Fighting on Lake Khasan (1938). Fighting near Lake Khasan

To attack the USSR, the aggressors chose the Posyetsky district in the Primorsky Territory, at the junction of the borders of the USSR, Manchukuo and Korea. The border area of ​​the Posyetsky district is replete with lowlands and lakes, one of the lakes is Khasan, with the adjacent Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya heights.

52. The crew of a mounted Japanese machine gun Type 92 (7.7 mm copy of the French Hotchkiss machine gun) fires at the positions of Soviet border guards. Soviet-Manchurian border, summer 1938 (RGAKFD).

Lake Khasan and its surrounding heights are located only 10 km from the shores of the Pacific Ocean and 130 km in a straight line from Vladivostok. This is the southernmost part of Primorye. The heights offer a magnificent view of the Posyet Bay and Tikhaya Bay. In clear weather, you can see the entire Soviet coastline from them. If the Japanese raiders had managed to retain these heights, they would have been able to hold a section of Soviet territory south and west of Posiet Bay under fire.

Here the area is a narrow coastal strip, then entirely swampy and low-lying. Driving along it is possible only along a few country roads and trails. A few hills rose above this swampy plain, dominating the area and providing a good overview. The state border line ran along the tops of two of them – Zaozernaya and neighboring Bezymyannaya. The hills offered a view of the Posyet Bay, and their slopes descended to Lake Khasan. The Soviet-Korean border, which ran along the Tumangan River, began very close by.

The Zaozernaya hill looked especially attractive from a military point of view in the Khasan area. Its top was an almost regular truncated cone up to 200 meters wide at the base. The steepness of the slopes on the eastern, Soviet side reached 10-15 degrees, and at the top - 45 degrees. The height of the hill reached 150 meters. The opposite, Japanese, slope reached a steepness of up to 85 degrees in places. The height dominated the area around Lake Khasan.

On the ground, Zaozernaya looked like an ideal observation point with excellent visibility on all four sides. In the event of a military clash, it could also become a good position for conducting a defensive battle. During the war, Sopka did not require any significant fortification work, since it was strongly strengthened by nature itself.

The nature of the terrain in the area of ​​Lake Khasan significantly hampered the maneuverability of units of the Red Banner Far Eastern Front. Immediately behind Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya there is the lake itself, stretching 4.5 km from north to south, along the border. Thus, both hills are separated from the rest of Soviet territory by a relatively wide water barrier, which can only be bypassed on the way to the hills in the immediate vicinity of the border along two very narrow corridors. This gave the Japanese great advantages. The Japanese also counted on the fact that the swampy terrain and limited number of roads would not allow the Soviet command to widely use tanks and artillery.

53, 54. Infantrymen of the 120th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division practice combat coordination while being in the reserve of the advancing group. Zaozernaya height area, August 1938 (RGAKFD).

On July 3, about a company of Japanese infantrymen advanced to the height of Zaozernaya, where a border detachment of two Red Army soldiers was located. Following an alarm signal, a group of border guards arrived from the outpost led by Lieutenant Pyotr Tereshkin (who was later awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the battles on Lake Khasan). The Japanese turned into a chain and, with rifles at the ready, as if in an attack, moved towards the height. Not reaching the top of Zaozernaya, where the border line ran, about fifty meters, the Japanese chain, on the orders of the officers who walked with naked sabers in their hands, stopped and lay down.

A Japanese infantry detachment remained at Zaozernaya for a whole day, unsuccessfully trying to cause a border incident. After this, the Japanese retreated to the Korean village of Homoku (in the territory of Manchukuo), which was located only 500 meters from the hill, and also began the construction of various service buildings near the height, and established an air communication line.

The order (permission) to occupy Zaozernaya came to the Posyet border detachment on July 8. The Japanese learned that the Soviet side had decided to occupy the heights from a radio interception of an order from Khabarovsk. The next day, the Soviet reserve border outpost, not numerous in its composition, secretly moved up to the heights and on its top began the construction of trenches and barbed wire barriers.

Two days later, on the 11th, she received reinforcement. OKDVA Commander Marshal V.K. Blucher ordered one company of the 119th Infantry Regiment to be moved to the area of ​​Lake Khasan. In case of alarm and serious violation of the state border near Zaozernaya, the army could quickly come to the aid of the border guards. Such serious measure was by no means premature.

Blucher knew, among other things, that the southern section of the state border 2 months earlier had been inspected from that side by the commander of the Kwantung Army, General Ueda, and the Minister of War of the State of Manchukuo, Yu Zhishan. The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army reported the results of the inspection trip to Deputy War Minister Tojo in Tokyo. The report spoke about the readiness of Japanese troops for a military clash on the border with Soviet Primorye.

55, 58. Cavalry platoon of the 120th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division named after Sergo Ordzhonikidze, in ambush. Zaozernaya height area, August 1938 (AVL).

55, 57. Deputy commander of the Far Eastern Front for aviation, brigade commander P.V. Leverages (pictured on the right). Pictures of the late 30s (AVL).

On July 15, the first shot was fired on the Zaozernaya hill. That evening, Japanese gendarme Shakuni Matsushima was killed on the crest of a hill by a rifle shot. The head of the engineering service of the Posyet border detachment, Lieutenant V.M., shot at him. Vinevitin, who was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (during the battles, the Japanese suffered considerable losses from the landmines he planted). An investigation into the tragic incident was immediately carried out by both parties. As the Soviet investigation determined, the corpse of the Japanese gendarme-violator lay on the territory of the Soviet Union, three meters from the state border line. The Japanese commission argued exactly the opposite: the murder took place on the territory of Manchukuo and, therefore, was an armed provocation of the Russian military.

This was the essence of the Hassan conflict, which was followed by the bloody Hassan battles. Vinevitin’s rifle shot detonated the passions of the Japanese side, which were ready to explode, which believed that the sapper fortifications (trench and wire fence) of the Soviet border guards on the top of Zaozernaya had crossed the state border. In response, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Stomonyakov officially stated that not a single Soviet border guard had set foot on the neighboring land.

On July 18, a massive violation of the border section of the Posyet border detachment began. The violators were unarmed “Japanese postmen”, each of whom had a letter to the Soviet authorities demanding to “cleanse” the Manchurian territory. According to the memoirs of the commander of the border detachment K.E. Grebennik, the author of the book of memoirs "The Khasan Diary", Japanese "postmen" literally "flooded" his headquarters. In just one day, July 18, twenty-three similar violators with letters to the Soviet side were detained at the Quarantine outpost site.

The “postmen” were delayed and after a short time were escorted out of Soviet territory in the opposite direction. But this was done according to international rules. This transfer of several “columns” of border violators, “postmen,” to the Japanese side officially took place on July 26. They did not even receive a verbal response to their letters of protest.

On July 19 at 11.10 a conversation took place via direct wire between the deputy chief of the Posyet border detachment and a representative of the Military Council of the OKDVA: “Due to the fact that the Japanese command of Hunchun openly declares its intention to take the height of Zaozernaya by battle, I ask from the support company located in Pakshekori one send the platoon to reinforce the garrison at Zaozernaya Heights. I'm waiting for an answer at the wire. The deputy head of the detachment is Major Alekseev."

At 19.00 the answer came (conversation over a direct wire from the operational duty officers of the OKDVA headquarters and the Posyet border detachment. - Author's note):“The commander gave permission to take a support company platoon, bring it in secretly, and not succumb to provocations.”

The next day, the headquarters of the Posyetsky border detachment received a message from the department of the commander of the border and internal troops of the Far Eastern District about the cancellation of the previous decision of the army commander: “The platoon is removed by order of the commander. He believes that the border guards should fight first, who, if necessary, will be provided with help and support by the army ..."

On July 20, 1938, the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow Mamoru Shigemitsu at a reception with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov, on behalf of his government, in the form of an ultimatum, presented territorial claims to the USSR in the area of ​​Lake Khasan and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Zaozernaya hill. Mamora Shigemitsu stated that “Japan has rights and obligations to Manchukuo under which it can resort to force and force Soviet troops to evacuate the territory of Manchukuo they illegally occupied.”

At the end of the conversation with Litvinov, Shigemitsu stated that if the Zaozernaya hill was not voluntarily transferred to Manchukuo, then the Japanese imperial army would use force. These words of the envoy from Tokyo sounded like a direct, undisguised threat from one state to another, its neighbor.

“If Mr. Shigemitsu,” said the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry M.M. Litvinov, “considers intimidation from a position of force, before which individual states really give in, to be a compelling argument, then I must remind you that it will not find successful application in Moscow.”

On July 22, the Soviet government sent a note to the Japanese government, which directly and decisively rejected the unfounded demands for the withdrawal of troops from the Zaozernaya heights. And on the same day, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Japanese Empire approved a plan to eliminate the border incident at Lake Khasan using the imperial army. That is, Japan decided to test the strength of the Soviet Far Eastern border in the south of Primorye and the combat capabilities of the Red Army troops. Or, to use military terminology, Tokyo decided to conduct reconnaissance in force against the USSR.

Marshal V.K. Blucher had reliable information about the concentration of large Japanese army forces in the Posyetsky border detachment area. This was evidenced even by the simple observation of border guards on the adjacent side. On July 24, the Military Council of the Red Banner Far Eastern Front (KDF) gave the 1st Primorsky Army a directive to immediately concentrate reinforced battalions of the 118th and 119th rifle regiments of the 40th rifle division (commander - Colonel V.K. Bazarov) and squadron 121- th cavalry regiment in the area of ​​​​the settlement of Zarechye and bring all army troops (primarily the 39th Rifle Corps) to full combat readiness. The directive ordered the return of people from all economic and engineering work to their units.

By the same directive of the Military Council of the Far Eastern Front, the entire air defense system in Primorye was put on alert. These measures also affected the Pacific Fleet. The border guards were instructed by their command to maintain calm and restraint, not to succumb to provocations from the neighboring side, and to use weapons only in the event of a direct violation of the state border.

59. Chief of Staff of the Red Banner Far Eastern Front (formed on the basis of OKVDA on July 1, 1938) Corps Commander G.M. Stern. A snapshot of the second half of the 30s (AVL).

60. Commander of the 2nd OKDVA (with headquarters in Khabarovsk) corps commander I.S. Konev. During the period July-October 1938, this army was part of the troops of the Far Eastern Front. Photo from the late 30s (AVL).

On the same day, the 24th, Marshal V.K. Blucher sent an “illegal” commission to the heights of Zaozernaya to clarify on the spot the circumstances of the border incident that “puffed up” the war. The commission found that part Soviet trenches and wire fences on the hill - on its ridge is on the adjacent side. Blucher reported this to Moscow, proposing to “exhaust” the border conflict by recognizing the mistake of the Soviet border guards who dug a trench, and by simple sapper work. Commander of the Far Eastern Front, Marshal V.K. Blucher, for his part, made, it seems, an attempt to “sit down” the conflicting parties at the rank of high-ranking diplomats at the negotiating table in order to resolve an ordinary border incident. However, neither Moscow nor Tokyo wanted to hear about this anymore.

Moreover, sending an “illegal” commission soon cost its initiator dearly. Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher will be arrested and repressed. A secret order from the People's Commissar of Defense, also a marshal from their first five, K.E., sheds light on his fate. Voroshilov No. 0040 dated September 4, 1938. This document said: “... He (Marshal Blucher) quite unexpectedly on July 24 questioned the legality of the actions of our border guards at Lake Khasan. Secretly from the member of the military council, Comrade Mazepov, his chief of staff, Comrade Stern, deputy people's commissar of defense, Comrade Mehlis and Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Frinovsky, who were at that time in Khabarovsk, Comrade Blucher sent a commission to the Zaozernaya height and, without the participation of the head of the border section, carried out an investigation into the actions of our border guards. The commission created in such a suspicious manner discovered a “violation" of the Manchurian border by our border guards on 3 meters and, therefore, "established" our "guilt" in the outbreak of the military conflict on Lake Khasan. In view of this, Comrade Blucher sends a telegram to the People's Commissar of Defense about this alleged violation of the Manchurian border by us and demands the immediate arrest of the head of the border section and other "culprits in provoking the conflict" with the Japanese. This telegram was sent by Comrade Blucher also secretly from the comrades listed above..."‹8›

Blucher did not calm down in his desire to “get to the bottom” of the truth of the brewing military conflict on the state border. On July 27, by order of the marshal, a new commission went to the Zaozernaya area to investigate the fact of border violation by the Soviet side. But halfway there the commission was returned back to the city of Voroshilov (now Ussuriysk).

The day before, on July 26 at 23.30, the head of the Posyet border detachment, Colonel Grebennik, reported via direct wire to his superiors: “... The detachment is not able to ensure the constant defense of all the heights with its own forces, especially since the border runs along ridges everywhere. Transition to the defense of the heights the outpost forces will violate border security and will not provide a complete guarantee against breaking through the border..."

The next day, the deputy chief of troops of the Far Eastern Border District, A. Fedotov, arrived in the village of Posiet to investigate the facts of violation of the state border and the murder of a Japanese gendarme on the Zaozernaya hill. However, nothing could stop the outbreak of hostilities at Lake Khasan.

By the evening of July 28, 1938, units and units of the 75th Infantry Regiment from the first echelon of the 19th Japanese Infantry Division took up battle formation in the area of ​​Lake Khasan.

61. Infantrymen of the 32nd Saratov Rifle Division are preparing to attack Japanese positions. Lake Khasan area, August 1938 (AVL).

The Soviet command took measures to protect the outposts from a surprise attack by the Japanese: permanent observation posts were installed on Zaozernaya and Bezymyannya, a reserve outpost of S. Ya. Nameless.

62. Infantry and cavalry platoon of the 40th Infantry Division named after Sergo Ordzhonikidze practice offensive combat techniques before launching an attack on Japanese positions. Lake Khasan area, August 1938 (AVL).

63. Commander of the tank company of the 2nd mechanized brigade, Lieutenant K.H. Egorov. The Order of the (Combat) Red Banner is visible on the tunic. Lake Khasan area, August 1938 (RGAKFD).

By the evening of July 28, 1938, units of the 59th Posyetsky Red Banner Border Detachment had the following forces: on Zaozernaya there was a reserve outpost, a platoon of a maneuver group, a platoon of heavy machine guns and a group of sappers - a total of 80 people.

They were commanded by Senior Lieutenant E.S. Sidorenko, the commissar was Lieutenant I.I. Funny. A border patrol of 11 people under the command of Lieutenant A.M. constantly served on Bezymyannaya. Makhalina, his assistant was junior commander T.M. Shlyakhov, who voluntarily joined the army.

