to Tsarevo-Zamishche to warn their own. But Davydov did not let them do this. The detachment rushed in pursuit of the foragers and almost burst into the village together with them. The convoy and its guards were taken by surprise, and an attempt by a small group of French to resist was quickly suppressed. 130 soldiers, 2 officers, 10 carts with food and fodder ended up in the hands of the partisans.

3. Denis Davydov as a poet

Denis Davydov was a wonderful romantic poet. He belonged to the genre of romanticism.

It should be noted that almost always in human history, a nation that has been subjected to aggression creates a powerful layer of patriotic literature. This was the case, for example, during the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus'. And only some time later, having recovered from the blow, having overcome pain and hatred, thinkers and poets think about all the horrors of the war for both sides, about its cruelty and senselessness. This is very clearly reflected in the poems of Denis Davydov.

In my opinion, Davydov’s poem is one of the outbursts of patriotic militancy caused by the invasion of the enemy.

What did this unshakable strength of the Russians consist of?

This strength was made up of patriotism not in words, but in deeds the best people from the nobility, poets and simply the Russian people.

This strength consisted of the heroism of the soldiers and best officers of the Russian army.

This invincible force was formed from the heroism and patriotism of Muscovites who leave their hometown, no matter how sorry they are to leave their property to destruction.

The invincible strength of the Russians consisted of the actions of partisan detachments. This is Denisov's detachment, where the most the right person- Tikhon Shcherbaty, people's avenger. Partisan detachments destroyed Napoleonic army piece by piece.

So, Denis Davydov in his works depicts the war of 1812 as a people’s war, a Patriotic War, when the entire people rose to defend the Motherland. And the poet did this with enormous artistic power, creating a grandiose poem - an epic that has no equal in the world.

The work of Denis Davydov can be illustrated as follows:

Dream

Who could cheer you up so much, my friend?

You can hardly speak from laughter.

What joys delight your mind, Or do they lend you money without a bill?

Or a happy waist has come to you

And did the pair of trantels take the endurance test?

What happened to you that you don’t answer?

Ay! give me a rest, you know nothing!

I'm really beside myself, I almost went crazy:

Today I found Petersburg completely different!

I thought that the whole world had completely changed:

Imagine - Nn paid off his debt;

There are no more pedants and fools to be seen,

And even Zoey and Sov got smarter!

There is no courage in the unfortunate rhymers of old,

And our dear Marin does not stain papers,

And, deepening into the service, he works with his head:

How, when starting a platoon, shout at the right time: stop!

But what I was more delighted by was:

Koev, who pretended to be Lycurgus,

For our happiness he wrote laws for us,

Suddenly, fortunately for us, he stopped writing them.

A happy change has appeared in everything,

Theft, robbery, treason have disappeared,

No more complaints or grievances are visible,

Well, in a word, the city took on a completely disgusting appearance.

Nature gave beauty to the ugly,

And Lll himself stopped looking askance at nature,

Bna's nose has become shorter,

And Ditch scared people with his beauty,

Yes, I, who myself, from the beginning of my century,

It was a stretch to bear the name of a person,

I look, I’m happy, I don’t recognize myself:

Where the beauty comes from, where the growth comes from - I look;

Every word is bon mot, every look is passion,

I’m amazed how I manage to change my intrigues!

Suddenly, oh the wrath of heaven! suddenly fate struck me:

Among the blissful days Andryushka woke up,

And everything I saw, what I had so much fun with -

I saw everything in a dream, and lost everything in the dream.

Burtsov

In a smoky field, on a bivouac

By the blazing fires

In the beneficial arak

I see the savior of people.

Gather in a circle

Orthodox is all to blame!

Give me the golden tub,

Where fun lives!

Pour out vast cups

In the noise of joyful speeches,

How our ancestors drank

Among spears and swords.

Burtsev, you are a hussar of hussars!

You're on a crazy horse

The cruelest of frenzy

And a rider in war!

Let's hit cup and cup together!

Today it’s still too late to drink;

Tomorrow the trumpets will sound,

Tomorrow there will be thunder.

Let's drink and swear

That we indulge in a curse,

If we ever

Let's give way, turn pale,

Let's pity our breasts

And in misfortune we become timid;

If we ever give

Left side on the flank,

Or we'll rein in the horse,

Or a cute little cheat

Let's give our hearts for free!

Let it not be with a saber strike

My life will be cut short!

Let me be a general

How many I have seen!

Let among the bloody battles

I will be pale, fearful,

And in the meeting of heroes

Sharp, brave, talkative!

Let my mustache, the beauty of nature,

Black-brown, in curls,

Will be cut off in youth

And it will disappear like dust!

Let fortune be for vexation,

To multiply all troubles,

He will give me a rank for shift parades

And "Georgia" for the advice!

Let... But chu! This is not the time to walk!

To the horses, brother, and your foot in the stirrup,

Saber out - and cut!

Here is another feast God gives us,

And noisier and more fun...

Come on, put your shako on one side,

And - hurray! Happy day!

V. A. Zhukovsky

Zhukovsky, dear friend! Debt is rewarded by payment:

I read the poems you dedicated to me;

Now read mine, you are smoked in the bivouac

And sprinkled with wine!

It's been a long time since I chatted with either the muse or you,

Did I care about my feet?..

.........................................
But even in the thunderstorms of war, still on the battlefield,

When the Russian camp went out,

I greeted you with a huge glass

An impudent partisan wandering in the steppes!

Conclusion

It was not by chance that the War of 1812 received the name Patriotic War. Folk character This war was most clearly manifested in the partisan movement, which played a strategic role in the victory of Russia. Responding to accusations of “war not according to the rules,” Kutuzov said that these were the feelings of the people. Responding to a letter from Marshal Bertha, he wrote on October 8, 1818: “It is difficult to stop a people embittered by everything they have seen; a people who for so many years have not known war on their territory; a people ready to sacrifice themselves for their Motherland... ". Activities aimed at attracting the masses to active participation in the war were based on the interests of Russia, correctly reflected the objective conditions of the war and took into account the broad opportunities that emerged in the national liberation war.

During the preparation for the counteroffensive, the combined forces of the army, militia and partisans constrained the actions of Napoleonic troops, inflicted damage on enemy personnel, and destroyed military property. The Smolenskaya-10 road, which remained the only guarded postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly subject to partisan raids. They intercepted French correspondence, especially valuable ones were delivered to the main apartment of the Russian army.

The partisan actions of the peasants were highly appreciated by the Russian command. “The peasants,” wrote Kutuzov, “from the villages adjacent to the theater of war inflict the greatest harm on the enemy... They kill the enemies in large numbers, and deliver those captured to the army.” The peasants of the Kaluga province alone killed and captured more than 6 thousand French.

And yet, one of the most heroic actions of 1812 remains the feat of Denis Davydov and his squad.

Bibliography

    Zhilin P. A. The death of Napoleonic army in Russia. M., 1974. History of France, vol. 2. M., 2001.-687p.

    History of Russia 1861-1917, ed. V. G. Tyukavkina, Moscow: INFRA, 2002.-569 p.

    Orlik O.V. Thunderstorm of the twelfth year.... M.: INFRA, 2003.-429p.

    Platonov S.F. Textbook of Russian history for secondary school M., 2004.-735p.

    Reader on the History of Russia 1861-1917, ed. V. G. Tyukavkina - Moscow: DROFA, 2000.-644 p.


While Napoleonic troops are relaxing with drunkenness and looting in Moscow, and the regular Russian army is retreating, making clever maneuvers that will then allow it to rest, gather strength, significantly replenish its strength and win victories over the enemy, let's talk about club people's war as we like with light hand Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy called the partisan movement of 1812.

Partisans of the Denisov detachment
Illustration for Leo Tolstoy's novel War and Peace
Andrey NIKOLAEV

Firstly, I would like to say that this club has a very distant relation to guerrilla warfare in the form in which it existed. Namely, army partisan detachments consisting of military personnel of regular units and Cossacks, created in the Russian army to operate in the rear and on enemy communications. Secondly, even reading various materials recently, not to mention Soviet sources, one often comes across the idea that their supposed ideological inspirer and organizer was solely Denis Davydov, the famous poet and partisan of that time, who was the first to come up with a proposal to create detachments , like the Spanish guerrilla, through Prince Bagration to Field Marshal Kutuzov before the Battle of Borodino. It must be said that the dashing hussar himself put a lot of effort into this legend. Happens...

Portrait of Denis Davydov
Yuri IVANOV

In fact, the first partisan detachment in this war was created near Smolensk by order of the same Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly, even before Kutuzov’s appointment as commander-in-chief. By the time Davydov turned to Bagration with a request to allow the creation of an army partisan detachment, Major General Ferdinand Fedorovich Wintzingerode (commander of the first partisan detachment) was already in full swing and successfully smashing the rear of the French. The detachment occupied the cities of Surazh, Velezh, Usvyat, and constantly threatened the outskirts of Vitebsk, which was the reason that Napoleon was forced to send the Italian division of General Pino to help the Vitebsk garrison. As usual, we have forgotten the deeds of these “Germans”...

Portrait of General Baron Ferdinand Fedorovich Wintzingerode
Unknown artist

After Borodino, in addition to Davydov’s (by the way, the smallest detachment), several more were created that began active fighting after leaving Moscow. Some detachments consisted of several regiments and could independently solve large combat missions, for example, the detachment of Major General Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov, which included a dragoon, hussar and 3 cavalry regiments. Large detachments were commanded by colonels Vadbolsky, Efremov, Kudashev, captains Seslavin, Figner and others. Many glorious officers fought in the partisan detachments, including future satraps(as they were previously introduced to us) Alexander Khristoforovich Benkendorf, Alexander Ivanovich Chernyshev.