At an altitude of 68.8, a heavy machine gun was installed to support the border guards on Bezymyannaya with fire; at an altitude of 304.0, a reinforced squad (squad) occupied the defense. The total number of border posts "Pakshekori" and "Podgornaya", located in close proximity to Lake Khasan, was 50 people. In addition, in the area of ​​the Pakshekori outpost, the 7th support company of the 119th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division with a platoon of tanks under the command of Lieutenant D.T. Levchenko.

Two reinforced support battalions of the same division were stationed in the Zarechye area. Thus, in the area of ​​Lake Khasan on July 28, 1938, up to three rifle battalions of border guards and Red Army soldiers confronted 12-13 enemy battalions.

64. Artillery platoon commanders of the 39th Corps Artillery Regiment clarify the firing sectors. In the background is a 76.2 mm gun of the 1902/1930 model. Lake Khasan area, August 1938 (AVL).

65. Lieutenant M.T. Lebedev, awarded the Order of the Red Star for the battles at Lake Khasan, tells his new crew how he crushed the Japanese invaders with his BT-7 tank. Tsalny Vostok, 2nd mechanized brigade (later - 42nd tank brigade), October 1938 (RGAKFD).

66. Commanders and soldiers of one of the battalions of the 78th Kazan Red Banner Rifle Regiment of the 26th Zlatoust Red Banner Rifle Division under the command of Captain M.L. Svirina in the operational reserve near the village of Kraskino. Far Eastern Front, August 9, 1938 (RGAKFD).

The border posts of the Posyetsky border detachment intensively monitored the adjacent strip, alarm was transmitted to everyone - it was clear that on the other side of the border they were preparing for something. On the Zaozernaya hill there were up to a company of border guards in the trenches. At the neighboring height of Bezymyannaya there are 11 border guards, led by the assistant chief of the Podgornaya outpost, Lieutenant Alexei Makhalin, who has not left the hill for several days. All the weapons of the border post on Bezymyannaya consisted of ten rifles, a light machine gun and grenades.

At 15.00 on July 29, through the dissipating fog, the border guards saw 2 Japanese detachments of up to an infantry company moving straight towards the Bezymyannaya hill. Lieutenant Makhalin, using a field telephone, reported the developing situation to the outpost and to the neighboring Zaozernaya height.

By order of the Japanese officer commanding the detachment, a heavy machine gun hit the top of Bezymyannaya. The border guards responded with rifle salvos only when the attacking chain of Japanese infantry, shouting “Banzai,” crossed the state border line and found itself on Soviet territory. Having made sure of this, the senior border post, Lieutenant Makhalin, gave the command: “Fire at the raiders!”

Eleven border guard heroes bravely met the enemy. Alexander Savinykh killed 5 Japanese with five shots. Roman Lisnyak, wounded in the right hand, hastily bandaged the wound and fired at the enemy. But the forces of the border guards were dwindling. Ivan Shmelev and Vasily Pozdeev died. Bleeding, the border guards fought back with bayonets, rifle butts, and grenades. The wounded Lieutenant Makhalin never stopped leading the battle for a minute. He managed to tell senior lieutenant P.F. by phone. Tereshkin, who was at the detachment’s field headquarters on Zaozernaya: “A large detachment of Japanese crossed the state border... We will fight to the death. Avenge us!”

Head of the Podgornaya border outpost of the Posyet detachment P.F. Tereshkin suggested supporting Makhalin’s group with heavy machine gun fire. But the head of the political department of the border district, divisional commissar Bogdanov, and the head of the Posyet border detachment, Colonel K.E. Grebennik, who were present at the NP (Zaozernaya), refused him this, citing possible retaliatory actions of the Japanese in the area of ​​​​the Zaozernaya height, and then left for Posiet.

2 squads were sent to help Lieutenant Makhalin under the command of Chernopyatko and Batarshin (I.V. Ratnikov’s group). Apparently, a little later, border guards under the command of G. Bykhovtsev, a support company of the 119th joint venture with a platoon of T-26 tanks under the command of Lieutenant D.T. set out from the Pakshekori outpost. Levchenko. However, it was already too late.

The Japanese were squeezing the ring ever closer... The only way out was to break through the enemy chains in hand-to-hand combat. During the breakthrough, Alexander Makhalin, Alexander Savinykh and David Yemtsov were killed. Subsequently, under fire, taking their wounded and dead, the attackers retreated to their territory. They were not pursued.

On the same day, July 29 at 19.20, the following report was sent from the headquarters of the border and internal troops of the Far Eastern District via direct wire: “Colonel Fedotov, located at the Zaozernaya height, reported at 18.20 that the Nameless height was occupied by us. Lieutenant Makhalin was found killed at the height and 4 wounded Red Army soldiers were found. 7 people have not yet been found at all. The Japanese retreated in the fog and positioned themselves approximately 3,400 meters from the border line..." The fact of an armed breakthrough of the state border - the Japanese attack on the Bezymyannaya heights - was immediately reported to the headquarters of the Red Banner Far Eastern Front. Marshal V.K. Blucher gave an order that said: “The Japanese advancing on our territory in the area north of the Zaozernaya heights are to be immediately destroyed on our territory without crossing the border... Pay attention to the strong hold of this mountain in our hands and immediately take measures to set up artillery for firing positions with the task of blocking the enemy from any advance into our territory.‹9›

67. Participant in the battles near Lake Khasan, captain of the sapper units of the 39th Rifle Corps N.V. Sherstnev.

By the evening of July 30, in accordance with the order of the representative of the KDF command, Colonel Fedotov, the defense area of ​​the Khasan sector by border guards and units of the Red Army was built as follows: the northern slope of Zaozernaya (the right flank of the defense) was occupied by the Podgornaya border outpost, reinforced by a half-platoon and an anti-tank battery of 118 joint ventures (commander - head of the border post P.F. Tereshkin); in the center and on the southern slope of Zaozernaya (left flank) there was a reserve outpost S.Ya. Hristolyubov and a maneuver group, reinforced by a platoon of heavy machine guns led by S.E. Sidorenko, to the north of the left flank of the defense there was a reinforced squad led by junior commander G.A. Batarshin, which covered the rear of our defense. At an unnamed height, a rifle company with a platoon of T-26 tanks under the command of D.T. dug in. Levchenko and a group of border guards G. Bykhovtsev. At a height of 62.1, the defense company of the 119th rifle regiment, reinforced by an anti-tank artillery battery and a platoon of tanks, and a unit of border guards of Lieutenant Kurdyukov occupied the defense.

Each of the heights was an independent stronghold. Between the heights of Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya, the main forces of the 118th rifle regiment occupied the defense, with a combat guard in front of them consisting of rifle and machine-gun platoons and a squad of border guards I.V. Ratnikova. At an altitude of 68.8, the 118th rifle support platoon and a machine gun platoon concentrated, and in the Novoselki-Pakshekori area, the 119th rifle battalion of the 40th rifle division took up positions.

68. Border guards from the reserve outpost S.Ya. Hristolyubov train in throwing grenades. Lake Khasan area, July 1938 (AVL).

69. The first marshals of the Soviet Union. Sitting (from left to right): M.N. Tukhachevsky, K.E. Voroshilov, A.I. Egorov. Standing: S.M. Budyonny and V.K. Blucher. 1935 (AVL).

On the evening of July 30, Japanese artillery fired at the tops of the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills, trying to destroy the border guards' trenches and wire fences. At the beginning of the next day - around 2.00, under the cover of the darkness of the night, Japanese infantry in large forces (up to two infantry regiments), chain by chain, began an attack on these border heights.

The battle for Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya was characterized by heavy losses among the defenders and attackers. The attackers were supported by their fire from several artillery batteries. Soviet border guards and Red Army soldiers more than once rose from the trenches into bayonet counterattacks, throwing enemy infantrymen who burst onto their tops onto the slopes of the hills. The defense was directly led by the commander of the Posyet border detachment K.E. Comb.

However, the forces of the parties were clearly not equal. The defenders suffered losses from enemy shells. By the end of the day, the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills were in the hands of the Japanese, who immediately began to strengthen their positions.

Within three days, the heights were covered with a web of deep trenches, in front of which wire barriers in 3-4 rows were installed. Machine gun platforms, dugouts, trenches, artillery firing positions, anti-tank ditches were hastily equipped, and the approaches to the hills were mined. At the heights, armored caps for machine gun and artillery nests, mortars, and observation posts were installed. There were especially many machine gun nests at a height to the left of Zaozernaya, so it was later called Machine Gun Hill (Gorka). Japanese snipers were hiding behind the stones. Heavy artillery was stationed on the sandy river islands and beyond the Tumen-Ula River. The enemy kept all approaches to the heights under fire.

The remaining defenders of the heights retreated to the opposite shore of Lake Khasan. There they began to establish themselves in field positions. The Japanese did not pursue them and did not develop their tactical success. The plans of their command, apparently, did not include advancing further.

The enemy lost 257 soldiers and officers in the Zaozernaya Heights area alone. Of the 94 border guards who defended the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills, 13 people were killed and 70 were wounded. Most of those soldiers who received combat wounds remained in service after bandaging. In addition to genuine military valor and readiness to fight to the end, this first battle for the border heights also demonstrated an example of a different kind.

The company of the 118th Infantry Regiment, sent to help the fighting border guards, was not only late in time, but arrived at the scene with blank cartridges and wooden grenades. Its commanders mistook the combat alert for a regular training exercise and with such “weapons” entered into a real battle. The border guards shared rifle cartridges with the army men, although they themselves were already running low on ammunition.

70. T-26 from the tank battalion of the 32nd Rifle Division of the Red Army. The tanks are camouflaged with engineering means. Lake Khasan area, August 1938 (RGAKFD).

71. Commander of the BT-7 tank platoon, Lieutenant M.T. Lebedev, awarded the Order of the Red Star for distinction in battles on Lake Khasan. 2nd mechanized brigade, August 1938 (AVL).

72. T-26 tanks of the tank battalion of the 40th Rifle Division of the Red Army, camouflaged with tufts of grass in a field. Lake Khasan area, August 1938 (AVL).

August 1, 1938 I.V. Stalin and K.E. Voroshilov gave the order to V.K. via direct wire. Blucher in short term destroy the Japanese and their material. In accordance with this, V.K. Blucher ordered commander G.M. Stern to attack the enemy on August 1, without waiting for all the troops to arrive, with the forces of the 40th Infantry Division. However, the division's units, which made a difficult march, only occupied their starting position for the offensive by the evening of August 1. As a result, the attack did not take place. Arriving at the command post of the 40th Infantry Division G.M. Stern ordered the offensive to be postponed to 2 August. The division command was given only one night to prepare the attack on Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya.

The Japanese conducted the first battles with the forces of their 19th Infantry Division of the Korean Army, while at the same time bringing up the 15th and 20th Infantry Divisions, a mechanized brigade, a cavalry regiment, artillery - up to 38 thousand people in total - to the site of the Posyet border detachment. In addition, for possible fire support for Japanese ground forces (if the fighting moves south, to sea ​​coast) a detachment of Japanese ships consisting of one cruiser, 14 destroyers and 15 military boats approached the mouth of the border river Tumangan.

The 40th Infantry Division's attack on Japanese positions on Soviet territory began at dawn on August 2. The main attack was delivered from the north by the 119th and 120th Infantry Regiments. The second auxiliary strike was delivered from the south by the 118th Infantry Regiment, which supported the tank battalion. The main target of the attack was the Bezymyannaya height.

The rifle battalions had to conduct an offensive along a narrow swampy strip between Lake Khasan and the state border. This created great difficulties and entailed unnecessary, unjustified losses in people. But the order for battle strictly demanded that commanders and fighters not violate the state border of Manchukuo under any circumstances.

The attack on Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya was hastily prepared and was carried out without artillery support for fear that shells might fall on the other side of the state border. By the end of the day on August 2, the 119th Infantry Regiment, having forded and swam Lake Khasan, reached the northeastern slopes of the Zaozernaya hill under heavy Japanese fire. Tired and wet Red Army soldiers under heavy fire from the Japanese (their artillery fired) were forced to lie down and dig in. The regiment's attack failed.

The attack of the 120th Infantry Regiment, which captured the eastern slopes of the Bezymyannaya hill, turned out to be just as unsuccessful. The 119th Infantry Regiment also failed to complete the assigned combat mission. The attackers suffered heavy losses in people. A participant in the Khasan battles, the commander of the rifle battalion, Captain Stezhenko, recalled the attack on August 2: “Our battalion advanced on the Japanese through the southern ledge, with the task of occupying Zaozernaya. In front of us lay a space of 150 meters, completely braided with wire and under crossfire. In the same position there were our units advancing through the northern ledge towards Bezymyannaya... We could have dealt with the presumptuous enemy much faster if we had violated the border and captured the trenches, bypassing them through Manchurian territory. But our units accurately followed the command’s order and acted within our territory."

A "travel" diary of a Japanese non-commissioned officer of "Sato's unit, Kamura's unit" was found on the battlefield. This is how he described the battles on Lake Khasan:

Heavy enemy shells are constantly exploding at our positions. At 14.00 enemy planes appeared above us and dropped bombs. Heavy bombers flew in and dropped huge bombs.

Being at the height of Chashkufu (Zaozernaya), they dug trenches all night from August 1 to August 2. Enemy tanks began attacking at the height. Something terrible happened that day. Bombs and shells exploded continuously. We ran around every now and then; we couldn’t even think about food. From midday on August 1st, we didn’t eat anything for a day and a half. The fight continued. I managed to eat only cucumbers and drink dirty water. Today is a sunny day, but in the middle of the day the sun was not visible. Depressed mood. I feel disgusting. It is unbearable to fight like this.

They dug trenches. While recording, a shell exploded. Very tired. Headache. I slept little. Enemy artillery fired heavily. Huge shells are exploding at our positions...” (At this point the diary entry ends.)

The haste of the offensive of the 40th Infantry Division, which had not yet managed to fully reach the state border, was dictated, first of all, by frequent orders from above. They did not know the situation on the battlefield and were in a hurry to report to Moscow, to the Kremlin, to Comrade Stalin about the victory at Lake Khasan. Here is how the events of August 2 are assessed in the “brief description of the Khasan operation” compiled by the headquarters of the Far Eastern Military District: “... the 40th Infantry Division completed its concentration by the morning of August 2 and on August 2 received the task of striking the enemy and capturing the area Bezymyannaya height - height Zaozernaya. Here, undoubtedly, haste was shown. The current situation did not require such rapid action, moreover, a significant part of the command staff of both divisions (artillery) and tank battalions was deprived of the opportunity to carry out pre-dark reconnaissance on August 1 and organize interaction on the ground. As a result of this haste, by 7 o'clock on August 2 (at the hour of the start of the offensive), part of the artillery that arrived at night was not ready, the position of the enemy, especially his front edge, had not been studied; communications did not have time to fully deploy, the left flank of the battle formation could not begin the offensive at the hour appointed by order..."‹10›

The next day, August 3, the 40th Infantry Division, having failed to achieve success, began to withdraw from the battle. Its retreat to its original positions took place under heavy fire from the Japanese. Only by 15 o'clock in the afternoon did the division's battalions reach their assigned concentration areas.