Portraits of Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov and Ivan Efremovich Efremov
George DOW Unknown artist

At the beginning of October 1812, it was decided to surround Napoleonic army with a ring of army partisan detachments, with a clear plan of action and a specific area of ​​deployment for each of them. Thus, Davydov’s detachment was ordered to operate between Smolensk and Gzhatsk, Major General Dorokhov – between Gzhatsk and Mozhaisk, Staff Captain Figner – between Mozhaisk and Moscow. In the Mozhaisk area there were also detachments of Colonel Vadbolsky and Colonel Chernozubov.

Portraits of Nikolai Danilovich Kudashev and Ivan Mikhailovich Vadbolsky
George DOW

Between Borovsk and Moscow, attacks on enemy communications were carried out by detachments of Captain Seslavin and Lieutenant Fonvizin. North of Moscow, a group of detachments under the overall command of General Wintzingerode waged an armed struggle. Colonel Efremov’s detachment operated on the Ryazan road, Colonel Kudashev’s on Serpukhovskaya, and Major Lesovsky’s on Kashirskaya. The main advantage of partisan detachments was their mobility, surprise and swiftness. They never stood in one place, they constantly moved, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. If necessary, several detachments were temporarily united to conduct large operations.

Portraits of Alexander Samoilovich Figner and Alexander Nikitich Seslavin
Yuri IVANOV

Without in any way detracting from the exploits of Denis Davydov’s detachment and himself, it must be said that many commanders were offended by the memoirist after the publication of his military notes, in which he often exaggerated his own merits and forgot to mention his comrades. To which Davydov replied innocently: Fortunately, I have something to say about myself, why not say it? And it’s true, the organizers, generals Barclay de Tolly and Wintzingerode, passed away one after another in 1818, so what to remember about them... And written in a fascinating, rich language, the works of Denis Vasilyevich were very popular in Russia. True, Alexander Bestuzhev-Marlinsky wrote to Xenophon Polevoy in 1832: Let it be said between us, he wrote out more than he knocked out his reputation as a brave man.

A memoirist, and even more so a poet, and even a hussar, well, how can one do without fantasies :) So let’s forgive him these little pranks?..


Denis Davydov at the head of the partisans in the vicinity of Lyakhovo
A. TELENIK

Portrait of Denis Davydov
Alexander ORLOVSKY

In addition to partisan detachments, there was also a so-called people's war, which was waged by spontaneously created self-defense units of villagers and the importance of which, in my opinion, is greatly exaggerated. And it’s already teeming with myths... Now, they say, a film has been made about the elder Vasilisa Kozhina, whose very existence is still disputed, and we can’t even say anything about her exploits.

But strangely enough, the same “German” Barclay de Tolly had a hand in this movement, who back in July, without waiting for instructions from above, addressed through the Smolensk governor Baron Kazimir Asch to the residents of the Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga regions with appeal:

The inhabitants of Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga! Hear the voice calling you to your own peace, to your own safety. Our irreconcilable enemy, having undertaken a greedy intention against us, has hitherto nourished himself with the hope that his impudence alone will be enough to frighten us, to triumph over us. But our two brave armies, stopping the daring flight of his violence, confronted him with their breasts on our ancient borders... Avoiding a decisive battle, ... his bandits of bandits, attacking unarmed villagers, tyrannized over them with all the cruelty of barbarian times: they rob and burn their houses; they desecrate the temples of God... But many of the inhabitants of the Smolensk province have already awakened from their fear. They, armed in their homes, with courage worthy of the Russian name, punish the villains without any mercy. Imitate them, all who love themselves, the fatherland and the sovereign!

Of course, ordinary people and peasants behaved differently in the territories abandoned by the Russians. When the French army approached, they moved away from home or into the forests. But often, some first of all destroyed the estates of their tyrant landowners (we must not forget that the peasants were serfs), robbed, set fire, ran away in the hope that the French would come now and free them (the earth was full of rumors about Napoleon’s intentions to rid the peasants of serfdom ).

The destruction of the landowner's estate. Patriotic War of 1812
Looting of a landowner's estate by peasants after the retreat of Russian troops before Napoleon's army
V.N. KURDIUMOV

During the retreat of our troops and the entry of the French into Russia, landowner peasants often rose up against their masters, divided the master's estate, even tore up and burned houses, killed landowners and managers- in a word, they destroyed the estates. The passing troops joined the peasants and, in turn, carried out plunder. Our picture depicts an episode of such a joint robbery of civilians with the military. The action takes place in one of the rich landowners' estates. The owner himself was no longer there, and the remaining clerk was captured so that he would not interfere. The furniture was taken out into the garden and broken. The statues that decorated the garden were broken; the flowers are wrinkled. There is a wine barrel lying around with its bottom knocked out. The wine spilled. Everyone takes whatever they can for themselves. And unnecessary things are thrown away and destroyed. A cavalryman on a horse stands and calmly looks at this picture of destruction.(original caption for illustration)

Partisans of 1812.
Boris ZVORYKIN

Where the landowners behaved humanely, the peasants and courtyard people armed themselves with whatever they could, sometimes under the leadership of the owners themselves, attacked the French troops, convoys and repulsed them. Some detachments were led by Russian soldiers who lagged behind their units due to illness, injury, captivity and subsequent escape from it. So the audience was varied.