At the location of the rifle division that had moved away from the heights, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, also the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, L. Mehlis, was already "acting" with might and main. The sovereign Stalinist emissary interfered with the orders of the commander of the Far Eastern Front, giving his own orders. And most importantly, Mehlis carried out the trial and execution in a hurry.

The same Mehlis reported to Moscow on June 31: “... in the battle area we need a real dictator to whom everything would be subordinated.” The “lit up” Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher was no longer suitable for this purpose: the fate of the famous Red commander of the Civil War was sealed.

Evidence of this is the same order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov No. 0040 dated September 4, 1938: “Even after receiving instructions from the Government to stop fussing with all sorts of commissions and investigations... Comrade Blucher does not change his defeatist position and continues to sabotage the organization of armed resistance to the Japanese. Things have reached the point where 1 August of this year, during a conversation over a direct line between Comrades Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov and Comrade Blucher, Comrade Stalin was forced to ask him a question: “Tell me, Comrade Blucher, honestly, do you have a desire to really fight the Japanese ? If you don’t have such a desire, tell me directly, as befits a communist, and if you have a desire, I would think that you should go to the place immediately.”‹11›

On August 3, People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov decides to entrust the leadership of military operations in the area of ​​Lake Khasan to the chief of staff of the Far Eastern Front, corps commander G.M. Stern, appointing him concurrently as commander of the 39th Rifle Corps. Thus, the front commander, Marshal V.K. Blucher was actually removed from direct leadership of the fighting on the state border.

By that time, the 39th Rifle Corps included the 32, 40, 26, 39th Rifle Divisions and the 2nd Mechanized Brigade, as well as corps reinforcement units. At the same time, the entire 1st Combined Arms Army defending Primorye was put on combat readiness.

73. A group of pilots of the 1st Primorsky Army who distinguished themselves in battles on Lake Khasan. August 1938 (AVL).

74. Deputy commander of the Far Eastern Fleet no aviation brigade commander P.V. Rychagov and Colonel A.B. Volodin inspecting the battle sites. Lake Khasan area, August 1938 (AVL).

75. Japanese positions of 150-mm guns abandoned by the enemy in the area of ​​Lake Khasan. August 1938 (AVL).

There was still an opportunity to end the military conflict at Lake Khasan through peaceful negotiations. Tokyo quickly realized that a victorious local battle for two border hills could result in a much wider armed confrontation. But the main forces of the imperial army were not in Manchukuo at that time, but were conducting military operations against Chiang Kai-shek China. Therefore, it was decided to localize the border armed conflict on favorable terms.

On August 4, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow M. Shigemitsu told the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR - M.M. Litvinov about the readiness of the Japanese government to begin negotiations to resolve the border conflict. Ambassador Shigemitsu knew that his empire was quite capable of fanning the fire of a great war from a position of strength.

The Soviet government expressed its readiness for such negotiations, but under the obligatory condition that Japanese troops must be withdrawn from the captured border territory. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov told the Japanese ambassador:

“By restoring the situation, I meant the situation that existed before July 29, that is, until the date when Japanese troops crossed the border and began to occupy the Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya heights...”

Tokyo, confident in its abilities, did not agree with such conditions from the Soviet side. Its Moscow ambassador M. Shigemitsu proposed returning to the border before July 11 - that is, before the appearance of the notorious trenches on the top of Zaozernaya.

However, such a proposal from the Japanese side was late for one significant reason. TASS has already transmitted an official report that Japanese troops have captured Soviet territory “to a depth of 4 kilometers.” However, in reality there was simply no such “depth of capture”. Crowded protest rallies took place throughout the Soviet country, the participants of which demanded to curb the presumptuous aggressor.

On August 5, TASS distributed the response of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov to the Japanese ambassador in Moscow: “The Soviet peoples will not put up with the presence of foreign troops even on a piece of Soviet land and will not hesitate to make any sacrifices in order to liberate it.”

In a matter of days, the sides built up large forces at the site of the fighting. On August 5, the defense on the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills was held, having in the immediate rear troops of the second echelon, the Japanese 19th Infantry Division, an infantry brigade, 2 artillery regiments and separate reinforcement units, including 3 machine-gun battalions, with a total number of up to 20 thousand Human. If necessary, these forces could be significantly strengthened.

The Japanese in the area of ​​​​the border heights were directly opposed by the Soviet 40th and 32nd (commanders - Colonels V.K. Bazarov and N.E. Berzarin) rifle divisions, 2nd separate mechanized brigade (commander - Colonel A.P. Panfilov) , rifle regiment of the 39th rifle division, 121st cavalry and 39th corps artillery regiments. In total they numbered 32,860 people. In the air, 180 bombers and 70 fighters were ready to support the Soviet offensive. Ships, aircraft, coastal defense and rear units of the Pacific Fleet were in a state of readiness.

The offensive operation on the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya heights was prepared according to all the rules of military art. Moscow, represented by Stalin and People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Voroshilov, was in a hurry to carry it out.

On August 5, 1938, a new military doctrine of the USSR was formulated and approved. In return" little blood and a mighty blow" - "victory at any cost." The Khasan events became its first test in practice.

On the same day, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal Voroshilov, sent a directive to Blucher and Stern to knock out Japanese troops from the heights of Zaozernaya using the flanks. That is, the troops of the Far Eastern Front were allowed to cross the state border in the upcoming offensive operation. And, accordingly, invade the territory of the neighboring state of Manchukuo.

The Soviet command scheduled a general offensive in the area of ​​the Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya heights for August 6 (the day of the 9th anniversary of the OKDVA. - Noteauto). It was planned to carry out artillery preparation by three artillery regiments, as well as support and cover ground units from the air. The implementation of the operation required, firstly, a triple superiority in the number of our advancing infantry and means of suppression; secondly, a sudden and simultaneous attack. It was necessary to identify the least protected areas of the fortified zone and take possession of it, if possible, by a roundabout maneuver, and not head-on.

The difficulty was that only 2 rifle divisions – the 40th and 32nd and their supporting tanks and self-propelled guns – actually participated in the liquidation of the Japanese adventure. With 6 regiments of these divisions, it was also necessary to allocate forces to secure both open flanks.

The combat order of the commander of the 40th Infantry Division, Colonel V. Bazarov, who fought on Lake Khasan from the first to the last day, was given to the regiments on the morning of August 6. It read: “... the 40th Infantry Division, attacking the Japanese-Manchurians... has the main task destroy the enemy together with the 32nd Infantry Division in the Zaozernaya area, capture and firmly secure the Zaozernaya heights..."

Before the offensive, the 32nd Rifle Division addressed the 40th with an appeal: “To better solve the problem, we challenge the 40th Rifle Division to a socialist competition: who will be the first to plant the Soviet flag on the Zaozernaya hill, polluted by a samurai boot.”

At dawn on August 6, Soviet assault units took up their initial positions. At night, in the pouring rain, a reconnaissance of the area was carried out, the location of Japanese positions was clarified, and issues of interaction between rifle units, artillery, tanks and aviation were worked out.

The signal for the offensive of the formations of the 39th Rifle Corps should have been the bombing strikes of our aviation. However, due to low clouds and rain, the flight departure in the first half of the day was delayed. In this regard, the time of the attack was also postponed.

When the sky became clear and the fog cleared, the command of the 39th Rifle Corps took its place at the observation post located at an altitude of 194.0. V.K. was also there. Blucher, Head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army L.Z. Mehlis and member of the Front Military Council P.I. Mazepov.

The offensive of Soviet troops on enemy positions on Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya began on August 6 at 16.00. The first blow was struck by Soviet aviation - 180 bombers covered by 70 fighters. The operation was led by brigade commander P.V. Leverages. TB-3 heavy bombers dropped 1,592 bombs weighing a total of 122 tons onto enemy positions at the heights and behind them.

The second wave of aircraft consisted of dozens of fighters. From a strafing flight they began to process enemy positions. Soviet pilots demoralized the enemy and inflicted heavy losses in manpower and equipment.

After an air raid on the heights and places of supposed concentration of Japanese reserves, an artillery fire raid was carried out. Thousands of shells rained down on the heights, destroying Japanese firing positions, smashing dugouts and shelters, and covering trenches and communication passages with earth and stones.

A division of coastal artillery guns of the Pacific Fleet under the command of Lieutenant Volgushev, with well-aimed concentrated fire, scattered and partially destroyed significant concentrations of infantry on the slopes of the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya heights.

At 17.00, after artillery preparation, with the support of tank battalions of the 2nd mechanized brigade, rifle units went on the offensive and began fighting for the heights. The tankers rushed forward. Steep rocky slopes made it difficult to advance, and two narrow passages (15–20 m wide) between the lake and the hills made maneuvering difficult. The attackers were immediately met by strong rifle and machine gun fire. From Korean (Homoku village) territory, several enemy artillery batteries concentrated their fire on a small area of ​​the ensuing battle.

And yet the tanks stubbornly moved forward. They walked along a narrow, swampy isthmus between Lake Khasan and the Tumen-Ula River. A serious obstacle on their way was the Nameless Hill. From here, in order to cover the approaches from the flank, the enemy fired concentrated fire from anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns. The Japanese hit the vehicles with direct fire, but the Soviet tanks, taking advantage of the uneven terrain, continued to move towards the heights. Using fire and tracks, they destroyed wire barriers, burst into the Japanese position, overturning military equipment as they went, and shooting infantry.

At the same time as the tanks, the battalions of the 96th Infantry Regiment were rapidly moving forward. At 18.00, as a result of a bayonet attack, they occupied the northeastern slopes of Bezymyannaya. At the same time, units of the 118th Infantry Regiment, supported by tanks, circled Lake Khasan from the west and attacked Zaozernaya. At the same time, the 119th Infantry Regiment was skirting Khasan from the north. Having captured the eastern slopes of Bezymyannaya, he launched an attack on Zaozernaya. At 22.00, Lieutenant Korolev’s platoon reached its foot, and half an hour later the regiments’ attack from the flanks ended with a swift bayonet strike, and part of the Zaozernaya heights was liberated from the invaders.

Distribution and combat composition of tank units of the 39th Rifle Corps on August 6, 1938‹12›

Combined arms formations | Tank units and units | Combat composition of tank units and subunits (T-26 / BT-5, BT-7) | Total tanks ||

32nd | 32 reps | 48/- | 48 ||

32nd | 3 TB 2 MBR | 50 / 6 | 56 ||

40 sd | 40 reps | 42/- | 42 ||

40 sd | 2 TB 2 MBR | 51/ 6 | 57 ||

40 sd | tank. reconnaissance battalion company 2 mbr | – / 19 | 19 ||

Reserve 39 sk | 2 mechanized brigades (without 2 and 3 TB and tank, reconnaissance battalion companies) | 66 / 63 | 129||

Total: | |257 / 94 | 351||

*129 tanks were left in the reserve of the corps commander, of which 15 122-mm self-propelled guns SU-5-2, as well as the control group of the 2nd mechanized brigade led by Colonel A.P., were subsequently recruited to participate in combat operations. Panfilov on BT (radium) tanks.

However, having brought up reserves, the enemy launched a counterattack. The thinned units of the 40th Infantry Division had difficulty repelling the fierce onslaught of the Japanese. A critical situation has arisen. Then regimental commissar Z.F. Ivanchenko and the head of the political department, battalion commissar N. Polushkin, gathered all the reserves of the division and led them into battle. The Japanese retreated.

The fierce battle on the nearest approaches to the heights and on the slopes of the hills continued until late at night.

About the events of August 6, the “Brief Description of the Khasan Operation,” compiled by the headquarters of the border and internal troops of the Far Eastern District, says the following: “Since the issue of invading enemy territory was positively resolved, the right flank of the advancing units of the 32nd Infantry Division captured the Chernaya height, and the left flank of the 40th Infantry Division - Homoku. Due to bad weather, the air departure was delayed, and the infantry offensive actually began at about 17:00 on August 6. Around midnight, units of the 118th Infantry Regiment of the 32nd Infantry Division reached the southern part of the ridge of the Zaozernaya height and hoisted a red flag on it (a photograph of it appeared on the pages of all central Soviet newspapers)... The enemy still managed that day to retain the northern part of the ridge of the Zaozernaya height and the ridge of the Bezymyannaya height...”‹13›

At dawn on August 7, the battles for the Zaozernaya heights resumed. The Japanese tried to regain lost positions. Having brought up significant reserves, they launched 20 fierce counterattacks during the day. Letting the enemy approach within 100–200 m, Soviet soldiers swept away his chains with hurricane fire. “On Zaozernaya,” reported G.M. Stern, “it is difficult to raise your head... Now the height is the main center of attraction for all types of Japanese fire around the clock. Last night, 4 attacks were repulsed in the sector of the 118th regiment and 1 attack in the sector of the 96th regiment "There were also several attacks this afternoon. All of them were repulsed..."

On this day the enemy suffered significant losses, but did not achieve success.

Fighting for the heights continued on August 8 and 9. On the third day of fighting, units of the 40th Infantry Division captured almost the entire long ridge (except for its northern part) of the Zaozernaya hill. The next day, the regiments of the 32nd Infantry Division, persistently attacking, captured Bezymyannaya Height. In the battle area, the Japanese retained only the small, well-fortified heights of Chernaya, Machine-Gun Gorka (the height received this name for the abundance of machine-gun nests on it) and Bogomolnaya. Artillery fire was fired not only at Japanese positions on the heights, but also at the Korean village of Homoku, where enemy batteries were stationed in firing positions.

76. Japanese positions of 150-mm guns abandoned by the enemy in the area of ​​Lake Khasan. August 1938 (AVL).

The Japanese government requested a truce. Back on August 7, 1938, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, visiting M.M. Litvinov, assured him of the Japanese government’s intentions to resolve the incident in the Lake Khasan area. MM. Litvinov categorically rejected the proposal of the Japanese ambassador to establish the border according to the maps presented by the command of the Kwantung Army, pointing out that “no agreement is possible if even a small Japanese military unit remains on Soviet territory.” He set out our conditions: “Military actions cease after both sides ... withdraw their troops, if any at the time of the agreement found themselves on the other side of this line. Such a line is recognized as the border shown on the map attached to the Hunchun Agreement, and thus "The situation that existed on July 29 will be restored, that is, before the first entry of Japanese troops into Soviet territory. Once calm on the border has arrived, a bilateral commission will go there and begin on the spot to re-demarcate the border established by the Hunchun Agreement."

However, the Japanese did not accept the demands of the Soviet government. They began to pull up new units to Lake Khasan. In just a few days, 46 trains with troops and equipment were transferred here.

On August 8, the Soviet command learned that the enemy was pulling up forces, including aircraft and tanks, concentrating them along the border line in the Prikhankai direction.

Soviet units were immediately reinforced by the 115th Infantry Regiment with a tank company. On August 9, the 78th Kazan Red Banner and 176th Rifle Regiments of the 26th Zlatoust Red Banner Rifle Division were brought up to the area of ​​the village of Kraskino.

On this day, Japanese troops, having received reinforcements, planned to go on the offensive in the Zaozernaya area. However, the troops of the Red Banner Far Eastern Front on the morning of August 8, ahead of the enemy, launched a counteroffensive. The enemy, throwing significant forces into the attack, occupied Zaozernaya. But the 96th Infantry Regiment counterattacked the Japanese and knocked them out from the heights.

77. Soviet commanders and weapons specialists inspect Japanese small arms. On the left, the colonel is wearing a raincoat for command personnel, introduced in 1931. Lake Khasan area, August 1938 (RGAKFD).

About the fierce battles on August 9 on Lake Khasan, the message from the headquarters of the 1st Primorsky Army said: “On August 9, Japanese troops again launched a series of attacks on the Zaozernaya height (Chashkufu), occupied by our troops. The Japanese troops were thrown back with heavy losses for them. The location of our troops pass along the border line, with the exception of the area of ​​Bezymyannaya Heights, where Japanese troops are wedged into our territory for two hundred meters, and our troops, in turn, are wedged into Japanese-Manchurian territory for three hundred meters. Artillery fire continues throughout the entire area."

Komkor G.M. Stern (repressed, like the commander of the Far Eastern Front, Marshal V.K. Blucher. - Noteauto) wrote about the battles near Lake Khasan, which were fought in incredibly difficult conditions for the advancing side: “There was no way to hide the place and direction of our attack... Possessing Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya, the Japanese looked from top to bottom throughout the entire area where the Red Army was located and all the routes to this area. They could count every one of our guns, every tank, almost every person. The possibility... of any maneuver at all for the Red Army units was completely absent... It was possible to attack only... directly to the forehead of the Japanese positions... For three days, from 7 until August 9, there were heavy battles to liberate Soviet land from the invaders."

On August 10, the next meeting of the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow M. Shigemitsu with representatives of the Soviet government took place. The conflicting parties agreed through diplomatic channels to cease fire and restore the status quo on the USSR border with Manchukuo. The next day, August 11, at 12 noon, military operations near Lake Khasan ceased. According to the agreement, Soviet troops, as well as Japanese, remained on the line they occupied on August 10 at 24.00 local time.

The first meeting of military representatives of both sides to fix the position of the troops took place south of the Zaozernaya heights on the same August 11. However, there were some complications. A TASS report on this matter said:

“At the first meeting of military representatives of the USSR and Japan on August 11 of this year, military representatives of the USSR stated that, despite the cessation of hostilities at 13.30 on August 11 (local time), some Japanese troops violated the armistice agreement and, taking advantage of the truce, moved forward by 100 meters and occupied part of the northern slope of the Zaozernaya height. Despite the protest of the military representatives of the USSR and their demand for the immediate withdrawal of Japanese troops to their previous positions, the Japanese military representatives categorically refused to fulfill this legal demand. Due to the fact that in the indicated area both sides approached 4-5 meters, and an armed clash could spontaneously arise again at any moment, the military representatives of both sides on the spot decided to mutually withdraw the troops of each side 80 meters back in this area. Upon receiving a report about this, the Soviet command in the Far East, in accordance with the concluded The armistice agreement ordered the immediate return of our units to their previous positions, which they occupied at 24 hours on August 10, and proposed to demand from Japanese representatives the withdrawal of Japanese troops. This order was strictly carried out by our troops...”

The military conflict near Lake Khasan did not continue. To the surprise of the diplomats of the two states, the Japanese command withdrew its troops from the piece of captured Soviet territory extremely slowly. On the northern part of the ridge of the Zaozernaya heights, the Japanese “lingered” until August 13. And at the heights - Machine Gun Hill, Chernaya and Bogomolnaya until August 15. On August 13, a mutual exchange of corpses of the dead took place.

76. Students of the Academy of the Red Army named after M.V. Frunze (from right to left): Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel D.D. Pogodin, Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel A.I. Rodimtsev and a participant in the battles near Lake Khasan, order bearer Lieutenant M.F. Potapov. Moscow, autumn 1938 (AVL).

Having been defeated during the intervention against Soviet Russia, in 1922 the Japanese were forced to evacuate from Vladivostok, but in the future they did not lose hope of subjugating the vast Asian territories of the USSR, right up to the Urals. By the early 1930s. The militarists took over in Japanese ruling circles. Japanese troops repeatedly staged military provocations against the Soviet Union from the territory of Manchuria they occupied in 1931-1932. In the summer of 1938, Japan with large military forces violated the Soviet border in the south of Primorye near Lake. Hassan. The 19th Infantry Division took part directly in the invasion. In addition, the 15th and 20th infantry divisions and other units were moving towards the combat area. On July 29, 1938, Japanese troops, after a series of attacks, throwing back the border units, captured the tactically advantageous Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills, relying on which they threatened the entire Posyet region. Troops of the future 39th Rifle Corps (formed on August 2, 1938, commander - corps commander G.N. Stern) took part in repelling the Japanese invasion. As soon as the provocation became known, the 40th Infantry Division of Colonel V.K. was concentrated in the conflict area. Bazarova. On July 31, the Primorsky Army and the Pacific Fleet were put on alert. The 32nd Infantry Division (Colonel N.E. Berzarin) and the 2nd Mechanized Brigade were additionally sent to the Lake Khasan area. The 2nd Mechanized Brigade was formed in April 1932 in Kyiv, and in 1934 it was transferred to the Far East. In October 1938, it was reorganized into the 42nd Light Tank Brigade. Just before the start of the conflict, Colonel A.P. took command of the brigade. Panfilov. The brigade was armed with, among other things, 94 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks. The brigade also includes a company of fire-reinforced HT-26s (5 serviceable units). In addition, the 32nd Rifle Division had a 32nd separate tank battalion (Major M.V. Alimov) with T-26s. The same battalion (Senior Lieutenant Sitnikov) was in the 40th Rifle Division. With considerable difficulty, the attack was repulsed and the border was restored, however, this incident revealed shortcomings in the management and training of troops. Miscalculations were used to justify repression. Many commanders, including one of the five first Marshals of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher were arrested and then shot.

ENTRY IN I.M.MAISKY’S DIARY OF APRIL 12, 1938 ABOUT THE CONVERSATION WITH SUN FO

Sun Fo spent 6 weeks in Moscow. Negotiated with the Soviet government about assistance to China. He left satisfied and expressed gratitude to me for the careful implementation of the agreements we concluded in Moscow. However, Sun Fo apparently did not immediately become satisfied with the Moscow negotiations. As far as I could understand from his somewhat vague explanations in this part (in general, he speaks very clearly, precisely and frankly), on his way to Moscow, he hoped to convince the Soviet government of the need for a military action by the USSR against Japan in alliance with China. The Soviet government rejected such a proposal, but promised energetic assistance by sending weapons, airplanes, etc. The results are visible in the course of military operations in China. There is no doubt that the Chinese successes of three weeks are largely due to the arrival of our aircraft, our tanks, our artillery, etc. It is not surprising that Sun Fo now feels almost triumphant. The details of his decisive conversation with Comrade are curious. “I was told,” Sun Fo said, “that I would see your leader on a certain day, but they did not indicate the exact date. I got ready. I'm sitting at the embassy and waiting. Evening comes - 8 o'clock, 9 o'clock, 10 o'clock, 11 o'clock... Nothing!.. Somewhat disappointed, I decided to go to bed. He undressed and climbed into bed. Suddenly, at a quarter to twelve they came for me: “Please, they are waiting for you!” I jumped up, got dressed and drove off. Along with Stalin were Molotov and Voroshilov. At the end, Mikoyan and Yezhov also came. Our conversation lasted from 12 at night to 5 1/2 in the morning. And then everything was decided.” It was during this conversation, according to Sun Fo, that the Soviet government rejected direct military participation of the USSR in the fight against Japan. The motives put forward by Comrade Stalin in defense of such a line of behavior, as transmitted by Sun Fo, boil down to the following: 1) a military action by the USSR would immediately unite the entire Japanese nation, which is now far from united in supporting Japanese aggression in China; 2) a military offensive by the USSR, on the contrary, could frighten the right-wing elements in China and, thus, split the united national front that has now been created there; 3) a military offensive by the USSR with the prospect of our victory would frighten England and the USA and could turn the current sympathy of both countries for China into its opposite; 4) a military offensive by the USSR - and this is especially important - would be used by Germany to attack our country in Europe, and this would unleash world war. For all the above reasons, Comrade Stalin considers an open military action by the USSR against Japan inappropriate. But he is ready to help China in every possible way by supplying weapons, etc. (Sun Fo is the head of the Chinese special mission sent to the USSR, England and France; Chiang Kai-shek’s confidant, millionaire). Published: Sokolov V.V. two meetings between Sun Fo and I.V. Stalin in 1938-1939. // New and recent history. 1999. N6.

HEAD OF THE PODGORNAYA BORDER POST P. TERESHKIN

On July 29, the head of the political department of the district, divisional commissar Bogdanov, and Colonel Grebnik arrived at the height of Zaozernaya. ...At the beginning of the conversation, Lieutenant Makhalin urgently called me by phone. I reported to Bogdanov. In response: “Let them act independently, do not allow the Japanese into our territory...”. Makhalin calls again and in an excited voice says: “A large detachment of Japanese violated the border and began to attack the border detachment’s locations, we will fight to the death, avenge us!” The connection was interrupted. I asked permission from divisional commissar Bogdanov to hold Makhalin’s group with heavy machine gun fire. I was refused this with the reasoning that this would cause retaliatory actions by the Japanese in the area of ​​Zaozernaya Heights. Then I sent 2 squads under the command of Chernopyatko and Bataroshin to help Lieutenant Makhalin. Soon, divisional commissar Bogdanov and department head Grebnik left for Posiet. From the memoirs of Hero of the Soviet Union P.F. Tereshkina

ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR DEFENSE OF THE USSR No. 0071, August 4, 1938

In recent days, the Japanese in the Posyet region suddenly attacked our border units and captured part of Soviet territory near Lake Khasan. This new military provocation met with due resistance on our part. However, the Japanese stubbornly cling to Soviet territory, despite heavy losses of their troops. The provocative actions of the Japanese military are obviously calculated on our peacefulness and restraint. The Japanese believe that the Soviet Union and the Red Army will endlessly tolerate the brazen provocations of their military, which, under the guise of local border incidents, began to seize entire chunks of Soviet territory. We don’t want a single inch of foreign land, including Manchurian and Korean, but we will never give up even an inch of our own, Soviet land, to anyone, including the Japanese invaders! In order to be ready to repel provocative attacks of the Japanese-Manchus and in order to be ready at any moment to deliver a powerful blow to the burrowing, insolent Japanese aggressors along the entire front, immediately bring the troops of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front and the Trans-Baikal Military District to full combat readiness, for which I order: 1 Immediately return to their units all command, political, commanding and Red Army personnel from all types of work, secondments and vacations. 2. The Military Council of the DKFront take measures to cover the borders of the front. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account that if a new provocation arises from the Japanese-Manchus, then the covering troops with aircraft and tanks must be ready, upon special orders from Moscow, for an immediate powerful, crushing blow. 3. Bring the air forces of the DKFront and the Western Military District to full combat readiness: a) relocate air units to field airfields, providing them with air defense systems and reliable communications, having strong fists for powerful strikes; b) establish constant duty of fighter flights in full readiness for immediate departure; c) provide units at field airfields with bombs, ammunition for at least 2 sorties, at remote airfields for 5 sorties and fuel for 5 sorties; d) provide all flight personnel with oxygen devices for high-altitude flights and the required amount of oxygen; check and seal devices; e) The military councils of the DKFront, ZabVO, 1st and 2nd armies and the Khabarovsk group immediately, through special flight technical groups, together with the command, verify the readiness of the aircraft’s equipment, weapons and instruments. This check should be carried out at least four times a month. Commanders and commissars of air units should check daily; f) commanders and commissars of air units ensure the speed of refueling aircraft, hanging bombs and filling with cartridges; g) all commanders of the air forces of the specified front, armies, district and Khabarovsk group immediately have the stock of bombs, aircraft cartridges, fuel and technical personnel in charge of storing weapons and fuel checked, immediately eliminating all discovered shortcomings. 4. A. The Military Councils of the Democratic Front and the Western Military District should put all fortified areas on full combat readiness, reinforcing them, if necessary, with field troops. B. In fortified areas, their commandants: a) immediately install fully weapons and equipment in all structures; b) fill military installations with the required standard amount of ammunition and property; c) install wire barriers in important directions and build anti-tank obstacles; d) fully provide combat installations, command posts and field troops occupying fortified areas with communications means; e) establish a permanent military guard, patrol and observation service. 5. Rifle, cavalry and tank units must be placed in camps or bivouacs with combat support measures (security, duty units, air surveillance and air defense), having reliable communications within the formation. 6. In tank units, put ammunition in combat vehicles, have tanks constantly refueled and fully ready for immediate action. 7. In rifle and cavalry units: a) restore the full regular number of units in the units; b) check the readiness of mobilized plans for formations and units; c) issue the weapons and ammunition assigned to the soldiers to the units, where they are stored in a sealed form under the responsibility of the duty officer; d) transported supplies of ammunition should be placed in charging boxes and carts; e) commission repair horses at least 3 years old and check forging. Reforge horse train with old forging; f) have weapons and other property ready for quick delivery. 8. At air defense points, install artillery and machine gun units in position, relocate fighter aircraft to operational airfields and raise the VNOS system, checking the connection of VNOS posts with command posts and airfields of the fighter unit. 9. Fully provide transport parts with rubber, spare parts and fuel. 10. The military councils of the DKFront, the 1st and 2nd armies, the Khabarovsk group and the Western Military District: a) fully provide the units with all required property and ammunition according to wartime standards at the expense of the front-line (district, army) warehouses; b) put warehouses in order, and first of all, ammunition warehouses: dismantle the property stored in them, check the readiness of warehouses for the rapid release of property, review the security of warehouses and strengthen the main ones at the expense of secondary objects; c) conduct combat alerts of units and subunits. When raising units on combat alert, check down to the smallest detail their equipment and material security in accordance with established standards and report cards. At the same time, conduct tactical exercises as part of formations, in which units raised on combat alert will act, obtaining from each commander, soldier and staff excellent knowledge of the terrain and combat conditions in their sector. Monitor the organization of communications at all levels of the headquarters service; d) pay special attention to training in night operations and repelling surprise enemy attacks at night and in fog, training your units to operate at night and in fog. I would like to draw the special attention of the entire command staff to this; e) in support units of border troops: 1) commanders of support units to develop on the ground, together with commanders of border units, a plan for border defense in their sectors. Provide technical communication between support units and the command of border units and with their direct superiors; 2) strengthen continuous military surveillance abroad, especially be vigilant at night; 3) study in detail the topography of their plots on the territory of the USSR; 4) store weapons and ammunition of support units in units, ensuring their uninterrupted food supply. 11. All measures to bring units into full combat readiness must be carried out while maintaining military secrets. 12. Commanders and commissars of all military formations should check all units and eliminate all detected deficiencies on the spot. About the results of verifications and measures taken report in code to the command of units and formations, the Military Councils of the Democratic Front, the 1st and 2nd armies, the Khabarovsk Army Group of Forces and the ZabVO once every five days, to the command of the DC Front and the ZabVO to report to the General Staff of the Red Army at the same time. Report receipt of this order and its communication to the executors no later than 24 hours on 08/06/38.37. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Army Commander 1st Rank B. Shaposhnikov