Defenders of the homeland
Alexander APSIT

Scouts Plastun
Alexander APSIT

It is also impossible to say that these detachments operated on a permanent basis. They were organized for as long as the enemy was on their territory, and then disbanded, all for the same reason that the peasants were serfs. After all, even from the militias created at the behest of the emperor, fugitive peasants were escorted home and put on trial. So Kurin’s detachment, whose exploits were sung by Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, lasted 10 days - from October 5 to 14, until the French were in Bogorodsky district, and then was disbanded. And not the entire Russian people participated in the people's war, but only residents of several provinces where the fighting took place, or adjacent to them.

French guards under the escort of grandmother Spiridonovna
Alexey VENETSIANOV, 1813

I started this whole conversation in order, firstly, to understand that our club of people's war could not stand any comparison with the Spanish-Portuguese guerrillas (you can read a little about this), which we supposedly looked up to, and, secondly, to show once again that the Patriotic War was won primarily thanks to the actions of our commanders, generals, officers , soldier. And the emperor. And not by the forces of the Gerasimov Kurins, the mythical lieutenants Rzhevskys, Vasilis Kozhins and other entertaining characters... Although it could not have happened without them... And we will talk more specifically about partisan warfare in the future...

And finally, a picture from today:

Archpriest of the Cavalry Regiment Gratinsky, serving a prayer service in the parish church of St. Euplaus, in Moscow, in the presence of the French on September 27, 1812.
Engraving from a drawing by an unknown artist

...Wanting to create a more favorable attitude towards himself among the population, Napoleon ordered not to interfere with the performance of divine services in churches; but this was possible only in a few temples that were not touched by the enemy. From September 15, services were properly performed in the Church of Archdeacon Euplaus (on Myasnitskaya); Divine services were held daily in the Charitonia Church in Ogorodniki. The first gospel message in the Church of Peter and Paul on Yakimanka made a particularly deep impression in Zamoskorechye...(w-l Excursionist's companion No. 3, published for the centenary of the War of 1812)

The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 significantly influenced the outcome of the campaign. The French met fierce resistance from the local population. Demoralized, deprived of the opportunity to replenish their food supplies, Napoleon's tattered and frozen army was brutally beaten by Russian flying and peasant partisan detachments.

Squadrons of flying hussars and detachments of peasants

The greatly extended Napoleonic army, pursuing the retreating Russian troops, quickly became a convenient target for partisan attacks - the French often found themselves far removed from the main forces. The command of the Russian army decided to create mobile units to carry out sabotage behind enemy lines and deprive them of food and fodder.

During the Patriotic War, there were two main types of such detachments: flying squadrons of army cavalrymen and Cossacks, formed by order of Commander-in-Chief Mikhail Kutuzov, and groups of partisan peasants, uniting spontaneously, without army leadership. In addition to actual acts of sabotage, flying detachments also engaged in reconnaissance. Peasant self-defense forces mainly repelled the enemy from their villages.

Denis Davydov was mistaken for a Frenchman

Denis Davydov is the most famous commander of a partisan detachment in the Patriotic War of 1812. He himself drew up a plan of action for mobile partisan formations against the Napoleonic army and proposed it to Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. The plan was simple: to annoy the enemy in his rear, capture or destroy enemy warehouses with food and fodder, and beat small groups of the enemy.

Under the command of Davydov there were over one and a half hundred hussars and Cossacks. Already in September 1812, in the area of ​​the Smolensk village of Tsarevo-Zaymishche, they captured a French caravan of three dozen carts. Davydov’s cavalrymen killed more than 100 Frenchmen from the accompanying detachment, and captured another 100. This operation was followed by others, also successful.

Davydov and his team did not immediately find support from the local population: at first the peasants mistook them for the French. The commander of the flying detachment even had to put on a peasant caftan, hang an icon of St. Nicholas on his chest, grow a beard and switch to the language of the Russian common people - otherwise the peasants would not believe him.

Over time, Denis Davydov’s detachment increased to 300 people. The cavalrymen attacked French units, which sometimes had a fivefold numerical superiority, and defeated them, taking convoys and freeing prisoners, and sometimes even captured enemy artillery.

After leaving Moscow, on the orders of Kutuzov, flying partisan detachments were created everywhere. These were mainly Cossack formations, each numbering up to 500 sabers. At the end of September, Major General Ivan Dorokhov, who commanded such a formation, captured the town of Vereya near Moscow. United partisan groups could resist large military formations of Napoleon's army. Thus, at the end of October, during a battle in the area of ​​the Smolensk village of Lyakhovo, four partisan detachments completely defeated the more than one and a half thousand brigade of General Jean-Pierre Augereau, capturing him himself. For the French, this defeat turned out to be a terrible blow. This success, on the contrary, encouraged the Russian troops and set them up for further victories.