Present: Voroshilov, Stalin, Shchadenko... Blucher. Listened: About the events on the lake. Hassan. The Main Military Council, having heard a report from the NGO on the situation in the DKF [Far Eastern Red Banner Front] in connection with the events at Lake. Khasan, as well as the explanations of the front commander Comrade Blucher and the deputy front commander, member of the military council Mazepov, and having discussed this issue, we came to the following conclusions: 1. Combat operations near the lake. Khasan were a comprehensive test of the mobilization and combat readiness of not only those units that directly took part in them, but also of all DCF troops without exception. 2. The events of these few days revealed huge shortcomings in the composition of the DCF. The combat training of the troops, headquarters and command and control personnel of the front turned out to be at an unacceptably low level. The military units were torn apart and incapable of combat; The supply of military units is not organized. It was discovered that the Far Eastern theater was poorly prepared for war (roads, bridges, communications). Storage, conservation and accounting of mobilization and emergency reserves, both in front-line warehouses and military units, found themselves in a chaotic state. In addition to all this, it was discovered that the most important directives of the Main Military Council and NGOs were criminally not implemented by the front command for a long time. As a result of this unacceptable state of the front troops, we suffered significant losses in this relatively small clash - 408 people. killed and 2807 wounded. These losses cannot be justified either by the extremely difficult terrain in which our troops had to operate, or by the three times greater losses of the Japanese. The number of our troops, the participation of our aviation and tanks in operations gave us such advantages that our losses in battles could be much smaller... Moreover, the percentage of losses of command and political personnel is unnaturally high - about 40%, which once again proves that The Japanese were defeated and thrown beyond our borders only thanks to the fighting enthusiasm of the fighters, junior commanders, middle and senior command and political personnel, who were ready to sacrifice themselves, defending the honor and inviolability of the territory of their great socialist Motherland, as well as thanks to the skillful management of operations against the Japanese, i.e. Stern and the correct leadership of Comrade Rychagov in the actions of our aviation (...) During the period of hostilities, we had to resort to cobbling together units from different units and individual fighters, allowing harmful organizational improvisation, creating all kinds of confusion, which could not but affect the actions of our troops. The troops advanced to the border on a combat alert completely unprepared... In many cases, entire artillery batteries found themselves at the front without shells, spare barrels for machine guns were not fitted in advance, rifles were issued unsighted, and many soldiers, and even one of the rifle units of the 32nd division , arrived at the front without rifles or gas masks at all. Despite the huge reserves of clothing, many fighters were sent into battle in completely worn out shoes, half barefoot, a large number of the Red Army soldiers were without overcoats. Commanders and staffs lacked maps of the combat area. All types of troops, especially the infantry, showed an inability to act on the battlefield, to maneuver, to combine movement and fire, to apply themselves to the terrain... tank units were used ineptly, as a result of which they suffered heavy losses in materiel. The culprit for these major shortcomings and for the excessive losses we suffered in a relatively small clash are the commanders, commissars and chiefs of all levels of the DKF and, first of all, the commander of the DKF, Marshal Blucher... The Main Military Council decides: 1. The administration of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front is to be disbanded. 2. Marshal Blucher should be removed from the post of commander of the DKF troops and left at the disposal of the Main Military Council of the Red Army. 3. Create two separate armies from the DKF troops, directly subordinate to the NPO... RGVA. F. 4. Op. 18. D. 46. L. 183-189 Blucher V. (1890-1938). Since 1929, commander of the Separate Far Eastern Red Banner Army. In the summer of 1938 - commander of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front. Arrested and shot in 1938. Rehabilitated after 1953. Stern G. (1900-1941). In 1938 - chief of staff of the Far Eastern Front. In 1941 - Colonel General, Head of the Main Directorate of Air Defense of the NPO of the USSR. Arrested on June 7, 1941 on charges of participation in an anti-Soviet military conspiratorial organization. Shot without trial on October 28, 1941. Rehabilitated in 1954. Rychagov P. (1911-1941) - Lieutenant General of Aviation (1940). In 1938 - commander of the Air Force of the Primorsky Group of the Far Eastern Front, 1st Separate Red Banner Army. In 1940 - Head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force. Arrested on June 24, 1941 on charges of participation in an anti-Soviet military conspiratorial organization. Shot without trial on October 28, 1941. Rehabilitated in 1954.

ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR DEFENSE OF THE USSR No. 0169, September 8, 1938

On the imposition of penalties on the command of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front for violating the orders of the NKO On August 7, 1938, during the period of hot battles with the Japanese in the area of ​​​​Lake Khasan, the deputy commander of the DKFront, corps commander Comrade Filatov, signed an order on the disbandment of medical battalions and field hospitals in the rifle divisions located in battles. The Military Council of the 1st Army delayed the execution of this order. On August 17, the corps commander, Comrade Filatov, made another gross mistake - he ordered the deputy commander of the front air force to provide a DB-3 aircraft for the transfer of a representative of the NKVD from Khabarovsk to the city of Chita, thereby violating the orders of NKO No. 022 of 1934 and [No. 022] of 1936, categorically prohibiting the use of combat aircraft as transport vehicles. Asked on my orders why the plane was provided, and even the DB-3, Comrade Filatov reported that he had given the order to provide the plane, but did not indicate the type of plane; Meanwhile, Comrade Senatorov reported to me that Comrade Filatov’s written order specifically indicated DB-3. Thus, Comrade Filatov did not find the courage to admit his mistake, did not tell the truth, trying to shift the blame to Comrade Senatorov. In turn, the deputy commander of the DKFront Air Force, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel Comrade Senatorov, having received and executed the order of the Corps Commander Comrade Filatov to send an aircraft for the specified purpose, did not report to him about the illegality of this order. Wine vol. Filatov and Senatorov is aggravated all the more so because they, having violated my orders, also did not take the necessary measures to organize this flight, and the plane crashed on the way back from Chita to Khabarovsk and 3 crew members were killed. For a frivolous attitude towards service and violation of NKO orders No. 022 of 1934 and No. 022 of 1936, I severely reprimand Comrade Commander Filatov. I put Colonel Comrade Senatorov on notice for violating NKO orders No. 022 of 1934 and 1936. I warn you that for the use of combat aircraft for purposes not related to combat and training missions, I will severely punish those responsible. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov

The thirties of the 20th century turned out to be extremely difficult for the whole world. This applies to both the internal situation in many countries of the world and the international situation. After all, global contradictions developed more and more on the world stage during this period. One of them was the Soviet-Japanese conflict at the end of the decade.

Background to the battles for Lake Khasan

The leadership of the Soviet Union is literally obsessed with internal (counter-revolutionary) and external threats. And this idea is to a large extent justified. The threat is clearly unfolding in the west. In the east, China was occupied in the mid-1930s, which was already casting predatory glances at Soviet lands. Thus, in the first half of 1938, powerful anti-Soviet propaganda unfolded in this country, calling for a “war against communism” and an outright seizure of territories. Such Japanese aggression is facilitated by their newly acquired coalition partner - Germany. The situation is aggravated by the fact that Western states, England and France, are in every possible way delaying the signing of any treaty with the USSR on mutual defense, thereby hoping to provoke the mutual destruction of their natural enemies: Stalin and Hitler. This provocation is spreading

and on Soviet-Japanese relations. At the beginning, the Japanese government increasingly begins to talk about fictitious “disputed territories.” At the beginning of July, Lake Khasan, located in the border zone, becomes the center of events. The formations of the Kwantung Army are beginning to concentrate more and more here. The Japanese side justified these actions by the fact that the border zones of the USSR located near this lake are the territories of Manchuria. The latter region, in general, was not historically Japanese in any way; it belonged to China. But China in previous years was itself occupied by the imperial army. On July 15, 1938, Japan demanded the withdrawal of Soviet border forces from this territory, citing the fact that they belonged to China. However, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted harshly to such a statement, providing copies of the agreement between Russia and the Celestial Empire dating back to 1886, which included relevant maps proving the Soviet side was right.

The beginning of the battle for Lake Khasan

However, Japan had no intention of retreating. The inability to substantiate her claims to Lake Khasan did not stop her. Of course, Soviet defense was also strengthened in this area. The first attack came on July 29, when a company of the Kwantung Army crossed and attacked one of the heights. At the cost of significant losses, the Japanese managed to capture this height. However, already on the morning of July 30, stronger forces came to the aid of the Soviet border guards. The Japanese unsuccessfully attacked their opponents' defenses for several days, losing a significant amount of equipment and manpower every day. The Battle of Lake Khasan was completed on August 11. On this day, a truce was declared between the troops. By mutual agreement of the parties, it was decided that the interstate border should be established in accordance with the treaty between Russia and China of 1886, since no later agreement on this matter existed at that time. Thus, Lake Khasan became a silent reminder of such an inglorious campaign for new territories.

Before we begin the description concerning the events at Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, we should remember what Japan was like in 1938. Nominally the emperor rules, but in reality the military and oligarchs have power. The entire top military ranks, the local Chubais and other Khodorkovites, are sleeping and looking for someone to rob and fill their purses with. And since your country has already been plundered, you can only grab something outside of Japan.

Nationalists, lured by the oligarchs, call on the people to fight against everyone who has offended and is offending the Japanese. The Russians, the USA, England, the Chinese (who are waging a civil war among themselves) and the Koreans for company are assigned as the culprits for everything. The USSR looked weaker than the USA and England, and they decided to start there. But, rightly fearing for their own skins, they did not dare to start a war without considering “is it worth it?” and “can we?” For this, it was decided to conduct reconnaissance in force, without starting a full-scale war. The place where it was decided to try our strength was near Lake Khasan. If you want to fight, there will be a reason, you just have to look for it. They found a reason and made a claim to the territory, which “suddenly” turned out to be “disputed.” To get things started, diplomats step in and, rather rudely, offer to leave the “disputed” territories. Attempts to point out what was wrong were met with threats of force.
Due to the increased threat of a military attack from Japan, the OKDVA was transformed into the Far Eastern Front on July 1, 1938. Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher is appointed commander

(He was considered an expert on the East: it was under his command that in 1929, units of the Red Army defeated Chinese troops in a clash on the Chinese Eastern Railway. But at that time he was no longer the same dashing grunt. He drank himself to death, abandoned worries about providing the rear, and did not train soldiers and officers , distracted soldiers for chores. And cheerful reports were sent to Moscow about the constantly growing combat readiness.), a member of the Military Council was divisional commissar P. I. Mazepov, and chief of staff was corps commander G. M. Stern.

On the morning of June 13, 1938, the head of the NKVD department for the Far Eastern Territory, State Security Commissioner 3rd Rank Genrikh Lyushkov, ran over to the Japanese. Currying favor with his new masters, he spoke in detail about the deployment of Soviet troops, about the codes used in military communications, and handed over the radio communication codes, lists and operational documents he had taken with him.
The 19th Infantry Division, numbering up to 20 thousand people, which was to capture the hills adjacent to Lake Khasan, as well as a brigade of the 20th Infantry Division, a cavalry brigade, three separate machine-gun battalions and tanks began an offensive, with the goal (to begin with) of capturing border heights. Heavy artillery, armored trains, and anti-aircraft guns were brought here. Up to 70 combat aircraft were concentrated at nearby airfields.
The measures taken to strengthen defense capabilities turned out to be timely.
At the end of July 1938, the Japanese Armed Forces started a conflict, believing that here, in conditions of roadlessness and swampy terrain, it would be much more difficult for the Red Army to concentrate and deploy its troops. If the attack was successful, the Japanese plans went much further than moving the border near Lake Khasan.
On July 23, Japanese units located in Korea and Manchuria on the border with the USSR began expelling residents from border villages. And the next morning, artillery firing positions appeared in the area of ​​the sandy islands on the Tumen-Ula River. Armored trains lurked on the railway. At Bogomolnaya heights, one kilometer from Zaozernaya, firing positions for machine guns and light artillery were set up. Japanese destroyers were cruising in Peter the Great Bay, near the territorial waters of the USSR. On July 25, in the area of ​​border checkpoint No. 7, our border detachment was subjected to rifle and machine-gun fire, and the next day a reinforced Japanese company captured the border height of Devil’s Mountain...
Dreaming of quickly returning to bottles and his young wife, Marshal Blucher decided to voluntarily engage in a “peaceful resolution” of the conflict. On July 24, secretly from his own headquarters, as well as from the deputies who were in Khabarovsk. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Frinovsky and Deputy. People's Commissar of Defense Mekhlis, he sent a commission to the height of Zaozernaya. As a result of the “investigation”, carried out without the involvement of the head of the local border station, the commission found that our border guards were to blame for the conflict, allegedly violating the border by 3 meters. Having performed this act worthy of current “peacekeepers” like Shevardnadze and Lebed, Blucher sent a telegram to the People’s Commissar of Defense, in which he demanded the immediate arrest of the head of the border section and other “those responsible for provoking the conflict.” However, this “peace initiative” did not meet with understanding in Moscow, from where came a strict order to stop fussing with the commissions and implement the decisions of the Soviet government to organize resistance to the Japanese.
Early in the morning of July 29, under the cover of fog, two Japanese detachments crossed our state border and began an attack on Bezymyannaya Height. The border detachment under the command of Lieutenant A. M. Makhalin met the enemy with fire. For several hours, eleven warriors heroically repelled the onslaught of many times superior enemy forces. Five border guard soldiers were killed and the rest were wounded, mortally - Lieutenant Makhalin. At the cost of heavy losses, the Japanese managed to take control of the heights. A reserve of border guards and a rifle company under the command of the communist Lieutenant D. Levchenko arrived at the battlefield. With a bold bayonet attack and grenades, our valiant warriors knocked out the invaders from Soviet soil.
Having cleared the hill, the soldiers equipped trenches. At dawn on July 30, enemy artillery rained concentrated fire on them. And then the Japanese went on the attack several times, but Lieutenant Levchenko’s company fought to the death. The company commander himself was wounded three times, but did not leave the battle. A platoon of anti-tank guns under Lieutenant I. Lazarev came to the aid of Levchenko’s unit and shot the Japanese with direct fire. One of our gunners was killed. Lazarev, wounded in the shoulder, took his place. The artillerymen managed to suppress several enemy machine guns and destroy up to a company of infantry. It was with difficulty that the platoon commander was forced to leave for dressing. A day later he was back in action and fought until the final victory...
Already the first battles on July 29-30 showed that this was not an ordinary border incident.
Meanwhile, Blucher actually sabotaged the organization of armed resistance to the invading aggressors. Things got to the point that on August 1, during a conversation over a direct wire, Stalin asked him a rhetorical question: “Tell me, Comrade Blucher, honestly, do you have a desire to really fight the Japanese? If you don’t have such a desire, tell me directly, as befits a communist, and if you have a desire, I would think that you should go to the place immediately.” However, having gone to the scene, the marshal only interfered with his subordinates. In particular, he stubbornly refused to use aviation against the Japanese under the pretext of fear of causing damage to the civilian Korean population of the adjacent strip. At the same time, despite the presence of a normally working telegraph connection, Blucher avoided talking via direct wire with People's Commissar Voroshilov for three days.
Due to the remote location and the almost complete absence of roads, the advance of the 40th Infantry Division to the border was slow. The situation was complicated by continuous heavy rains. At 3 o'clock in the morning on July 31, the Japanese opened artillery fire and, with the help of two infantry regiments, launched an offensive on the heights of Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya. After a fierce four-hour battle, the enemy occupied these heights. Our leading battalions retreated to the east of Lake Khasan: the battalion of the 119th regiment - to a height of 194.0, the battalion of the 118th to Zarechye. The main forces of the 40th Infantry Division at that time were on the march 30-40 km from the battle area.
At the direction of the People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov, the troops in the Primorsky Territory, as well as the forces of the Pacific Fleet, were put on combat readiness. Repelling the enemy attack was entrusted to the 39th Rifle Corps under the command of brigade commander V.N. Sergeev. It included the 40th Rifle Division named after S. Ordzhonikidze (commander Colonel V.K. Bazarov), the 32nd Saratov Rifle Division (commander Colonel N.E. Berzarap) and the 2nd Mechanized Brigade (commander Colonel A.P. . Panfilov). The chief of staff of the front, corps commander G.M. Stern, arrived in the combat area with a group of commanders.
The Japanese, having captured Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya, covered these hills with deep trenches within three days. Machine gun platforms, dugouts, firing positions for mortars and artillery, wire fences and anti-tank ditches were equipped. Armored hoods for machine guns were installed at key positions, and snipers were disguised behind rocks. The narrow passages between the lake and the border were mined.
The commander of the 40th Infantry Division made a decision - on August 1, attack the enemy at the heights on the move and restore the situation on the border. However, due to impassable roads, units of the division reached their starting lines late. Corporal Stern, who was at the command post of the formation, ordered the attack to be postponed until the next day.
On August 2, the commander of the Far Eastern Fleet troops, V.K. Blucher, arrived in Posiet. Having familiarized himself with the situation, he approved the actions of G. M. Stern and gave instructions for more thorough preparation of the troops for the attack.
On the same day, the 40th Infantry Division went on the offensive. The main attack on Bezymyannaya Height was carried out from the north by the 119th and 120th Infantry Regiments, with the attached 32nd separate tank battalion and two artillery divisions. The 118th Infantry Regiment was advancing from the south.
The fight was brutal. The enemy was extremely advantageous positions. In front of his trenches lay a lake, which did not allow our troops to attack the heights from the front: it was necessary to bypass the lake, that is, move along the border itself, strictly within our own territory, under enemy flank fire.
The 119th Infantry Regiment, having forded and swam the northern part of Lake Khasan, reached the northeastern slopes of the Bezymyannaya Sochka by the end of August 2, where it encountered strong fire resistance from the Japanese. The soldiers lay down and dug in.
By that time, the 120th Infantry Regiment had captured the eastern slopes of the Bezymyannaya hill, however, having encountered strong enemy opposition, it stopped the attack and lay down. The 118th Infantry Regiment captured a hollow to the west of Height 62.1 and by the end of the day reached the eastern and southeastern slopes of Bezymyannaya.
The infantry was assisted by the 32nd separate tank battalion of Colonel M.V. Akimov.
No matter how great the courage of the Soviet soldiers, all attempts by our troops on August 2 and 3 to drive the Japanese out of the occupied territory were unsuccessful. The front command, on the instructions of the People's Commissar of Defense on August 3, entrusted the task of defeating the enemy to the 39th Rifle Corps, whose commander was G. M. Stern. The corps included the 40th, 32nd, 39th rifle divisions and the 2nd mechanized brigade with reinforcements.
Meanwhile, trying to gain time to bring even larger forces to the Lake Khasan area and gain a foothold on captured Soviet soil, the Japanese government resorted to a diplomatic maneuver. On August 4, the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow met with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. M. Litvinov and stated that his government intended to resolve the conflict “peacefully.” This “peaceful path” meant an attempt to impose on the Soviet side negotiations on border changes, as well as to achieve the retention of Japanese troops in a number of areas of our territory. Such an impudent proposal was, naturally, resolutely rejected. The Soviet government firmly stated that a cessation of hostilities was possible only if the situation that existed before July 29 was restored. The Japanese refused this.
Then our troops were given the order to launch a general offensive. The order, in particular, said: “The task of the corps with attached units is to capture the Zaozernaya heights on August 6 and destroy the enemies who dared to invade our Soviet land.”
G. M. Stern proposed a bold plan: the 32nd Infantry Division with the 3rd Tank Battalion of the 2nd Mechanized Brigade would capture the Bezymyannaya height and, with a strike from the north-west, together with the 40th Infantry Division, expel the enemy from the Zaozernaya height;
The 40th division with the 2nd tank and reconnaissance battalions of the same brigade will capture the Machine Gun Hill height and attack from the northeast together with the 32nd division - the Zaozernaya height; The 39th Infantry Division with the 121st Cavalry Regiment, the motorized rifle battalion of the 2nd Mechanized Brigade was charged with providing cover for the right flank of the corps along the Novo-Kievskoye line, height 106.9.
The operation included artillery preparation by three regiments of corps artillery, as well as support and cover of ground forces by aviation. This time too, infantry and tanks were prohibited from crossing the state border between China and Korea.
The day of the general attack at Lake Khasan coincided with the ninth anniversary of the founding of OKDVA. In the morning, on this occasion, an order was read out in all units and divisions of the corps on behalf of the commander of the Far Eastern Fleet V.K. Blucher. “...Deal a crushing blow to the insidious enemy,” the order said, “to destroy him completely—this is the sacred duty to the Motherland of every soldier, commander, and political worker.”
On August 6, at 16:00, after the thick fog cleared, TB-3 heavy bombers, under the cover of fighters, attacked Japanese troops. More than 250 guns began artillery preparation. After 55 minutes, infantry and tanks rushed into the attack.
The enemy resisted fiercely. Under his machine-gun bursts, fighters in certain directions were forced to lie down in front of barbed wire barriers. But the heavily swampy terrain and dense artillery fire held back our tanks. But all these were just temporary delays.
By the end of the day on August 6, the 118th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Division captured the Soviet part of the Zaozernaya Height. The red banner on its top was hoisted by the secretary of the regiment's party bureau, Lieutenant (later Major General) I. N. Moshlyak, who inspired the soldiers with an example of personal courage. He went on the offensive with the lead battalion, and when the battalion commander died, he replaced him and ensured that the unit completed its combat mission.
The 32nd Rifle Division, under heavy enemy fire, persistently advanced along a narrow strip along Lake Khasan and successively captured the heights of Machine-Gun Hill and Bezymyannaya. The commander of the 1st battalion of the 95th Infantry Regiment, Captain M. S. Bochkarev, raised the soldiers to attack six times.
The fighting went on with unrelenting force. Both sides suffered heavy losses. Having brought up reserves, the enemy repeatedly launched counterattacks. Only on August 7, the enemy attempted them, for example, at the height of Zaozernaya twenty times! But they were all repulsed.
The battle lasted for four days without stopping. It ended with the defeat of Japanese units. On August 9, Soviet territory was completely cleared of foreign invaders. At noon on August 11, hostilities ceased. As a result, the Soviet side lost 960 people killed, died from wounds and went missing, and 3,279 were wounded and sick (Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: Statistical research. M., 2001. P. 173). Japanese losses were 650 killed and about 2,500 wounded. Considering that we used aircraft and tanks, and the Japanese did not, the loss ratio should have been completely different. As has often happened in our history, officers and sergeants paid for the sloppiness of the highest military authorities and the poor training of soldiers with their heroism. This, in particular, is evidenced by the large losses of command personnel - 152 killed officers and 178 junior commanders. However, Soviet propaganda presented the results of the Hassan clash as a resounding victory for the Red Army. The country honored its heroes. Indeed, formally the battlefield remained with us, but it should be borne in mind that the Japanese did not particularly try to retain the heights behind them.
As for the main “hero,” a well-deserved reward also awaited him. After the end of hostilities, Blucher was summoned to Moscow, where on August 31, 1938, under the chairmanship of Voroshilov, a meeting of the Main Military Council of the Red Army was held, consisting of members of the military council Stalin, Shchadenko, Budyonny, Shaposhnikov, Kulik, Loktionov, Blucher and Pavlov, with the participation of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Molotov and deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Frinovsky, who examined the issue of events in the area of ​​Lake Khasan and the actions of the commander of the Far Eastern Front. As a result, Blucher was removed from his post, arrested and executed on November 9, 1938 (according to another version, he died during the investigation). Taking into account the sad experience of the Blucher leadership, it was decided not to concentrate the command of Soviet troops in the Far East in one hand. On the site of the Far Eastern Front, two separate armies were created, directly subordinate to the People's Commissar of Defense, as well as the Trans-Baikal Military District.
The question arises: were Blucher’s actions ordinary sloppiness, or were they deliberate sabotage and sabotage? Since the materials of the investigative case are still classified, we cannot answer this question unambiguously. However, the version of Blucher’s betrayal cannot be considered deliberately false. So, back on December 14, 1937, Soviet intelligence officer Richard Sorge reported from Japan:
“There are, for example, serious conversations that there is reason to count on the separatist sentiments of Marshal Blucher, and therefore, as a result of the first decisive blow, it will be possible to achieve peace with him on terms favorable for Japan” (The Case of Richard Sorge: Unknown Documents / Publ. A G. Fesyuna, St. Petersburg, M., 2000, p. 15). The defector Lyushkov also told the Japanese about the presence of an opposition-minded group in the command of the Far Eastern Front.
As for the supposed impossibility of betraying such a well-deserved revolutionary commander, history knows many similar examples. Thus, the generals of the French Republic, Dumouriez and Moreau, defected to the enemy’s side. In a similar way, in 1814, Napoleon was betrayed by his marshals. And there is no need to talk about the conspiracy of German generals against Hitler, although many of them had services to the Third Reich no less than Blucher did to the USSR.
From the point of view of the Japanese command, reconnaissance in force was more or less successful. It turned out that the Russians were still fighting poorly, even in conditions of numerical and technical superiority. However, due to the insignificant scale of the clash, Tokyo soon decided to conduct a new test of strength.

Monument “Eternal glory to the heroes of the battles at Lake Khasan.” Pos. Razdolnoye, Nadezhdinsky district, Primorsky Krai

After Japan captured Manchuria in 1931-1932. The situation in the Far East has worsened. On March 9, 1932, the Japanese occupiers proclaimed the puppet state of Manchukuo on the territory of Northeast China bordering the USSR with the aim of using its territory for subsequent expansion against the USSR and China.

Japan's hostility towards the USSR increased noticeably after the conclusion of an allied treaty with Germany in November 1936 and the conclusion of the “Anti-Comintern Pact” with it. On November 25, speaking at this event, Japanese Foreign Minister H. Arita said: “Soviet Russia must understand that it has to stand face to face with Japan and Germany.” And these words were not an empty threat. The allies conducted secret negotiations on joint actions against the USSR and hatched plans to seize its territory. Japan, in order to demonstrate loyalty to Germany, its powerful Western ally, deployed the main forces of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and demonstratively built up “its muscles.” By the beginning of 1932 there were 64 thousand people, by the end of 1937 - 200 thousand, by the spring of 1938 - already 350 thousand people. In March 1938, this army was armed with 1,052 artillery pieces, 585 tanks and 355 aircraft. In addition, the Korean Japanese Army had more than 60 thousand people, 264 artillery pieces, 34 tanks and 90 aircraft. In the immediate vicinity of the borders of the USSR, 70 military airfields and about 100 landing sites were built, 11 powerful fortified areas were built, including 7 in Manchuria. Their purpose is to accumulate manpower and provide fire support for troops on initial stage invasion of the USSR. Strong garrisons were stationed along the entire border, and new highways and railways were laid towards the USSR.

Combat training of Japanese troops was carried out in an environment close to natural conditions Soviet Far East: soldiers developed the ability to fight in the mountains and on plains, wooded and swampy areas, in hot and arid areas with a sharply continental climate.

On July 7, 1937, Japan, with the connivance of the great powers, launched a new large-scale aggression against China. In this difficult time for China, only the Soviet Union extended a helping hand and concluded a non-aggression pact with China, which was essentially an agreement on mutual struggle against the Japanese imperialists. The USSR provided China with large loans, provided it with modern weapons, and sent well-trained specialists and instructors to the country.