Peasant initiative

A significant contribution to the destruction and exhaustion of French units was made by peasants who self-organized into combat detachments. Their partisan units began to form even before Kutuzov’s instructions. While willingly helping flying detachments and units of the regular Russian army with food and fodder, the men at the same time harmed the French everywhere and in every possible way - they exterminated enemy foragers and marauders, and often, when the enemy approached, they themselves burned their houses and went into the forests. Fierce local resistance intensified as the demoralized French army increasingly turned into a crowd of robbers and marauders.

One of these detachments was assembled by dragoons Ermolai Chetvertakov. He taught the peasants how to use captured weapons, organized and successfully carried out many acts of sabotage against the French, capturing dozens of enemy convoys with food and livestock. At one time, Chetvertakov’s unit included up to 4 thousand people. And such cases when peasant partisans, led by career military men and noble landowners, successfully operated in the rear of Napoleonic troops were not isolated.

Chigvintseva S.V.

Introduction

In our time - a time of grandiose social transformations - the need for a deep understanding of the steep moments in the course of social development and the role of the masses in history is felt more acutely than ever. In this regard, it seems relevant to us today to address the topic of the partisan movement during the Patriotic War, the 200th anniversary of which our country celebrates this year.

The purpose of the work is to determine the role of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, using materials from history and literature in an integrated manner.

The objectives of the work are to consider the reasons for the emergence of a wide wave of the partisan movement and its significance in the military events of the autumn-winter of 1812.

The topic of the partisan movement of 1812 is represented by a fairly wide range of sources and studies in historical literature. The range of sources involved allowed us to divide them into two groups. The first includes legal and government documents. The second group of sources includes diaries of eyewitnesses to the events of the Patriotic War of 1812.

Research methods - analysis of sources, applied a problem-thematic approach to literature, which clearly showed the significance of the actions of partisans in alliance with the people's militia during the autumn-winter of 1812.

The novelty of the research lies in integrated approach using information from literary and historical sources when analyzing the events of the Patriotic War.

The chronological scope of the study covers the second half of 1812.

The structure of the work corresponds to the stated goal and objectives and consists of: introduction, two chapters with paragraphs, conclusion, list of sources and literature used.

ChapterI. Reasons for the development of the partisan movement

Napoleon did not prepare for any war as carefully as for the campaign against Russia. The plan for the upcoming campaign was developed in great detail, the theater of military operations was carefully studied, and huge warehouses of ammunition, uniforms and food were created. 1,200 thousand people were put under arms. As the great Russian writer L.N. Tolstoy rightly notes: “Half of the army was stationed within the vast empire of Napoleon in order to keep the conquered countries in obedience, in which a national liberation movement was rising against the Napoleonic yoke.”

Historian A.Z. Manfred focuses on the fact that Russia knew about Napoleon’s preparations for war. The Russian ambassador in Paris, Prince A.B. Kurakin, starting in 1810, provided the Russian War Ministry with accurate information about the number, armament and deployment of French troops. Valuable information was brought to him by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Napoleon's government, Ch. Talleyrand, as well as J. Fouche.

Since 1810, the rearmament of the Russian army and the strengthening of its western borders began. However, the archaic recruiting system did not allow preparing the necessary human reserves for the upcoming war. The Russian army numbered about 240 thousand people and was divided into three groups: the first army (M. B. Barclay de Tolly) covered the St. Petersburg direction, the second (P. I. Bagration) - Moscow, the third (A. P. Tormasov) - Kiev .

Napoleon's usual war tactics were to win 1-2 major battles and thus decide the outcome of the war. And this time Napoleon’s plan was to, using his numerical superiority in border battles, defeat the first and second armies one by one, and then capture Moscow and St. Petersburg. Napoleon's strategic plan was thwarted when, in June-August 1812, the Russian armies retreated and decided to unite in Vitebsk and then Smolensk. In the very first days, the partisan movement began (20 thousand peasants rose up). G.R. Derzhavin wrote about those days:

“In the fiery dawn of former battles:
Every village was seething
Crowds of bearded warriors...

And, cunning warrior,
He suddenly called his eagles
And struck Smolensk...

We were blocking here with ourselves
The threshold of Moscow is the door to Russia;
Here the Russians fought like animals,
Like angels! (between 1812-1825)

In August, the army and people demanded that M. I. Kutuzov be appointed commander-in-chief. The Battle of Borodino showed the courage of the Russian army, the French retreated to their original positions, but Moscow had to be surrendered to the French.

Leaving Moscow, Kutuzov made a remarkable maneuver: creating the appearance of retreat along the Ryazan road, he moved with the main forces to the Kaluga road, where he stopped in September 1812 near the village of Tarutino (80 km from Moscow). He wrote: “Always fearing that the enemy would take control of this road with his main forces, which would deprive the army of all its communications with the most grain-producing provinces, I found it necessary to detach the 6th Corps with the infantry general (infantry - author) Dokhturov: on Kaluga Borovskaya road to the side of the village of Folminskoye. Soon after this, the partisan Colonel Seslavin really opened the movement of Napoleon, striving with all his forces along this road to Borovsk.”

The War of 1812 appears in Tolstoy's depiction as a people's war. The author creates many images of men and soldiers, whose judgments together make up the people's perception of the world.

In the Tarutino camp the formation of a new Russian army, the troops were given rest, and partisan detachments tried to replenish their reserves and equipment. N.A. Durova wrote about those days like this: “In the evening, our regiment was ordered to be on horseback. ...Now we have become the rearguard and will cover the army’s retreat.”

Historian V.I. Babkin believes that “partisan detachments, militia units of the 1st district entered the most important element into the plan for the preparation and implementation of the victorious offensive of the Russian army." In our opinion, we can agree with the author on this, since in a report to Alexander I M.I. Kutuzov wrote: “During the retreat... I made it a rule... to wage an incessant small war, and for this I put ten partisans on that leg in order to be able to take away all the ways from the enemy, who thinks in Moscow to find all kinds of food in abundance. During the six-week rest of the Main Army at Tarutino, my partisans instilled fear and terror in the enemy, taking away all means of food.”

However, researcher Beskrovny L.G. does not agree with our opinion, who believes that the partisans mainly acted spontaneously, without coordinating “their actions with the forces of the high command.”

While the Russian army had the opportunity to be replenished with new fresh forces in a calm environment, the enemy, surrounded in Moscow, was forced to conduct continuous military operations against the partisans. Thanks, among other things, to the actions of the partisans, there was virtually no break in military operations against Napoleon during the Tarutino period. Having occupied Moscow, the enemy received neither respite nor peace. On the contrary, during his stay in Moscow he suffered significant damage from attacks by popular forces. To help the militia and partisans, M.I. Kutuzov allocated army flying detachments of regular cavalry to strengthen the blockade of Moscow and strike enemy communications. In our opinion, the clear interaction of the main elements of the “small war” - militias, partisans and army flying squads - made it possible for M. I. Kutuzov to create a solid basis for a victorious counter-offensive.

The campaign in Russia was not like those that Napoleon had to wage before. Armand de Caulaincourt, who was under Napoleon, wrote: “ Local residents it was not visible, we could not take prisoners, we did not come across any stragglers along the way, we had no spies... The remaining residents all armed themselves; couldn't find any Vehicle. Horses were tortured to travel for food...” This was the nature of the “small war”. An internal front formed around the main French forces in Moscow, consisting of militias, partisans and flying detachments.

Thus, the main reasons for the rise of a wide wave of the partisan movement were the application to the peasants of the French army’s demand for the delivery of food, uniforms, and fodder to them; the robbery of native villages by the soldiers of Napoleon Bonaparte; cruel methods of treatment of the population of our country; the spirit of freedom that reigned in the atmosphere of the “century of liberation” (19th century) in Russia.

ChapterII. The growing wave of the partisan movement in the autumn-winter of 1812

On October 10, 1812, finding himself isolated, fearing the outrage of his multinational, hungry army, Napoleon left Moscow. Moscow burned for 6 days, 2/3 of the houses were destroyed, peasants fled into the forests. A guerrilla war broke out. The partisan heroes whom L.N. remained in the memory of the Russian people. Tolstoy called “the club of the people’s war” - D. Davydov, I. S. Dorokhov, A. N. Seslavin, A. S. Figner, peasant Gerasim Kurin, elder Vasilisa Kozhina. The partisans destroyed about 30 thousand enemy soldiers during the war. He dedicated his poems to D. Davydov to G.R. Derzhavin, A.N. Seslavin - F.N. Glinka, the patriotism of the common people was sung by V.V. Kapnist.

Among historians there are different points of view on the role of partisans in the liberation struggle of 1812. Thus, if academician E.V. Tarle notes that G. Kurin’s detachment gave successful battles to regular enemy units, exterminated them in hundreds, captured enemy guns, controlled the region until there was neither occupation nor Russian state power (that is, he actually exercised management functions there), then historian A.S. Markin considers this opinion an exaggeration.

If we consider the issue of the emergence of the partisan movement, here we can see different opinions of historians. E.V. Tarle believes that it originated in Poresensky, Krasinsky and Smolensky counties in July 1812, since the population of these counties primarily suffered from the invaders. But as the enemy army advanced deeper into Russia, he notes, the entire population of the Smolensk province rose up to fight. The Sychevsky zemstvo police officer Boguslavsky, the leader of the Sychevsky nobility Nakhimov, Major Emelyanov, retired captain Timashev and others took part in its organization. Historian Troitsky N.A. states otherwise - it manifested itself later, in Smolensk in August 1812: “The partisans of the Smolensk province dealt a significant blow to the enemy, and also greatly helped the Russian army. In particular, the detachment of the merchant of the city of Porechye Nikita Minchenkov helped the army detachment to liquidate the French detachment under the command of General Pinault.”