In this regard, Japan feared that the USSR could strike in the rear of the troops advancing in China, and in order to find out the combat capability and intentions of the Soviet Far Eastern armies, it conducted intensive reconnaissance and constantly expanded the number of military provocations. Only in 1936-1938. 231 violations were recorded on the border between Manchukuo and the USSR, including 35 major military clashes. In 1937, 3,826 trespassers were detained at this site, of whom 114 were subsequently exposed as Japanese intelligence agents.

The top political and military leadership of the Soviet Union had information about Japan's aggressive plans and took measures to strengthen the Far Eastern borders. By July 1937, Soviet troops in the Far East numbered 83,750 men, 946 guns, 890 tanks and 766 aircraft. The Pacific Fleet was replenished with two destroyers. In 1938, it was decided to strengthen the Far Eastern group by 105,800 people. True, all these considerable forces were dispersed over vast areas of Primorye and the Amur region.

On July 1, 1938, by decision of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, the Red Banner Far Eastern Front was deployed on the basis of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army under the command of the Marshal of the Soviet Union. The corps commander became the chief of staff. The front included the 1st Primorskaya, 2nd Separate Red Banner Army and the Khabarovsk Group of Forces. The armies were respectively commanded by the brigade commander and the corps commander (the future Marshal of the Soviet Union). The 2nd Air Army was created from the Far Eastern aviation. The aviation group was commanded by the Hero of the Soviet Union, brigade commander.

The situation on the border was heating up. In July, it became obvious that Japan was preparing to attack the USSR and was only looking for an opportune moment and an appropriate reason for this. At this time, it became completely clear that to unleash a major military provocation, the Japanese chose the Posyetsky region - due to a number of natural and geographical conditions, the most remote, sparsely populated and poorly developed part of the Soviet Far East. From the east it is washed by the Sea of ​​Japan, from the west it borders on Korea and Manchuria. The strategic importance of this area and especially its southern part lay in the fact that, on the one hand, it provided approaches to our coast and Vladivostok, and on the other, it occupied a flank position in relation to the Hunchun fortified area, built by the Japanese on the approaches to the Soviet border.

The southern part of the Posyetsky region was a swampy lowland with many rivers, streams and lakes, making the actions of large military formations almost impossible. However, in the west, where the state border passes, the lowland turned into a mountain range. The most significant heights of this ridge were the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills, reaching a height of 150 m. The state border passed along their peaks, and the high-rise buildings themselves were located 12-15 km from the shore of the Sea of ​​Japan. If these heights were captured, the enemy would be able to monitor a section of Soviet territory south and west of Posyet Bay and beyond Posyet Bay, and his artillery would be able to keep this entire area under fire.

Directly from the east, on the Soviet side, the lake adjoins the hills. Khasan (about 5 km long, 1 km wide). The distance between the lake and the border is very short - only 50-300 m. The terrain here is swampy and difficult to pass for troops and equipment. From the Soviet side, access to the hills could only be achieved through small corridors bypassing the lake. Hassan from the north or south.

At the same time, the Manchurian and Korean territories adjacent to the Soviet border were quite populated with a large number of settlements, highways, dirt roads and railways. One of them ran along the border at a distance of only 4-5 km. This allowed the Japanese, if necessary, to maneuver along the front with forces and equipment and even use artillery fire from armored trains. The enemy also had the opportunity to transport cargo by water.

As for the Soviet territory east and northeast of the lake. Hasan, it was absolutely flat, deserted, there was not a single tree or bush on it. The only railway Razdolnoye - Kraskino passed 160 km from the border. The area directly adjacent to the lake. Hassan had no roads at all. Planning an armed action in the lake area. Hassan, the Japanese command apparently took into account the unfavorable terrain conditions for the deployment of military operations by Soviet troops and their advantages in this regard.

Soviet intelligence established that the Japanese brought up significant forces to the Posietsky section of the Soviet border: 3 infantry divisions (19th, 15th and 20th), a cavalry regiment, a mechanized brigade, heavy and anti-aircraft artillery, 3 machine-gun battalions and several armored trains, and also 70 aircraft. Their actions were ready to be supported by a detachment of warships consisting of a cruiser, 14 destroyers and 15 military boats that approached the mouth of the Tumen-Ula River. The Japanese assumed that if the USSR decided to defend the entire coastal region, they could first pin down the Red Army forces in this area, and then, with a strike in the direction of the Kraskino-Razdolnoe road, encircle and destroy them.

In July 1938, the confrontation on the border began to develop into the stage of a real military threat. In this regard, the border guard of the Far Eastern Territory has strengthened measures to organize the defense of the state border and the heights located in close proximity to it. On July 9, 1938, on the Soviet part of the Zaozernaya height, which had previously been controlled only by border patrols, a horse patrol appeared and began “trench work.” On July 11, 40 Red Army soldiers were already working here, and on July 13, another 10 people. The head of the Posyet border detachment, the colonel, ordered to lay land mines at this height, equip stone throwers, make suspended rolling slingshots from stakes, bring in oil, gasoline, tow, i.e. prepare the height area for defense.

On July 15, a group of Japanese gendarmes violated the border in the Zaozernaya region. One of them was killed on our land 3 meters from the border line. On the same day, the Japanese attorney in Moscow protested and groundlessly demanded in the form of an ultimatum that the Soviet border guards be withdrawn from the heights west of the lake. Hasan, considering them to belong to Manchukuo. The diplomat was presented with the protocols of the Hunchun Agreement between Russia and China in 1886 with a map attached to them, which clearly showed that the area of ​​the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills indisputably belonged to the Soviet Union.

On July 20, the claims to the Khasan area were repeated in Moscow by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov, Ambassador of Japan to the USSR M. Shigemitsu. He stated: “Japan has rights and obligations to Manchukuo under which it can resort to force and force Soviet troops to evacuate the territory of Manchukuo they illegally occupied.” Litvinov was not frightened by this statement, and he remained adamant. Negotiations have reached a dead end.

At the same time, the Japanese government understood that its armed forces in this current situation were not yet ready to wage a major war with the USSR. According to their intelligence, the Soviet Union could field from 31 to 58 rifle divisions in the Far East, and Japan only 9 divisions (23 fought on the Chinese front - 2 were in the Metropolis). Therefore, Tokyo decided to carry out only a private, limited-scale operation.

The plan developed by the Japanese General Staff to oust the Soviet border guards from the heights of Zaozernaya provided: “Carry out battles, but not expand the scale of military operations beyond necessity. Eliminate the use of aviation. Allocate one division from the Korean Japanese Army to carry out the operation. Capturing the heights further actions do not take action." The Japanese side hoped that the Soviet Union, due to the insignificance of the border dispute, would not declare a large-scale war on Japan, since, according to them, the Soviet Union was clearly not ready for such a war.

On July 21, the general staff reported the provocation plan and its rationale to Emperor Hirohito. The next day, the General Staff's operational plan was approved by the Council of Five Ministers.

With this action, the Japanese military wanted to test the combat effectiveness of the Soviet troops in Primorye, find out how Moscow would react to this provocation, and at the same time clarify the data on the state of defense of the Far Eastern Territory received from the head of the NKVD department for the Far Eastern Territory, who defected to them on June 13, 1938.

On July 19, the Military Council of the Far Eastern Front decided to send a military support unit from the 1st Army to reinforce the border guards entrenched on the Zaozernaya heights, but front commander V.K. On July 20, Blucher, apparently fearing responsibility and new diplomatic complications from Japan, ordered the return of this unit back, believing that “the border guards should fight first.”

At the same time, the situation at the border was becoming critical and required an immediate solution. In accordance with the directive of the Far Eastern Front, two reinforced battalions of the 118th and 119th Infantry Regiments began to move into the Zarechye-Sandokandze area, and a separate tank battalion of the 40th Infantry Division began moving into the Slavyanka area. At the same time, all other units of the 39th Rifle Corps of the 1st Army were put on combat readiness. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, the Pacific Fleet was ordered to cover ground forces, as well as the areas of Vladivostok, Gulf of America and Posiet, with aviation and air defense (air defense), together with aviation of the 2nd Air Army, and be ready to launch air strikes on Korean ports and airfields. At the same time, it should be noted that all our hills are west of the lake. Hasan was still defended by border guards alone. Due to the lack of roads, the army support battalions of the 1st Army were still at a considerable distance from the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya heights.

The fighting began on July 29. At 16:00, the Japanese, having pulled up field troops and artillery to the border, in two columns of 70 people each, invaded Soviet territory. At this time, at the height of Bezymyannaya, on which the enemy was delivering the main blow, only 11 border guards with one heavy machine gun were defending. The border guards were commanded by the assistant chief of the outpost, lieutenant. Engineering work was carried out under the direction of Lieutenant. At the top of the hill, the soldiers managed to build trenches and cells for riflemen from soil and stones, and set up a position for a machine gun. They erected barbed wire barriers, laid land mines in the most dangerous directions, and prepared rock piles for action. The engineering fortifications they created and personal courage allowed the border guards to hold out for more than three hours. Assessing their actions, the Main Military Council of the Red Army noted in its resolution that the border guards “fought very bravely and courageously.”

The invaders’ lines could not withstand the dense fire of the hill’s defenders, they lay down repeatedly, but, urged on by the officers, they rushed into attacks again and again. In various places the battle escalated into hand-to-hand combat. Both sides used grenades, bayonets, small sapper shovels and knives. Among the border guards there were killed and wounded. While leading the battle, Lieutenant A.E. died. Mahalin, and with him 4 more people. The 6 border guards who remained in service were all wounded, but continued to resist. The support company of the lieutenant from the 119th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division was the first to come to the aid of the brave men, and with it two reserve groups of border guards of the 59th Border Detachment under the command of Lieutenants G. Bykhovtsev and I.V. Ratnikova. The united attack of Soviet soldiers was successful. By 6 p.m., the Japanese were knocked out from the heights of Bezymyannaya and pushed 400 m deep into Manchurian territory.

Participation of border guards in hostilities near Lake Khasan in July 1938

Border guards Alexei Makhalin, David Yemtsov, Ivan Shmelev, Alexander Savinykh and Vasily Pozdeev who fell in battle were posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin, and their commander, Lieutenant A.E. Makhalin was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The hero’s wife, Maria Makhalina, also distinguished herself in these battles. Hearing the sounds of the battle flaring up, she left a young child at the outpost and came to the aid of the border guards: she brought cartridges and bandaged the wounded. And when the machine gun crew went out of order, she took a place at the machine gun and opened fire on the enemy. The brave woman was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

The Japanese repeatedly tried to take the hill by storm, but, suffering heavy losses, rolled back. In these battles, only the company D.T. Levchenko repelled the attack of two enemy battalions. Three times the lieutenant himself led the soldiers in counterattacks, even while wounded. The company did not cede an inch of Soviet land to the Japanese. Its commander was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

However, intelligence reported that the Japanese were preparing for new attacks on the Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya heights. Their forces amounted to two infantry regiments and a howitzer artillery regiment. The concentration of enemy troops ended on the night of July 31, and at 3 o'clock on August 1 the offensive began.

By this time, the Khasan sector area was defended by the 1st battalion of the 118th and 3rd battalion of the 119th rifle regiments of the 40th rifle division of the 1st Army with reinforcements and border guards of the 59th Posyet border detachment. Enemy artillery continuously fired at Soviet troops, while our artillerymen were prohibited from firing at targets on enemy territory. Counterattacks by the battalions of the 40th Infantry Division, unfortunately, were carried out in an insufficiently organized manner, sometimes scatteredly, without established interaction with artillery and tanks, and therefore most often did not bring the desired result.

But the Soviet soldiers fought with ferocity, throwing the enemy off the slope of the Zaozernaya height three times. In these battles, the crew of the tank of the 118th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division, consisting of (tank commander), and. The tank destroyed several enemy firing points with well-aimed fire and broke through deep into its position, but was knocked out. The enemies offered the crew to surrender, but the tankers refused and fired back to the last shell and cartridge. Then the Japanese surrounded combat vehicle, doused her with fuel and set her on fire. The crew died in the fire.

The commander of a fire platoon of the 53rd separate anti-tank fighter division of the 40th Infantry Division, a lieutenant, under enemy machine-gun fire, moved a gun into an open firing position in the infantry battle formations and supported its counterattacks. Lazarev was wounded, but continued to skillfully lead the platoon until the end of the battle.

The commander of the 59th Posyet border detachment, junior commander, skillfully suppressed enemy firing points. When the Japanese tried to surround his unit, he drew fire on himself, ensured the withdrawal of the wounded soldiers, and then himself, being seriously wounded, managed to pull the wounded commander from the battlefield.

By 6:00 on August 1, after a stubborn battle, the enemy still managed to push back our units and occupy the Zaozernaya height. At the same time, the advancing 1st Battalion of the 75th Infantry Regiment of the enemy lost 24 killed and 100 wounded; the 2nd Battalion's losses were even greater. The Japanese fired hurricane artillery fire throughout the entire area from Nagornaya to Novoselka, Zarechye and further to the north. By 22:00 they managed to expand their success and capture the tactically important heights of Bezymyannaya, Machine Gun, 64.8, 86.8 and 68.8. The enemy advanced 4 km deep into Soviet land. This was real aggression on their part, because... all these heights were on the side of the sovereign state.

The main forces of the 40th Infantry Division were unable to provide assistance to their forward battalions, because were at that time moving through difficult terrain 30-40 km from the battle area.

The Japanese, having captured the heights north of the lake. Hassan, immediately began their engineering strengthening. Construction materials, including liquid concrete and armored caps, arrived hourly by rail directly to the fighting area. With the help of the mobilized Manchu population, new roads were laid, trenches were opened, and shelters were erected for infantry and artillery. They turned each hill into a heavily fortified area capable of conducting a long battle.

Japanese officers at Lake Khasan. August 1938

When the Japanese Emperor was informed of the results of these actions, he “expressed pleasure.” As for the Soviet military-political leadership, the news of the Japanese capture of the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya heights caused him great irritation. On August 1, a conversation took place via direct wire, V.M. Molotov and with front commander V.K. Blucher. The marshal was accused of defeatism, disorganization of command and control, non-use of aviation, setting unclear tasks for the troops, etc.

On the same day, People's Commissar of Defense Marshal K.E. Voroshilov gave the directive to immediately bring all front troops and the Pacific Fleet to full combat readiness, disperse aviation to airfields, and deploy air defense systems to wartime states. Orders were given on the logistics of the troops, especially in the Posyet direction. Voroshilov demanded that the troops of the Far Eastern Front “within our border sweep away and destroy the invaders who occupied the heights of Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya, using military aviation and artillery.” At the same time, the commander of the 40th Infantry Division received from the commander of the 1st Primorsky Army K.P. Podlas ordered to restore the situation at the height of Zaozernaya.