An episode of the Patriotic War of 1812, associated with the activities of the peasant detachment of Gerasim Matveevich Kurin (1777-1850), has for many decades served as a textbook illustration of the thesis about peasant guerrilla warfare against the Napoleonic invaders.

On September 24, 1812, foragers from Ney’s French corps who arrived from Bogorodsk plundered and burned the Vokhon village of Stepurino. Kurin expected the enemy to appear, dividing his three thousand strong squad into three parts, which began to methodically beat the French. On the same day, in the evening, Ney’s corps, along with other corps stationed around Moscow, received an order to return to the capital. Upon receiving news of the occupation of Bogorodsk by the French, the Vokhon volost assembly, of course, with the approval of the local head Yegor Semyonovich Stulov, decided to form a squad for self-defense, while hiding women, old people, children and movable property in the forests. The gathering also entrusted the command of the squad to the local peasant Gerasim Kurin.

One of the large peasant partisan detachments of up to four thousand people was led in the region of Gzhatsk (Moscow region) by soldier Eremey Chetvertakov. In the Smolensk province in the Sychevsky district, a partisan detachment of four hundred people was led by a retired soldier S. Emelyanov. The detachment fought 15 battles, destroyed 572 enemy soldiers and captured 325 French.

However, it is necessary to note a feature noted by researcher V.I. Babkin - economic (state-owned) peasants (as opposed to landowners and monasteries) have always been an island of stability and were not prone to anarchy. For example, by 1812, the Vokhonsky volost consisted primarily of economic peasants, in comparison with their privately owned counterparts, who had long legally enjoyed greater personal freedom.

In our opinion, it is necessary to see the difference between peasant and army partisan detachments. If peasant detachments were organized by peasants G. Kurin, peasant Vasilisa Kozhina in the Smolensk province, and former ordinary soldier Eremey Chetvertakov, then the first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M.B. Barclay de Tolly. Its commander was General F.F. Wintsengerode, who led the united Kazan Dragoon (cavalry), Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the city of Dukhovshchiny.

Seslavin Alexander Nikitich (1780-1858) was a lieutenant general, in 1812 a colonel, commander of the Sumy Hussar Regiment, who, on behalf of M.I. Kutuzov, became the head of a partisan detachment and was tasked with destroying enemy divisions in small groups and coordinating their actions with units active Russian army.

The detachment of Denis Davydov was a real threat for the French. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment. Together with his hussars (lightly armed horsemen with a saber and carbine), he retreated as part of the army of P.I. Bagration to Borodin. A passionate desire to bring even greater benefit in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov to “ask for a separate detachment.” D. Davydov asked General P.I. Bagration to allow him to organize a partisan detachment to operate behind enemy lines. For the “test” M.I. Kutuzov allowed D. Davydov to take 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, D. Davydov began bold raids behind enemy lines. In the very first skirmishes near the villages of Tsarev Zaymishcha and Slavkoy, he achieved success: he defeated several French detachments and captured a convoy with ammunition.

An army partisan flying squad is a mobile unit deployed to various areas of military operations. For example, a detachment of General I. S. Dorokhov operated from Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk. Captain A.S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow. In the area of ​​Mozhaisk and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I.M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks.

Acting, according to the orders of the commander-in-chief, between Mozhaisk and Moscow, a detachment of retired soldiers and Colonel A.S. Fignera, together with other partisans, helped armed peasants near Moscow in exterminating small detachments of marauders and intercepting French couriers and convoys.

At the beginning of October 1812, Napoleon, leaving Moscow, moved to Kaluga, where the food warehouses of the Russian army were located, hoping to spend the winter there. Russian troops pursued the enemy, inflicting sensitive blows on him. In those years, M.I. Kutuzov addressed the army with the following words: “...Napoleon, not seeing anything else ahead as a continuation of a terrible people’s war, capable of short time destroy his entire army, seeing in every inhabitant a warrior, a common one...undertook a hasty retreat.”

Thus, the general offensive of the Russian army was successfully combined with a “small war”. Tens of thousands of militia warriors and popular partisan detachments successfully fought the enemy together with the army. On December 25, 1812, Alexander I published a special Manifesto on the expulsion of the enemy from Russia and the end of the Patriotic War. On this occasion, N.A. Durova noted in her notes: “The French fought with frenzy. Ah, the man is terrible in his frenzy! All properties wild beast then they unite in it. No! This is not bravery. I don’t know what to call this wild, brutal courage, but it is not worthy of being called fearlessness.”

The Patriotic War of 1812 ended with the victory of the Russian people, who waged a just, liberation struggle. The reason for the rise of the partisan movement in the autumn-winter of 1812 was the following: The Napoleonic invasion caused enormous damage to the country's economy and brought untold misfortune and suffering to the people. Hundreds of thousands of people died, no less became crippled; many cities and villages were destroyed, many cultural monuments were looted and destroyed.

The significance of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War was manifested in the following: the actions of the partisans raised the spirit of patriotism in battles with the enemy, the national self-awareness of the Russian people grew; By helping the regular army, the partisans made it clear to Napoleon that he would not win the war with lightning speed, and his plans for world domination were destroyed.

Conclusion

The historical past of the people, historical memory, a system of generally valid patterns of behavior at such critical moments in history as the Patriotic War - this is not a complete list of those facts that influence the formation of the personality of the 21st century. Hence the relevance of our appeal to the topic of the role of the masses and the organization of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812.

The Patriotic War of 1812 ended in victory for the Russian people.

In the course of our work, we came to the following conclusions:

If we consider the issue of the emergence of the partisan movement, E.V. Tarle believes that it originated in the Smolensk province; Troitsky N.A. - it manifested itself later, in Smolensk; Manfred A.Z. - during the capture of Mogilev and Pskov.

Among the reasons for the emergence of the peasant and army partisan movement, historians highlight the following: the application of the French army’s demand to the peasants to hand over food, uniforms, and fodder to them; plunder of villages by Napoleon Bonaparte's soldiers; cruel methods of treatment of the population of our country; the spirit of freedom that reigned in the atmosphere of the “century of liberation” (19th century) in Russia.

The role of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War was as follows:

  1. replenish the reserves of the Russian army with people and equipment,
  2. in small detachments they destroyed the forces of the French army, transmitted information about the French to the Russian army,
  3. they destroyed convoys with food and ammunition that were going to the French in Moscow.
  4. Napoleon's plans for a lightning war against Russia failed.

The importance of the partisan movement was manifested in the growth of national self-awareness of the peasantry and all layers Russian society, a growing sense of patriotism and responsibility for preserving their history and culture. The close interaction of the three forces (militia, peasant partisans and army flying detachments) ensured enormous success in the “small war”. The great Russian writer L.N. Tolstoy, conveying the spirit of that time, noted: “... the club of the people’s war rose with all its formidable and majestic strength and, without asking anyone’s tastes and rules, rose, fell and nailed the French until the entire invasion was destroyed.”

Notes

From the report of M.I. Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle of Maloyaroslavets // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S. Orlov, V.A. Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva and others - M.: PBOYUL, 2000, From the report of M.I. Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle of Borodino // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to this day // Tamzhe et al.

Zhilin P. A. The death of Napoleonic army in Russia. Ed. 2nd. - M., 1974. - P. 93.

From M.I. Kutuzov’s appeal to the army about the beginning of Napoleon’s expulsion from Russia // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day. - M., 2000. - P. 271.

Durova N.A. Notes from a cavalry maiden. - Kazan, 1979. - P. 45.

Tolstoy L.N. War and Peace: in 4 volumes - M., 1987. - T.3. - P. 212.

List of sources and literature used

1. Sources

1.1 Borodino. Documents, letters, memories. - M.: Soviet Russia, 1962. – 302 p.

1.2. From the report of M.I. Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle of Borodino // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S.Orlov, V.A.Georgiev, N.G.Georgieva and others - M.: PBOYuL, 2000. - P. 268-269.

1.3. From the report of M.I. Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle of Maloyaroslavets // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S.Orlov, V.A.Georgiev, N.G.Georgieva and others - M.: PBOYuL, 2000. - P. 270-271.

1.4. From M.I. Kutuzov’s appeal to the army about the beginning of Napoleon’s expulsion from Russia // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S.Orlov, V.A.Georgiev, N.G.Georgieva and others - M.: PBOYuL, 2000. - P. 271.

1.5. Davydov D.V. Diary of partisan actions // http://www.museum.ru/1812/Library/Davidov1/index.html.

2. Literature

2.1. Babkin V.I. People's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812 - M.: Sotsekgiz, 1962. - 212 p.

2.2. Beskrovny L.G. Partisans in the Patriotic War of 1812 // Questions of history. – 1972. - No. 1. – P. 13-17.

2.3. Bogdanov L.P. Russian army in 1812. Organization, management, weapons. - M.: Voenizdat, 1979. – 275 p.

2.4. Glinka F.N. Partisan Seslavin //lib.rtg.su/history/284/17.html

2.5. Derzhavin G.R. 1812 //lib.rtg.su/history/284/17.html

2.6. Durova N.A. Notes from a cavalry maiden. Reissue. – Kazan, 1979. – 200 p.

2.7. Zhilin P. A. The death of Napoleonic army in Russia. Ed. 2nd. - M., 1974. - 184 p.

2.8. Kapnist V.V. Vision of a Russian crying over Moscow in 1812...//lib.rtg.su/history/284/17.html