On August 1, at 13:30 - 17:30, front aviation in the amount of 117 aircraft carried out waves of raids on the heights of Zaozernaya and 68.8, which, however, did not give the desired results, because Most of the bombs fell into the lake and onto the slopes of the heights without causing harm to the enemy. The attack of the 40th Infantry Division, scheduled for 16:00, did not take place, because its units, making a difficult 200-kilometer march, arrived in the concentration area for the attack only at night. Therefore, by order of the chief of staff of the front, brigade commander G.M. Stern, the division's offensive was postponed to August 2.

At 8:00 in the morning, units of the 40th division were immediately thrown into battle without preliminary reconnaissance and reconnaissance of the area. The main attacks were carried out by the 119th and 120th rifle regiments, a tank battalion and two artillery divisions along the Bezymyannaya height from the north, and the auxiliary attacks were carried out by the 118th rifle regiment from the south. The infantrymen were essentially advancing blindly. The tanks got stuck in swamps and ditches, were hit by enemy anti-tank gun fire and could not effectively support the advance of the infantry, which suffered heavy losses. Aviation did not take part in the battle due to the dense fog that shrouded the hill; interaction between the military branches and control was unsatisfactory. For example, the commander of the 40th Rifle Division received orders and tasks simultaneously from the front commander, the military council of the 1st Primorsky Army and from the commander of the 39th Rifle Corps.

Unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the enemy from the hills continued until late at night. The front command, seeing the futility of the offensive actions of the troops, ordered to stop the attacks on the heights and return parts of the division to their previously occupied positions. The withdrawal of units of the 40th Division from the battle took place under the influence of heavy enemy fire and was completed only by the morning of August 5th. The division, despite its persistence in battle, was unable to complete its assigned task. She simply did not have enough strength for this.

In connection with the expansion of the conflict, on the instructions of People's Commissar K.E. Voroshilov, front commander V.K. arrived in Posiet. Blucher. On his orders, units of the 32nd Infantry Division (commander - colonel), units and units of the 40th Infantry Division (commander - colonel) and units of the 2nd mechanized brigade (commander - colonel) began to arrive in the battle area. . All of them became part of the 39th Rifle Corps, command of which was taken over by corps commander G.M. Stern. He was given the task of defeating the invading enemy in the lake area. Hassan.

By this time, the corps troops were on the move to the concentration area. Due to the lack of roads, formations and units moved extremely slowly, their supply of fuel, fodder, food and drinking water was unsatisfactory. G.M. Stern, having understood the situation, believed that in such conditions it would be possible to begin an operation to defeat the enemy no earlier than August 5 after the regrouping of units of the 40th Infantry Division to the left flank of the front, replenishing it with people, ammunition, tanks, since in previous battles the division suffered heavy losses (up to 50% of riflemen and machine gunners).

On August 4, the Japanese Ambassador to the USSR Shigemitsu informed the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov about the Japanese government's readiness to resolve the military conflict in the area of ​​Lake Khasan through diplomatic means. It is obvious that by doing so it tried to gain time to concentrate and consolidate new forces at the conquered heights. The Soviet government unraveled the enemy's plan and confirmed its previously put forward demand for the immediate liberation by the Japanese of the territory of the USSR they had captured.

On August 4, the USSR NKO order No. 71ss was issued “On bringing the troops of the Democratic Front and the Trans-Baikal Military District to full combat readiness in connection with the provocation of the Japanese military.” And on August 5, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR sent a directive to the commander of the Far Eastern Front, in which, emphasizing the uniqueness of the area around Zaozernaya, he actually allowed him to finally act in accordance with the situation, using an attack to bypass the enemy from the flanks across the state border line. “After clearing the Zaozernaya height,” the directive stated, “all troops should immediately withdraw beyond the border line. Zaozernaya Height must be in our hands under all conditions.”

Intelligence established that on the Japanese side, the Zaozernaya, Bezymyannaya and Machine Gun Hills were held by: the 19th Infantry Division, an infantry brigade, two artillery regiments and separate reinforcement units, including three machine gun battalions, with a total number of up to 20 thousand people. At any time these troops could be reinforced with significant reserves. All hills were fortified with full profile trenches and wire fences in 3-4 rows. In some places, the Japanese dug anti-tank ditches and installed armored caps over machine-gun and artillery nests. Heavy artillery was stationed on the islands and beyond the Tumen-Ula River.

Soviet troops were also actively preparing. By August 5, the concentration of troops was completed, and a new strike force was created. It consisted of 32 thousand people, about 600 guns and 345 tanks. The actions of ground troops were ready to support 180 bombers and 70 fighters. Directly in the combat area there were over 15 thousand people, 1014 machine guns, 237 guns, 285 tanks, which were part of the 40th and 32nd rifle divisions, the 2nd separate mechanized brigade, the rifle regiment of the 39th rifle division, 121 1st Cavalry and 39th Corps Artillery Regiments. The general offensive was scheduled for August 6.

Infantrymen of the 120th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division named after S. Ordzhonikidze practice combat coordination while being in the reserve of the advancing group. Zaozernaya height area, August 1938. Photo by V.A. Temina. Russian State Archive of Film and Photo Documents (RGAKFD)

The operation plan, developed on August 5 by brigade commander G.M. Stern, envisaged simultaneous attacks from the north and south to pin down and destroy enemy troops in the zone between the Tumen-Ula River and Lake Khasan. In accordance with the order given for the offensive, the 95th Infantry Regiment of the 32nd Infantry Division with the tank battalion of the 2nd Mechanized Brigade was to deliver the main attack from the north across the border to the Chernaya height, and the 96th Infantry Regiment was to capture the Bezymyannaya height.

The crew of the 76.2 mm gun reads a report from the combat area. 32nd Infantry Division, Khasan, August 1938. Photo by V.A. Temina. RGAKFD

The 40th Infantry Division with the tank and reconnaissance battalions of the 2nd Mechanized Brigade launched an auxiliary attack from the southeast in the direction of the Oryol heights (119th Infantry Regiment) and the Machine Gun Hill hills (120th and 118th Infantry Regiments), and then to Zaozernaya, where, together with the 32nd Division, which was performing the main task, they were supposed to finish off the enemy. The 39th Rifle Division with a cavalry regiment, motorized rifle and tank battalions of the 2nd Mechanized Brigade formed the reserve. It was supposed to protect the right flank of the 39th Rifle Corps from possible enemy outflanking. Before the start of the infantry attack, two air strikes of 15 minutes each and an artillery preparation lasting 45 minutes were planned. This plan was reviewed and approved by the front commander, Marshal V.K. Blucher, and then People's Commissar of Defense Marshal K.E. Voroshilov.

A cavalry platoon of the 120th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division named after S. Ordzhonikidze in an ambush. Zaozernaya height area, August 1938. Photo by V.A. Temina. RGAKFD

At 16:00 on August 6, the first air strike was carried out on enemy positions and areas where his reserves were located. Heavy bombers loaded with six 1000-kilogram and ten 500-kilogram bombs were especially effective. G.M. Stern later reported to I.V. at a meeting of the Main Military Council. Stalin that even on him, an experienced warrior, this bombing made a “terrible impression.” The hill was covered with smoke and dust. The roar of bomb explosions could be heard tens of kilometers away. In the areas where the bombers dropped their deadly payload, the Japanese infantry were overwhelmed and rendered 100% incapacitated. Then, after a short artillery preparation, at 16:55 the infantry rushed into the attack, accompanied by tanks.

However, on the hills occupied by the Japanese, not all fire weapons were suppressed, and they came to life, opening destructive fire on the advancing infantry. Numerous snipers hit targets from carefully camouflaged positions. Our tanks had difficulty crossing the swampy terrain, and the infantry often had to stop at the enemy's wire fences and manually make passages through them. The advance of the infantry was also hampered by artillery and mortar fire located across the river and on Machine Gun Hill.

In the evening, Soviet aviation repeated its strike. Artillery positions on Manchurian territory were bombed, from where enemy artillery fired at Soviet troops. The enemy's fire immediately weakened. By the end of the day, the 118th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division stormed the Zaozernaya height. The lieutenant was the first to rush to the heights and hoist the Soviet banner on it.

Soldiers plant a victory banner on the Zaozernaya hill. 1938 Photo by V.A. Temina. RGAKFD

On this day, soldiers, commanders and political workers showed exceptional heroism and skillful leadership of the battle. So, on August 7, the commissar of the 5th reconnaissance battalion, senior political instructor, repeatedly raised the soldiers to attack. Being wounded, he remained in service and continued to inspire the soldiers by personal example. The brave warrior died in this battle.

The platoon commander of the 303rd separate tank battalion of the 32nd Infantry Division, a lieutenant, replaced the company commander who was out of action at a critical moment of the battle. Finding himself surrounded in a damaged tank, he bravely withstood a 27-hour siege. Under the cover of artillery fire, he got out of the tank and returned to his regiment.

Part of the forces of the 32nd Infantry Division advanced along the western shore of Lake Khasan towards the 40th Infantry Division. In this battle, the commander of one of the battalions of the 95th Infantry Regiment of the 32nd Infantry Division, Captain, especially distinguished himself. He led the fighters into the attack six times. Despite being wounded, he remained in service.

The commander of the 120th Infantry Regiment of the 40th Infantry Division in the Zaozernaya Heights area successfully controlled the battle. He was wounded twice, but did not leave the unit and continued to carry out the task assigned to him.

The fighting continued with great intensity in the following days.

The enemy constantly carried out powerful counterattacks, trying to recapture the lost terrain. To repel enemy counterattacks, on August 8, the 115th Infantry Regiment of the 39th Infantry Division with a tank company was transferred to the Zaozernaya heights. The enemy offered strong resistance, often turning into hand-to-hand combat. But the Soviet soldiers fought to the death. On August 9, units of the 32nd Infantry Division knocked out the Japanese from Bezymyannaya Heights and threw them back across the border. The height of Machine Gun Hill was also liberated.

Scheme map. Defeat of Japanese troops at Lake Khasan. July 29 - August 11, 1938

The evacuation of the wounded from the battlefield was carried out exclusively by horse-drawn transport under heavy enemy fire, and then by ambulances and trucks to the nearest seaports. After a medical examination, the wounded were loaded onto fishing vessels, which, under the cover of fighters, proceeded to Posyet Bay. Further evacuation of the wounded was carried out by steamships, warships and seaplanes heading to Vladivostok, where military hospitals were established. A total of 2,848 wounded soldiers were transported by sea from Posiet to Vladivostok. Warships of the Pacific Fleet also carried out numerous military transports. They delivered 27,325 soldiers and commanders, 6,041 horses, 154 guns, 65 tanks and wedges, 154 heavy machine guns, 6 mortars, 9,960.7 tons of ammunition, 231 vehicles, 91 tractors, a lot of food and fodder to Posiet Bay. This was a great help to the soldiers of the 1st Primorsky Army, who were fighting the enemy.

On August 9, all the territory previously captured by the Japanese was returned to the USSR, but the enemy’s counterattacks did not weaken. Soviet troops firmly held their positions. The enemy suffered heavy losses and was forced to withdraw on August 10.
On the same day, the Japanese Ambassador to the USSR M. Shigemitsu proposed starting negotiations on a truce. The Soviet government, which has always strived for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, agreed. At noon on August 11 at 12:00, hostilities near Lake Khasan ceased. According to the armistice agreement, Soviet and Japanese troops were to remain on the lines they occupied on August 10 by 24:00 local time.

But the truce process itself was difficult. On November 26, 1938, Stern reported at a meeting of the Military Council of the USSR NGO (quoted from the transcript): “Corps headquarters received an order at 10:30 a.m. with instructions to cease hostilities at 12 o'clock. This order of the People's Commissar was brought to the bottom. It's 12 o'clock, and the Japanese are firing. 12 hours 10 minutes too, 12 hours 15 minutes. too - they report to me: in such and such an area there is heavy artillery fire from the Japanese. One was killed, and 7-8 people. wounded. Then, in agreement with the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, it was decided to launch an artillery raid. In 5 min. we fired 3010 shells at the targeted lines. As soon as this fire raid of ours ended, the fire from the Japanese stopped.”

This was the final point in the two-week war with Japan on Lake Khasan, in which the Soviet Union won a convincing victory.

Thus, the conflict ended with the complete victory of Soviet weapons. This was a serious blow to Japan's aggressive plans in the Far East. Soviet military art has been enriched by the experience of the massive use of aviation and tanks in modern combat, artillery support for the offensive, and the conduct of combat operations in special conditions.

For exemplary performance of combat missions, courage and bravery of its personnel, the 40th Infantry Division was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the 32nd Infantry Division and the 59th Posyet Border Detachment were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Soldiers and commanders who participated in the battles in the area of ​​Lake Khasan read the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On perpetuating the memory of the heroes of Khasan.” Battle area, 1939

26 participants in the battles (22 commanders and 4 Red Army soldiers) were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and 6.5 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, including the Order of Lenin - 95 people, the Red Banner - 1985, the Red Star - 1935, medals " For courage" and "For military merit" - 2485 people. All participants in the battles were awarded a special badge “Participant in the battles on Lake Khasan”, and the Posyetsky district of the Primorsky Territory was renamed the Khasansky district.

Badge “Participant in the battles on Lake Khasan. 6 VIII-1938". Established July 5, 1939

Victory over the enemy was not easy. When repelling Japanese aggression in the area of ​​Lake Khasan, human losses during the period of hostilities alone amounted to: irrevocable - 989 people, sanitary losses - 3,279 people. In addition, 759 people were killed and died from wounds during the sanitary evacuation stages, 100 people died from wounds and illnesses in hospitals, 95 people went missing, 2,752 people were wounded, shell-shocked and burned. There are other numbers of losses.

In August 1968 in the village. Kraskino on Krestovaya Sopka, a monument to the soldiers and commanders who died in battles near Lake Khasan in 1938 was unveiled. It represents a monumental figure of a warrior hoisting the Red Banner on one of the heights after expelling the enemy. On the pedestal there is an inscription: “To the Heroes of Hassan.” The authors of the monument are sculptor A.P. Faydysh-Krandievsky, architects - M.O. Barnes and A.A. Kolpina.

Memorial to those killed in battles near Lake Khasan. Pos. Kraskino, Krestovaya Sopka

In 1954, in Vladivostok, at the Marine Cemetery, where the ashes of those who died in the naval hospital after severe wounds were transferred, as well as those previously buried at the Egersheld Cemetery, a granite obelisk was erected. On the memorial plaque there is the inscription: “Memory of the heroes of Hassan - 1938.”

Material prepared by the Research Institute
(military history) Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation